India og Pakistan : historiske, politiske og tekniske perspektiver på kjernevåpenkonflikten

Abstract

India and Pakistan have fought three wars (1947, 1965 and 1971) and have had numerous nearly-war episodes. The conflict between them has been difficult to solve, mainly due to the dispute over Kashmir. India’s motivations for the nuclear weapons development have been her national security against China, as well as the quest for higher international prestige. Pakistan has been motivated by national security only: To protect herself against the more powerful India. The importance of the concept of an “Islamic bomb” has been overestimated by Western analysts. In both countries, domestic politics has been decisive for the point in time for performance of the nuclear tests. The nuclear tests led to economic suffering, the internationalisation of the India-Pakistan conflict and the globalisation of the quest for Kashmir. While India confesses to a “no first-use” policy, this idea is being rejected by Pakistan, due to her conventional inferiority. Nuclear weapons might give a false illusion of deterrence. During the Kargil conflict in 1999, we saw that nuclear weapons do not deter critical low-intensity conflicts. Behind the facade of deterrence lies the risk of use. Factors that are especially critical are the regional stability, history of wars, unresolved boundary disputes and the strong position of Indian Hindu nationalism and the Pakistani military, as well as growing radical Islamism in Pakistan. During the first half of 2004, the two countries have participated in a new round of peace talks.