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Creating content for social media training in Somulator

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Summary

The social media training tool Somulator was launched by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in 2022. The purpose of this tool is to provide a safe environment to use different forms of common online services, such as video sharing sites or news sites. The primary use is to train staff in armed forces and emergency services as well as local and national government on how the unwanted spread of malign influence, disinformation and misinformation can affect their work in a crisis.

This report is meant to help organisers create better and more appropriate content without requiring a lot of effort. This report thus extends the original Somulator report that provides an overview of Somulator usage.

Based on feedback and observations of Somulator use, the key issue for successful training seems to be content that a) reflects real life information manipulation and b) is relevant to the participants in the training situation. The underlying benefit of this is that it provides more realism, which in turn improves the learning outcomes for participants.

Since Somulator was launched, it has been used by a wide range of civilian and military actors in Norway and abroad, for research, training, and large-scale emergency exercises. Somulator provides four clones of known social media platforms as well as online news sites. Its key components are the *Excon tools*, which allow a single user to control the social media clones in terms of access and content.

Sammendrag

Treningsverktøyet Somulator ble lansert av Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt i 2022. Formålet med verktøyet er å tilby et trygt miljø for bruk av ulike former for netjtjenester, for eksempel videodelings- eller nyhetsnettsteder. Det primære bruksområdet er å trene ansatte i forsvaret, nødetatene og lokale og nasjonale myndigheter i hvordan uønsket spredning av skadelig påvirkning, desinformasjon og feilinformasjon kan påvirke arbeidet i en krise.

Denne rapporten er ment å hjelpe dem som arrangerer trening og lignende, med å skape bedre og mer hensiktsmessig innhold, uten at det krever for mye innsats. Rapporten er dermed en utvidelse av den opprinnelige Somulator-rapporten, som gir en oversikt over bruken av Somulator.

Basert på tilbakemeldinger og observasjoner av Somulator i bruk, er det tydelig at nøkkelen til vellykket trening er innhold som a) gjenspeiler reell informasjonshåndtering og b) er relevant for deltakerne i treningssituasjonen. Den underliggende fordelen med dette er at det gir mer realisme i treningen. Dette forbedrer læringsutbyttet for deltakerne.

Siden Somulator ble lansert, har den blitt brukt av en rekke sivile og militære aktører i Norge og utlandet til forskning, trening og store beredskapsøvelser. Somulator inneholder fire kloner av kjente sosiale medier og nyhetsnettsteder, og den viktigste komponenten er Excon-verktøyene, som lar en enkeltbruker kontrollere tilgang til og innhold i de forskjellige sosiale medier-klonene.

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Glossary of terms

[*Definitions from Bergh (2023)*]

Training is used as an overarching term for different activities. Here it refers to individual / group-based training (for example, a workshop), more focused educational settings such as regular classes and larger (total) defence type exercises where previous training may be tested.

Exercise controllers (Excon for short) refers to personnel controlling Somulator during the training (according to an overall plan).

Participant is a person who participates in the training. In the context of Somulator, this person will have access to an account created for or by them on one or more of Somulator's four social media clones (see **Content** below). They will also have access to one or more news sites if they have been set up. In a military context this is often referred to as Blue Team (BT).

Clone/Social media clone is used to denote a web application that copies features of a mainstream social media platform, for instance Twitter.

Content is the term used for news articles and social media posts that are created for use in a training situation. A post can be anything from a tweet in a few words for use in the Twitter clone (see **Clone** above), to a longer article with videos for the Somulator news module.

An **account** (also known as a profile) is used in regular social media to log in to a service and then post content and interact with other users, for example by liking other users' posts. Accounts that are created and controlled by the Excon staff are referred to as **distribution channels** in this document. Distribution channels are used to post content made for participants to read during the training, while the participants use accounts to access and post content in the social media clones, including content from the distribution channels.

Propaganda, disinformation, misinformation, information operation and influence operation: These terms are often used interchangeably. In this report, **propaganda** refers to biased information used to propagate a particular view. **Disinformation** is information that is partially or completely untrue and is deliberately created by the sender with the intention of causing harm (UNESCO, 2021). For example, Russia mimicked authentic online newspapers where they spread false news that Ukraine had killed civilians in Bucha (Nimmo & Torrey, 2022).

Misinformation is information that is partially or completely untrue, but where the sender had no intention of causing harm (UNESCO, 2021). Examples of this include media consumers sharing conspiracy theories on social media about the origin of the COVID-19 virus (Klepper et al., 2021).

An **influence operation** is a clearly defined effort to influence people or groups through propaganda which in turn may consist of both dis- and misinformation. Information operation is a broader term that is not used in this document.

In strategic communications, advertising and other forms of communications a **target group** denotes the group that one is trying to reach with a particular message, e.g., people who are interested in sports. In Somulator training sessions, participants will typically pretend to one or more target groups. For example, participants from a hospital may form two groups; one group perform their real-life roles whereas the other group play patients who have encountered anti-vaccine disinformation. In other words, the participants role-play two different target groups.

1 Introduction

Social media has made it easier for adversarial actors to disseminate information that may have an undesirable impact on groups in the population. Training to detect and manage the undesired influence of manipulated, distorted or false information has thus become necessary as part of emergency preparedness exercises. In response to this training need, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment created a social media simulator called Somulator. This report is aimed at those who want to learn about content production for training with Somulator, and how to enhance the realism of the training through relevant content.

In Somulator, you can practise handling information that could lead to unwanted influence within a controlled framework. Although it uses several clones of real-life social media platforms, it will lack authentic active user profiles that generate organic content, be it holiday photos or comments on news events. In other words, the content and profiles must be created in advance by those in charge of the training (hereinafter “Excon”). Furthermore, Somulator has no inbuilt automatic selection that spreads the information that is put into it. This places some demands on preparation before a training session, as it is up to Excon to distribute the different content to the various participants during the actual training session.




Figure 1.1 Illustration of the steps in the work process with Somulator.

When working with Somulator, the process can be divided into three stages: Development, production and deployment, as seen in figure 1.1. This manual focuses on the [development](#) and [production](#) stages: the preparatory work and the actual production of the content intended for the training scenario.

The current report complements the FFI report “*Guide to social media training with Somulator*”. That report provides an overarching guide to using Somulator for training purposes and can be found here: <https://ffi.no/reports>.

