

## **Faryab Survey – wave 6**

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## English summary

Wave 6 of the Faryab Survey was conducted in October/November 2012. The questionnaire used in the survey has been developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in co-operation with the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team Maimanah (PRT Maimanah). It consists of approximately 50 questions covering three main areas: Security, development and governance, in line with both the Norwegian and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategies. In total, 1433 people in Faryab between 18 and 75 years of age were interviewed.

44% of the respondents answered that Faryab is developing in the right direction while 40% express the opposite. Compared to previous waves, this represents a continuous negative trend. Unemployment is clearly stated as the biggest problem in Faryab, like it has been through previous waves.

The Afghan National Police is considered an important security provider, and the impression of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is good. But it is also an underlying negative trend. The perception of the security situation also seems to have a seasonal variation: The respondents are more positive to the security situation in the spring compared to in the fall.

The overall perception of the government is good. Nevertheless, the good impression is somewhat contradicted by the fact that corruption amongst the government officials is stated as a problem. It is worth noticing that the Afghan people may be uncomfortable in criticising the authorities, and that cultural aspects may influence the acceptance of corruption.

The opinions of women and men in the survey are fairly similar with only small differences.

When comparing the answers for Pashtuns with the answers for Faryab in general, we find that the Pashtuns are more dissatisfied with their own situation and the development in their area than the overall population in Faryab. The same patterns are found when comparing the answers for the population in Ghormach, which only consists of Pashtuns, with the answers for Faryab.

Despite the significant number of respondents in the survey, every poll suffers from limitations and biases. This is especially relevant in conflict areas, mainly because there might be limitations in the areas available for the pollers, or respondents may be more afraid of expressing their real opinions.

## Samandrag

Faryab Survey wave 6 vart gjennomført i oktober og november 2012. Spørjeskjemaet som vart nytta er utvikla av Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI) i samarbeid med det norsk-leia Provincial Reconstruction Team Maimanah (PRT Maimanah). Meiningsmålinga består av omlag 50 spørsmål som dekker dei tre hovudområda; tryggleik, utvikling og styresett, i tråd med strategiane som er lagt av norske myndigheiter og den NATO-leia International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Totalt vart 1433 persona intervjuet i Faryab. Desse var mellom 18 og 75 år.

44 % av respondentane svarer at Faryab utviklar seg i riktig retning, medan 40 % uttrykkjer det motsette. Samanlikna med tidlegare undersøkingar, representerer dette ei kontinuerleg negativ trend. Arbeidsløyse er det største problemet i Faryab og har vore det i alle seks undersøkingane.

Det afghanske politiet vert sett på som ein viktig leverandør av tryggleik, og inntrykket av dei afghanske tryggleiksstyrkane er godt. Men data indikerer samstundes er det ei negativ trend. Inntrykket av tryggleikssituasjonen ser ut til å variere med årstida: Respondentane er meir positive til tryggleikssituasjonen om våren samanlikna med hausten.

Det generelle inntrykket av styresmaktene er godt. Dette står noko i motstrid til det faktum at korrupsjon blant offisielle styresmakter vert sett på som eit problem. Det er verdt å merka seg at afghanarar kan vera ukomfortable med å kritisera myndighetar, og at kulturelle aspektar kan gjera korrupsjon meir akseptert.

Meiningane til kvinner og menn i undersøkinga er relativt like med berre nokre små skilnader.

Når ein samanliknar svara frå pashtunarar i Faryab med resten av svara frå Faryab finn me at pashtunarane er mykje meir misnøgd med deira eigen situasjon og utviklinga i deira område enn befolkninga generelt. Dei same trendane finn ein når ein samanliknar svara frå Ghormach, kor det berre var pashtunarar blant respondentane, med svara frå Faryab.

Trass det store talet på respondentar som vart intervjuet, har alle spørjeundersøkingar avgrensingar og uvisse. Dette gjeld særskilt for undersøkingar i eit konfliktområde, mellom anna av di det kan vera områder som er utilgjengelege for intervjuarane og dessutan kan nokre av respondentane vera redde for å uttrykka sine eigentlege meiningar.

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## Preface

As part of the project “Analysis support to military operations” (ANTILOPE), the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) has deployed operational analysts with the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT<sup>1</sup>) to Afghanistan since December 2008.

PRT Maimanah has been one of 28 PRTs across Afghanistan and part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). One of the main tasks for the analysts was to carry out comprehensive progress assessments regularly. This included both civilian and military issues. In order to embrace the Afghan society in the assessment, FFI has in cooperation with PRT Maimanah developed a survey to be held in the Faryab province.

This report documents the main findings of the sixth wave of the survey, completed in October/November 2012. We have focused on the trends over time rather than the single results from wave 6. However, it is important to keep in mind the potential biases when dealing with results from surveys in conflict zones.

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<sup>1</sup> In June 2012 the PRT was replaced by the Transition Support Group Faryab (TSG-F), and 28<sup>th</sup> of September the last person of the TSG-F left Faryab.

