

Permanent readiness units in the Russian Armed Forces

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard and Rolf-Inge Vogt Andresen

Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

9 February 2009

FFI-rapport 2009/00605

1114

P: ISBN 978-82-464-1551-2

E: ISBN 978-82-464-1552-9

Keywords

Russland

Russlands væpnede styrker

Russisk forsvarsreform

Profesjonalisering

Beredskapsavdelinger

Approved by

Tor Bukkvoll

Project Manager

Espen Skjelland

Director of Research

Jan Erik Torp

Director

English summary

The Russian Armed Forces are currently undergoing a process of professionalisation, the aim of which is to build a 70 per cent professional force, retaining only 30 per cent conscript soldiers. The process of professionalising the Land and Airborne Forces is mapped out in this study. An attempt has been made to obtain an overall picture of units and formations that have been professionalised and are on so-called permanent readiness. The permanent readiness units will be the sharpest end of the future Russian Armed Forces. Hence a survey of these units can provide important insights to analyses of the current and future state of the Russian Armed Forces.

There is considerable uncertainty as to the validity of available data based on open sources. There is reason to believe that Russian authorities themselves do not possess exact data on the current state of professionalisation. In its conclusion, the report gives two estimates, one low – 75,000 – and one high – 150,000 – for the number of professional soldiers in the Land and Airborne Forces today. These soldiers serve in the permanent readiness units that are supposed to be best trained and equipped for participation in future operations.

Sammendrag

Det russiske forsvaret skal profesjonaliseres. Kun 30 prosent av de væpnede styrker skal bestå av vernepliktige. Denne studien kartlegger profesjonaliseringsprosessen i landstridskreftene og luftlandestyrkene med sikte på å få oversikt over hvilke avdelinger som er profesjonalisert og nå står på såkalt permanent beredskap, og hvor mange soldater avdelingene består av. Det er disse avdelingene som i fremtiden sannsynligvis vil utgjøre de viktigste delene av det russiske forsvaret. En kartlegging av disse avdelingene gir derfor viktig innsikt i både dagens og fremtidens russiske forsvar.

Det er knyttet stor usikkerhet til tallmaterialet som er basert på åpne kilder. Det er grunn til å anta at heller ikke russiske myndigheter har full oversikt over hvor langt profesjonaliseringsprosessen har kommet. Rapporten konkluderer med to estimater: Tallet på profesjonelle soldater i landstridskreftene og luftlandestyrkene i dag anslås til mellom 75 000 og 150 000. Disse soldatene tjenestegjør i permanente beredskapsavdelinger. Beredskapsavdelingene skal utgjøre den delen av det russiske forsvaret som er best trent og utrustet for deltakelse i operasjoner i fremtiden.

Contents

1	Introduction	7
2	The professionalisation process	8
2.1	The Pskov experiment	9
2.2	The Federal targeted programme	9
3	Data on professionalisation – challenges	11
4	Findings	14
4.1	Total numbers	15
4.2	Numbers for each military district	16
4.2.1	Leningrad military district	17
4.2.2	Kaliningrad special region	17
4.2.3	Moscow military district	18
4.2.4	Volga-Ural military district	18
4.2.5	Siberia military district	19
4.2.6	Far Eastern military district	19
4.2.7	North Caucasus military district	20
5	Final assessments	20
5.1	Estimate 1: The low end – 75,000 professionals	20
5.2	Estimate 2: The high end – 150,000 professionals	21
5.3	The road ahead	22
Appendix A	Listings of all Russian military units pr. military district, professional and non-professional, with sources	24
A.1	Leningrad military district ground and airborne forces	24
A.2	Moscow military district ground and airborne forces	25
A.3	Volga-Urals military district ground and airborne forces	28
A.4	Siberian military district land and airborne forces	29
A.5	Far Eastern military district land and airborne forces	30
A.6	North Caucasus military district ground and airborne forces	32
	References	36

1 Introduction

This report is an output of the FFI project “Russia’s Armed Forces towards 2020 – Implications for the High North”. The project aims to analyse trends and developments of relevance to Norway’s security situation and defence planning. The main research areas are defence economy; defence industry and technology; the High North in Russian security policy.

Permanent readiness units (PRU) will be the sharp end of the future Russian Armed Forces in the future. In this study, the process of professionalisation is mapped out and an attempt is made to obtain an overall picture of units and formations that have been professionalised and are on permanent readiness. A survey of these units can contribute important insights to analyses of the current and future state of the Russian Armed Forces.

As part of an overall strategy to move away from Soviet doctrine and structures, the idea of creating a number of well-equipped and well-trained units to make up the core of the Armed Forces had circulated since the beginning of the 1990s. During Putin’s first presidency, the concept of permanent readiness units as the sharp end of the Armed Forces became a key element of military reform. The principle of manning these units with professionals was established at an early stage.¹ With the adoption of radical new reform plans in the autumn of 2008, the role of permanent readiness units has become even more vital to Russia’s military capabilities. Still, “permanent readiness unit” (Rus. “часть постоянной готовности”/“chast’ postoiannoï gotovnosti”) is a rather vague concept which has been the subject of much speculation. Detailed information seems scarce. The two concepts of “permanent readiness units” and “professional units” will be used interchangeably for the purpose of this report, since the permanent readiness units are supposed to consist only of professional soldiers.

Chapter 2 of this study gives an account of the background for the process of reform and professionalisation leading up to today’s situation. This process has been difficult, partly because of resistance to change within the military. Moreover, the actual results are disputable. Although the programme of professionalisation seemed to stake out quite clearly the future direction of the professional Russian Armed Forces, ascertaining which units in the Armed Forces that are in the process of becoming or have become professional, has proved troublesome. The uncertainty connected with the numbers and data found is described in chapter 3. Chapter 4 contains the main findings of our enquiry, and chapter 5 gives two estimates, one low and one high, for the current state of the process of professionalisation.

The analysis is focused on *the Land and Airborne Forces*. Detailed information about the units that have been professionalised in these branches is to some extent available from open sources. Today, studies of Russian military affairs in the West as well as in Russia are commonly based on open sources. In addition to the fact that basing research on open source information has become

¹ Korotchenko Igor’: “Transfer to contract becomes an axiom”, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 10 Apr 2003.

possible, it allows for writing unclassified reports. The potential number of readers will be larger, and research may inform public debate.

With regard to the Navy, the Air Force, and the Strategic Forces in particular, detailed information is scant. A target has been set for all sailing formations and all of the Air Force and Strategic Forces to become professional, with the exception of some categories of base, support, and non-combat personnel. Beyond that, it is difficult to determine how many of the troops in these branches that are professional soldiers and sergeants.²

Far-reaching reforms of the Russian Armed Forces have recently been announced. As part of the reforms, the number of military units will be cut drastically (from 1890 to 172), and the role of PRUs will be enhanced.³ The aims of these reforms are not known in their specifics. The object of this report is limited to establishing an overall picture of the present state of professionalisation. There is reason to believe, however, that the units that have been professionalised thus far will remain so – and so this might be a preview of the key units in the future Russian Armed Forces.

2 The professionalisation process

The professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces has long been an issue of contention between Russian military and civilian leaders. Partial professionalisation of the military was attempted under Yeltsin. In 1997, there were reportedly four divisions and three brigades that were on permanent readiness, although it is not known how many, if any, were professional.⁴ Two campaigns in Chechnya demonstrated that not even the more able Russian military units were well enough trained or equipped for protracted, asymmetrical war-fighting against an elusive enemy. By the time Putin took over, he was determined to push forward with defence reform, which included professionalising the forces. He wanted to enhance the combat readiness of troops and never again use conscript soldiers for complex operations such as in Chechnya. The appointment of a “civilian”, Sergei Ivanov,⁵ as Defence Minister in 2001 signified this determination of the new Russian administration not to be dictated by the military leadership in questions of military policy. However, when Ivanov declared in 2003 that military reform had been completed, this seemed to be more out of a realisation of the difficulty of implementing

² In today’s Russian defence structure, only the Army, Navy, and Air Force are *branches* of the Armed Forces (Rus. “виды вооружённых сил”/“vidy vooruzhënykh sil”), whereas the Airborne Forces together with the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Space Forces are independent *arms of service* (Rus. “рода войск”/“roda vojsk”). The latter three are often referred to as “troops” (Rus. “войска”/“voiska”).

³ Shcherbakov Vladimir: “Peculiarities of National Military Reform”, *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, 31 Oct 2008; Gavrilov Iurii: “Reduction of Generals”, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 15 Oct 2008.

⁴ Trenin Dmitri, Malashenko Aleksei: *Russia’s Restless Frontier. The Chechnya Factor in post-Soviet Russia*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. 2004, p. 111.

⁵ Ivanov has served as an officer in the security services – the KGB, the FSB, and the SVR (the Foreign Intelligence Service) – but he has never been a *military* officer. He was the first Defence Minister in Soviet and post-Soviet time to come from outside the Armed Forces.

reform than out of having achieved tangible results in the reform process.⁶ From that point onwards, the defence leadership started talking about the "modernisation" of the Russian Armed Forces. This may have reflected a realisation by Putin and his administration that they relied on support from the military and did not have sufficient political capital for the comprehensive undertaking needed for genuine reform of the Russian Armed Forces.