2 Relationship between content and scenario

In crisis drills and exercises, the events and incidents that one wants to prepare for are commonly presented in a scenario. A scenario is simply a way of training for something that could possibly happen. For the purpose of this report, a scenario is described below in Table 2.1. This scenario integrates international politics and an adversary's long-term goals with sudden, local events. The function of this scenario is to illustrate how to create content in Somulator to make the training as realistic as possible. The scenario covers a period of 2 years leading up to a joint defence and civilian exercise involving two allied countries. Each part of the scenario is commented, and references are made to relevant sections of chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 discusses different considerations and methods in a series of vignettes that will help the reader understand more about the process of planning content and distribution channels. In Chapter 4 the actual production of content is discussed, with tips on when to manually create content, or when and how to generate content using chatbots or by downloading existing, freely available content.

When creating the type of training scenario used in Somulator, whether for hospitals in a small municipality or the national defence, one should consider:

1. Who would be spreading the malign information? Is it a clearly defined *adversary*, such as a nation state, or an *online group* of conspiracy theorists? How would the adversary create and spread information, what issues would they try to capitalise on?
2. The *roles* that participants are acting in the training session, and how these roles would be affected by, and try to defend against, an influence operation?
3. The *real-life jobs* of the training participants, what should the learning outcome be, based on role playing the previous group?
4. The *social media ecosystem*, i.e., the social media platforms, the technologies used and general social media users. What is their role in spreading and reacting to information from the adversary and defender.

Content created for a training session should thus reflect the goals and methods of the adversary to emulate the targeting of the defending part and use third party audience and social media properties to improve the reach of the manipulated information. In the scenario below we will explore these perspectives while explaining how to create relevant content.

One may also consider sharing the underlying scenario information before a Somulator training session to help participants understand how to contextualise the information they will be exposed to.

Stages and actions	Comments on training content
<p>Overarching scenario</p> <p>Goal: The non-democratic country Brutopia wants to a) stop neighbouring Harmonia from hosting military training and exercises in Harmonia’s Domainia province and b) reduce the presence of US troops in Harmonia. The US is an ally of Harmonia and a guarantor for peace in the region. The long-term goal is to make it difficult for Harmonia and the US to support other countries in the case of a Brutopian invasion.</p> <p>Strategy: Influence decisions that Harmonia’s local and national governments make through long-term manipulation of the civilian populations’ opinions. This is in part achieved by focusing on the economic and reputational costs of maintaining a deterrence in the area and partly by portraying it as an aggressive move by Harmonia that could lead to war.</p>	<p>As will be explained in chapter 3, the scenario used for social media training in Somulator guides the decisions regarding the content creation for Somulator. The comments in this column will explore this scenario to content connection through brief summaries of how to create relevant content that is necessary for good learning outcomes.</p>
<p>The starting point (months 1 - 3)</p> <p>The Brutopian authorities begin by issuing formal objections to military activity in the Domainia region through diplomatic channels. the Brutopian embassy places op-eds in leading Harmonian newspapers calling for dialogue. Using a professional tone, the message is carefully crafted to portray Brutopia’s concerns as legitimate and Harmonia’s defence policy as aggressive.</p> <p>The message is supported and amplified by social media engagement, often through public accounts by other Brutopian diplomats and officials. What begins as a seemingly normal public debate in the media, gradually escalates in social media. Wikipedia pages on related topics in several languages are surreptitiously edited to support the Brutopian narrative.</p>	<p>It is important to consider the use of more formal, traditional media content in influence operations, typically using newspapers or national broadcasters (see Relationship between traditional media and social media in Somulator). Often these sources will generate discussions in social media and be quoted by journalists in newspaper articles.</p> <p>An online news piece as described here will rely on carefully crafted content and not on the speed and volume of social media. It could be several screenfuls long and would be linked to by the adversary’s other resources, for instance international news cable TV or diplomatic missions’ social media accounts. See also Create content: Composition of information type.</p>

Stages and actions	Comments on training content
<p>The Build-Up (months 3 - 12)</p> <p>Facebook, Instagram and X posts are boosted by click farms managing thousands of social media profiles that repost and “like” content that is created by, or supports, Brutopia. Over time negative coverage of the US-led military exercises is repeated and referenced in Brutopian state-controlled media, nationally and internationally. The situation is described as tense and is blamed on Harmonia’s reckless defence policies.</p> <p>A popular narrative is that Harmonia is a puppet for the American anti-Brutopian agenda, and that this is clearly not in Harmonia’s best interest. Old narratives reappear, such as the claim that Harmonian child services kidnap babies from Brutopians living in Harmonia. The international broadcasting outfit owned by Brutopia promote videos of a demonstration in Harmonia that make similar claims. In reality these are old videos that are reused in the new context.</p>	<p>When emulating the social media environment volume and diversity of content can be important. On real social media, influence operations hide among the large number of real messages and give users less time to evaluate if something is true or not. In Somulator it can therefore be useful to add “noise” in the form of random social media messages that are sent out to participants during the training. This can be achieved by downloading existing data sets of social media content or generating content using machine learning (such as ChatGPT). Somulator’s feature for automatically sending out messages can then be used to push out these random messages.</p> <p>Whenever creating content for use in Somulator, it must be remembered that direct lies are often counterproductive. A professional influence operation will focus on biased information that is true but presented in such a way as to support particular narratives (see also Narrative). This is done by focusing on a particular angle, blow up certain events or facts and ignoring others or taking things out of context.</p>
<p>The Kinetic Element (month 12)</p> <p>Parts of Harmonia experience massive cyber-attacks on civilian infrastructure. Some power outages last for several hours. Airports and mobile networks go down. Systems are restored with no major consequences, but the attacks create irritation, speculations and fear in the civilian population. Harmonian media speculate that the cyber-attacks may be a Brutopian warning. The Brutopian embassy in Harmonia issues a statement denying any involvement.</p>	<p>Influence operations are not only about directly creating and distributing information. Actions that will result in news may also be part of it. This need not only be cyber-based, other events could be real life demonstrations organised in the adversary state, arrests of tourists to the adversaries’ country on spying charges, and so on.</p> <p>In Somulator such events would typically be represented by official news items describing what is happening and reactions to these news items in comment fields or through social media accounts representing regular people.</p>