# 1 Introduction

Norway has been the lead nation of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT<sup>2</sup>) Maimanah<sup>3</sup> in the Faryab province from 2005 and until September 2012.<sup>4</sup> As part of this contribution, a strategy for the Norwegian civilian and military effort in Faryab was developed by the Norwegian Government [1]. The main goal in the strategy was to support the Afghan government in its effort to ensure stability, security and development. The strategy also emphasized *afghanisation*, meaning that the Norwegian effort, both in terms of security, development and good governance, should be based on Afghan values.

## 1.1 Transition phase

Afghanistan is now well into transition – the process where security responsibility is gradually transferred from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghan leadership [2]. The process was agreed upon between the Afghan Government and NATO at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, and formally began in July 2011. The PRT Maimanah was terminated in September 2012 as part of the transition. ISAF is now concentrating its effort on the major population centers and main transport routes.

The last years the PRT has therefore operated as a partner to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It is ANSF that primarily has planned and led operations, with the PRT in a supporting role. The objective of this concept has been to train and guide the Afghan security forces and at the same time help them to provide security in the Faryab province.

## 1.2 Assessments

Assessments of the situation and the development in the society are needed in order to analyse the value of the effort in Afghanistan. This has been even more important prior to and during the transition phase, due to the four main transition-criteria that need to be fulfilled. The criteria are [2]:

- ANSF are capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF.
- Security is at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities.
- Local governance is sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced.
- ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish.

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<sup>2</sup> In June 2012, the PRT was replaced by the Transition Support Group Faryab (TSG-F), and 28<sup>th</sup> of September the last person of the TSG-F left Faryab.

<sup>3</sup> Maimanah is the provincial capital of Faryab.

<sup>4</sup> The PRT was part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and was a joint military-civilian unit. The mission statement was to “assist Government of Afghanistan in Faryab province in building security, governance and promote development in order to establish a safe and well governed Afghanistan.” <http://www.norway.org.af>.

In the assessment of the situation and the development, and in line with the afghanisation approach, it is important to include the population. Wave 6 of the Faryab Survey is the sixth in line of an extensive survey conducted in the province in order to better understand the population and their perception of their own situation. Wave 6 was carried out in October/November 2012. The survey has been carried out twice a year since the first wave in April 2010 [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Our ambition is to conduct a seventh wave in April 2013 in order to capture the situation in the province after the withdrawal of the military troops.

**1.3 Outline of the report**

This report consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the Faryab Survey in general and the sixth wave in particular. This includes the sampling method. Chapter 3 gives the demographics for wave 6. This covers the age, gender and ethnicity distribution, the living standard and literacy level. Chapter 4 presents the margin of error of wave 6 and the uncertainties of the survey. The main findings of wave 6, and comparisons of the results with previous waves, are presented in Chapter 5. Province level results are also compared to the women’s, Pashtuns’ and respondents from Ghormachs’ perception on the same matters. The last chapter gives the conclusions.

**2 Faryab Survey**

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6
<b>Field Dates</b>	April 2010	Oct/Nov 2010	April 2011	Oct 2011	April/May 2012	Oct/Nov 2012
<b>Sample Size</b>	1069	1182	1208	1388	1449	1433

The Faryab Survey has been conducted in the Faryab province by the agency Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR). The agency utilizes civil Afghans to do in-depth interviews. The interviewers are about 50% male/female and a mix of ethnicities to match the respondents. Quality controls are provided from the central office in Kabul in order to assure that the standards are maintained.

The questionnaire employed in the survey has been developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in cooperation with PRT Maimanah. It is an extensive survey that consists of approximately 50 questions, with batteries of supplementary questions, covering three main areas: security, development and governance, in line with both the Norwegian and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategy. Each interview takes on average about 35 minutes to conduct. Only minor modifications have been made to the questionnaire employed in the different waves. This report covers the main findings from the survey, and does not go into detail on the extensive data.



## 2.1 Wave 6

Country: **Afghanistan**

Study: **Faryab, wave 6**

Field Dates: **October 20th–November 3rd 2012**

Sample Size: **1433 (1082 excl. boosters)**

Research Provider: **ACSOR-Surveys**

Number of Interviewers: **63**

The Faryab Survey wave 6 was conducted in October and November 2012. It has a sample size of 1433 respondents. This consists of the representative sampling of the province (the main bulk) and four extra samplings (boosters) of areas of interest.

Since the last wave (wave 5) in April/May 2012, some conditions have occurred that may affect the results of wave 6. Some examples are:

- The uncertainties with regards to the Province Governor from May to October 2012.<sup>5</sup>
- The increase in the number and size of PRT/TSG-F operations after May 2012 as compared to the previous 6 months.
- The redeployment of US forces from Qaisar and Ghowrmach towards the end of July.
- The handover of Camp Griffin during August.
- The handover of Camp Maimanah to Afghan National Army on the 28<sup>th</sup> of September.
- The heavy convoy traffic along highway 1 from Maimanah to Mazar-e-Sharif.
- On 26<sup>th</sup> of October, the first day of Eid-ul-adha, a suicide bomber killed 42 people and wounded 60 persons in the Eid Gah Mosque in Maymanah. [8, 9]

## 2.2 Interview sample

The respondents are selected using a multi-stage random stratification process which has four layers:

- Province – the interview sample is distributed based on the urban/rural characteristics in the province.
- District – the sample is distributed between the province districts based on the population estimates for each district.
- Settlement – a simple random selection of the known settlements in each district (neighbourhoods in the cities).<sup>6</sup> In each settlement a predefined number of interviews will take place, normally 10.
- Household – a random walk method is used to select the households in which the in-depth interviews will take place.

