Russland og arbeidet med kjernefysisk ikke-spredning - en kartleggingsstudie
This study assesses Russia’s role and policy with regard to nuclear non-proliferation. It gives an overview of Russia’s nuclear sector and nuclear weapons, and discusses how Moscow goes about to prevent the outflow of nuclear materials, technology and expertise to new states and non-state actors. It also discusses questions concerning Russia’s compliance with its legal and political commitments and its contributions to develop the international non-proliferation regime(s). The study finds that the image of Russia as a (real and potential) nuclear proliferator is often exaggerated and in many cases cannot be by substantiated with empirical evidence. Developments both within Russia and in Russia’s policy on nuclear export have contributed to this. One finding is that although many objects in Russia where nuclear weapons and materials are being stored have yet to undergo security upgrades, the number of illicit trafficking incidents (thefts a.o.) of nuclear materials in the upper spectrum of risk materials (HEU and plutonium) is low and generally involves only small quantities of fissile materials. There have been no confirmed cases in this category in recent years. With regard to Russia and Iran, the study detects a certain shift in Russia’s policy from 2002-03 and concludes that the risk that Russia will contribute (willingly or unwillingly) to an Iranian nuclear weapons program has been reduced as a result of this shift. Yet Russia has both (geo)political and economic interests in Iran and aims at new contracts in Iran’s emerging civilian nuclear sector. Underlying Russia’s policy towards Iran is also a strong concern that Washington’s tough line is motivated by goals that are not related to non-proliferation and which are in direct conflict with Russia’s own interests.