Stages and actions	Comments on training content
<p>An increasing number of Harmonian citizens begin to question their own government's crisis handling capacity.</p> <p>The cyber-attack is engaging stuff. Commercial low quality and fake news websites start to create content referencing these events to earn money.</p>	<p>One could for example create a national broadcaster news site and show videos (custom made or reused) that illustrate the event. In addition, there would typically be rumours floating around on social media. This could come from regular people, special interest groups and the actor behind the influence operation. See also Distribution channels: How to build a realistic distribution channel?</p> <p>Additionally, opportunistic actors, such as low-quality news websites or well-established influencers, may reference the event to get more viewers. This could be simulated using news sites or social media accounts with a clear profile, for instance alternative medicine. See also section on Production.</p>
<p>The Amplification (months 12 - 18)</p> <p>Brutopian authorities capitalize on the cyber-attack by stirring up emotions through covert postings on social media. We see a variety of humorous memes being spread on TikTok, Instagram and X. Content that support a range of anti-Harmonia issues, from inability to handle hacking to disputes about childcare among the Brutopian community in Harmonia. Most of the content appear to be generated by artificial intelligence. Simultaneously a continuous propaganda campaign from Brutopia makes numerous claims about the benefits of the Brutopian system of government.</p> <p>Brutopian state media feature regular reports on exercise Allied Shield. Some reports make fake or exaggerated claims about weapons and capabilities. Others report near-accidents resulting from aggressive NATO behaviour.</p>	<p>Influence operations often use many different channels at the same time to spread narratives. It can therefore be useful to create "official" accounts for organisations, diplomats, government spokespersons, etc., on the adversaries' side. One can also consider the use of fictional personalities that comment on events, for instance researchers.</p> <p>In terms of content formats, it is useful to explore different types that appeal to different target groups. Visual memes, for instance, are often used to comment on real events and can be distributed in Somulator through existing social media accounts (see Create content: Composition of information type, Sender and Target group).</p> <p>Somulator also has a facility to manipulate "likes" on a post. This could be used to promote certain posts in the training session.</p>

Stages and actions	Comments on training content
<p>The impression that Brutopia is being threatened by NATO is heavily promoted by Brutopian state media and social media amplifications. Statements from NATO public affairs office that try to set the records straight drown in noise.</p> <p>At the same time the relentless positive propaganda about Brutopia starts having an effect. Facebook groups promoting Harmonian-Brutopian friendship appear and gain momentum. Over the course of many months, the public debate in Harmonia is slowly polarized. Strong voices warn against the destabilizing effects of continuing allied presence in the Domainia region in general and the planned exercise in particular.</p>	<p>Influence operations are not only about creating negative feelings, they may also try to portray certain actors and events very positively. For this purpose, one can consider the use of different groups of accounts, newspapers and personalities in Somulator to makes the information more believable than using the same account for positive and negative information. See also Platforms and channels for more information.</p>
<p>Real Life Incident (month 18)</p> <p>A small, relatively unknown terrorist group linked to a cult-like political outfit blow up several 5G base stations in different parts of Harmonia. The attacks are not related to Domainia or the international situation between Harmonia and Brutopia. It was caused by online, international disinformation claiming that 5G telephone networking was being used to control the human brain. The leader of the political group ordered the attack to get attention for their new manifesto.</p> <p>At two of the base stations several local telecoms personnel are wounded or killed, and several of the terrorists are also wounded. Harmonia quickly declares a state of emergency to handle the situation. Small, local hospitals struggle to cope with the influx of wounded people.</p> <p>As Brutopia already have an ongoing information operation underway to pressure Harmonia, it is easy for them to take advantage of the situation. They offer help from their own armed forces, knowing it cannot be accepted. They quickly spread disinformation about the scale of the terrorist</p>	<p>In a crisis, anything can be used by an influence operation to foment trouble. At the same time the adversary typically has less restrictions in terms of what they write as they do not have to be truthful and work anonymously. There are real life examples of how influence operations have manipulated the information space around disastrous events. Just a few hours after the London Bridge terrorist attack in 2017, false information was spread by Russian controlled accounts originally used to manipulate US politics.</p> <p>During an emergency there is less need to target people carefully for information manipulation. Content can exploit the general fear and lack of quality information. Real social media users who normally would be careful about checking information can easily be manipulated to spread disinformation using urgent sounding messages. Furthermore, actors who would not normally worry about disinformation, such as local hospitals, can suddenly be implicated in an influence operation.</p>

Stages and actions	Comments on training content
<p>attacks on social media and claim that US forces refused to help Harmonia. Later they also claim that they were able to quickly locate and help their own citizens in Harmonia while other countries struggled.</p> <p>They also promote existing 5G conspiracy theories but amend them to falsely claim that the 5G equipment in Harmonia is produced in USA for use by their troops. To create further chaos in an ongoing situation they claim that hospitals in Harmonia are instructed to implant 5G chips on everyone who are operated at a hospital.</p>	<p>Content that relates to the event but focus on existing conspiracy theories, marginal political groups, and so on, can thus be used here.</p> <p>In a training situation it can be useful to provide ad-hoc content at this stage. This can be used to enhance the training by having live content that reacts to the scenario as it is played out in the training/exercise. This can be done by directly adding messages in the various social media clones, or by having prewritten content in an Excel spreadsheet, and select manually what and when something is deployed.</p>
<p>Offline Reactions (months 2 - 24)</p> <p>Anti-NATO demonstrations pop up, with a major one in front of the Parliament. Brutopian media airs interviews of Harmonians who express great concern over the upcoming exercise and NATO's aggression. The interviews reach a wide audience through social media.</p> <p>Polls in NATO countries show falling support for NATO's policies in the Harmonia border region, and a growing sympathy for Brutopia's concerns. In Harmonia, an increasing number of people say that they think NATO is to blame for the tense situation, and that it is unwise to host such a large NATO exercise so close to the Brutopian border.</p> <p>This leads to the establishment of a Facebook group called "Stop Exercise Allied Shield". The group gains over 100.000 members in an afternoon. Topics focus on costs and problems with Brutopia. The story is heavily promoted by Brutopian media and automated reposts, spreading to media outlets around the world.</p>	<p>Although Somulator is an online tool, it is important to reflect offline events relating to the scenario. Offline events can trigger online commentary, and online commentary can further inflame offline tensions.</p> <p>This vicious cycle can be emulated in Somulator by using content that make references to offline events, perhaps from a first-person perspective. An effective method could be to use generic videos, for instance of a protest, and write new text relevant to the training session. Such "real life events" could be reported by re-using existing content. See https://ffi.no/some-lab/sources for more information in this approach. Additional content could be in the form of responses to such content that support or challenge the reports.</p>

