FFI RAPPORT

RESTORING PEACE OR PROVOKING TERRORISM? Exploring the Links Between Multilateral Military Interventions and International Terrorism

KJØK Åshild, HEGGHAMMER Thomas, HANSEN Annika, KNUDSEN Jørgen Kjetil

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FORSVARETS FORSKNINGSINSTITUTT
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
Postboks 25, 2027 Kjeller, Norge
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This study is an empirical investigation of the connection between multilateral military interventions and international terrorism. Of particular concern is the question of the extent to which increased international interventionism and increasingly forceful interventions cause changes in the level and type of international terrorism. The study will first present a number of hypotheses on possible links between these phenomena. It then introduces three detailed case studies: the deployment of MNF I and II in Lebanon (1982-84); Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Kuwait (1990-91); and the NATO campaign and KFOR missions in Kosovo (1998-2000). The study also includes two shorter case studies describing the terrorist response to the recent military interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). It proceeds to compare the data from these case studies: while all the interventions provoked terrorist attacks outside the conflict theatre, the number and scale of the attacks vary greatly, as each of the interventions had its own set of circumstances that determined the nature and level of the terrorist response. Nevertheless, certain general trends can be found. Most surprisingly, the great majority of the terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by ideological groups with no apparent stake in the conflict, rather than by actors who were directly involved. Furthermore, the question of UN support for an intervention does not seem to influence the terrorist response, although the general perception of political legitimacy does seem to matter. There are also some indications that the use of extensive force by intervening armies is likely to result in more lethal terrorist responses, but the evidence substantiating this finding needs to be further examined. Business interests have been the most common targets, followed by diplomatic and military targets. Finally, it should be noted that this study does not account for in-theatre violence nor does it provide a detailed study of possible long-term effects.
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RESTORING PEACE OR PROVOKING TERRORISM? Exploring the Links Between Multilateral Military Interventions and International Terrorism

1 INTRODUCTION

NATO-countries have become increasingly involved in military operations abroad after the end of the Cold War.¹ Such operations have also become increasingly involved and complex, in that traditional peacekeeping missions supervising cease-fires have to some degree been replaced by larger-scale military interventions, which often involve the political and societal reconstruction of war-torn countries. Globalisation and the rise of transnational terrorist networks are further important aspects of the post-Cold War development. This research report will investigate possible links between these phenomena. It will focus on how multilateral military interventions impact on patterns of international terrorism, asking whether they generate more international terrorism against the participating nations. In particular, do deep and forceful interventions turn the participant countries into targets of political violence at home or in third countries?

The central concept of this report is therefore that of terrorism “spill-over”. When and how is a conflict likely to spill over into other states in the form of terrorism? How does the nature of the intervention and the political strategies adopted by the intervening countries affect the type and extent of the spill-over? These questions have so far only been partially addressed, and answers are often largely normative or superficial. In public debates about international interventions the complex connections between conflict and terrorism tend to be explored simplistically as “violence causes violence”, and it is often taken for granted that a military intervention will produce a significant increase in terrorism. However, this does not necessarily tally with the actual spill-over from military interventions.

The issue of terrorism spill-over has thus far received relatively little attention in academic literature. Much has been written about the challenges and risks posed by new types of military operations for the intervening forces on the battlefield and within the war theatre, but little is known about the security implications outside the area of operations. The issue has appeared in the corpus of literature on asymmetric warfare that has grown relatively large since the end of the Cold War.² However, a large number of these works are prognostic in nature, and based on projections rather than empirical data, and hence their dealing with the connection between international intervention and terrorism is often difficult to verify. There is also an adjacent field in which the connection between conflict and terrorism is increasingly being explored from an empirical perspective. This is the area of conflict studies or peace studies, which has a long tradition of quantitative approaches to the study of conflict, and some efforts are now being made to explore the conflict-terrorism dimension.³ However, quantitative works usually lack the

¹ The authors would like to thank Professor Øyvind Østerud, Morten Bremer Mærlø, Brynjar Lia and Petter Nesser for useful comments on this report.
² For a survey of this literature, see Lia and Andrésen (2000a).
³ See e.g. http://www.sipri.se/taac.htm
qualitative input necessary to highlight the detailed mechanisms of the conflict-terrorism interplay. A third and possibly more fruitful approach to the specific issue of terrorism spill-over is therefore that of detailed case studies. Such case studies are relatively rare, but some good studies do exist, particularly on the terrorism spill-over from the 1991 Gulf War. Nevertheless, there have been no attempts so far to synthesize and compare multiple case studies. This would enable us to reach a higher level of generalization, which is what this study attempts to achieve.

The first chapter presents a number of hypotheses on possible mechanisms linking military interventions to international terrorism. These focus on three main aspects: the nature and extent of the intervention; the conflict characteristics and conditions; and the existence of potential terrorist groups. The following chapters present five case studies of multilateral interventions: the international intervention in Kuwait (Desert Shield and Desert Storm) during the Gulf crisis from 1990-1991; the deployment of the Multinational Forces (MNF I and II) in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984; the international interventions in Kosovo from 1998 to mid-2000; Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan since October 2001; and Operation Iraqi Freedom since March 2003. MNF represents a traditional peacekeeping mission, while the remaining cases represent various variants of the more recent and deeper type of intervention. The purpose of selecting this range of case studies is to provide a historical basis for comparison. In the final chapter, some tentative conclusions are drawn on the initial hypotheses.