2.1 The Pskov experiment

The decision to professionalise parts of the Russian Armed Forces was thus largely imposed on the military leadership, most of which was keen to retain the conscript service and a Cold War style military organisation based on the principle of mass mobilisation.⁷ An experiment was launched in September 2002 with the airborne division at Pskov to assess the cost and process of professionalising a military unit. The experience was later to be used as a blueprint for professionalising other units in the Russian Armed Forces. The experiment ran into a number of problems almost before it had started. The first and most important was the incompatibility of the financial provisions and the extensive social provisions of the contract soldiers, especially promises of housing.⁸ In addition, the 76th airborne division was not able to attract the type of recruits that one had hoped for. Some observers have concluded that the failure of the experiment was an intended outcome by the officers who designed it, the aim being to halt any further spread of professionalism in the Armed Forces.⁹

2.2 The Federal targeted programme

Notwithstanding the fact that the Pskov experiment was a near failure, the programme design for professionalising the Russian Armed Forces went ahead, and the first programme for comprehensive professionalisation was launched 25 August 2003. "The Federal targeted programme for the transfer of soldiers to contract service in a number of units and armed formations 2004–2007" outlined the main provisions for the continued professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces.¹⁰ At the programme's inception in 2003, there were already 22,100 professional soldiers and sergeants in the parts of the Armed Forces that were included in the programme.¹¹

⁶ Thornton Rod: "Military Organization and Change: The 'Professionalisation' of the 76th Airborne Division", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol.17 issue 3, Sept 2004.

⁷ The reasons for this keenness to retain conscripts have been explained by many factors, the first and foremost of course being the vastness of the Russian territory and the need for defending this with a numerous force. Other factors include possibilities for corruption and the use of conscript labour for non-military purposes. Moreover, the need for a large officer corps seems also to have influenced the Russian military's stance on professionalisation, which would inevitably lead to dramatic cuts in the number of officers. Thornton Rod: "Military Organization and Change: The 'Professionalisation' of the 76th Airborne Division", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol.17 issue 3, Sept 2004.

⁸ The financial provision for the experiment was 1,496.5 million RUB in the 2003 budget, approximately 44 million EUR when the budget was passed. Kudelina Liubov: "Troop support. Defense Budget–2004", *Russian Military Review*, no. 002, 29 Feb 2004.

⁹ Thornton Rod: "Military Organization and Change: The 'Professionalisation' of the 76th Airborne Division", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol.17 issue 3, Sept 2004.

¹⁰ "The Federal targeted programme", *Krasnaia zvezda*, no. 222, 25 Nov 2004.

¹¹ Ibid.

The initial plan was to transfer a total of 209 units of various sizes from Russia's uniformed agencies to contract Manning – 91 units from the Ministry of Defence, 83 units from the Federal Security Service Border Guard, five units from the Interior Ministry, two units from the Federal Special Construction Agency, and 28 units from the Federal Railway Force Service, with altogether 176,000 servicemen.¹² The Defence Ministry was going to convert permanent units with a total of 155,300 men into all-contract forces. An interdepartmental working group calculated the costs already incurred by the introduction of contract-based recruitment and estimated the total costs of the programme to be 139.9 billion roubles. The proposed budget was then scaled down by the Finance Ministry to 94.6 billion, later to 79.1 billion, i.e. slightly more than 55 per cent of initially projected expenses.¹³ The scope of the programme had to be reduced. The Federal Special Construction Agency and the Federal Railway Force Service were removed from the list. In its final version, the programme would include 80 units manned by 147,600 servicemen. Of these, 72 units with 133,400 men were in the Armed Forces.

The programme measures were grouped along two lines: i) social guarantees and "increases of the attractiveness" of contract service on the posts of soldiers and sergeants, and ii) the improvement of combat readiness of the units transferred to the new method of Manning. Budget allocations for the programme would be drawn from the budget chapters "National defence" and "Law enforcement and provisions of national state security". Of the 79.1 billion roubles, some 68.4 billion was to be allocated to the Armed Forces. About two thirds of this would cover direct expenses, whereas the rest would be spent on capital investments; a tiny fraction was allocated to R&D.¹⁴

The state of "permanent readiness" was taken to mean that units and formations would be at least 80 per cent manned and equipped and ready to deploy to a combat zone on short notice and without further mobilisation. The units were envisaged as mobile, i.e. capable of deploying into any region to settle missions of localising possible armed conflicts and crushing the enemy.¹⁵ The system of training in these units would be enhanced, with a focus on heightening the combat readiness and professionalism of whole units. Moreover, professionalisation was to be achieved through better service conditions for contracted servicemen, including improved housing services, increased level of perks, and more beneficial pay structures. In total, the process of professionalising the forces was in Russia seen as a cure-all for many of the ills that had haunted the Russian Armed Forces since the fall of the Soviet Union.

¹² Alexandrov Vladimir: "Contract service. The Cost of a Volunteer Soldier", *Russian Military Review*, no. 10, 31 Oct 2004.

¹³ Equivalent to approximately 2.15 billion EUR at the start of the programme. "New Conscription Concept Unveiled", Russian Ministry of Defence website; www.mil.ru/eng/1862/12069/index.shtml, accessed 15 Oct 2008.

¹⁴ "The Federal targeted programme", *Krasnaia zvezda*, no. 222, 25 Nov 2004.

¹⁵ Denisov Vitalii, Gafutulin Nail': "We have already outgrown an old overcoat", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 3 Oct 2003.

A number of reports describe how the plan of recruitment was not achieved according to the Federal targeted programme.¹⁶ However, few details are given, and it is difficult to determine exactly how far the Ministry of Defence did come in the recruitment process. In the spring of 2007, it was reported that the Defence Ministry asked for an additional 10 billion roubles for the completion of the programme, but that additional funding was not granted.¹⁷ The consequences of such lack of funding are unknown. Moreover, it has also been reported that some of the results of the Federal targeted programme were achieved by illegal methods such as forcing conscripts to sign contracts for the remainder of their service.

However, few numbers are obtainable with regard to the shortcomings of the professionalisation process, beyond the mentioning of “several thousand contractor positions remaining vacant”.¹⁸ Shortly before the end of the programme period, Deputy Defence Minister Nikolai Pankov asserted that 100,000 soldiers and sergeants would be serving in units of permanent readiness by the beginning of 2008. The general said that the Federal targeted programme had a target of 81 professional units and formations with 125,000 servicemen, and that fulfillment of the programme should be accomplished in a few months.¹⁹

What can be concluded, due to the change of targets, as well as the lack of definite proof of the results achieved, is that professionalisation has not progressed according to plan. The further course of professionalisation will be left undescribed here. The focus of this report is on identifying professional units and establishing estimates of professional troops after the completion of the Federal targeted programme. As discussed in the next chapter, this effort is complicated by a number of circumstances related to the quality of available information.

3 Data on professionalisation – challenges

The implementation of professionalisation in the Russian Armed Forces can be read as a series of confusing and incomplete sets of figures. Ascertaining the reliability and validity of the information that can be found is a central part of the work on a study like this. Different branches of government and the Armed Forces seem to provide quite varying data and numbers. Sources of confusion are many. Information is limited both by official authorities’ general lack of openness in these matters and by deliberate secrecy on the part of various actors.

Difficulties with establishing reliable figures will apply even to the basic question of how many troops Russia has. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, the total number of manpower in the Russian Armed Forces currently stands at 1,134,000 (October 2008).²⁰ However, according to

¹⁶ Gol’ts Aleksandr: “Minus one division”, *Ezhednevnyi zhurnal*, 15 Dec 2006; Litovkin Sergei: “Contract soldiers flee from bluff and humbug”, *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, 29 Jun 2007; Mukhin Vladimir, “Military professionals flee from barracks”, *Nezavisimaa gazeta*, 3 Dec 2007.

¹⁷ Bozh’eva Ol’ga: “Defence Ministry prolongs the contract”, *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 13 Apr 2007.

¹⁸ Nikolskii Aleksei: “A New Contract”, *Vedomosti*, 16 Jun 2008.

¹⁹ Gavrilov Iurii: “Commander under contract”, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 5 Dec 2007.

²⁰ Felgenhauer Pavel: “The financial crisis may curtail Kremlin plans for modernizing armed forces”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 5 no. 194, 9 Oct 2008.

The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the personnel number has been exactly the same for the past three years (2005–2007): 1,027,000 men, down by (the very even number of) 10,000 from 2004.²¹ It is unlikely that the number of troops in the armed forces stays on the exact same for such a long period, particularly in a force which has been in considerable flux in recent years. It might be that nobody, even in the Russian government, has exact knowledge of the number of troops in the Russian Armed Forces. The lack of reliable figures has been a persistent problem and is partly the result of corruption and economic underreporting in the Russian military system.²²

In many instances it is unclear what is meant by the term "professionals" or *kontraktniki* (the Russian term meaning a person who has signed a contract with the Russian Armed Forces). "The Federal targeted programme for the transfer to contract Manning of a number of units and formations 2004–2007" focuses on the professionalisation of sergeants and enlisted soldiers.²³ However, some numbers cited by defence officials often seem to include officers as well. Moreover, it is seldom made explicit whether numbers include professionals in the whole of the Armed Forces, in only one or several branches, in the units that are on permanent readiness, or the total number of professional soldiers in Russian armed formations, which would also include forces such as those of the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service. Furthermore, statements from politicians and military leaders on the exact targets of the Federal programme have been unclear. Russian military analyst Aleksandr Gol'ts observed in 2006 how Russian defence officials, including the Defence Minister, constantly corrected the number of units and soldiers that were to be transferred to professional service in the course of the programme.²⁴ Such changing of targets and achievements is another explanation why reliable data on the professionalisation process is hard to come by.