Full Spectrum Propaganda (months 18 - 24)	
<p>Reactions from Brutopian citizens inside and outside of Brutopia on social media are now mainly negative to Harmonia. The hashtag #ungratefulHarmonians, referencing the economic trade ties between Brutopia and the Domainia region, is trending.</p> <p>In social media many Harmonians close to the Brutopian border share this view and are openly critical of what they see as political ignorance from the capital. The chaos in the aftermath of the terrorist attack and the ongoing pro-Brutopian propaganda supports these local narratives.</p> <p>Foreign social media users enter the debate, including groups such as 4chan that create memes based on these incidents. It is getting attention in media abroad. News aggregation websites with few resources base their reporting on social media reports.</p> <p>A spokesman for Brutopian MoD says on Brutopian TV that that the problem isn't Harmonia's military, but that Harmonia does not have military command over NATO forces in Harmonia. The statement is received as a scandal in Harmonia even though this has been standard NATO policy for decades.</p> <p>The same evening the Harmonian national broadcaster airs a report from Brutopian TV. This shows a large Brutopian army deployment close to the Harmonian border.</p>	<p>How far one wants to go in a scenario depends on the time available, participants' needs and available resources. In the example scenario used here, this last section could be skipped as it primarily repeats the methods and topics discussed above.</p> <p>However, it could be used to rehearse how to defend against influence operations. The previous sections taught participants various methods deployed by influence operations. This section could let them develop ideas on how they could counteract the effects of these methods.</p> <p>This section also opens up the possibility to involve a wider range of roles than those directly targeted by an influence operation. This could be teachers who train secondary school pupils in source criticism or staff who could be pose an insider threat after being exposed to propaganda from the adversary.</p>

Table 2.1 Example scenario

The scenario discussed in Table 2.1 above has explored and explained how common influence operation methods could be simulated in Somulator. As a part of this exploration, references have been made to relevant sections of the report that explains in detail issues such as purpose of training, narratives, and the use of traditional media. The remainder of this report will now go through these and other issues in the context of creating content for Somulator training sessions. The reader may want to use this as a reference and then develop actual content, or it can be read in full for future use.

3 Issues to consider during development

This chapter will examine common issues that arise when developing content for training or exercises. Where relevant, the scenario in Table 2.1 will be referenced.

3.1 What is the overall purpose of the training?

The first thing to consider is the purpose of the training. For example, is the training intended for education, research or as part of a larger exercise? How long will the training programme be, and how many participants are involved? This can influence how the content should be designed and the amount of content required to achieve the relevant level of realism. Somulator can be used to train both simple and advanced scenarios, so this first consideration is important to assess.

3.2 Information types to train on

Disinformation is often used as a catch-all term for the type of problematic information related to online influence efforts. However, there are several different types, and it is worth considering the (sometimes subtle) differences between these types when planning the content. In addition to dis- and misinformation (defined in the Glossary of terms), UNESCO has categorised an additional category of undesirable information influence, mal-information (UNESCO, 2021).

Mal-information is information that is true but is deliberately used to cause harm. Jack Teixeira's leak of the Pentagon Papers in 2023 is an example of mal-information (Associated Press, 2023).

These three ways of categorising information are based on the sender's intention and the degree of truthfulness. However, we may also consider a fourth category:

Biased information is information that may be true, partially true or false, but where the information has been taken out of context, is re-contextualised, or has a strong bias that is unilaterally promoted to create division or support for preferred narratives. Pictures of a political protest in another country could for instance be re-used to show that the other country is on the brink of meltdown, when in fact such protests are simply a normal democratic expression.

Finally, **noise** is the authentic and organic content in social media that make it challenging to recognise unwanted information from an adversary. There are a lot of videos and images of, for example, cute animals and dance videos, or large amounts of adverts about, for example, furniture and clothing. This is content that may seem irrelevant for training in Somulator. However, by including a certain amount of noise the realism of the exercise can be enhanced.

3.3 Resources vs. realism

One of the aims of Somulator is to increase the realism of social media training. Realism in Somulator will often revolve around the amount of information and the type of information presented. This in turn needs to replicate the flow of information encountered in social media. However, the time available to create content and the number of participants in a training session sets certain limits on how realistic the training experience can be. Hence it is important to find a balance between the amount of noise that could mask an influence operation (and increase realism) and time available to create content that is not specific to the scenario. For this one could consider using existing libraries of content (see chapter 4.1.2.1) or using chatbots to generate the content (chapter 4.1.2.2).

3.4 Actors in a scenario: Planning for distribution channels setup

As shown in the scenario in Table 2.1, an adversary can use a mixture of overt and covert means to push out information and narratives. In Somulator each of these means are represented by a distribution channel. A distribution channel is the same as an online newspaper or a social media account.

3.4.1 Sender (Who is the influencer?)

When designing the purpose of the training, one needs to consider who the sender of the information is, i.e., the entity behind the influence operation. This affects the choice of platform, media channel and the content to be produced, because during the training you want to recreate the perspectives, capacities and methods of this sender. Some things to consider are:

3.4.1.1 Actor category

What category of actor are we talking about (see text box 3.1 below with examples of actor categories). This will have an impact on how information is coordinated. For example, Russia spent a lot of resources on accounts with false identities to influence the 2016 US presidential election (Seib, 2021, pp. 130–132) while the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group usually used real identities in their videos to recruit new members (Seib, 2021, p. 84).

Box 3.1: Examples of actor categories (Bjørgul et al., 2022):

- Governmental organisations
- Foreign state actors
- Non-state actors within their own state
- Non-state actors outside their own state
- Individuals

3.4.1.2 What is the sender's intermediate and overall objectives?

Different influence actors may have different overall strategic objectives in seeking to influence (Bjørgul et al., 2022, p. 22). For example, we see that Russia chooses to use unwanted influence to sow discord in democratic states by reinforcing existing attitudes and perceptions in the population (Bergh, 2020, p. 12). China, on the other hand, uses undue influence with the overall aim of changing the West's perception and attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party (Masaaki, 2022; Tran, 2023). However, for training it will be more beneficial to focus on a more intermediate goal that the sender has. This could be to influence the outcome of an election or sow divisions between allies, similar to the example scenario in Table 2.1.