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<sup>5</sup> There have been three different governors in this period.

<sup>6</sup> There is no population data on settlement sizes, thus the sample can not be distributed based on settlement sizes.

There were two constrictions in the final selection of the respondents:

- The respondents had to be 18 years or older.
- The sample should have approximately 50% male and 50% female respondents.

In total, 1433 people in Faryab were interviewed in wave 6. This includes four boosters. Booster 1 with 60 respondents, is a geographic area of interest. This has been one of the focus areas for PRT Maimanah. Booster 2 with 228 respondents, is an ethnic area of interest. Booster 2 consists of Pashtun villages in 5 different districts in order to better cover the Pashtun perception. In addition, 60 people from Kohistan (booster 3) and 60 from Ghormach (booster 4) were interviewed. These interviews had to be done in neighbouring districts due to security restrictions (Ghormach) and transportation restrictions (Kohistan).<sup>7</sup>

## 2.3 Analysis

The analysis in this report includes data from the **main bulk** of interviews, which is weighted in order to get a representative result. The boosters are not included as this will change the distribution and the ethnical profile and will not give comparable results for the six waves.<sup>8</sup> The Pashtun booster is used to compare the results for the Pashtuns with the overall results for Faryab (Section 5.6). Similarly the Ghormach booster is used to compare the results for Ghormach with the overall results for Faryab (Section 5.7).

The interviewer conducting the survey assesses each respondent's comprehension of the survey questionnaire. This assessment uses four categories, where the lowest category is covering those that have difficulty in understanding most of the questions, even with help from the interviewer.<sup>9</sup>

## 3 Demographics

This chapter summarises the demographics for wave 6.

### 3.1 Age distribution

The respondents in the main bulk of the survey ranged between 18 and 75 years of age (Figure 3.1). The age distribution shows peaks at the age of 30, 35, 40, 45, and so on. One factor

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<sup>7</sup> Unlike standard intercept interviews done on the street where you contact, for instance, each fifth passer-by, the single selection criteria here has been respondents from Kohistan/Ghormach willing to be interviewed. The actual interviews were usually done in a nearby Samawars (tea-houses, restaurants) or at some secluded place in the open.

<sup>8</sup> In earlier analysis of the results from wave 1–4 [3, 4, 5, 6], the data for Kohistan and booster 1 have been included. In this report results from wave 1–6 is calculated in the same way in order to provide consistency. This implies some minor deviations may be found in some numbers when comparing the results with the previous reports.

<sup>9</sup> We removed these respondents from the analysis of the six surveys in order to minimize the margin of error caused by misunderstandings and alike. In wave 6, no respondents were removed due to poor comprehension of the survey questionnaire.

contributing to this is the estimation of age by the interviewer; the interviewer estimates the age if the interviewee does not know it. The age is then to a large extent estimated to a round number. However, this only covers a small fraction of the respondents. The pronounced peaks may therefore indicate that many do not know their real age and estimate it to a round number themselves.




Figure 3.1 Age distribution of the Faryab Survey wave 6.

### 3.2 Gender

The main bulk of the survey has 55% male and 45% female respondents. ACSOR utilises female interviewers exclusively to interview female respondents.

### 3.3 Ethnicity

The ethnicity distribution<sup>10</sup> of the main bulk of wave 6 is:

- 52% Uzbek
- 20% Pashtun<sup>11</sup>
- 15% Tajik
- 7% Turkmen
- 6% Other ethnicities

A population census has not been conducted in Afghanistan since 1979. In the meantime, millions of people have been displaced. The ethnicity profile in Afghanistan therefore relies on estimates. The ethnicity distribution of wave 6 is different than the estimated ethnicity profile of Faryab [10].

<sup>10</sup> There are variations in the ethnicity distribution through the six waves of surveying. Wave 6 stands out with significantly more Pashtuns and fewer Uzbeks than previous waves.

<sup>11</sup> This is exclusive the booster in Pashtun villages. When the boosters are included there is 31% Pashtuns.

**3.4 Survey coverage**


The interviews took place in all of Faryab’s 14 districts except for Kohistan.<sup>12</sup> We would also like to include the Ghormach district of the Badghis province in the survey, but due to security issues it has not been covered. We got some responses from people living in Ghormach and Kohistan though interviews conducted in neighbouring districts as described in Section 2.2.