The current report is one in a series of studies in the field of terrorism research published by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).\textsuperscript{4} The bulk of it was written in the context of FFI’s first terrorism research project, “Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare: Emerging Security Challenges after the Cold War” (TERRA I). However, due to changes in research priorities in the wake of 11 September 2001, the study was put on hold and only finalized under the second and third research projects in the series, “Terrorism and Acts of Sabotage: Scenarios” (TERRA II) and “Transnational Radical Islamist Movements: ideology, methods and support networks” (TERRA III). The report has been authored by four different people, due to changes in the FFI research staff. They have chosen somewhat different approaches to the research material, but all the case studies largely follow the same three-step method:

- First the key characteristics of the conflict as well as the intervention are identified, focusing on factors that might indicate the extent to which the conditions are conducive to the use of asymmetric tactics, conflict exportation and international terrorism.
- Secondly the factors and structures that link the conflict and its participants to the international arena are highlighted, paying particular attention to the international infrastructure of in-theatre terrorist organisations, the role of Diaspora groups and of sympathetic groups in other countries.
- Thirdly the available data of international terrorist attacks related to the conflict is examined, with a view to explaining the level and type of terrorism spill-over in each case.

\textsuperscript{4} Other studies in this series can be accessed at http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/FFI-prosjekter/Alfover/_TERRA/Publikasjoner/article.jhtml?articleID=76986
The two most recent case studies, however, only focus on the third aspect, i.e. that of terrorism spill-over. They were originally not intended to be included in the study, as they had not yet occurred when the first draft was completed. Nevertheless a shortened version of these recent cases is included in order to increase the policy relevance of the report and illustrate recent developments.

A few remarks on the methodology of selecting incidents of international terrorism are required. The ITERATE database is used for the cases of Kuwait, Lebanon and Kosovo, whereas the RAND-MIPT database and various newspapers have been the sources for the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. This was mainly a practical choice, due to a lack of access to recent data from ITERATE. While this might represent a problem, as the selection criteria of the two databases are likely to be somewhat different, the value of including the two recent cases outweighs the disadvantages. Moreover, we are also reasonably confident that the selection criteria are not so different as to influence the results in any significant manner. The incidents included in the case studies have been selected based on the following criteria:

1) Incidents carried out by actors who are directly involved in the conflict.
2) Incidents involving targets connected to the conflict.
3) Incidents accompanied by a statement referring specifically to the conflict.

All the interventions studied in this report resulted in acts of terrorism against the intervening countries. However, the number and scale of the attacks vary greatly. Each of the interventions had its own set of circumstances that determined the nature and level of the terrorist response. Nevertheless, certain general trends can be found. Terrorism fears during international interventions are usually tied to actors participating directly in the conflict, but most of the attacks have actually been perpetrated by local ideological groups with no apparent stake in the conflict. Yet they can represent a threat in cases where they have acquired significant terrorist capabilities. This can probably be explained by a lack of capabilities among affected groups. The question of UN backing for an intervention does not seem to impact on the terrorist response, although the general perception of political legitimacy does. Moreover, there are some indications that the use of extensive force by intervening armies will result in more lethal terrorist responses, although the substantiating evidence for this proposition needs to be further examined. This study does not account for in-theatre violence nor does it provide a detailed study of possible long-term effects.

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5 ITERATE is available in book format (Micklous), and can also be purchased as a data-file. The MIPT/Rand-database can be accessed at http://db.mipt.org/mipt_rand.cfm
2 POSSIBLE LINKS BETWEEN MULTILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The mechanisms by which an international intervention into a local conflict might impact on the level and type of direct terrorism spill-over seem to be shaped by three fundamental factors:

- The nature and extent of the intervention itself.
- The conflict characteristics and conditions.
- The existence of potential terrorists.

In this chapter, some hypotheses on how these mechanisms link multilateral interventions and international terrorism are presented.

2.1 Nature and extent of the intervention

The legitimacy of the intervention, particularly the question of UN backing, is likely to influence the degree to which the intervening force and the coalition countries are seen as legitimate targets of violence. The same applies to the level of speculation over the ideological/political motivations of the interveners. Although the overall level of political dissatisfaction over an international intervention does not necessarily translate into terrorism, the lack of perceived legitimacy may play a role in mobilising ideological or affected groups to violent action.

The level of force used by the intervention armies appears to be a factor in the shaping of violent responses such as terrorist campaigns. It is reasonable to assume that a high-intensity military intervention risks producing a stronger terrorist response than a classic peacekeeping mission. For instance, a bombing campaign seems likely to provoke more aggression than the deployment of lightly-armed interposition forces in a buffer zone. However, it is not clear to what extent the terrorist response is proportional to the objective level of destruction inflicted by the intervening forces.

The casualty aversiveness of nations participating in a low-intensity peacekeeping mission is, on the other hand, likely to be higher than that of nations involved in a war-like scenario. This may make them more vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as terrorists might conceive that they are easily deterred. A case in point is Usama bin Ladin’s frequent referrals to the American withdrawals from Somalia and Lebanon as proof that terrorist attacks against U.S. interests is a cost-effective method of persuading the superpower into changing its policies.6

The composition of the intervening forces might play a role in shaping the direction of the terrorist responses. However, this issue is complex. A narrow coalition dominated by a great power such as the United States is on the one hand more likely to be perceived as motivated by one state’s national interest, and is thus likely to produce more violent responses. A broader

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coalition on the other hand internationalises the conflict and might turn more countries into terrorist targets, but reduces the probability of terrorist strikes against individual participating states.