The overall target for the professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces has been a 70 per cent professional force (although numbers vary slightly in different sources).²⁵ As part of the reform plan endorsed by President Medvedev on 15 September 2008, it was announced that the total number of military personnel is to be brought down to one million by 2012.²⁶ More dramatically, the number of officers will be reduced from the present 355,000 to 150,000.²⁷ Retired officers will be replaced by professional sergeants, which would bring the Russian military more into line

²¹ *The Military Balance 2006, 2007, 2008*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

²² On corruption in Russia's Armed Forces, see Bukkvoll Tor: "Their Hands in the Till. Scale and Causes of Corruption in the Russian Armed Forces", *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 34, issue 2, Jan 2008.

²³ "The Federal targeted programme", *Krasnaia zvezda*, no. 222, 25 Nov 2004.

²⁴ Gol'ts Aleksandr: "Minus one division", *Ezhednevnyi zhurnal*, 15 Dec 2006.

²⁵ Vorob'ev Eduard, Tsybmal Vitalii: "Status collapse of the contract system is preprogrammed", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, no. 39, 27 Oct 2006.

²⁶ Solov'ev Vadim, Litovkin Viktor: "Serdiukov's revolutionary steps", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 9 Oct 2008.

It has recently been announced that the economic crisis has made it necessary to postpone reforms, and that the personnel reductions shall be implemented by 2016 – Litovkin Viktor: "The President will slow down the pace of reform", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 Jan 2009.

²⁷ *Interfaks*, 14 Oct 2008.

with many modern Western armies.²⁸ Nevertheless, the ambition still seems to be close to an overall ratio of 30 per cent conscripts and 70 per cent professionals. It is unclear to what extent the ratio will vary within each service or branch, and what the subdivision of professionals into officers and enlisted personnel will be. So far the Navy, Air Force, and the Strategic Forces seem to have aimed for a higher professionalisation rate than the Land Forces. However, paces and ambitions of professionalisation for each part of the Armed Forces may change as a result of the recently initiated reforms.

Another problem arises in the process of counting the number of professional units in the Russian Armed Forces. Defence officials cite certain numbers of units that have been professionalised, but because of the given uncertainty as to the size of the unit, it is difficult to know what the numbers mean in terms of troops. The Russian programme for professionalisation listed both *соединение* ("soedinenie") and *часть* ("chast") as the types of units that were to be professionalised, the former meaning a unit on brigade level and upwards, the latter listing a unit or a formation on battalion or regiment level.²⁹ This means that a whole division may have been professionalised, or only two regiments of the division. Moreover, it allows the lenience of counting two units (two regiments) rather than one (one division) if the target of recruiting contract soldiers for all the regiments in the division has not been fully achieved.³⁰ The source material for this study makes apparent the difficulty with ascertaining the numbers, as regiments that form part of a division have been mentioned as professionalised. Whether this means that they were the only units intended for professionalisation, or if the rest of the division was supposed to be or is in the process of becoming professionalised, or has been fully professionalised since the source was written, remains unclear in several instances.

Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the Federal targeted programme includes units both in the Armed Forces and in Russian state security agencies such as the Interior Ministry troops and others. This is part of the reason why some numbers do not add up – few defence officials clarify what agency they are talking about when they cite numbers of units and personnel that have been transferred to contract Manning. Moreover, a number of units were already on permanent readiness and manned by professionals when the programme was commenced in 2004. According to one source, some 20 units in the Armed Forces were already professional in 2002.³¹ These units and soldiers are sometimes included in overall numbers of professional units and soldiers, sometimes not.

²⁸ Felgenhauer Pavel: "The financial crisis may curtail Kremlin plans for modernizing armed forces", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 5 no. 194, 9 Oct 2008.

²⁹ In translations into English from Russian sources, "chast" seems to be consistently rendered as "unit", "soedinenie" as "formation".

³⁰ Is the confusing designation of units intentional? Some think it is. See Gol'ts Aleksandr: "An unfinished house", *Defense & Security*, no. 37, 6 Apr 2007.

³¹ "V RF budet formirovat'sia chast'i i soedineniia nostoianno'i gotovnosti", *Lenta Novostei Defense Express*, 1 Aug 2002.

4 Findings

Whether the confusion over the numbers of professional soldiers and units is intentional on part of Russian authorities, or whether no one has complete control of the process, is beyond the scope of this enquiry. What is significant is that it is hard to estimate both total manpower and the number of professionals in Russian military units. Both in terms of the plans that were made for the professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces and in terms of what has been achieved, we must accept the uncertainty of the numbers that have been quoted by different sources in this process. Still, going through and structuring available information makes it possible to create a basis for assessing the results of the professionalisation efforts.

Our ambition with this study has been to collect and present information that will contribute to a more complementary picture of professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces. To identify professional units, our method has been to gather a large quantity of empirical data, mainly through Russian central and local newspapers and periodicals. Such reports have provided ample statements from Russian defence officials and politicians as to which units have become professional units and/or permanent readiness units, as well as on training, equipment and particular issues in some of the units. Our aim has been to identify the units of the Armed Forces that have been professionalised before and during the Federal targeted programme, i.e. somewhere around 80 units in Russian ground troops, airborne troops and naval infantry troops. It proved near impossible, however, to distinguish between the units that were already professional and on permanent readiness before the programme started, and those that have been professionalised under the programme.

Some assumptions have been made in this process of counting and mapping out professional military units, and these assumptions must be taken into account when assessing the reliability and validity of the data set:

- Russian military officials' statements have been counted as reliable sources. A statement by a Ministry of Defence official or a regional commander about one unit being professional or in the process of becoming professional has resulted in the counting of that unit as professional.
- All personnel stationed in conflict zones or abroad are counted as professionals.³²
- Numbers of troops in units have been recited where such numbers have been found. In the cases where the authors have been unable to find citations for troop numbers, the generic numbers in table 4.1 have been used. It should be added that in many cases where troop numbers have been reported they do not seem to correspond to any overall standards.

³² The use of conscripts in combat operations abroad is prohibited by Russian law. It has been admitted by the Russian General Staff that conscripts were used in the recent war with Georgia ("Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia", Law Library of Congress, available at <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia-war.html#f31>, accessed 3 Dec 2008; Chizhkova Liubov': "Russian conscripts in Georgia: Coerced Contract", *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty News Report*, 22 Aug 2008).

It seems clear that some of the units that will be permanent readiness units are not fully professional. However, the two concepts of professional units and permanent readiness units are indistinguishable in the Russian context, and it would prove impossible to try to separate the conscripts from the professional soldiers in a permanent readiness unit. In order to obtain a total estimate of the number of professionals it has been necessary to count the whole unit as professionals, although it may contain conscripts as well. It has been stated, however, that the professionalisation process is focused on the permanent readiness units, and so it is assumed that most of the personnel in these units will become professionals. The units that have a mixed manning concept will be the exception rather than the rule.

Unit	Number of troops
division	8,000
brigade	3,000
regiment	2,000
battalion	1,000
artillery division	1,000
artillery brigade	300
artillery regiment	200
spetsnaz brigade	1,000
spetsnaz platoon	50

Table 4.1 Generic troop numbers in Russian units.

4.1 Total numbers

Table 4.2 below summarises some of our main findings. The starting point of the table is the number of military personnel in the Russian Armed Forces as reported to *The Military Balance 2008* (column 2). *The Military Balance* is used as the reference point because it is the only comprehensive listing of the number of troops in the different Russian military units.

Of the 1,027,000 troops in the Russian Armed Forces, some 777,000 are listed as MoD personnel.³³ Of these, some 360,000 are listed as army personnel and 35,000 are listed as personnel in the Airborne Forces. As mentioned earlier, the Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Forces are not subject to this study.

Column three lists the total number of professionals identified through the collection and analysis of sources as described above. In the subsequent columns, these numbers are broken down by military district. Row 4 lists the total troop number for land and airborne forces in that particular military district as reported in *The Military Balance*. Rows 5 and 6 list the total number of professionals that it has been possible to locate in each district. Row 7 lists the total number of professionals and row 8 lists the shares of professionals in percentage to total numbers, in the case

³³ The difference – 250,000 – is made up by personnel in command and support.

of column 3 for the whole of the Land and Airborne Forces, and in the case of columns 4 through 9 in each military district.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Agency			Len MD	Mos MD	Vol-U MD	Sib MD	F East M	N Cauc MD
2	Total active	1027000							
3	MoD	777000							
4	Land & airborne	395000		30000	86200	55000	52000	75000	90000
5	Army	360000		5960	27450	28291	24500	11000	68601
6	Airborne	35000		5500	15690	3000	0	1000	5500
7	Total prof		196492						
8	% professionals		50 %	38 %	50 %	57 %	47 %	16 %	82 %

Table 4.2 Professionals in Russian military districts in the Land and Airborne Forces as of 1 January 2008. Sources: For total numbers – The Military Balance; for numbers of professionals in the Land and Airborne Forces – selected sources, i.a. Russian military and other periodicals and newspapers. The use of different sources is a challenge. There may be significant variations or inconsistencies between sources, and as a result overall numbers may not add up.

Five naval units were also supposed to be part of the Federal targeted programme, and so some of the numbers that have been released by Russian defence officials would include these. These units, along with naval units that have been professionalised outside the realm of the programme, are listed together with land and airborne units in the charts below (chapter 4.2). As becomes apparent in the subsequent data sets for each of the military districts, this amounts to some 12,000 naval troops in units in various military districts.

All of the Airborne Troops are supposed to be professionalised.³⁴ This is in relative accordance with the numbers found by the authors. The fact that the 106th airborne division at Tula is not entirely professional, although it has been reported that the whole of the Airborne Forces are professional, illustrates the leniency with which Russian military authorities make statements about the professionalisation programme.