3.4.1.3 Fake or real adversarial actors in the training?

It is not necessary to use names of real actors when training, although it can be argued that it can add realism to the training experience. Here it may be useful to return to the question of what the purpose of the training is and what you want to train on. If the purpose is to train on general preparedness, for example, it may not be necessary to refer to real actors. On the other hand, when training specifically to withstand disinformation from a particular country it might be beneficial to use real names of public figures and national or international bodies.

3.4.2 Receiver (Target group)

The receiver is the group of individuals that the sender targets with the unwanted influence. In a Somulator training session, target groups are played by the training participants. The participants may take on the same roles they have in real life (e.g., police) or they can take on the role of others, such as students acting as politicians. Who the target group is will vary depending on the purpose of the influence operation (Bergh, 2020, p. 12). Therefore, regardless of whether the training is simple or advanced, it will be necessary to consider who the sender wants to influence and why it may be desirable to influence that particular target group.

Based on the size of the training programme and the number of participants, it is conceivable that training participants roleplay several target groups. The choice of target group affects the type of content produced for Somulator, because the information disseminated must be perceived as relevant, engaging and credible by the recipient. Information that appeals to the emotions and corresponds to the recipient's attitudes and perceptions is spread more quickly in social media because the threshold for source criticism is lowered if one is emotionally affected (Shen et al., 2019; Shephard et al., 2023). In practice, this will have an impact on whether it is necessary to produce different sets of content sent to different participants, or whether it is sufficient to produce one set that is sent out to all participants. The question to ask is to what extent it is relevant to achieving the purpose of the training.

See <https://ffi.no/some-lab/sources> for links to sources for simple target group analysis.

3.4.3 Platform properties

Social media is an umbrella term that can overshadow the fact that the platforms have different characteristics as a result of different technologies (Van Dijck, 2013; Voorveld et al., 2018). Features of the different social media platforms provide different user experiences and fulfil different user needs (Bryant & Finklea, 2022; Voorveld et al., 2018). These platforms will also have differences in style, tone, norms and culture on the different platforms. Furthermore, different demographic groups have different platform preferences, older users often use Facebook, whereas younger users use TikTok. It is therefore relevant to consider which platform is best suited to reach the target group when preparing content for Somulator training, e.g., the YouTube clone with videos or basic newspaper articles.

To enhance the realism of a Somulator training session, one can take this into account in terms of the form and format of the content created, for instance using online newspapers for politicians or the YouTube clone for a more casual target audience.

3.4.4 Distribution channels: How to build a realistic distribution channel?

Distribution channels are the newspapers and social media accounts that Excon creates and controls during training. These are the "influence profiles" from which participants receive influence content. This requires that the profile(s) are defined in a way that does not make it obvious to the participants that they are being exposed to unwanted influences.¹

A credible distribution channel, whether it's a group channel or a personal channel, starts with a credible profile name and profile picture. Here one should think along the same lines as with narratives: who is the target audience for the profile? As discussed in previous chapters, it would be wise to customise the profile name and profile picture as follows:

- Style, tone, norms and culture on the platform or among target groups on the platform: Is it expected that you introduce yourself with a real name or a humorous profile name?
- Purpose of the profile: For example, is the profile intended to have entertainment value or political value for the target group?
- Current events: For example, if there a current event going on, such as Pride month, perhaps a profile is more credible if it displays rainbow graphics in the profile picture?

¹ See chapter 8.3.2

Create distribution channels in the main Somulator manual (Bergh, 2023) for practical information on how to set up a distribution channel in Somulator.




Figure 3.1 Examples of profile names and profile pictures.

Figure 3.1 shows examples of two user profiles, the former US president Donald Trump and the gamer Felix Arvid Ulf Kjellberg. The different platforms and purposes of the profiles mean that they have structured their profiles differently. Donald Trump gives a more formal impression with an informative style and tone, which is reflected in his full name and professional profile picture. Kjellberg, on the other hand, has chosen a fictitious username, "PewDiePie", and a graphic profile picture that reflects YouTube's more informal and entertaining style and tone.

3.5 Content, emulating the adversary to provide good training

3.5.1 Narratives

Narratives are stories that may present individual events in a particular order to give them a meaning, a cause-and-effect relationship that is understandable to the audience (Burton, 2010, pp. 10–12). A narrative can be understood as an overarching and unifying story shared by a group, which is then used by individuals to understand their own lives and the surrounding environment. For example, Russia promotes a narrative that portrays Ukrainians as Nazis. In this narrative, the invasion of Ukraine is a liberation of its own Russian citizens (Dåbakk, 2022).

3.5.1.1 Narratives and impact

The narratives one believes in have an impact on how one thinks and acts (Johannessen et al., 2021, p. 107). A narrative, used correctly, can therefore influence how the target group that one wants to influence interprets new information. Influencers can either construct a new narrative or play on existing narratives, directly or by distorting them. For example, Donald Trump played on the narrative of the "American Dream" during the 2016 US presidential election. This is a narrative that many of the American voters were familiar with and could identify with. Identification with a narrative means that voters may become more favourable to that person's overall rhetoric (Polletta & Callahan, 2019).

It can be easier to play on existing narratives that support an actor's objectives, than to create engagement around a new narrative. Playing on existing narratives can more easily engage recipients to spread the unwanted information further and thus influence the algorithm that is embedded in the real social media (Bergh, 2020). The explanation lies in the fact that people are more susceptible to believing information that corresponds to pre-existing perceptions and attitudes (Brewer, 2007).



Connor
@cdbeaton



Your new poster resembles outright Nazi propaganda, @Nigel_Farage.
Thanks to @brendanjharkin for pointing it out.

[Oversett tweeten](#)



Figure 3.2 The 2016 referendum on the UK's EU membership.

The implication of this is that it will be useful to familiarise oneself with the narratives that a real-life target group believes in and uses. In figure 3.2 one can observe how the user writes “Your new poster resembles outright Nazi propaganda” to guide how to interpret the two images attached to the post. The images, in the context of the scripture, can reduce support for the politician in question, in this case Nigel Farage (Stewart & Mason, 2016).