*The different stages* of the intervention might also involve different levels of terrorism threats. For instance, parties to the conflict might decide to launch deterrence campaigns prior to the actual intervention in order to dissuade prospective participants. On the other hand, interventions that last for longer periods involve greater risk for the forces of being drawn into the local power game, and also allow prospective terrorists more time to prepare their campaigns.

*The intervening forces might be seen to be responsible* for atrocities that occur during the conflict, if failing to prevent them. A case in point is the criticism that emerged against Dutch troops after the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This may instigate victimised groups to seek revenge by staging terrorist attacks against the intervening countries. Another possibility is that previous colonial rulers intervening in a conflict are seen to be co-responsible for its outbreak due to previous policies that may have prepared the ground for the conflict.

### 2.2 Conflict characteristics and conditions

*The nature of the conflict* could influence the potential for an international terrorist response to an international intervention. One important factor to consider is the level of state involvement. Interstate conflicts (e.g. the Gulf War) might provide a more predictable set of potential perpetrators that are easily kept under surveillance, but such actors are also likely to benefit from the logistical support of a state. In a civil war scenario (e.g. Lebanon), the number of potential perpetrators might be larger, and the chances of one or more party feeling marginalized are probably greater.

*The intensity of the conflict* is likely to impact on the level of terrorism spill-over. The psychological threshold of using violence against third parties may be lower in a high-intensity conflict than in a low-intensity scenario, where the parties are less likely to have developed a “culture of violence” and thus more averse to the idea of “collateral damage”.

*The stage of the conflict* at the time of the intervention might be important to the deterrent effect of the intervening force, its credibility, and the level of “accumulated grievances” among the warring parties. It is also known from earlier studies that political transition phases are particularly prone to violence and potentially also to terrorism. Furthermore, Stedman’s thesis on so-called spoiler problems in peace processes has illustrated the phenomenon of terrorism during periods of stabilisation or parallel negotiations.

*The geographic location* of the conflict might give important indications of the likelihood of

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7 Lia & Skjølberg (2000).
8 Stedman (1997).
terrorism spill-over. International interventions in the Middle East appear to have provoked far more terrorism spill-over to the developed world than interventions in Africa. This is probably linked to the way the conflicts are perceived. For instance, the close U.S.-Israeli relationship and the large oil reserves in the Middle East provide ample opportunities for leftist radicals and Islamic extremists to frame Western interventions in the region as imperialist aggressions.

*Geographic proximity* to the conflict-theatre could have an influence on where the terrorism spill-over takes place. In the case of neighbouring states, parties involved in the conflict might easily slip across the border to carry out attacks, which would enhance the risk of terrorism spill-over.

### 2.3 The existence of potential terrorist groups

The operational capabilities of *militant groups and regimes with a stake in the conflict* probably have consequences for the level of terrorism spill-over during an international intervention. International terrorism requires a significant level of expertise and resources, which is not readily available to militant groups. A terrorist group or regime that is directly involved in a conflict faces enormous challenges because its terrorist ambitions are usually known or expected, and counter-terrorism efforts are likely to be concentrated on them. The importance of experience in or “traditions” for carrying out terrorist operations within a given group or regime should therefore not be underestimated. The acquisition of such capabilities is likely to take time, and hence the highest threat, at least in the early stages of an intervention, is likely to come from groups or regimes with an established tradition for terrorism.

*The extent or potential of regional involvement* is likely to be another important factor shaping the international terrorist threat during international interventions. The conflict pattern in the region as a whole must be taken into consideration as the local constellations may provide an incomplete picture. Moreover, groups or states that are not directly involved in the initial fighting may be drawn into the conflict, either because they have bonds of allegiance to a warring party, or because they are gradually affected by the course of events.

*Diaspora* support is a potentially important facilitating factor for terrorist groups that are involved in the conflict. There could also be cases where Diasporas themselves will engage in violent conflict in their host countries in order to advance the causes of their respective home states or communities. For instance, some observers have claimed that there is a link between Diaspora communities and the occurrence of international terrorism in Europe. The political violence in Germany as a result of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict is a case in point. However, the relationship between an insurgent group, its Diaspora and the host country is a complex one, and there are strong reasons why Diaspora support communities are averse to antagonising the host state. To an insurgent group, a large European-based Diaspora community, sympathetic to their

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9 Gerald Steinberg, for example, asserted in 1996 that there was a direct link between political and social instability in the South and an increased level of terrorism in Europe. He argued that “the level of terrorism in Europe has been increasing, in large part due to the spill-over effects of domestic political and social instability in North Africa and the Middle East.” Steinberg (1996). See also Joffé in Aliboni (1996).
cause, is a most valuable asset, providing crucial political and material support to the fight “at home”, and terrorist acts in Europe might jeopardise this essential support.\textsuperscript{10}