The numbers of professional soldiers in the Russian Land Forces (165,802) and Airborne Forces (30,690) make up a total of 196,492, a number that fits well with the numbers quoted by the defence leadership as mentioned earlier. However, this only fits if the numbers mentioned are for the Land and Airborne Forces exclusively and do not include forces in other branches, in command and supply, or in the paramilitary forces (according to *The Military Balance*, paramilitary forces in Russia number 418,000 men and women).

4.2 Numbers for each military district

The charts below list professional units along with estimated manpower numbers for each military district. The charts include naval infantry and spetsnaz units that are not included in the overall chart in chapter 4.1. A chart listing both professional and non-professional units is given in Appendix A.

³⁴ "Russia Airborne Troops to double combat power – defense minister", *RIA Novosti*, 22 Mar 2007.



Figure 4.1 Russian military districts. Source: www.scramble.nl.

4.2.1 Leningrad military district

Leningrad MD		Units	No. of troops
Total navy			3900
Total land forces			5960
Total airborne			5500
Sum professionals			15360
Navy	61th indep naval inf bde, Pechenga		1300
	separate mot inf bde, Baltic fleet		2500
	4th indep spetsnaz plt, Baltiisk		50
	420th intel spetsnaz plt, Poliarnyi		50
Army	200th mot inf bde		3000
	138th indep mot inf bde, Kamenka		2000
	2nd spetsnaz bde, Pskov		960
Airborne	76th airborne div, Pskov		5500

4.2.2 Kaliningrad special region

Kaliningrad SR		Units	No. of troops
Total navy			3000
Total land forces			0
Total airborne			0
Sum professionals			3000
Navy	7th mot rifle bde, Kaliningrad (Baltic Fleet)		3000
Army	N/A		
Airborne	N/A		

35

³⁵ The 7th mot rifle bde in Kaliningrad was not included in the Federal targeted programme – Robinson Colin: "The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206. There is reason to believe that all of Russia's naval infantry troops (ca. 12,000) are professionals.

4.2.3 Moscow military district

Moscow MD	Units	No. of troops
Total navy		0
Total land forces		27450
Total airborne		15690
Sum professionals		43140
Navy	N/A	
Army	2nd guards mech inf div, Taman'	8500
	3rd mot rifle div, Mulino	10850
	8th mot rifle bde, Tiraspol'	2000
	4th tank div, Naro-Fominsk	4000
	16th spetsnaz bde, Tëplyi stan	1000
	216th indep spetsnaz bde, Moscow	1100
Airborne	106th airborne div, Tula	7000
	98th airborne div, Ivanovo	5500
	45th indep airborne recce regt, Moscow	690
	38th indep airborne comms regt, Moscow	2500

4.2.4 Volga-Ural military district

Volga-Ural MD	Units	No. of troops
Total navy		0
Total land forces		28291
Total airborne		3000
Sum professionals		31291
Navy	N/A	
Army	27th mot rifle div, Totskoe (PK)	8200
	15th separate PK mot rifle bde, Roshchinskii	3000
	4th military base, Dushanbe (former 201st mot rifle	5500
	34th mot rifle div, Ekaterinburg	8000
	186th engineer-sapper bde, Alkino	1230
	12th spetsnaz bde, Ekaterinburg	1000
	3rd spetsnaz bde, Chernorech'e	1040
	385th arty bde, Perm'	321
Airborne	31st airborne bde, Ulianovsk	3000

4.2.5 Siberia military district

Siberia MD	Units	No. of troops
Total navy		0
Total land forces		24500
Total airborne		0
Sum professionals		24500
Navy	N/A	
Army	74th mot rifle bde, Iurga	1500
	85th mot rifle div, Novosibirsk	8000
	122nd mot rifle div, Altai	8000
	67th spetsnaz bde, Berdsk	1000
	24th spetsnaz bde, Kiakhta	1000
	11th air assault bde, Ulan-Ude	3000
	272nd mot rifle regt, Borzia	2000
Airborne		0

4.2.6 Far Eastern military district

Far Eastern MD	Units	No. of troops
Total navy		2550
Total land forces		11000
Total airborne		1000
Sum professionals		14550
Navy	55th marines div, Vladivostok	2500
	42nd spetsnaz plt, Russkii ostrov	50
Army	One mech inf regt of 5th army, Ussuriisk (121st or	2000
	Tank btn of 33rd mot div, Khomutovo	1000
	14th spetsnaz bde, Ussuriisk	1000
	One mot rifle regt of 270th mot div, Khabarovsk	2000
	One mot rifle regt of 81st mot div, Bikin	2000
	143rd guards mot rifle regt, Ekaterinoslavka	2000
	127th arty div, Sergeevka	1000
Airborne	83rd indep airborne (air assault) bde, Ussuriisk	1000

4.2.7 North Caucasus military district

North Caucasus MD	Units	No. of troops
Total navy		5950
Total land forces		68601
Total airborne		5500
Sum professionals		80051
Navy	810th indep marines regt, Sevastopol'	1400
	77th indep marines bde, Kaspiisk	2500
	431st indep spetsnaz plt, Tuapse	50
	One guards mot rifle regt, Sevastopol'	2000
Army	42nd mot inf div, Chechnya	18000
	33rd indep mot inf mountain bde, Botlikh	3500
	34th indep mountain bde, Zelenchukskaia	3500
	22nd spetsnaz bde, Aksai	1700
	10th spetsnaz bde, Mol kino	3500
	20th mot inf div, Volgograd	8000
	503rd mot rifle regt, Ingushetia	2387
	102nd military base, Erevan	3690
	135th indep mot regt, Prokhladnyi	2100
	114th msl bde, Krasnodar	300
	439th msl bde, Znamensk	300
	102nd air defence bde, Krasnodar	680
	One indep tank btn, Maikop	1000
	205th indep mot rifle bde, Budën novsk	6000
	200th indep mot rifle regt, Troitskoe	2000
	1128th arty regt, Maikop	144
	19th mot rifle div, Vladikavkaz	11800
Airborne	7th airborne mountain div, Novorossiisk	5500

5 Final assessments

As has been demonstrated in the course of this study, great uncertainty is attached to the scale of the professionalisation in the Russian Armed Forces. Rather than attempting to establish a specific estimate of the number of professional soldiers, it seems more appropriate to indicate an interval defined by one low and one high estimate.

5.1 Estimate 1: The low end – 75,000 professionals

The starting point of this lower estimate is that the numbers of professionals in the Russian Armed Forces are inflated. Such inflation may stem from faulty reporting by Russian commanders and officials themselves, or by inaccurate citing in the media. Also, the fact that some units might be on permanent readiness, but not manned exclusively with professionals further increases uncertainty. In this report, all troops of permanent readiness units are counted as professionals. According to Zoltan Barany, commanders routinely inflate the personnel numbers in their military units. This is explained by the easiness with which new cutbacks can be implemented (by scrapping vacant slots). Furthermore, allocation of provisions (financial and others) are based on the number of troops, i.e. the more troops, the more money, and the more

non-existing troops, the more money for the lining of commanders' pockets.³⁶ The fact that some units might be on permanent readiness, but not manned exclusively with professionals, further increases uncertainty.

If this is the case, then only qualified guesses can be made at the actual number of professionals in the Russian Armed Forces. Still, there is obviously some substance to the professionalisation efforts. There has been much reporting on the issue. Foreign observers have been invited to visit a number of professional permanent readiness units, and they have seen with their own eyes advanced, modern facilities and seemingly well-trained cadres.³⁷ The professionalisation programme has almost certainly been carried through, albeit hardly completely successfully.

The airborne units as well as the naval infantry units seem certain to have been almost fully professionalised, as numerous reports indicate. One of the airborne units, the 106th at Tula, is partly manned with conscripts. But apart from that, the remaining 3 divisions and 2 brigades (ca. 25,000 troops) should be fully professional. Moreover, some of the well-known Land Force units have received much coverage for their high level of combat readiness and professionalisation process, such as the two motorised rifle brigades in Leningrad military district, the 138th and 200th (ca. 5,000 troops), the 2nd Taman motorised rifle division in Moscow military district (ca. 8,500 troops)³⁸, the 27th motor rifle division at Totskoe in the Volga-Urals military district (ca. 8,200 troops), numerous units in the North Caucasus military district, notably the 42nd motor rifle division and the 33rd and 34th independent mountain brigades (ca. 25,000 troops), peacekeeping units such as the 15th motor rifle brigade in Roshchinskii (ca. 3,000 troops), units stationed abroad, among them the 8th motor rifle brigade in Tiraspol' (ca. 2,000 troops), the 4th army base in Dushanbe (ca. 5,500 troops) and the 102nd military base in Erevan (ca. 3,700 troops). The listed military intelligence special forces brigades are also almost certainly professionalised (ca. 12,000 troops).

Altogether these units that are almost certainly professional make up close to 100,000 troops. However, the troops numbers cited in the above section are overall numbers that include officers. The aim of professionalisation has been to increase the number of enlisted personnel, not officers (ref. chapter 3). Officers make up ca. 30 per cent of total manpower at present. It is likely that the percentage is lower in the PRUs (the average is pulled up by a large number of staff officers). If the share of officers in PRUs is estimated at 25 per cent, the low scale estimate of the number of professionals in the Land and Airborne Forces is 75,000.

5.2 Estimate 2: The high end – 150,000 professionals

The upper scale scenario starts from the assumption that the Russian Armed Forces have succeeded in professionalising the units that they say they have, that these units do contain as

³⁶ Barany Zoltan: *Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 113.