The use of relevant narratives would improve the learning outcome for the participants.

3.5.2 Text, images and video

In addition to being adapted to the purpose of the training, the content should also be customised according to the different social media clones in Somulator. Each social media facilitates different uses of text, images and video. For example, writing dominates on X, while images and videos dominate on Instagram. This further influences the style and tone, in other words, the impression, one can get from the platforms. For example, X can give the impression of seriousness and formality due to the norm of using writing, while Instagram may give the impression of emphasising aesthetics and creativity due to the focus on visuals. The choice of media to use depends on 1) the purpose of the training, 2) the platform, and 3) the desired impression left on the recipient.

3.5.3 Relationship between traditional media and social media in Somulator

When setting up an online newspaper in Somulator, in addition to the considerations discussed above, one should think about the coverage area of the online newspaper. Should it have a local, national or international angle? Or is it better to focus on specific areas of interest such as economics, Asia or Christianity? The editorial/online newspaper's potential bias could be expressed in its editorial. This can be combined with a simulated viral spread by using distribution channels on the different social media clones to share links to individual newspaper articles and thus increase the spread of traditional media content.

3.6 Summary of content planning/development

The learning impact when using Somulator will benefit from the right combination of believable distribution channels, relevant narratives and matching content formats. The extended communication model (Phelps et al., 2017) summarises these issues and can be a useful aid in the Somulator development phase.




Figure 3.3 The extended communication model. The bracketed text show how the different elements relate to Somulator training.

The extended communication model shown in figure 3.3 is a simplified illustration of the elements that should be taken into account when working with strategic communication. The sender is the actor who wants to exert influence over a specific target group through information. To achieve this, the information must first be shaped (encoded) in a way that allows the recipient to perceive the information as the sender wishes. For example, the information can be expressed as a text in Norwegian, and then the text is sent as a post through the Mastodon platform (channel). The recipient then reads the message in Mastodon and further interprets the message (decoding). Regardless of whether the recipient perceived the message as intended, it can be assumed that it will generate some form of reaction (feedback). Throughout this process, content noise may exist; peripheral, organic information that may prevent the recipient from recognising that they are exposed to an influence.

Having discussed the issues that should be considered when planning a training session or an exercise in Somulator, this report will now explore how to create content in practical terms.

4 How to create content (Production)

4.1.1 Create content: Composition of information type

Influence operations come in different forms. In addition to appearing as, for example, specifically self-produced disinformation or propaganda from fake or hidden profiles, it can just as well hide behind existing content from authentic users (Bergh, 2020). An influencer can reuse existing profiles for new purposes, hack ordinary users' accounts to create the impression of grassroots support, or amplify and spread authentic posts with opinions and narratives that support the influencer's overall goal (see chapter 4.1.2, *ibid*). It is up to the Excon staff to decide how to categorise the information, and hence the posts, to be used for the training. Before starting to produce the content, one should have made up one's mind about how much of the total content production should belong to the information categories that have been set. This will also depend on the scenario that is used.



Figure 4.1 From left to right, examples of how the composition of content can be categorised by: Sender's intention, content types and genre. The purpose of such a categorisation is to aid in the content development process. In this way one can for instance estimate how many videos would be required, or how many text-based messages to create. Other compositions may also be used, for instance what languages to use (70% Norwegian and 30% English for instance).

Figure 4.1 exemplifies three ways of thinking about the composition of the information categories. The three charts here are only intended to help you think about how you can put together different content to simulate a realistic picture of what you might encounter on social media. The size of the information categories is not a formula for creating realism. The content composition must always be customised according to the purpose of the training and the above-mentioned discussion on platform and user considerations.

4.1.2 Procedures for producing content

The approach one chooses to produce content depends on a number of considerations. Below in Table 4.1 is an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches, which will be discussed in detail in chapters 4.1.2.1 to 4.1.2.3.

	Advantages	Disadvantages
Manual content	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suitable for customising content. • Less chance of violating copyright law. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time-consuming to produce.
Reuse of content	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suitable for producing a larger amount of content faster. • Reusing other people's work and re-contextualising it is common internet culture. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The material may be protected by copyright. • Can be time-consuming to find relevant material. • The material may be outdated.
AI-generated content	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Produces different types of content quickly on instruction. • Can produce biased content and harmful content. • Can contextualise visual material (images and video) and respond to other people's articles. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited amount of content that can be produced in each batch. • Rejects inappropriate requests that directly ask it to generate false / manipulative content. • To ensure relevant content, precise and detailed descriptions must be provided in the instructions.

Table 4.1 Benefits and drawbacks of different methods for creating or obtaining content

When putting together content that simulates real social media, the approach should be chosen according to what you want to train on. An overarching question to keep in mind is the balance between quality and quantity.

4.1.2.1 Manual content production

Producing manual content means that you create material that can be published for a specific purpose. This involves actively going out and taking your own photos, filming and writing your own text.

The advantage of manual content production is that you have control over the product during all phases of production. This makes manual content production particularly suitable if you are looking for content that is tailored to the training's purpose or a specific stakeholder's objectives. At the same time, there is less chance that the content violates copyright, but you must remember to avoid plagiarism.

The disadvantage of producing content manually is that it can be time consuming to produce a large enough amount of content that can be used in Somulator to simulate the flow of

information in social media because each individual post requires time to be set aside for the idea phase, recording, editing and finalisation.

4.1.2.2 Reusing content

Reusing content that others have created involves everything from directly copying and reusing the material as it was first produced, but it can also involve taking an existing text, image or video and putting it into a new context to adapt it to its own purpose. In this way, there can be an overlap between reusing content and manually producing content.

Advantages: Reusing existing material saves time that would otherwise have gone into planning the recording and designing the raw material. At the same time, reusing other people's work and putting it into a new context has always been part of online culture. This suggests that this method may be suitable for producing a larger amount of data that can be used in Somulator more quickly. In particular, it may be suitable for producing noise content such as entertainment content or memes that simulate the vastness of random content on social media.

See <https://ffi.no/some-lab/sources> for examples of how to find open sources for data and illustrations.

