Hegemon til nytte eller besvær - unipolær sikkerhetslogikk og amerikansk utenrikspolitikk

Abstract

The present international system can best be understood as a unipolar system, with the US as the hegemonic power. Despite the fact that we historically often have had unipolar international systems, the security thinking in such systems have only to a small degree been discussed analytically. The aim of this report is both to contribute to the more theoretical research on the security logic in unipolar international systems and to apply these results on the American post Cold War security thinking. The hegemonic power could use two main strategies in order to maintain its dominant position in the international system. The first strategy, called the “soft power” strategy, is characterized by an effort by the dominant power to be seen from the other actors in the system as a “good hegemon” striving to obtain the stability in the system as such, and using its power according to international norms and laws, and within the framework of international institutions, thereby creating on international situation that is been as beneficent to all. Using his power within the framework of norms and institutions can, however, be seen from the hegemon as limiting the efficiency of the power, and especially the military power, to an unacceptable degree, leading to the other main strategy, the “hard power” strategy. This strategy gives more priority to the military efficiency, and is more concerned of being seen as a strong hegemon than a good hegemon, and can lead to more conflicts of interests with other states in the system. The policy of the Clinton-administration was, at least to some degree, characterized by the “soft power” strategy, and the policy on the administration of George W. Bush was much more characterized by a “hard power” strategy.