³⁷ "International Military Cooperation", *Rossiiskoe voennoe obozrenie*, no. 7, July 2008.

³⁸ According to recent reports, the Tamanskaia division will be dissolved in 2009 and replaced by two brigades – "The Tamanskaia and Kantemirovskaja divisions will be dissolved", *Izvestiia*, 28 Oct 2008.

many people as stated, and that practically all the people in these units are contracted professionals. This estimate is based on acceptance of all numbers that have been presented by defence officials. The total number of professionals in the Land and Airborne Forces is then close to 200,000, as the tables in chapter 4.3 show. If we subtract from the number a 25 per cent share of officers, the high scale estimate of professionals in the Land and Airborne Forces is 150,000.

5.3 The road ahead

Professionalisation has not been a straightforward process so far. Initial ambitions have had to be reduced. Sources in the MoD have been quoted as claiming that a total of 100,000 professionals were recruited under the Federal targeted programme 2004–2007; the envisaged number was 133,400.³⁹ A new Federal targeted programme running from 2009 through 2013 stipulates the transfer of another 80,000 people to contract service.⁴⁰ In the budget for 2009, 28.1 billion roubles is allocated to the implementation of the new professionalisation programme. The budget plans set aside 24.8 billion for 2010 and 32 billion for 2011.⁴¹

The process of professionalisation has been impeded by a number of problems. These will have to be dealt with for professionalisation to succeed. In the new programme, the issue of wages is given increased attention. If the new reforms are carried out as planned, the wage system will be radically changed. Wages will be differentiated to a much larger extent than today, and officers in permanent readiness units may come to constitute an elite among public employees.⁴² Another crucial issue is housing. The number of people waiting for their statutory apartment has hovered around 130,000 for several years, and there seems to be no imminent solution.⁴³ Wages and social conditions appear to be the main determinants for increasing the quantity and quality of personnel that is drafted and contracted into the Russian army. If improvements are made in these areas, this will also improve the Armed Forces' ability to recruit and retain high-quality non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers. Together with better equipment for the troops, this will lead to more professional soldiers and NCOs.

Increasing the share of contracted personnel will not automatically result in a more modern and capable military.⁴⁴ Professionalisation is but one of several challenges facing Russia's Armed Forces. Among the other challenges are long-term investments in military equipment and in the defence industry, investments in military research and development, and structural reorganisation. But professionalisation may play a key role insofar as technical, organisational and operational

³⁹ Nikol'skii Aleksei: "Sergeants cost 243 billion", *Vedomosti*, 23 Jul 2008; Gavrilov Iurii: "Commander under contract", *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 5 Dec 2007.

⁴⁰ "Defense Ministry Plans to Increase the Quantity of Contract Servicemen in the Armed Forces Almost to 300,000 by 2013", *ARMS-TASS*, 1 Apr 2008.

⁴¹ Mikhailov Viktor: "National defence: Four trillions for three years", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, 19 Sept 2008.

⁴² Gavrilov Iurii: "70,000 for a captain", *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 9 Dec 2008.

⁴³ "The reform of the Russian army may be postponed because of underfunding", *Lenta.ru*, 16 Jan 2009.

⁴⁴ There may e.g. be reason to question the operational advantage of the use of professional land forces in Russia's war with Georgia in August 2008 – "The War in Georgia – Implications for Norway?", FFI report 2009/00268.

modernisation will be facilitated by the ability of professional personnel to absorb new technology and modern concepts for war-fighting. Although the goal of a 70 per cent professional force may seem distant for the Russian Armed Forces, the Russian military leadership has commenced the process of creating a professional manpower base.

Appendix A Listings of all Russian military units pr. military district, professional and non-professional, with sources

All the units listed here are taken from the *warfare.ru*-listing of units in each of the Russian military districts.⁴⁵ The professional units/units on permanent readiness are highlighted, and their status as professional has been established through other sources than the above-mentioned. There is a reference to each source in which a unit has been referred to as professional or as a permanent readiness unit.

A.1 Leningrad military district ground and airborne forces

200 indep motorised rifle brigade, Pechenga⁴⁶

138 indep motorised rifle brigade, Kamenka⁴⁷

2 designation GRU spetsnaz brigade, Pskov⁴⁸

26 missile brigade, Luga

133 air defence brigade, Stugi Krasnye

18 air defence brigade, Pontonnoe

271 air defence brigade, Lupche-Stavino

141 air defence brigade, Niunemiaki

9 arty brigade, Luga

268 arty brigade, Pushkin

380 MLRS regiment, Pushkin

1148 anti-tank arty regiment, Lomonosov

56 indep training centre, Sertolovo

1071 indep training centre, Pechory

42 storage base, Vladimirskie lageria

36 storage base, Sapernoie

35 storage base, Alakurtti

23 storage base, Lahdenpokhia

30 storage base, Petrozavodsk

591 arty storehouse, Ivanteevo

232 reserve base, Chernaia rechka

107 storage repair, Luga

62 engineer regiment, Toksovo

140 bridge regiment, Kerro

95 indep comms brigade, Chernaya rechka

45 detached recce regiment (before 2008)⁴⁹

⁴⁵ *Warfare.ru* is the website of Omega Services, a company "supplying specialised hardware and personnel worldwide". The company's listing of Russian military units is one of the most comprehensive and up-to-date sources on the subject and appears to be well in accordance with open information from Russian authorities.

⁴⁶ Klenov Iurii, Pochiniuk Oleg: "From Pskov to Pechenga", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 27 Aug 2002.

⁴⁷ Klenov Iurii, Pochiniuk Oleg: "From Pskov to Pechenga", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 27 Aug 2002.

⁴⁸ Robinson Colin: "The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206.

146 indep ELINT brigade, St. Petersburg
29 indep EW regiment, Ostrov
292 indep EW regiment, Kandalakhsa
73 indep radio technical brigade, Toksovo
194 indep radio technical regiment, Alakurtti
41 indep chemical brigade, Vologda
76 guards airborne division, Pskov⁵⁰
Two battalions of the 7 motor rifle brigade of the Baltic Fleet – on permanent readiness, but not included in the Federal targeted programme.⁵¹
(7 motorised rifle brigade, Kaliningrad⁵² and one battery of a separate motorised infantry brigade)

A.2 Moscow military district ground and airborne forces

22 Army

3 motorised rifle division “Vislenskaia”, Mulino⁵³
100 tank regiment, Dzerzhinsk
237 tank regiment, Dzerzhinsk
245 motorised rifle regiment, Mulino
99 arty regiment, Mulino
1143 air defence regiment, Novyi
159 indep arty battalion, Mulino
84 indep intelligence battalion, Nizhnii Novgorod
145 indep engineering battalion, Seima
692 indep comms battalion, Novyi
9 indep EW battalion, Bor
625 indep chemical battalion, Mulino
152 indep repair battalion, Mulino
911 logistics battalion, Mulino
231 medical battalion, Mulino

50 missile brigade, Shuia
752 motorised rifle regiment, Novyi
5 air defence brigade, Shuia
211 arty brigade, Mulino
918 MLRS regiment, Mulino
70 storage base, Tver'
1174 storage base, Novoe Smolino
28 engineering regiment, Bol'shoe Kozino
130 indep comms regiment, Nizhnii Novgorod
119 logistics brigade, Orlovskie Dvoriki

⁴⁹ ”Detached Airborne Brigade in Ulyanovsk fully manned with contract personnel”, *Agentstvo voennykh novostei*, 26 Dec 2005.

⁵⁰ ”Elite Air-Assault Units Meeting Professionalisation Goals”, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Analysis*, 2 Nov 2005.

⁵¹ Khudoleev Viktor: ”Combat training. Fruitfulness of the training fields”, *Krasnaia zvezda*, 3 Aug 2006.

⁵² Robinson Colin: ”The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination”, *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206.

⁵³ Robinson Colin: ”The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination”, *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206; ”Russian motor rifle division to switch to contract manning by 2008”, *World News Connection*, 4 Sept 2007.

219 medical brigade, Orlovskie Dvoriki
6459 repair base, Volodarsk

20 army, Voronezh

4 tank division “Kantemirovskaia”, Naro-Fominsk⁵⁴

12 tank regiment, Naro-Fominsk
13 tank regiment, Naro-Fominsk
14 tank regiment, Naro-Fominsk
423 motor rifle regiment, Naro-Fominsk
538 air defence regiment, Naro-Fominsk
275 arty regiment, Naro-Fominsk
137 indep intelligence battalion, Naro-Fominsk
413 indep comms battalion, Naro-Fominsk
996 indep EW battalion, Naro-Fominsk
616 indep chemical battalion, Naro-Fominsk

10 tank division, Voronezh

61 tank regiment, Voronezh
62 tank regiment, Voronezh
6 motorised rifle regiment, Kursk
248 motorised rifle regiment, Voronezh
744 arty regiment, Voronezh
359 air defence regiment, Voronezh
112 indep intelligence battalion, Voronezh
152 indep comms battalion, Voronezh
127 indep chemical battalion, Voronezh
131 indep engineering battalion, Voronezh
60 repair battalion, Voronezh
1072 indep logistics battalion, Voronezh
188 indep medical battalion, Voronezh
689 indep EW battalion, Voronezh
448 missile brigade, Kursk
53 air defence brigade, Kursk
236 arty brigade, Tambov
397 MLRS regiment, Skopin
4944 storage base, El'nia
one engineering regiment, Tula
6 indep comms regiment, Voronezh
250 indep ELINT regiment, Ostrogozhsk
227 indep EW regiment, Kursk
51 indep radio technical battalion, Dmitriev-L'govskii

2 motorised rifle division “Tamanskaia”, Alabino⁵⁵

1 motorised rifle regiment, Kalininets
15 motorised rifle regiment, Kalininets
283 motorised rifle regiment, Kalininets

⁵⁴ Mironov Vitalii: “You live in comfort while you serve in a tank regiment”, *Russkii kur'er*, no. 241, 29 Nov 2004. According to recent reports, the Kantemirovskaia division will be dissolved as part of recently adopted reform plans – “The Tamanskaia and Kantemirovskaia divisions will be dissolved”, *Izvestiia*, 28 Oct 2008.