Disadvantages: When reusing content, care must be taken to ensure that it is not protected by copyright law. As long as the material is not marked with a licence stating that it is free to use or that it can be used under certain conditions, it is not allowed to use it. See fact box 4.1 regarding ethical issues for more information on copyright and licences. Another disadvantage of using other people's work is that it can be time-consuming to find material that you consider relevant for your own purposes. At the same time, even if the content is relevant, it may be designed in a way that is no longer in tune with the norms and culture of the platform at the time. This consideration should be assessed in terms of whether the material enhances or detracts from the realism and learning impact of the training.

Box 4.1: Ethical and legal issues

When producing content, there are two main considerations to be aware of.

1. Privacy issues/data protection

Privacy is about protecting people's privacy and their right to control their own personal data. Although it may be more realistic for training to use real profiles and the following personal background, it may be unethical and/or illegal without the person's consent. To avoid violating privacy, fake names can be given to different profiles, but which are still intended to act in the same role of responsibility as the intended character. Be aware that even if you change the names of people and places, you may still be in breach of the law on the protection of sensitive information if other information makes it clear which person is being discussed. In most of Europe it is the GDPR rules that are relevant (Greene et al., 2019).

2. Copyright

Copyright is about protecting the intellectual property of the creator. An intellectual work, an original creative work, can be books, films, music, photographs or computer programmes, but it also covers a single tweet from a private individual. Copyright is particularly important when reusing material found through open sources. One solution is to filter the search on the internet to searches that are registered with "Creative Commons copyright licences". These licenses will let you re-use the content, as long as you follow certain rules, such as attributing a picture to the person who took it.

4.1.2.3 Content production using AI technology

With the advent of ChatGPT and similar technologies, the quality of text, images and videos generated by so-called large language models has improved rapidly. These models use a subset of artificial intelligence research that rely on machine learning to process a large number of texts on a particular topic, for instance, climate change. From this the software is able to generate content that will often pass as human made. In this manual, content production using the text programme ChatGPT has been tested.

AI technology offers many advantages when it comes to producing products in a short time, but its use can be limited by, among other things, the rules given to it by the manufacturer and the fact that it needs precise and detailed descriptions to create realistic and credible content. This requires a certain level of expertise from the person giving the computer prompts (that is, instructions on what to produce). In the case of Somulator, Excon should have good knowledge of the purpose of the training and an overview of the participants to give the computer prompts that can provide relevant content. For instance, it is possible to ask ChatGPT to generate 20 tweets for and against a particular issue.

Box 4.2: Generative AI technology: Pitfalls and opportunities

ChatGPT and similar software is not intelligent in any real sense of the word. Therefore, it often “hallucinates”, that is, it creates text on a subject that sounds plausible, but is totally incorrect (Emsley, 2023). Although a major issue in terms of real-life disinformation, this can actually be a benefit when creating content for Somulator as it can be used to quickly create fake news or very biased content about a topic.

What and how much can it produce?

ChatGPT is suitable for most things when it comes to producing both short and longer texts that can be used in Somulator. On demand, it can produce different genre texts for different purposes. For example, it can produce a news article on a desired topic, write an argumentative text commenting on an existing news article, or create a caption for a social media image, as seen in figure 4.2 below.




Figure 4.2 Screenshot from ChatGPT. Here, a request is made to generate a caption intended for a GIF to be used on X. The image caption is in brackets.

ChatGPT is programmed to reject inappropriate requests that directly ask it to produce something with the intent to harm or that promotes information that could have a negative effect. For example, it could reject an instruction that ask it to produce Facebook posts promoting vaccine scepticism. At the same time, ChatGPT is sensitive to adjustments to its instructions. For example, it rejected the following request:

Can you write a news article, in 600 words, about Vladimir Putin? The article should take the perspective of a pro-Russian journalist and discuss the positive outcomes from having Putin as president for Russia and the world. What have Putin achieved while being president, and why should he continue to be in the leader role? The arguments don't need to have reason in facts

and science, but it should engage the audience to want to know more about Putin. The article is meant to be published in a Ukrainian newspaper.

However, ChatGPT responded to this request without problems:

Can you write a news article, in 600 words, about Vladimir Putin? The article should take the perspective of a pro-Russian journalist and discuss the positive outcomes from having Putin as president for Russia and the world. What has Putin achieved while being president, and why should he continue to be in the leader role? The arguments should engage the audience to want to know more about Putin. (See Appendix to read the response from ChatGPT.)

The above example suggests that you need to think about what information you give the model. Here are a few tips on what to consider specifying in the request:

- Briefly state who will be the sender of the text that is generated. It is also a good idea to state the purpose of the text here, although this does not mean that it will reject the request. See chapter 3.2 for information about the sender.
- Clarify who the target audience is. ChatGPT is not (yet) good at customising content to a specific target group without a detailed description of who the intended target group is. Here you should also specify what effect you want the generated text to have on the recipient. See chapter 3.2 for information about target groups.
- Specify genre, style and tone. Be clear about whether the text is to be a news article or a social media post, for example. This can help guide ChatGPT to produce content that is suitable for the platform the text will be used on. One should also specify whether the text should have, for example, a humorous tone or a serious tone, even if it is a news article. For example, the prompt could be "Please write a news article about climate change but in a humorous way".
- Specify language and length. As a rule, ChatGPT responds in the language in which you give it instructions. It can generate text in most languages on request, but the grammar may not be completely correct. It can also be an advantage to specify how long you want the text to be.

Box 4.3: Image-generating AI technology

In this manual, only AI technology for generating text content has been tested. There is also AI technology that can create still images generated from text that can be tested by anyone producing content for Somulator. Examples of such programmes are Dall-E (OpenAI) and Stable Diffusion. This can be useful to generate illustrations for a fictional scenario.

4.2 Reaching different target groups in Somulator without content selection

The fact that Excon recognises and understands the participants as one or more target groups is important to create realism in the training because they must be able to distribute the content to the relevant participant. In social media, automated software “algorithms” will do the target group analysis for the sender. Such automated content selection outside the user's control can help to confirm and reinforce the group's narrative, attitudes and perceptions. In Somulator, Excon need to undertake this content selection by matching content with relevant distribution channels. The participants can then be connected to all or some of these channels (by being assigned as followers or subscribers to an account).




Figure 4.3 Setup where different training participants will be connected to different distribution channels, and thus be exposed to different content/narratives through these channels.