**3.5 Living standard**

The interviewers made an assessment of the living standard for each respondent. The standard is divided into five categories:

- 1. High quality road, access to water and electricity 6 to 7 days per week
- 2. Good road, access to water and electricity 4 to 5 days per week
- 3. Fair road, access to water and electricity 1 to 3 days per week
- 4. Poor road, access to water and electricity 1 day a week
- 5. Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electricity

Figure 3.2 shows that 76% of the respondents fell into the two poorest categories. These respondents live in areas with poor or no road and with little or no access to water and electricity (not more than one day a week). There has been a slight increase in the sum of category 4 and 5 in the last two waves compared to earlier waves. Only 12% of the respondents fell into the top two categories and live in areas with good road conditions and with access to water and electricity 4–7 days a week.



*Figure 3.2 Assessed living standards. The standard of roads, water and electricity accessibility is categorised into 5 categories (1 is the best, 5 is the worst).*

<sup>12</sup> Faryab originally has 14 districts. ISAF and PRT Maimanah included Ghormach district (originally Badghis province) into the PRT’s area of responsibility in 2009.

### 3.6 Literacy and education

When it comes to literacy, 24% replied that they can read and write. The average literacy rate in Afghanistan is 28% [11]. The literacy among the respondents in Faryab corresponds to the education level (Figure 3.3): 76% say they are illiterate and 74% have no schooling.




Figure 3.3 Highest level of education of the respondents.

## 4 Biases and margin of error

One of the key aspects of the Faryab Survey is the large number of respondents. The size of the sample reduces the margin of error to an acceptable level, also when looking at smaller fractions of the dataset than province level. On province level the stated sampling error is 2.6%.<sup>13</sup> There are, nevertheless, challenges specific to polls in conflict zones which increase the margin of error [12, 13].

The randomness of the sampling is a key challenge. This is a challenge for surveys in general, but in particular for surveys in Afghanistan due to the poorly documented demography, bad infrastructure and security risks. A truly random sample is impossible to achieve in Afghanistan because there does not exist an exhaustive list of residents or households. The respondents are therefore selected using the stratification process described in Section 2.2. A number of villages per district are randomly selected proportional to the population size of the districts, with some adjustments in order to have a minimum number of respondents per district. In each village a number of respondents are selected (e.g. 5 or 10). Since the sample is not totally proportional to the population size in each district, relative weights is assigned to the respondents. Data from the Central Statistical Office was used to compute these weights.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> 2.6% is the stated sampling error by ACSOR. The sampling error applies if the respondents are sampled randomly. The employed random stratification process (Section 2.2) will increase the sampling error.

<sup>14</sup> <http://cso.gov.af>.

For the first time no one of the original randomly selected villages had to be replaced. In earlier waves between eight and twenty villages has been replaced due to poor security or poor accessibility. That is, some of the most underdeveloped villages (at least when it comes to infrastructure) and unsafe areas have not been included in the survey (see also Section 3.4). This will, to some extent, affect the questions about development and security. On the other hand, the fact that a village is assessed to be impossible to reach or too dangerous to travel to, is itself an indication of the development or the security situation in these areas of the province.<sup>15</sup>

In addition, there are biases because some people misunderstand questions, answer what they think is expected by them, do not remember correctly, do not have the knowledge to answer, deliberately answer wrong, or refuse to answer. There are also cultural norms that could affect the answers. For instance, Afghans may be uncomfortable in giving public or open criticism of state institutions. We have reduced the biases by using civil Afghans, which understand the Afghan culture, to do in-depth interviews, and by removing respondents that do not understand the questions (Section 2.3). Where biases remained, this effect is assumed to remain constant from wave to wave. We have, therefore, tried to focus on the trends over time rather than single results.

## 5 Main findings

The subsequent sections in this chapter summarise main findings from wave 6 of the Faryab Survey, in its own and compared to the previous five waves. The findings are categorised into the general situation (Section 5.1) and the three main areas of the survey; security, development and governance (Section 5.2–5.4). The main findings for Faryab are also compared to the women's and the Pashtun's perception on the same matters (Section 5.5 and 5.6) as well as to respondents from Ghormach (Section.5.7).

The results are calculated as a percentage of those who have an opinion. The proportion of respondents replying *Refused* or *Do not know* is very small and do not affect the results and are therefore removed.

### 5.1 General situation

The Faryab Survey attempts to measure the population's perception of their own and of Faryab's situation in general.

In the surveys, the respondents are first asked if they think things in Faryab, in general, are going in the right or wrong direction. Figure 5.1 compares the results on this question from all six surveys. In the comparison, wave 1, in April 2010, stands out as the extremely positive with as many as 79% saying things are going in the right direction. Wave 2–6 are less positive, where respectively 58%, 56%, 53%, 49% and 44% say the same. The ratio between respondents saying

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<sup>15</sup> There is no clear trend in the number of villages that have been replaced due to the security situation or poor accessibility.

things are going in the right direction and the increasing number of respondents saying things are going in the wrong direction implies a negative trend.




Figure 5.1 Result for the question: In which direction do you think things in Faryab today are going?

## 5.2 Security

The perception of security is stated directly through a question on how satisfied the respondent is with the security situation. In wave 6, 58% reply that they are somewhat or very dissatisfied (rightmost column in Figure 5.2). 12% say the security situation has improved, while 37% express the opposite (the remaining saying it is the same).