⁵⁵ “2nd Taman MRD to become experimental force for testing new armored vehicles”, *World News Connection*, 14 Sept 2005.

1 tank regiment, Kalininets
147 arty regiment, Kobiakovo
1117 air defence regiment, Kobiakovo
136 indep intelligence battalion, Kalininets
16 indep spetsnaz brigade, Tambov⁵⁶
216 indep spetsnaz battalion, Moscow⁵⁷
 154 commandant regiment, Moscow
 112 missile brigade, Shuia
 202 air defence brigade, Naro-Fominsk
 49 air defence brigade, El'nia
 34 arty division, Mulino
 288 arty brigade, Inzhenernyi
 303 arty brigade, Mulino
 355 arty brigade, Inzhenernyi
 24 arty division, Inzhenernyi
 273 arty brigade, Tver'
 79 MLRS brigade, Tver'
 45 arty brigade, Tambov
 395 anti-tank arty regiment, Novaia Liada
 9 sound intelligence regiment, Voronezh
 467 indep training centre, Vladimir
 385 indep training centre, Mulino
 22 central reserve base, Bui
 8 engineering regiment, Rostov
 66 bridge regiment, Murom
 1 indep comms brigade, Kurkino
 119 indep comms brigade, Seliatino
 272 indep comms regiment, Erino
 82 indep ELINT brigade, Viaz'ma
 312 indep ELINT regiment, Smolensk
 225 indep EW regiment, Novomoskovsk
 70 indep radio technical brigade, Naro-Fominsk
 3 chemical brigade, Kineshma
 27 chemical brigade, Kursk
 27 indep motorised rifle brigade "Sevastopol'skaia", Mosrentgen
Operative group in Pridnestrov'e, Tiraspol'⁵⁸
15 indep comms regiment, Tiraspol'
1162 indep air defence regiment, Tiraspol'
72 indep helo group, Tiraspol'
8 motorised rifle brigade, Tiraspol'
69 storage base, Tiraspol'
98 airborne division, Ivanovo⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Robinson Colin: "The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206.

⁵⁷ Robinson Colin: "The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206.

⁵⁸ Robinson Colin: "The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206.

⁵⁹ "Defense Ministry Commission to inspect permanent-readiness Airborne units", *World News Connection*, 28. Jun 2005

106 airborne division, Tula⁶⁰ (partially manned with conscripts)⁶¹
45 indep airborne recce regiment, formed on the base of 218 spetsnaz brigade, Moscow⁶²
38 indep airborne comms regt, Moscow⁶³

A.3 Volga-Urals military district ground and airborne forces

2 army

27 motor rifle division, Totskoe⁶⁴
 433 motor rifle regiment
 506 motor rifle regiment
 152 tank regiment
 268 arty regiment
 838 air defence regiment
 1017 indep anti-tank arty division
 907 indep intelligence battalion
 1614 indep engineering battalion
 834 indep comms battalion
 481 indep repairs battalion
 932 indep EW battalion
 367 indep chemical battalion
 140 indep logistics battalion
 341 indep medical battalion
 4 military base (201 motorised rifle division), Dushanbe
 psychological operations group, Dushanbe
 670 air force group, Dushanbe
 303 indep helicopter squadron, Gissar
 fighter group, Dushanbe
15 separate motor rifle brigade, Roshchinskii (Samara)⁶⁵
 5968 storage, Chernorech'e (Samara)
 191 indep comms regiment, Samara
34 motorised infantry division, Ekaterinburg⁶⁶
 81 indep motorised regiment, Samara
3 spetsnaz brigade, Chernorech'e⁶⁷
12 spetsnaz brigade, Asbest-5⁶⁸

⁶⁰ Thornton Rod: "Military Organization and Change: The 'Professionalisation' of the 76th Airborne Division", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol.17 issue 3, Sept 2004, pp. 449–474.

⁶¹ "Airborne forces were the first to accomplish the programme of transition to contract service", *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 26 Dec 2007.

⁶² "A regiment for the future", *Voенно-promyshlennyi kur'er*, no.8 (75), 2–15 Mar 2005.

⁶³ "The 38th independent communications regiment", Bratishka, <http://bratishka.ru/specnaz/vdv/7.php>; accessed 4 Dec 2008. Professionalisation may be limited to some of the subunits..

⁶⁴ "The battle chronicle of the Volga-Urals military district", *Ural'skie voennye vesti*, no. 96, Dec 2007.

⁶⁵ Robinson Colin: "Update on the Russian Ground Troops", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 19:1, 2006, pp. 25–32; Rodionov Viktor: "On the Territory of Two Federal Districts", *Voенно-promyshlennyi kur'er*, no. 37 (253), 17–23 Sept 2008; http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2008.253.articles.army_01.

⁶⁶ Belousov Iurii, Tikhonov Aleksandr: "Better in the ground forces", *Krasnaia zvezda*, no. 35, 2 Mar 2007.

⁶⁷ Robinson Colin: "Update on the Russian Ground Troops", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 19:1, 2006, pp. 25–32.

92 missile brigade, Kamenka
air defence brigade, Donguzskii
297 air defence brigade, Alkino
385 arty brigade, Perm⁶⁹
950 MLRS regiment, Buzuluk
469 indep training centre, Samara
479 indep training centre, Kamyshlov
repair base, Verkhniaia Pyshma
tank storage base, Novye Liady
5967 storage, Markovo
186 engineer-sapper brigade, Alkino⁷⁰
67 engineer regiment, Tiumen'
18 bridge regiment, Penza
59 indep comms brigade, Ekaterinburg
indep comms regiment, Kalinovka
313 indep ELINT regiment, Perm
40 indep radio technical brigade, Marks
173 indep radio technical brigade, Samara
indep EW battalion, Tiubuk
29 chemical brigade, Ekaterinburg
23 AERL DEFS brigade, Chernorech'e
112 indep logistics brigade, Roshchinskii

A.4 Siberian military district land and airborne forces

41 army

85 motor rifle division, Novosibirsk⁷¹

122 motor rifle division⁷²

74 motor rifle brigade, Iurga⁷³

61 air defence brigade, Biisk
storage base, Omsk
storage base, Biisk
storage base, Abakan
storage base, Kamenka
indep comms regiment, Kochenëvo

36 army

131 machine gun arty division, Sretensk

⁶⁸ Robinson Colin: "Update on the Russian Ground Troops", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 19:1, 2006, pp. 25–32.

⁶⁹ "Units transferred to contract manning in 2006", from the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/56/226/index.shtml>, accessed 7 Oct 2008.

⁷⁰ Robinson Colin: "Update on the Russian Ground Troops", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 19:1, 2006, pp. 25–32.

⁷¹ Robinson Colin: "The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206.

⁷² Robinson Colin: "The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206.

⁷³ Robinson Colin: "The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206.

196 (168) indep motorised rifle brigade, Borzia
175 indep comms regiment, Borzia

29 army

5 tank division, Kiakhta
108 tank regiment
140 tank regiment
160 tank regiment

2 parachute battalions of the 11 air assault brigade, Ulan-Ude⁷⁴

181 indep comms regiment, Ulan-Ude

272 motorised rifle regiment, Borzia⁷⁵

24 spetsnaz brigade, Kiakhta⁷⁶

67 spetsnaz brigade, Berdsk⁷⁷

182 missile brigade, Krasnoiarsk

air defence brigade, Chita

12 arty division, Shelekhov

232 MLRS brigade, Chisty Kliuchi (Irkutsk)

reserve base, Krasnoiarsk

382 indep arty brigade, Divizionnaia

anti-tank arty regiment, Divizionnaya

212 indep training centre, Chita

indep training centre, Droviannaia

storage base, Nizhneudinsk

tank reserve base, Topchikhin (Altai)

tank reserve base, Shilovo (Novosibirsk)

tank reserve base, Krasnoiarsk

arty storage, Achinsk

55 bridge brigade, Taskino

174 engineering regiment

136 indep comms brigade, Ulan-Ude

101 indep comms brigade, Chita

102 indep comms brigade

1620 indep training comms battalion, Ulan-Ude

indep ELINT brigade, Biisk

232 indep EW regiment, Chita

11 chemical brigade, Pospelikha

151 logistics brigade, Chita

A.5 Far Eastern military district land and airborne forces

5 army

⁷⁴ "Elite Air-Assault Units Meeting Professionalisation Goals", *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Analysis*, 2 Nov 2005.

⁷⁵ "The military council of the Siberian military district discusses contract service and military discipline", *Publikatsii*, 16 Feb 2007, the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/publish/index.shtml>, accessed 23 Sept 2008.

⁷⁶ Robinson Colin: "The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206.

⁷⁷ Robinson Colin: "Update on the Russian Ground Troops", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 19:1, 2006, pp. 25–32.