A country or region with \textit{strong and active pan-ideological terrorist groups} appears more likely to experience terrorism spill-over on its territory than areas without such groups. Pan-ideologies, i.e. ideologies (political or religious) that are global in their worldview, and see world events as the result of a struggle between the “forces of good” and the “forces of evil”, have been a very important factor in mobilising local groups around the world toward violence in the name of distant conflicts. Moreover, international interventions tend to involve economically and militarily strong Western powers that become engaged in conflicts in the less developed world, and are therefore likely to be perceived by adherents to pan-ideologies as a result of imperialism. The degree to which an intervention will be interpreted as aggression is largely inherent to the ideologies themselves. Groups and movements that are inspired by the conflict but physically removed from it seem to be less influenced by the actual \textit{experience} of the military, political, social and economic effects of the intervention and more influenced by their own impression of its effects on the conflict situation or the world order.\textsuperscript{11}

\section{THE GULF WAR AND OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM}

Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) in 1990-91 constituted a turning point in the history of multilateral military interventions.\textsuperscript{12} It was thought to mark the beginning of what U.S. President George Bush called the “New World Order”, that is to say a post Cold-War world governed by principles of international law and human rights, a world in which “rogue states” and ruthless leaders would have to face the consequences of their actions. Operation Desert Storm indeed represented a new type of intervention, for a number of reasons. It was the first military enforcement operation carried out with the backing of the United Nations since the Korean War (1950-53), and one might argue that it enjoyed more international consensus (on the inter-state level) than most previous multilateral operations.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, it was also the largest and most violent military operation carried out in the name of the international community since the 1950s, both in terms of mobilisation and actual damage.\textsuperscript{14}

While the nature of the intervention was novel, the international and regional context in which it took place had also changed. On the global level, the fall of the Soviet Union changed the international system from a bipolar to a unipolar one, leaving previous satellite regimes in limbo as Moscow crumbled. On the regional level, the 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the slow but steady rise of political Islam. These changes influenced political and strategic thinking in the West to a significant degree: politically, the enemy was no longer the Soviet Union, but rogue states, Islamic fundamentalism, and “zones of turmoil”; strategically, it was the end of Mutually

\textsuperscript{10} Lia and Kjøk (2001).
\textsuperscript{11} See Berdal (2000).
\textsuperscript{12} This chapter was authored primarily by Thomas Hegghammer.
\textsuperscript{13} Roberts (1996), pp. 323-4.
\textsuperscript{14} For details, see Freedman & Karsh (1991), pp. 24-35.
Assured Destruction and the beginning of asymmetrical warfare. What came to exist in 1990-91 was therefore a new type of intervention in a new international climate.

### 3.1 Background

#### 3.1.1 Operation Desert Storm

Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 in a move that was motivated by nationalist, economic and geopolitical interests. On the domestic scene, the Iraqi economy was crippled by eight years of war with Iran and falling oil prices. Saddam Hussein had been receiving subsidies from the Gulf States and credit in the West to finance the war against Iran, but these sources of funding were starting to dry up by early 1990. Iraq’s neighbour, Kuwait, contributed to a low oil price by exceeding its OPEC quota, and simultaneously demanded that Iraq start to pay back its loans.\(^{15}\) Kuwait was rich and militarily speaking a relatively easy prey. Moreover, Saddam Hussein was able to use the disputes over the Rumayilah oilfield and over the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan as an argument to attack the country. He also capitalised, especially domestically, on Iraq’s historical claim to Kuwait.\(^{16}\) Saddam’s economic motives seem to have been accompanied by strong political ambitions. Scholars have emphasised the importance of Saddam Hussein’s persona in determining Iraqi foreign policy, and it is often assumed that a personal hunger for power and prestige was an important factor in his bid for leadership in the Arab world in August 1990.\(^{17}\)

The late-1980s had witnessed changes on the regional and international levels. Saddam Hussein sensed that the conservative political order in the region was faltering, that Islamism was feeding from growing popular resentment of the Middle Eastern states and the West, that the Palestinian intifada was causing frustration, and that the underlying suspicion among most Arabs towards the rich Gulf States remained. Saddam Hussein also knew that the American military capability in the Gulf was modest, and that the United States was still suffering from the so-called Vietnam syndrome. However, his mistakes were in assuming that the United States would accept as a fait accompli that Saudi Arabia would not ask for foreign military help and that Moscow would not side with Washington.\(^{18}\)

The United States, who may be to blame for misinterpreting the signals from Baghdad prior to the invasion, did not hesitate in reacting to this serious challenge to the status quo in the Persian Gulf.\(^{19}\) Operation Desert Shield, launched for the protection of Saudi Arabia (and vital Western oil interests), started days later, and on 8 August 1990 the UN officially condemned Iraq’s

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16 The Ottoman province of Kuwait was closely linked to that of Baghdad and Basra. A secret agreement between Kuwait and Britain in 1899 was never recognised by Iraq. When the British announced their departure in 1961, Iraq tried to annex Kuwait and forced the British to airlift thousands of soldiers back to protect the Kuwaitis.
17 See e.g. Shlaim (1994), p. 89.
19 For example, on 25 July 1990, the American ambassador April Glaspie met with Saddam Hussein. She spoke of U.S. disapproval of settlement of disputes "by any but peaceful means," and simultaneously asserted that "we have no opinion of the Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait." See Shlaim (1994), p. 93.
invasion of Kuwait. On 29 November 1990 the Security Council authorised the use of “all necessary means” if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. Saddam Hussein stood firm, and on 17 January 1991 Operation Desert Shield became Operation Desert Storm, as American, British, Italian, French, Kuwaiti and Saudi aircraft started bombing military targets throughout Iraq, and the “Mother of All Battles” (in Iraqi parlance) began. The allied ground assault started on 24 February 1991, and 100 hours later, on 28 February, the war was over. It had been an exceptionally quick operation, and the casualty rates on the allied side were much lower than predicted. However, tens of thousands of Iraqi lives were lost, and stories of unnecessary killings and bombing of civilians were leaked to the press. The United States was criticised over two incidents in particular. One was the bombing on 13 February 1991 of a bomb shelter for civilians (200 casualties); the other was the story of the so-called “Highway of Death”, where Iraqis and Palestinians fleeing Kuwait City on 26 February 1991 were bombed by allied tanks and aircraft.