Figure 5.2 shows the results from all six waves on this question. The indicated negative trend seems parallel to the development of the general situation (Section 5.1).

The results may also indicate a seasonal variation with an underlying negative trend. The respondents are relatively more positive to the security situation in April (wave 1, 3 and 5), while they are more negative in October (wave 2, 4 and 6). The seasonal variation might be due to a more active fighting season during summer, i.e. prior to the October survey, compared to winter. The same seasonal variation is also seen in the results of other security related questions, such as how satisfied the respondents are when it comes to security at schools and the ability to move safely.




Figure 5.2 Result on the question: How satisfied are you with the security situation?

The respondents saying things are going in the right direction in Faryab (Figure 5.1), were asked to give the main reason for why they think so. 35% of these respondents justify this optimism by saying the security has improved or that the Taliban no longer exists in their area (Figure 5.3). 31% justify it by saying that it is due to reconstruction.




Figure 5.3 Main reasons for why things are going in the right direction. (Note: this was a single-answer question.)

In the survey, respondents are also asked what the biggest problem in their local area is. 14% respond lack of security (see Section 5.3 and Figure 5.11).



### 5.2.1 Key security actors

64% of the respondents consider the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be the most important security provider in their districts (Figure 5.4), whereas 10% express the same about the Afghan National Army (ANA). The reason why the ANP is considered to be the most important is probably not due to a better impression of the police compared to the army (as stated later in this section), but due to their area of responsibility: the ANP is recruited locally and continuously operates in the province as a whole, while the ANA is focusing on the problem areas. Thus, the ANA has less visibility compared to the ANP, and the security is worse in the areas where the ANA operates.

Comparing the waves, the results show that the proportion saying the ANA provides the security has an underlying negative trend (even if it is a slightly increase this time), while the proportion saying the ANP provides security is fairly steady and fluctuates around 60%.

Only 1% believes that international forces are an important security provider in their district. As the security responsibility in Faryab has been in transition to the Afghan security forces, the national forces have primarily been in lead of the operations in Faryab with the international forces only in a supporting role. As such, it is positive that the people recognise ANSF as the security provider rather than the international forces. 36% respond that the people themselves provide security in their area, and 18% respond that the elders or the Shuras provide security in their area (Figure 5.4). This may be a result of cultural aspects but it also may indicate that the national security actors are not present in these areas or they are not doing a good enough job. The latter may be supported by the fact that about 59% of the respondents agree that the ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained (third graph, Figure 5.6).




Figure 5.4 Result on the question: Who provides security in your district? (Note: this was a multi-answer question, i.e. the respondent could answer more than one actor as the provider of security.)

**The Afghan National Police**

All in all, the respondents have a positive view of the Afghan police. 70% believe that the police are leaving a good impression on the people (Figure 5.5), and 89% agree that the ANP is honest and fair to the Afghan citizens (Figure 5.6). This confidence in the ANP is confirmed through another question: 87% say they will report crimes to the police. However, it is important to know that the Afghan people may be uncomfortable in criticising their local authorities. And so, the support to the Afghan security forces may therefore be overestimated in the results. Hence, as stated earlier the development of the response over time is more interesting than the levels of impression in itself.

There is a negative trend on the impression of the ANP comparing the different waves: The proportion saying the ANP is leaving a good impression on the people have decreased from 91% and 94% in the first two waves to 87% in wave 3 and then 77% in wave 4, 75% in wave 5 and 70% in wave 6 (Figure 5.5).




Figure 5.5 The impression the Afghan National Police is leaving on people with its performance.

About 55% of the respondents agree that the ANP has sufficient forces in their area while 45% express the opposite. And about 60% of the respondents believe that the ANP can not operate on their own and need support from international forces. Still, 77% agree that the ANP helps to improve the security (Figure 5.6).




Figure 5.6 Responses on four statements related to the ANP.

Even though the respondents seem to believe the police are improving security and are honest and fair, they also believe the ANP are corrupt: 58% respond that corruption is a problem amongst police officers in their area. This discrepancy might be due to several reasons, especially cultural factors: the expectations of the ANP might be low, the population might be uncomfortable in criticising the authorities, corruption is part of how the society functions, and so on.

## Corruption

The question regarding corruption in the survey is based on a western definition of corruption; payment for services the recipient is not entitled to by law. In a society like Afghanistan without a functioning tax system, collection of money by the representatives of the local authorities falls into the definition of corruption. Therefore, corruption by the western definition may be accepted and it also may be considered a good thing, by indicating that the local authorities are eager in doing their job.

## The Afghan National Army

All in all, the respondents have a good impression of the Afghan army (Figure 5.7). 70% believe that the army is leaving a good impression, and 86% agree that the ANA is honest and fair to the Afghan citizens. Again, it is important to stress that the Afghan people may be uncomfortable in

criticising their local authorities. As for the ANP, the support to the ANA may be overestimated. (Corruption amongst the ANA was not included in the questionnaire.)