129 machine gun arty division, Barabash
127 arty division, Sergeevka⁷⁸
121 motorised infantry division, Sibirtsevo
 One mechanised infantry regiment of 121 mot inf div
130 machine gun arty division, Sergeevka
One regt of the 81 motorised infantry division, Bikin⁷⁹
20 missile brigade, Spassk-Dal'nii
305 arty brigade, Pokrovka (Primorskii krai)
719 MLRS regiment, Pokrovka
958 anti-tank arty regiment, Pokrovka
arty recce division, Pokrovka
5506 storage base, Krasnyi Kut
58 engineering regiment, Razdel'noe
650 bridge regiment, Dal'nerechensk
86 indep comms regiment, Ussuriisk
94 indep radio technical battalion, Ussuriisk
317 indep ELINT regiment, Sergeevka
612 indep ELINT regiment, Ussuriisk
304 indep EW regiment, Pokrovka

35 army

270 motorised infantry division, Khabarovsk – one regiment⁸⁰

128 machine gun arty division, Babstovo
21 motorised infantry division, Belogorsk
165 arty brigade, Belogorsk
MLRS regiment, Belogorsk
Anti-tank arty regiment, Belogorsk
arty recce division, Belogorsk
storage base, Belogorsk
engineering regiment, Belogorsk
161 indep comms regiment, Belogorsk
1719 indep comms battalion, Belogorsk
156 indep radio technical regiment, Belogorsk
1889 indep radio technical battalion, Belogorsk
indep EW battalion, Belogorsk
logistics brigade, Belogorsk

68 army corps

33 motorised infantry division, Khomutovo (Sakhalin)

One tank battalion, Khomutovo⁸¹

⁷⁸ “By the end of this year, two motorised infantry regiments will be transferred to contract service in the Far Eastern military district”, the Defence Ministry’s website on contract service, 9 Aug 2007; <http://contract.mil.ru/publish/details/index.shtml?id=1845>, accessed 4 Dec 2008.

⁷⁹ Pinchuk Aleksandr: “An alarm near Ussuriisk”, *Krasnaia zvezda*, 6 Apr 2007, and “By the end of this year, two motorised infantry regiments will be transferred to contract service in the Far Eastern military district”, the Defence Ministry’s website on contract service, 9 Aug 2007; <http://contract.mil.ru/publish/details/index.shtml?id=1845>, accessed 4 Dec 2008.

⁸⁰ “Units transferred to contract manning in 2006”, from the Defence Ministry’s website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/56/226/index.shtml>, accessed 4 Dec 2008.

18 machine gun arty division, Iturup
storage base, Leonidovo
engineering regiment, Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk
166 indep comms regiment, Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk
553 indep comms battalion, Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk

83 air assault brigade, Ussuriisk⁸²

14 spetsnaz brigade, Ussuriisk⁸³

107 missile brigade, Birobidzhan
203 air defence brigade, Birobidzhan
109 air defence brigade, Srednebelaiia
arty brigade, Ussuriisk
338 MLRS brigade, Novosysoevka
MLRS brigade, Bikin
129 indep training centre, Khabarovsk
storage base, Krasnoznamenska
storage base, Novoe
engineering brigade, Khabarovsk
3 bridge regiment, Khabarovsk
8 indep comms brigade, Komsomolsk
104 indep comms brigade, Kniaze-Volkonskii
105 indep comms brigade, Belogorsk
106 indep comms brigade, Dal'nerechensk
8 indep comms regiment, Garovka
158 indep training comms regiment, Khabarovsk
104 indep comms battalion, Khabarovsk
76 indep radio technical brigade, Komsomolsk
38 indep radio technical regiment, Komsomolsk
92 indep ELINT brigade, Primorskii krai
16 chemical brigade, Khabarovsk

31 airborne brigade stationed in Ulianovsk (fully manned with contract personnel pr. 26.12.2005 (as second unit)⁸⁴

143 guards motorised rifle regiment, Ekaterinoslavka⁸⁵

A.6 North Caucasus military district ground and airborne forces

58 army

19 motorised rifle division, Vladikavkaz⁸⁶

⁸¹ "Russian Army Units in Far East to go from Conscript to Professional Soldiers", *World News Connection*, 2 Aug 2005.

⁸² "Elite Air-Assault Units Meeting Professionalisation Goals", *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Analysis*, 2 Nov 2005.

⁸³ Robinson Colin: "Update on the Russian Ground Troops", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 19:1, 2006, pp. 25–32.

⁸⁴ "Detached airborne brigade in Ulianovsk fully manned with contract personnel", *Agentstvo voennykh novostei*, 26 Dec 2005.

⁸⁵ "By the end of this year, two motorised infantry regiments will be transferred to contract service in the Far Eastern military district", *Publikatsii*, 9 Aug 2007, the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/publish/index.shtml>, accessed 23 Sept 2007.

429 motorised rifle regiment, Mozdok
503 motorised rifle regiment, Ingushetia⁸⁷
696 motorised rifle regiment, Vladikavkaz
141 indep tank battalion, Vladikavkaz
292 arty regiment, Vladikavkaz
481 indep air defence regiment, Vladikavkaz
1329 indep anti-tank arty division, Vladikavkaz
239 indep intelligence battalion, Vladikavkaz
405 indep comms battalion, Vladikavkaz
1493 indep engineering battalion, Vladikavkaz
344 indep repair battalion, Vladikavkaz
532 indep chemical battalion, Vladikavkaz
1077 indep EW battalion, Vladikavkaz
1098 indep logistics battalion, Vladikavkaz
135 indep medical battalion, Vladikavkaz
205 indep motorised rifle brigade, Budënnovsk⁸⁸
136 separate motorised infantry brigade, Buinaksk (Dagestan)⁸⁹
 131 indep motorised rifle regiment, Maikop
135 motorised rifle regiment, Prokhladnyi⁹⁰
200 indep motorised rifle regiment, Troitskaia (Ingushetia)⁹¹
 67 air defence brigade, Volgograd
 1451 MLRS division, Prokhladnyi
 11 engineering regiment, Kavkazskaia
 234 indep comms regiment, Vladikavkaz
 22 indep EW regiment, Vladikavkaz
 1542 repair base, Prokhladnyi
34 mountain brigade, Zelenchukskaia (Karachaevo-Cherkesiia)⁹²
42 motorised rifle division⁹³
20 motorised rifle division, Volgograd⁹⁴
428 indep tank battalion, Volgograd
944 arty regiment, Volgograd
358 air defence regiment, Volgograd
487 indep anti-tank arty division, Stepnoi (Volgograd)
68 indep intelligence battalion, Volgograd

⁸⁶ "In North Ossetia the anniversary of the 19 motorised rifle division was celebrated", *RIA novosti*, 23 Jul 2007; "The Voronezhsko-Shumlenskaia division deployed in Vladikavkaz turned 84", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 12 Aug 2006.

⁸⁷ Ustinov Evgenii: "In Astrakhan' they are signing contracts", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 1 Mar 2006.

⁸⁸ "The North Caucasus military district plans to enlist 11,000 contract soldiers this year", *Publikatsii*, 15 May 2006, the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/publish/index.shtml>, accessed 11 Jun 2008.

⁸⁹ Permiakov Sergei: "Contract: What is wrong?", *Voенно-promyshlennyi kur'er*, no. 41, 24–30 Oct 2007.

⁹⁰ "The evolution of the contract: 2007", *Rossiiskoe voennoe obozrenie*, no. 6, Jun 2007.

⁹¹ "The North Caucasus military district plans to enlist 11,000 contract soldiers this year", *Publikatsii*, 15 May 2006, the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/publish/index.shtml>, accessed 11 Jun 2008.

⁹² Ustinov Evgenii: "In Astrakhan' they are signing contracts", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 1 Mar 2006.

⁹³ "Commander of the Russian ground forces General of the Army Aleksei Maslov checked the 42 mechanised infantry division based in Chechnya", *Voенно-promyshlennyi kur'er*, no. 36, 19–25 Sept 2007.

⁹⁴ Ustinov Evgenii: "In Astrakhan' they are signing contracts", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 1 Mar 2006.

454 indep comms battalion, Volgograd
153 indep chemical battalion, Volgograd
1124 indep logistics battalion, Volgograd
539 indep EW battalion, Volgograd
109 indep engineering battalion, Volgograd
39 indep repair battalion, Volgograd
347 indep medical battalion, Volgograd
33 separate mechanised infantry mountain brigade in Botlikh, Dagestan⁹⁵
22 spetsnaz brigade, Aksai⁹⁶
10 spetsnaz brigade, Mol'kino⁹⁷
 114 missile brigade, Kapustin Iar
 1 missile brigade, Krasnodar
2 indep missile battalions of 114 missile regiment, Krasnodar⁹⁸
102 air defence brigade, Krasnodar⁹⁹
 179 air defence brigade, Eisk
 814 air defence regiment, Kropotkin
 227 arty brigade, Slavyansk-na-Kubani
 291 arty brigade, Maikop
One tank battalion, Maikop¹⁰⁰
439 missile brigade, Kapustin Iar¹⁰¹
 943 MLRS regiment, Krasnooktiabr'skii
 264 anti-tank arty regiment, Oktiabr'skii
1128 arty regiment, Maikop¹⁰²
 214 engineering brigade, Kamensk-Shakhtërskii
 120 bridge regiment, Kamensk-Shakhtërskii
 175 indep comms brigade, Aksai
 206 indep comms regiment, Zernograd
 91 indep comms regiment, Krasnodar
 71 indep EW regiment, Kovalëvka
 131 indep radio technical brigade, Rostov
 154 indep radio technical brigade, Moskovskoe
 170 indep radio technical battalion, Krasnodar
 21 chemical brigade, Kamyshin
 176 radio technical brigade, Novocherkassk

⁹⁵ "Mountain brigades are ready to fight", *WPS Observer*, 15 Oct 2007.