The swift and unified response by the international community to the Iraqi invasion was largely a product of the fact that it was a fairly clear case of aggression (combined with Western economic interests). It was the first time since the creation of the UN that a sovereign state had been annexed in its entirety by another state. In fact, it was a textbook example of the kind of situation the UN was designed to address. Furthermore, while most conflicts have complicated and ambiguous beginnings, the Iraqi-Kuwaiti confrontation was a “simple” conflict in that it was mainly about power and economic interest, and did not contain any significant ideological or ethnic elements. As a consequence, the coalition enjoyed unparalleled international support and the intervention was undeniably less catastrophic for the UN than was the Korean War.

However, as Adam Roberts has pointed out, even in the unusually clear circumstances of Kuwait in 1990-91, many states and individuals expressed strong reservations about the operation. Although the overwhelming majority of states did take part in the sanctions against Iraq, the differences over the military action confirmed a weakness of collective security proposals, namely that they depend on more unanimity among states than actually exists. While state leaders and the Western media were often keen to present the Gulf War as legitimate and necessary, there is no doubt that the large number of Iraqi casualties and the American dominance over the military coalition raised concern and anger with the political left and in many Third World states, especially in the Arab world where the U.S. acceptance of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and Golan since 1967 was contrasted with the swift U.S. response to Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.

3.1.2 Pre-War Concerns

At the beginning of the Gulf crisis there was widespread concern among the coalition countries that any commencement of hostilities with Baghdad would be accompanied by a wave of international terrorism. This threat assessment was the result of three main factors: first, the rise in international terrorism experienced in the mid-to-late 1980s; secondly, direct Iraqi threats to

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use terrorism against the West; and thirdly, Saddam Hussein’s apparent rapprochement with the PLO and with Islamist movements.

The years 1984-88 witnessed a very high level of international terrorist activity, and this period may be considered the “heyday” of state-sponsored terrorism.\(^2\) Thus terrorism was brought to the forefront of the international security agenda and significantly changed threat perceptions, particularly in Western countries.

Well aware of the psychological impact of terrorism on Western democracies, Saddam Hussein embarked on a massive deterrence campaign prior to and during the Gulf crisis. Early in the crisis, Iraqi diplomats indicated that there would certainly be terrorist strikes by groups sympathetic to Baghdad.\(^2\) Examples of threats abound, and they increased in frequency in late 1990 and early 1991. During the war, Iraqi short-wave radio and Radio Baghdad broadcast messages to so-called “action cells” and “revolutionary cells”. These messages appeared to be strange codes calling upon the cells to undertake unspecified action, but it is now widely believed that these broadcasts constituted Iraqi psychological warfare rather than a serious effort to mobilise terrorists.\(^2\)

Partly in an attempt to muster popular Arab support for his cause, and partly as a deterrence effort, Saddam Hussein publicly appealed to Palestinian and Islamic sentiment during the Gulf crisis. He skilfully portrayed himself as a champion of the Palestinian cause and as a defender of Islam, and framed the confrontation with the West and the Gulf states sometimes as a fight against imperialist U.S.-Zionist forces, and at other times as a case of *jihad* against the enemies of Islam. The strategy seemed to work, and as manifestations of popular Arab support for Iraq increased in frequency and intensity, so did the fear of terrorism among coalition countries.\(^2\)

### 3.2 The Gulf conflict and the potential for international terrorism

#### 3.2.1 Iraq

It was widely believed that the Iraqis had the capability, either of carrying out attacks themselves, or of providing financial and operational support to terrorist organisations. Baghdad had proved willing to use international terrorism as an instrument of national policy since the 1968 Ba’athist revolution.\(^2\) Indeed, Saddam Hussein’s boast that “the hand of the revolution can reach out to its enemies wherever they are found” was not unfounded: the Iraqi military intelligence organisation *Istikhbarat* had been responsible for several more or less successful assassination attempts on enemies of Saddam Hussein throughout the 1970s.\(^2\)

\(^2\) \hspace{1cm} See *Patterns of Global Terrorism* for the relevant years.

\(^2\) \hspace{1cm} Banks (1990), p. 559.

\(^2\) \hspace{1cm} Terrill (1993), p. 224.

\(^2\) \hspace{1cm} For a description of the response to the Gulf crisis in the Arab street, see Sayigh (1991).

\(^2\) \hspace{1cm} Terrill (1993), p. 219.

