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dc.contributor.authorÅtland, Kristianen_GB
dc.contributor.authorNilsen, Thomasen_GB
dc.contributor.authorPedersen, Torbjørnen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-18T12:39:23Z
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-24T08:12:33Z
dc.date.available2024-10-18T12:39:23Z
dc.date.available2024-10-24T08:12:33Z
dc.date.issued2024-09-18
dc.identifier.citationÅtland K, Nilsen T, Pedersen T. Bolstering the Bastion: The Changing Pattern of Russia's Military Exercises in the High North. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies. 2024;7(1):145-160en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12242/3330
dc.descriptionÅtland, Kristian; Nilsen, Thomas; Pedersen, Torbjørn. Bolstering the Bastion: The Changing Pattern of Russia's Military Exercises in the High North. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 2024 ;Volum 7.(1) s. 145-160en_GB
dc.description.abstractBetween 2015 and 2022, Russia conducted a number of naval and air exercises, including live-fire drills, in the international waters and airspace on NATO’s northern flank. Some of this activity took place in the Norwegian Sea, well south of the Arctic Circle, and often coincided in time and space with NATO exercises or U.S. deployments to the region. This indicated that the activity was largely meant to serve the purpose of political signaling. Drawing on recent empirical data, including Russian Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) messages issued after February 24, 2022, this study finds that the pattern of Russia’s military exercise activity in the High North has changed significantly since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Almost all Russian NOTAM events in the High North now take place in the Barents Sea, rather than in the Norwegian Sea. The primary purpose of the activity now seems to be to bolster the Northern Fleet’s bastion defense, rather than to send political signals. Exploring the Russian exercise activity in greater detail, we discuss four hypotheses that may explain the “post-invasion” pattern change: (1) Russia may have realized that its previous signaling events in the Norwegian Sea had proven futile; (2) pushback from civilian actors and foreign governments; (3) lack of conventional capacity due to military losses suffered in Ukraine; and (4) an increased Russian emphasis on the need to boost nuclear deterrence.en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.relation.urihttps://sjms.nu/articles/10.31374/sjms.280
dc.subjectRusslanden_GB
dc.subjectForsvaren_GB
dc.subjectNordområdeneen_GB
dc.titleBolstering the Bastion: The Changing Pattern of Russia's Military Exercises in the High Northen_GB
dc.date.updated2024-10-18T12:39:23Z
dc.identifier.cristinID2298542
dc.identifier.doi10.31374/sjms.280
dc.source.issn2596-3856
dc.type.documentJournal article
dc.relation.journalScandinavian Journal of Military Studies


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