⁹⁶ Robinson Colin: "Update on the Russian Ground Troops", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 19:1, 2006, pp. 25–32.

⁹⁷ Robinson Colin: "Update on the Russian Ground Troops", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 19:1, 2006, pp. 25–32.

⁹⁸ "Units transferred to contract manning in 2006", from the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/56/226/index.shtml>, accessed 7 Oct 2008.

⁹⁹ "The North Caucasus military district plans to enlist 11,000 contract soldiers this year", *Publikatsii*, 15 May 2006, the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/publish/index.shtml>, accessed 11 Jun 2008.

¹⁰⁰ "The North Caucasus military district plans to enlist 11,000 contract soldiers this year", *Publikatsii*, 15 May 2006, the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/publish/details/index.shtml?id=1740>, accessed 5 Dec 2008.

¹⁰¹ "Units transferred to contract manning in 2006", from the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/56/226/index.shtml>, accessed 7 Oct 2008.

¹⁰² "Units transferred to contract manning in 2006", from the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/56/226/index.shtml>, accessed 7 Oct 2008.

424 indep comms battalion, Novocherkassk
860 indep flamethrower battalion, Oktiabr'skii
744 arty storage, Novocherkassk
763 storage, Mol'kino
7 guards airborne division, Novorossiisk¹⁰³
Two VDV division\brigade in Krasnodar and Rostov (one is 7 airborne mountain division, Novorossiisk)¹⁰⁴
242 motorised rifle regiment¹⁰⁵
102 military base, Erevan/Giumri, Armenia
 123 motor rifle regiment, Erevan
 124 motor rifle regiment, Giumri
 128 motor rifle regiment, Giumri
 992 arty regiment, Giumri
 998 air defence regiment, Giumri
 116 indep tank battalion, Giumri
 66 indep anti-tank arty division, Giumri
 772 indep recce battalion, Giumri
 628 indep comms battalion, Giumri
 550 engineering battalion, Giumri
 174 repair battalion, Giumri
 626 chemical battalion, Giumri
 1552 logistics battalion, Giumri
 storage base, Giumri

¹⁰³ Robinson Colin: "Update on the Russian Ground Troops", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 19:1, 2006, pp. 25–32; "Russian General Says Inspection Begins of 7th Airborne Division in Novorossiysk", *World News Connection*, 11 Oct 2005.

¹⁰⁴ "The North Caucasus military district plans to enlist 11,000 contract soldiers this year", *Publikatsii*, 15 May 2006, the Russian Defence Ministry's website on contract service; <http://contract.mil.ru/publish/index.shtml>, accessed 11 Jun 2008.

¹⁰⁵ "The evolution of the contract: 2007", *Rossiiskoe voennoe obozrenie*, no. 6, Jun 2007.

References

- ”The Federal targeted programme”, *Krasnaia zvezda*, no. 222, 25 Nov 2004
- ”New conscription policy unveiled”; Russian Ministry of Defence website, at www.mil.ru/eng/1862/12069/index.shtml, accessed 16 Jun 2008
- “On the main indicators of the project of the Federal targeted programme for 2004–2007” – plan formulated by the Russian government; http://www.government.ru/archiv/data/structdoc.html-he_id_102_do_id_923.htm
- Alexandrov Vladimir: ”Contract service. The Cost of a Volunteer Soldier”, *Russian Military Review*, no. 10, 31 Oct 2004
- Baranets Viktor: ”Russia is preparing arctic special forces”, *Komsomol’skaia pravda*, 11 Jun 2008
- Barany Zoltan: *Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007
- Belousov Iurii, Tikhonov Aleksandr: ”Better in the ground forces”, *Krasnaia zvezda*, no. 35, 2 Mar 2007
- Bozh’eva Ol’ga: ”Defence Ministry prolongs the contract”, *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 13 Apr 2007
- Bukkvoll Tor: ”Their Hands in the Till. Scale and Causes of Corruption in the Russian Armed Forces”, *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 34, issue 2, Jan 2008
- Denisov Vitalii, Gafutulin Nail’: ”We have already outgrown an old overcoat”, *Krasnaia zvezda*, 3 Oct 2003
- Fatigarov Vasilii, Iushkov Oleg: ”To train professionals, to bring up leaders”, *Krasnaia zvezda*, 21–27 Mar 2007
- Felgenhauer Pavel: ”The financial crisis may curtail Kremlin plans for modernizing armed forces”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 5 no. 194, 9 Oct 2008
- Gavrilov Iurii: ”Commander under contract”, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 5 Dec 2007
- Gavrilov Iurii: ”Reduction of Generals”, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 15 Oct 2008
- Gavrilov Iurii: ”70,000 for a captain”, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 9 Dec 2008
- Gol’ts Aleksandr: ”An unfinished house”, *Defense & Security*, no. 37, 6 Apr 2007
- Gol’ts Aleksandr: ”Minus one division”, *Ezhednevnyi zhurnal*, 15 Dec 2006
- Khrolenko Aleksandr: ”Commander of the North Caucasus military district General of the Army A. Baranov: ‘The North Caucasus military district is looking confidently into the future and developing comprehensively’”, *Voennyi vestnik iuga Rossii*, no. 17, 21 Apr 2008

- Khudoleev Viktor: "Combat training. Fruitfulness of the training fields", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 3 Aug 2006
- Klenov Iurii, Pochiniuk Oleg: "From Pskov to Pechenga", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 27 Aug 2002
- Khramchikhin Aleksandr: "Lessons of military successes and failures", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, 22 Aug 2008
- Korotchenko Igor': "Transfer to contract becomes an axiom", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 10 Apr 2003
- Kudelina Liubov: "Troop support. Defense Budget – 2004", *Russian Military Review*, no. 002, 29 Feb 2004
- Litovkin Viktor: "The President will slow down the pace of reform", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 Jan 2009
- Maslov Aleksei: "The army needs professionals", *Armeiskii sbornik*, no. 1, Jan 2008
- Mikhailov Viktor: "National defence: Four trillions for three years", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, 19 September 2008
- Military Balance 2008, 2007, 2006*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Mironov Vitalii: "You live in comfort while you serve in a tank regiment", *Russkii kur'er*, no.241, 29 Nov 2004
- Mukhin Vladimir: "It is too early to abolish drafting", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, no. 25, 3–9 Aug 2007
- Myers Steven Lee: "Hazing trial bares dark side of Russian military", *The New York Times*, 13 Aug 2006
- Nikolskii Aleksei: "A new contract", *Vedomosti*, 16 Jun 2008
- Nikol'skii Aleksei: "Reform of the army at the cost of 2.6 billion \$", *Vedomosti*, 4 Apr 2003
- Nikol'skii Aleksei: "Sergeants cost 243 billion", *Vedomosti*, 23 Jul 2008
- Permiakov Sergei: "Contract: What is wrong?", *Voенno-promyshlennyi kur'er*, no. 41, Oct 2007
- Permiakov Sergei: "Underfinancing of 80 billion roubles", *Voенno-promyshlennyi kurier*, no. 21, 6–12 Jun 2007
- Pinchuk Aleksandr: "An alarm near Ussuriisk", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 6 Apr 2007
- Plugatarëv Igor': "Conscripts and contract servicemen will cover the 'demographic pit'", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, no. 3, 1–7 Feb 2008
- Pylaev Vladimir: "Commander of the Far Eastern military district General of the Army Iurii Iakubov: 'Changes in the Far Eastern Military District are for the better'", *Orientir*, no. 10, 31 Oct 2005
- Robinson Colin: "The Russian Ground Forces Today: A Structural Status Examination", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 18:2 2005, pp. 189–206
- Robinson Colin: "Update on the Russian Ground Troops", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 19:1, 2006, pp. 25–32

Rodionov Viktor: "On the Territory of Two Federal Districts", *Voенно-promyshlennyi kur'er*, no. 37 (253), 17–23 Sept 2008; http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2008.253.articles.army_01

Shcherbakov Vladimir: "Peculiarities of National Military Reform", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, 31 Oct 2008

Shutikov Aleksandr, Kutishchev Viktor: "New military 'pros'", *Armeiskii sbornik*, no. 1, Jan 2008

Skorodumov A. I.: "Combat Training: Urgent Problems and Solutions", *Military Thought*, vol. 4, issue 3, 2003

Smirnov Vasilii: "Contract-based military in Russia: Problems and solutions", *Military Thought*, no. 001, 31 Mar 2003.

Smirnov Vasilii: "The Federal targeted programme: A four-year transition", *Armeiskii sbornik*, no. 1 Jan 2008

Solov'ev Vadim, Litovkin Viktor: "Serdiukov's revolutionary steps", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 9 Oct 2008

Thornton Rod: "Military Organization and Change: The 'Professionalisation' of the 76th Airborne Division", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol.17 issue 3, September 2004

Tiazhlov Ivan: "The President and General Staff will help contract soldiers with roubles", *Kommersant*, 1 Oct 2008

Tikhonov Aleksandr: "The north-western bastion", *Krasnaia zvezda*, no. 45, 19 Mar 2008

Trenin Dmitri, Malashenko Aleksei: *Russia's Restless Frontier. The Chechnya Factor in post-Soviet Russia*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. 2004

Vorob'ev Eduard, Tsymbal Vitalii: "Status collapse of the contract system is preprogrammed", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, no. 39, 27 Oct 2006