\(^2\) \hspace{1cm} For example, in 1971, they killed General Harden Al-Takriti in Kuwait; see Marr (1985), p. 216. In the same year they nearly succeeded in killing the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani; see Al-Khalil (1989), p. 13. In 1978 they assassinated former Iraqi Prime Minister Abd Al-Razeq Al-Nayef in London; see Karsh & Rautsi (1991), p. 133.
because of operational constraints on the Iraqi intelligence services in foreign countries, Saddam Hussein relied to some extent on proxies. There was a long-standing relationship between Iraq and the Palestinian radical Sabri al-Banna aka Abu Nidal, leader of the Fatah Revolutionary Council (Fatah-RC). Moreover, just prior to the Gulf crisis, the U.S. Department of State identified several Palestinian organisations operating within Iraq, including the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) under Abu Abbas, the 15 May Organisation under Abu Ibrahim, and the Arab Liberation Front. There were also other groups which had no previous record of cooperating with the Iraqis, but which nevertheless made statements of support for Saddam during the Gulf crisis, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under George Habash and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) under Nayif Hawatemeh; even Ahmed Jibril, the pro-Syrian leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC).

The infrastructure of the Iraqi intelligence services operating abroad relied to a large extent on official channels such as the diplomatic service, and most of the personnel involved in political assassinations and the like were based in or had close connections with embassies abroad. Hence the intelligence services had access to a sophisticated communications network, as well as military equipment in situ almost everywhere in the world. However, it is much easier for a host country to take preventive action against officials or to destroy official communication installations than it is to contain cells operating “underground”. The specific infrastructure linking Iraq with other, mainly Palestinian, terrorist organisations at the time of the Gulf War is difficult to ascertain. Baghdad certainly extended financial support to Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas, and possibly to Abu Ibrahim and George Habash, but little is known about the provision of arms and the like.

Prior to the intervention in Kuwait, some feared that Iraq might use chemical or biological weapons for terrorist purposes. Indeed, Saddam Hussein had a record of using chemical weapons tactically in the war against Iran and in the repression of the Kurds, and he repeatedly threatened the coalition with chemical weapons in the months preceding Desert Storm. However, it must be noted that the full scale of the Iraqi unconventional weapon programmes became known only after the war, and that conventional terrorism remained the prime concern.

The most ambitious effort was the 1975 plot to assassinate Anwar Sadat; see Weizman (1981), p. 77. The Istikhbarat appears to have been the one branch of Saddam Hussein’s extensive security network most frequently used to carry out attacks abroad; see Al-Khalil (1989), p. 13-14, and The Economist, 29 September 1990, p. 43. After breaking with the mainstream PLO in the 1970s, Abu Nidal became almost totally dependent on Baghdad, with which he broke in 1983; see Seale (1992), chapter six. In 1990 there were rumours that Abu Nidal and Saddam Hussein had met, and that Abu Nidal’s nephew had set up an office in Baghdad. See Los Angeles Times, 2 September 1990, p.1; Seale (1992), p. 313; Seger (1991), p. 25; and Schwarzkopf (1992), p. 317. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991; see also Melman (1986). See Terrill (1993), p. 221-2. See Rathmell (1991), p. 393. For example, after the assassination of former Iraqi Prime Minister Abd Al-Razeq Al-Nayef in London in 1978, the police investigation resulted in the declaration of eleven Iraqi diplomatic officials as personae non gratae; see Terrill (1993), p. 230. Similarly, in January 1991, two Iraqis, sons of the Iraqi ambassador to Somalia, were implicated in the attempt to bomb the US cultural centre in Manila, Philippines. See ITERATE. See Cigar (1992).
It is also worth noting that the Iraqi state had not been able to operate from within the Iraqi Diaspora to any significant degree. This was mainly due to the fact that the Iraqi expatriate community consists of large numbers of Shi’ites, Kurds, and political dissidents, but could also be explained by the fact that it was difficult to rally support behind a political agenda that served the regime or the state leader only. The Iraqi state was therefore unable to present ideological or nationalist notions that commanded widespread support from the Diaspora.

In addition to the operational constraints suffered by a country at war, Iraq also faced the problem of a lack of political support. William Quandt has argued that Saddam Hussein’s credentials as a leader of the Arab world, a new Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, or a new Saladin preparing to confront the modern-day crusaders were not particularly impressive. He had no great vision to impart to the Arab masses, he was no great orator, and his secular and elitist Ba’athist regime was seen as excessively brutal even by Middle Eastern standards. Despite the cult of personality surrounding him in Iraq, he had little charismatic appeal in the rest of the Arab world.

3.2.2 Palestinian Organisations

The second group of foes, as seen from the West, consisted of Palestinian terrorist organisations operating internationally. Despite the fact that Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) had officially abandoned terrorism as a policy in November 1988, there were still a number of militant Palestinian groups that refused to accept his decision and continued to plan and execute operations outside the Occupied Territories. Many Palestinian groups were sympathetic to Saddam Hussein. Most of these have been mentioned already, but deserve to be treated separately in light of the fact that they had their own motivations and constraints. Many of these organisations had decade-long records of carrying out very effective attacks on Israeli and Western targets.

Among the organisations with links to Iraq, the Abu Nidal – organisation (Fatah-RC) was well known for its murdering of prominent Palestinians, its expulsion from the PLO in 1974 and its leader’s and Yasir Arafat’s sentencing of each other to death in absentia. Infamous terrorist attacks by Abu Nidal include the strikes on the Rome and Vienna airports in 1975 and on the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul in 1986; his attacks are believed to have killed over 300 people. PLF leader Abu Abbas had a less notable record, but was nevertheless considered
dangerous, especially after the 1985 seizure of the cruise ship *Achille Lauro*. Much less is known about the **Arab Organisation of 15 May**, which specialised in making sophisticated barometrically triggered bombs used to destroy civilian air carriers, the most famous of which was the TWA flight in April 1986. The **Arab Liberation Front** is better known for its armed raids into Israel and for its role in Lebanon than for its international terrorist attacks.