As for the impression of the ANP, there is a negative trend. The proportion saying the ANA is leaving a good impression has gradually decreased from 90% in wave 1 to 70% in wave 6.




Figure 5.7 The impression the Afghan National Army is leaving on people with its performance.

The perceptions of the ANA are about the same as of the ANP, but slightly less positive. 45% agree that the ANA has sufficient forces in their area, while 55% express the opposite view. Still, 67% believe the army helps improve the security (Figure 5.8). At the same time, 51% believe that the ANA can not operate on their own and need support from international forces.




Figure 5.8 Responses on four statements related to the ANA.

### International forces

Even though only 1% believe that international forces provide security (Section 5.2.1), the respondents in Faryab recognise a need for international support to the national security forces (Figure 5.6 and 5.8). 62% reply that they have a good impression of the international forces and their efforts in the province (Figure 5.9).




Figure 5.9 The impression the international military force are leaving on people with its performance.

There has been a negative trend on the impression of the international military forces from wave 1 to wave 4, but wave 6 is back on the level of wave 3 (Figure 5.9). The proportion saying the international forces are leaving a good impression has gradually decreased from 84% in wave 1 to only 53% in wave 4, and then has slightly increased again to 62% in wave 6. The visibility of ISAF in the same period is shown in Figure 5.10; the visibility has gradually decreased since wave 1. In wave 1, 16% said they saw ISAF in their area less than once a month, while in wave 6, 81% said the same.




Figure 5.10 How often people see ISAF in their area.

### 5.3 Development

In the survey, the respondents are asked what the biggest problem in their local area is. This is an open-ended single-answer question, i.e. there are no alternatives, and so the respondent is free to reply what he or she feels like. As illustrated in Figure 5.11, the biggest problem in the province is by far unemployment (25%). Lack of security is the second mentioned biggest problem in the province, with a response rate of 14%. Poverty ends up at third place with 11% saying this is the biggest problem.




Figure 5.11 The biggest problem in the local area.

Table 5.1 shows the top 5 problems in the area for wave 1–6. Unemployment has by far been the biggest problem through all waves. Also, lack of water and poverty have recurred at top 5 in all waves.

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6
N° 1	Un-employment	Un-employment	Un-employment	Un-employment	Un-employment	Un-employment
N° 2	Lack of electricity	Lack of water	Illiteracy	Lack of water	Lack of water	Lack of security <sup>16</sup>
N° 3	Lack of water	Poverty	Lack of water	Lack of security	Lack of electricity	Poverty
N° 4	Poverty	Illiteracy	Poverty	Poor roads	Poverty	Lack of water <sup>17</sup>
N° 5	Corruption	Corruption	Lack of electricity	Poverty	Illiteracy	Illiteracy

Table 5.1 The five biggest problems in the local area.

### 5.3.1 Basic infrastructure and public services

The survey attempts to explore how the population assesses the basic infrastructure and essential public services. This is done, by the interviewer, assessing the road conditions and access of water and electricity (Section 3.5), and an extensive question on how satisfied the respondents are when it comes to different subjects within basic infrastructure and public services. Figure 5.12

<sup>16</sup> In this survey, security for the first time comes second. Although, security is significantly less of a problem than unemployment.

<sup>17</sup> This is the sum of those who lacks clean drinking water and those who lacks water for irrigation.

shows the result from wave 6 on this question. In addition, there are some questions regarding the respondents actual use of different basic infrastructure and public services

The availability of jobs, in general and for women in particular, is the subject which the respondents are most dissatisfied with. This is in conjunction with previous stated results (Section 5.3). In wave 6, 72% are dissatisfied with job opportunities in general and 62% with education and job opportunities for women. Only 10% and 12%, respectively, express that these conditions have improved the last year. Road conditions and condition at the facilities for detention are also subjects the respondents are dissatisfied with. 63% and 61% express their dissatisfaction on these matters.




Figure 5.12 How satisfied are you with the...?

The subjects the respondents are most satisfied with are availability of water (68%), security at school (56%), and availability of products in the market (52%). The satisfaction with the availability of education for children have a slightly negative trend from wave 1 to wave 6 (the answers were more positive in wave 5 though). In wave 1, 70% were satisfied with this, compared to 67%, 64%, 55% and 67% respectively in wave 2, 3, 4 and 5, and then 52% in wave 6. The respondents’ satisfaction with the security situation has a negative trend, while the respondents’ satisfaction with the availability of products in the markets has a positive trend.



Overall, the proportion of dissatisfaction is substantial. This is a concern as insurgents can exploit this situation for recruiting and support, especially when it comes to the great dissatisfaction of job opportunities.

### 5.3.2 Reconstruction

The respondents saying things are going in the right direction in Faryab (green line in Figure 5.1), were asked to give the reason why. 31% of these respondents justify this optimism by saying that this is due to reconstruction, i.e. development of the province (Figure 5.3).

On another question, 24% of the respondents say that aid projects (to the benefit of the community) have been implemented in their area in the last year. This is a significantly lower proportion than in wave 1–5. In the two first waves in 2010, about half of the respondents said aid projects had been implemented the last year, and as many as 64% said the same in April 2011.