The matrix above in figure 4.3 illustrate how different groups in a Somulator training session are exposed to different types of narratives. Table 4.2 below provides a summary of the advantages and disadvantages when different training participants are exposed to different content in Somulator.

	Advantages	Disadvantages	Suitability
Similar content	Participants gain the same experience from the training.	Less realistic.	For simple workouts.
Different content	More realistic.	Time-consuming to produce.	For advanced training or training where the aim of the sender is to create discord between groups.

Table 4.2 Considerations for target groups and platforms

This concludes the discussions on issues to consider, and the practical aspects of creating content for training sessions in Somulator.

5 Recapitulation

Somulator is a tool that facilitates social media training to help those who might be the target of online influence operations understand how such influence efforts work. Through such training one can build resilience toward online dis- and misinformation. A key aspect of such training efforts is the information (known as content) that training participants are presented with during their role playing within Somulator. This report showed how to best plan and create relevant content for Somulator.

The relationship between a **training scenario and relevant content** was illustrated in chapter 2 by introducing an influence operation scenario in Table 2.1. Each section of the scenario included a discussion about what types of content could provide good learning in the different stages of the scenario.

In chapter 3 the different issues to consider when **planning content** for Somulator was discussed. This included the different types of problematic information – disinformation, misinformation, mal-information and biased information and the importance of generic, non-influence related social media content. The presence of the latter type of content increases the realism when using Somulator while hiding influence content better, thus increasing the learning potential.

It was then suggested that when using Somulator it is worth first analysing how real-world influence actors use online news and social media platforms: What is the overarching and intermediate goals when they try to influence people, what types of accounts do they create, what narratives do they deploy, who are the target groups for different narratives. This section concluded by using the extended communications model to summarise how people typically encounter and process content online.

Chapter 4 provided a discussion on how to **create content**, whether manually (typing one and one tweet) or by reusing existing content from online sources, if allowed by the license of the content. It also provided a summary of how recent advances in so-called large language models can help to create content by using text generation software to, for instance, provide 20 tweets on a particular topic. This section was concluded by showing how the automated selection of content for different target groups can be emulated in Somulator.

Overall, the focus of this report has been on explaining how Somulator can be used to increase the realism of social media role playing, whether in a training session, for research or during an exercise.

Appendix

A Example ChatGPT response

ChatGPT is one of many machine learning tools that can generate textual content from short descriptions known as prompts. The example below comes from the following prompt:

Can you write a news article, in 600 words, about Vladimir Putin? The article should take the perspective of a pro-Russian journalist and discuss the positive outcomes from having Putin as president for Russia and the world. What has Putin achieved while being president, and why should he continue to be in the leader role? The arguments should engage the audience to want to know more about Putin.

Title: Vladimir Putin's Stewardship: A Vision for Russia's Progress and Global Stability

Date: August 11, 2023

Author: [Your Name]

In the tapestry of global leadership, one name shines brightly – Vladimir Putin. As President of Russia, Putin's tenure has been marked by remarkable achievements that have transformed the nation's trajectory and left an indelible mark on the world stage. As we reflect on his leadership, it becomes evident that Putin's continued role is paramount for both Russia and the global community.

Economic Resurgence and Stability

Under Putin's stewardship, Russia's economy has been revitalized and fortified against external pressures. His commitment to diversification and investment in key sectors has paved the way for robust growth, even amidst global uncertainties. Energy exports, advanced technologies, and agricultural advancements have fueled Russia's economic engine, contributing not only to national progress but also to the stability of global markets.

Geopolitical Balance and Diplomatic Acumen

Putin's strategic acumen has reasserted Russia's role as a global player and broker of stability. His deft diplomacy has led to constructive engagements with partners and rivals alike, mitigating conflicts and fostering cooperation. Notably, his efforts in resolving the Syrian crisis underscore Russia's commitment to global peace, emphasizing dialogue over confrontation.

Safeguarding Sovereignty and National Identity

Putin's presidency has seen Russia assert its sovereignty and uphold its unique cultural identity. His steadfast leadership has protected Russia's interests on the global stage, ensuring that the nation's voice is heard in matters of international importance. By nurturing a sense of pride in Russian heritage, Putin has cultivated a stronger and more resilient nation, capable of navigating complex geopolitical currents.

Investments in Infrastructure and Modernization

Putin's vision extends beyond political and diplomatic realms, encompassing tangible improvements to the lives of ordinary citizens. His ambitious infrastructure projects have revitalized cities, connected remote regions, and enhanced transportation networks. By modernizing Russia's infrastructure, Putin has facilitated economic growth, improved quality of life, and bolstered national connectivity.

Championing Technological Advancements

Russia's advancements in technology owe much to Putin's commitment to innovation. His support for scientific research and development has fostered breakthroughs in fields ranging from space exploration to artificial intelligence. By nurturing a culture of innovation, Putin is paving the way for Russia to be a leader in the technological frontier of the 21st century.

Continuity and Stability in Uncertain Times

In an increasingly unpredictable world, Putin's steady hand offers a sense of continuity and stability. His experience and pragmatism have shielded Russia from the turbulence of global events, providing a steady anchor for citizens and investors alike. This stability has not only fostered domestic confidence but has also contributed to a more predictable international environment.

The Road Ahead: Embracing Putin's Leadership

As the world looks to the future, the prospect of Putin's continued leadership offers promise for both Russia and the global community. His accomplishments speak volumes about his dedication to progress, stability, and cooperation. Putin's capacity to steer Russia through complex challenges and his unwavering commitment to global harmony make a compelling case for his continued role on the international stage.

In a world yearning for leadership that balances national interests with global cooperation, Vladimir Putin stands as an exemplar. His achievements, commitment to peace, and unwavering determination to propel Russia forward make him a leader worthy of further exploration and contemplation. As we look toward the horizon, it is evident that Vladimir Putin's journey is far from over, and his continued presence promises to shape a brighter future for Russia and the world at large.

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About FFI

The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) was founded 11th of April 1946. It is organised as an administrative agency subordinate to the Ministry of Defence.

FFI's mission


FFI is the prime institution responsible for defence related research in Norway. Its principal mission is to carry out research and development to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces. FFI has the role of chief adviser to the political and military leadership. In particular, the institute shall focus on aspects of the development in science and technology that can influence our security policy or defence planning.

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FFI turns knowledge and ideas into an efficient defence.

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