There were also organisations without operational links to Iraq that had to be taken seriously. The Marxist **PFLP** had a notorious past, and was responsible for some of the most famous and brutal international terrorist operations on record, including the hijacking of the Air France flight to Uganda in 1976, and the Lufthansa flight to Mogadishu in 1977. Although the PFLP at the end of the 1970s adopted a policy of limiting its operations to Israeli targets within Israel, it was part of the ‘Rejection Front’ that opposed Fatah’s increasing emphasis on diplomacy from the late 1980s, and this could be seen as a motivating factor in the context of the Gulf War.

The **PFLP-GC** was known for being less ideological than the PFLP; its trademark was the taking of Israeli hostages, but it had also carried out important operations such as the two bombings of U.S. troop trains in Germany in 1987 and 1988. The Marxist-Leninist **DFLP** was the first of the Palestinian organisations to limit its operations to Israel and the Territories, and it even preceded Fatah in making diplomatic initiatives, making contact with Israeli socialist counterparts as early as 1970. It carried out several attacks within Israel in the 1970s, but by 1988 DFLP actions were limited to small border raids.

The primary motivation of the Palestinian organisations lay in the opposition to the U.S. support for Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, none of the above-mentioned groups supported the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but opposing the Western presence was more important than worrying about Kuwait. For example, George Habash said in August 1990, “We have an Arab proverb that when a destructive animal comes onto your land you drive it away. So we are not asking why the animal came here – first we get rid of it.”

A second motivation for these organisations was the fact that the UN’s response to the occupation of Kuwait stood in stark contrast to the international handling of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, a contrast that Saddam Hussein was very keen to emphasise. A third motivation may have been the prospect of escaping the deadlock and frustration in the occupied territories in the third year of the *intifada*. A fourth factor may have been the dynamics of inter-Palestinian politics; a group’s relative strength and popularity could in certain circumstances be bolstered by successful terrorist attacks on Western or Zionist targets.

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39 Note that the PLF is an umbrella term for three different groups, the most significant of which is headed by Ahmed Jibril. Iraq, Libya and Syria each back one of the three PLF fronts. See Anderson & Sloan (1995), p. 265-8.
40 Anderson & Sloan (1995), p. 213. It is believed that the organisation is no longer active today, and that most of its members have joined other groups.
41 Note that the ALF was created by the Iraqi government in 1969 as a tool to extend Iraqi influence within the Palestinian movement and within Lebanon. *Ibid*, p. 38.
The infrastructure of the above-mentioned groups had one unifying characteristic, namely the reliance on strong financial backing from sponsor states such as Libya, Syria, Iran, and to some extent Yemen. The history of the relationship between the individual groups and the sponsor states is a very complex one, and is characterised by opportunism and changing allegiances; very often, organisations relied on more than one sponsor state. However, this backing was also an Achilles’ heel in the sense that it led to dependence, and groups could conceivably be reined in by their sponsor states. The fact that Saddam Hussein was in conflict with some of the main sponsors of these groups, notably Syria and Iran, increased the potential costs for Palestinian organisations of supporting the “wrong side”.

Operational support in terms of weapons provision also came from the radical Arab states, although some organisations had suppliers outside the region, notably Cuba and the USSR.  

A number of the Palestinian groups also had links with terrorist organisations elsewhere in the world. The DFLP is believed to have had contact with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, while there had also been extensive co-operation between German groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) / Movement 2 June / Revolutionary Cells and Palestinian organisations (particularly the PFLP) in the 1970s. Many of the Palestinian groups enjoyed a significant operational capability, sometimes based on sophisticated hardware.

3.2.3 Radical Islamic Groups

A third category of potential terrorists was made up of radical Islamists, that is to say organisations which use violence as a means to further Islamic values with the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic state. These organisations tend to be fiercely anti-Western, and it was believed that the intervention in Kuwait would prompt terrorist attacks from organisations throughout the Muslim world, especially as Saddam Hussein intensified his efforts to “Islamise” the Gulf crisis. Furthermore, the Islamists constitute an important political opposition force in many Arab countries, and it was unclear what effect the allied intervention would have on political stability in countries whose regimes supported the coalition, such as Egypt and Morocco.

Although there had been Islamist movements (in the modern sense) in the Middle East for a long time, they first made their entry on the Western security agenda with the Iranian revolution in 1979. The 1980 American hostage crisis in Tehran, the 1981 assassination by Egyptian Islamic Jihad of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the taking of Western hostages by groups like Hizbullah in Lebanon, the activities of the Palestinian groups Islamic Jihad and Hamas in the late 1980s, as well as the Islamist takeover in Sudan in 1989, had all contributed to an increased focus on Islamic fundamentalism as a security threat to the West. This tendency gained further momentum with the fall of the Eastern Bloc.