The respondents who know of aid projects were asked to mention which kind of projects these were. 42% say (firstly or secondly mentioned) these projects are bridges, while corresponding numbers for construction of wells, road construction, tailoring projects and schools are 41%, 36%, 29% and 15% respectively. These are the same type of aid projects that are mentioned in the previous waves as well (although not always in the same order).

## 5.4 Governance

The overall perception of the government has been good throughout all six waves. The apparently good impression of the government is somewhat contradicted by the fact that corruption amongst the government officials is stated as a problem. Again it is important to stress that the Afghan people may be uncomfortable in criticising the authorities and have a different definition of corruption than the western definition.

When asked who has most influence in their local area, the government, opposing government elements or neither, 74% respond the government and 22% respond elements in opposition to the government (OGE – opposing government elements). Figure 5.13 compares the results from all six waves on this question, showing a negative trend for the government.

On another question, 42% of the respondents say that the government has satisfactorily addressed the needs of their community. This is a significantly lower proportion than in wave 1–3. In these first waves, the corresponding results were about 60%, before the result dropped in wave 4 and 5 to 48% and 43% respectively. This result can be seen in connection with Section 5.3.2, where the same negative trend is seen with respect to aid projects.

The apparently good impression of the provincial government is somewhat contradicted by the fact that 67% state that corruption is a moderate to big problem amongst the provincial government officials. This is the same situation as seen when looking at the Afghan police (Section 5.2.1). There are significant fewer that state that corruption is a moderate to big problem

amongst the provincial government officials this time from earlier waves (it has been around 80% in earlier waves). Over time there has been a significant reduction when it comes to whether or not the respondents express that the provincial and district governors misuse their power. In wave 1 in April 2010, more than 50% stated that the provincial government officials never misused their power. Corresponding numbers for wave 6 in October 2012 is around 22%.




Figure 5.13 Who has most influence in your mantaqa (local area)?

When it comes to justice and the rule of law, 43% would go to an Afghan state court if they had a dispute. 30% would go to the local Shura/Jirga, and 22% of the respondents would take the dispute to both. 4% would not use any in case of a dispute. The total portion going to an Afghan state court only shows minor variations.

**5.5 Women**

Afghanistan is considered by Anderson [14] as the most dangerous country for a woman to live, due to violence, bad healthcare and poverty. Also, women that speak their opinion may challenge the culture of what is acceptable, and may be intimidated or, in worst case, get killed.

In general the opinion of women and men in the survey is fairly similar with only some minor differences. A few examples of the questions where women reply different from men are shown in Figure 5.14. It is also worth mentioning that women in general reads newspapers, watches TV, listens to radio and uses mobile phones less often than men.




Figure 5.14 Differences between women and men's responses.

ACSOR uses female interviewers to interview female respondents. Still, one concern related to female respondents is the question of whether there were other people present in the room. Most women were not alone in the room when interviewed, but we do not know if the others present were children or for example husband. Women in Afghanistan may be afraid of speaking their mind freely and for example criticizing the government when there are men in the room.

### 5.6 Pashtuns

When comparing the answers for Pashtuns with the answers for Faryab as a whole, we find some differences. Figure 5.15 shows the living standard for the Pashtuns and for Faryab as a whole for wave 6. While 83% of the Pashtuns fell into the two worst categories, about 76% of the respondents in the main sample fell into the same two categories.




Figure 5.15 Living standard comparisons between Pashtuns and Faryab (main sample).

However, regarding opinions about what direction the general situation in Faryab is developing in and why, there are no significant differences between Pashtuns and the overall population in Faryab.

The Pashtuns share the opinion with the rest of the population in Faryab on who are the most important security providers in the area – the Afghan National Police and the people themselves. 53% of the Pashtuns stated that the ANP is an important security provider, and 36% stated the people themselves.

When it comes to the impression of the ANP, 63% of the Pashtuns have a good impression of the Afghan police compared to 70% overall in Faryab. 86% of the Pashtuns agree that the ANP is honest and fair to the Afghan citizens; while the corresponding number for Faryab is 89%.

About 64% of the Pashtuns have a good impression of the Army. 85% of the Pashtuns agree that the ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people compared to 86% overall in Faryab. But only 58% of the Pashtuns believe that the Afghan army helps improve security while 67% have the same impression overall in Faryab.

The Pashtuns are more dissatisfied with their own situation and the development in their area than the overall population in Faryab. The Pashtuns satisfaction with the situation is shown in

Figure 5.16. The corresponding numbers for Faryab are shown in Figure 5.12. For most parts the Pashtuns are significantly more dissatisfied than the overall population of Faryab (except for the availability of medicines, availability of clean water and condition at the facility of detention where the impression is similar, and the availability of water for irrigation where the Pashtuns are more satisfied). The biggest differences are in the areas of electricity, security, jobs, security at school and the condition of the roads.




Figure 5.16 How satisfied are the Pashtuns with the...?

Regarding who has most influence in their area, significantly fewer Pashtuns respond the government, about 61% of the Pashtuns compared to 74% overall. 26% responded that opposing government elements have more influence, and 13% that neither of them has more influence. Corresponding numbers for Faryab is 22% and 4%. Regarding corruption among provincial government officials and trust in the state court, there is not any significant difference.

### 5.7 Ghormach

Because of the security situation in Ghormach, ACSOR has not been able to conduct interviews inside the district in either of the waves. In this wave we have received answers from people from Ghormach who were questioned when travelling to nearby markets in Qaisar district (see Section 2.2). The results are compared with answers from Faryab. The respondents from Ghormach are solely Pashtuns.

When comparing the answers for Ghormach with the answers for Faryab as a whole, we find some differences. First of all, it is worth mentioning that only 8% of the respondents from Ghormach are literate compared to 24% in Faryab in general. The same results are found when comparing formal schooling. When comparing the percentage of 6–14 year old boys and girls going to school (Figure 5.17), there are fewer boys and girls going to school in Ghormach than overall in Faryab.<sup>18</sup> Particularly there are few girls going to school in this district. The respondents from Ghormach mention *They are not allowed* and *No schools* as the main reasons for why the girls are not going to school.<sup>19</sup>




Figure 5.17 How many boys and girls between 6 and 14 years of age are going to school?

Regarding what direction the general situation in Faryab is developing in and why, the respondents from Ghormach are more negative than the overall population in Faryab.<sup>20</sup>

The respondents from Ghormach have a significantly different opinion from the rest of the population in Faryab on who are the most important security actors in the area, with only 2% considering the Afghan National Police to be an important security provider, 68% the people themselves and about 27% the local elders and Shuras. Corresponding numbers for Faryab are 64%, 36% and 18%. The drop in respondents answering the Afghan National Police will be studied further.

Of the population in Ghormach only 5% believe that the government has satisfactorily addressed the needs of their community in the last year. This is substantially lower than the 42% in Faryab as a whole.

<sup>18</sup> In Faryab 81% of the boys and 63% of the girls are going to school compared to 78% of the boys and only 7% of the girls in Ghormach.

<sup>19</sup> 41 % of the respondents answer *They are not allowed* and 37 % answer *No schools* as the reason for why girls are not going to school.

<sup>20</sup> Only 25% of the respondents from Ghormach answer that things are developing in the right direction. The corresponding number of the respondents in Faryab is 44%.

Regarding who has most influence in their area, significantly fewer respondents from Ghormach respond the government, about 38% compared to 74% overall in Faryab. 17% responded that opposing government elements have more influence, and 45% responded that neither of them has more influence. Corresponding numbers for Faryab is 22% and 4%.

The respondents from Ghormach are much more dissatisfied with their own situation and the development in their area than the overall population in Faryab. How satisfied the respondents from Ghormach are with the situation is shown in Figure 5.18 (the corresponding numbers for Faryab are shown in Figure 5.12). For all categories the respondents from Ghormach are significantly more dissatisfied. The biggest differences are in the areas of electricity, security, healthcare, products in the markets, job opportunities and education. It is worth noticing that the sample from Ghormach is not random as only people coming to the market can be selected, as described in Section 2.2. Hence, this could lead to biased results as the people coming to the market are not necessarily representative of the population in Ghormach (but this has not been examined).




Figure 5.18 How satisfied are the people in Ghormach with the...?

## 6 Conclusions

The Faryab Survey provides insight into the population's perception of their own situation, and Faryab's situation in general. It is hard to interpret a single wave; therefore looking at the trends is most interesting. After six waves of surveying, a general conclusion is that on most questions we see a negative trend.

Overall the perception of what direction things are going in Faryab is divided: 44% say that things go in the right direction, while 40% express the opposite. Compared to previous waves, this represents a continuous negative trend.

The overall impression of the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army is very good. But it is also an underlying trend pointing downwards. The perception of the security situation also seems to have a seasonal variation; the respondents are more positive to the security situation in the spring compared to in the fall.

The overall perception of the government is good. However, wave 3, 4, 5 and 6 are less positive than wave 1 and 2. When this is combined with the increasing share that states that opposing government elements have the most influence in their area, this can be seen as a slightly negative trend for the government.

Unemployment is clearly stated as the biggest problem in Faryab, and so it has been through all waves. In this survey, security for the first time comes second. Although, security is significantly less of a problem than unemployment.

The opinions of women and men in the survey are fairly similar with only small differences.

The living standard for the Pashtuns is worse than that of Faryab in total. The Pashtuns are also much more dissatisfied with their own situation and the development in their area than the overall population in Faryab. When it comes to the impression of the government and the ANSF, the Pashtuns have a significantly worse impression than the overall population in Faryab. The group of respondents from Ghormach consists solely of Pashtuns, and there are clear similarities between the opinions of this group and the Pashtuns. The negative patterns we see for the Pashtuns are even clearer in the responses from Ghormach.



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## Abbreviations

ACSOR	Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Force
ANTILOPE	Analysis support to military operations, FFI project 1229
FFI	Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSD	National Security Directorate
OGE	Opposing Government Elements
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
TSG-F	Transition Support Group – Faryab