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46 The DFLP, for example, received Soviet training and Cuban aid; see Anderson & Sloan (1995), p. 90.
47 For DFLP and the Sandinistas, see Anderson & Sloan (1995), p. 90. For Palestinian-German co-operation, see Karmon (2000).
In the context of the Gulf crisis, one could identify three main possible motivations behind Islamist terror attacks on coalition targets. First, and by far the most important, was the antagonism with the West, with its roots in Western colonisation and the Islamic notions of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. Many scholars have written about Islamic perceptions of the West, and although many have pointed to the fact that this “confrontation” is more of a cosmological background than a political agenda, it was certainly believed at the time of the Gulf War that the notion of “lesser jihad” could mobilise radical Islamist groups. A second motivating factor was the political symbolism of Saudi Arabia and to some extent Palestine in Islamic doctrine; the stationing of American troops on Saudi Arabian soil was seen by some as a violation of the sanctity of Muslim land. In addition, the Gulf War highlighted the double standards in the West toward continued Israeli occupation of Muslim land in Palestine. A third motivation was linked to the dynamics of domestic politics. There was little doubt that the Arab streets would be highly sceptical of the allied intervention in Iraq, and this was something that the Islamist organisations could not ignore, and it was expected that domestic Islamist groups would try and make political capital of such a popular outcry.

In terms of operational resources and infrastructure, the main point to note is that most of the Islamist organisations relied to a large extent on funding from the conservative Arab regimes and from Saudi Arabia in particular. It is more difficult to assess the role of Diasporas when we are dealing with the Islamist movement, because the term ‘Diaspora’ usually refers to an ethnic or national entity, while Islam does not have a “homeland”. However, a number of militant Islamist organisations have networks in Europe, and use certain Western countries as “sanctuaries” from persecution in their countries of origin. While this provides some of these groups with a certain operational capability in the West, this capability is severely circumscribed by political considerations.

During the 1990s, Diaspora-based Islamist groups were willing to antagonise the host state and jeopardise their relative operational freedom only under very special circumstances. This brings us to another important point, namely that Islamist terrorist groups did not yet have a global focus in the early 1990s; they were primarily interested in increasing their domestic political influence and in confronting Israel. As a consequence, most of the operations mounted by these organisations were targeted at local regimes or Israeli targets, and the number of past Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe did not justify fears of a global jihad on the West, at least in the shorter term. (See paragraph 4.3.4 for long-term effects.)

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50 Dar al-Islam means “Abode of Islam”, i.e. areas ruled according to Islamic law; and Dar al-Harb means “Abode of War”, i.e. areas where Muslims are prevented from practising their religion. It should be noted that moderate Islamists and Muslims also operate with a third concept, i.e. Dar al-Ahd or “Abode of Pact”, where Muslims represent a minority but are allowed to practice their religion freely.
54 Lia & Kjøk (2001).
From the above it is possible to discern some of the limitations to the Islamist threat during the Gulf War. In 1991 James Piscatori wrote an influential article whose title, “Religion and Realpolitik”, illustrates very well the political constraints under which the Islamist movement operated during the war.\textsuperscript{56} Furthermore, as Piscatori pointed out, “the Islamic dimensions of the Gulf crisis were often manipulated by various groups and governments for their own political advantage, and these Islamic concerns may have even been of secondary importance in the competition for power.”\textsuperscript{57}

### 3.2.4 Local Ideological Groups Worldwide

A well known phenomenon associated with regional conflicts involving Western powers is the mobilisation of radical groups worldwide who have little or no direct connection with the conflict area, but who act according to the creed that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. In Europe, concerns were raised primarily about groups such as the Red Army Faction in Germany, Action Directe in France, the Red Brigades in Italy, the October First Antifascist Resistance Group in Spain, and the 17 November Group in Greece. Notorious groups elsewhere included among others the ‘Revolutionary Left’ (\textit{Dev Sol}) in Turkey, the National Democratic Front in the Philippines, and the Shining Path in Peru. All of these had long and morbid records of carrying out terrorist attacks in the name of anti-imperialism, and many of them had expressed their intention of carrying out terrorist attacks if Operation Desert Storm was to go ahead.\textsuperscript{58}

The large number of successful attacks by these groups is a reflection of their often well-developed infrastructure. For a start, they enjoy more operational freedom than international terrorist organisations because they are located inside their respective countries. In a sense, they are “everywhere” because they are local, and they do not rely on an exogenous network such as a Diaspora. Similarly, they do not rely on cross-border arms transfers, but are often self-sustained. Moreover, hardware acquisition is often facilitated by the fact that the legal systems in Western countries limit the extent to which authorities are able to monitor and interfere with suspected individuals.

However, many of these organisations also have networks that extend beyond their domestic arena. Some groups have sponsor states: for example, leftist groups in Europe have had links not only with (former) Communist states, but also with the Iraqi Ba’ath party.\textsuperscript{59} Certain groups also had links with international terrorist organisations. Ely Karmon has studied the contact that existed between Palestinian groups such as the PFLP and German groups such as the Red Army Faction in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{60} Palestinians provided a safe haven as well as training for German

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{56} Piscatori (1991).
\textsuperscript{57} Piscatori (1991), p. 23.
\textsuperscript{58} For example, the leftist National Democratic Front in the Philippines warned that they would embark on an intensive and comprehensive political-military offensive against American military bases. See ITERATE and Lia (2001), p. 14.
\textsuperscript{60} Karmon (2000).
\end{footnotes}
terrorists in the Middle East (Libya, Lebanon, Yemen), and the PFLP perpetrated kidnappings and hijackings in attempts to pressure the German authorities to release jailed terrorists. In return, Germans participated in dangerous and large-scale PFLP operations. It must be noted, however, that there is no evidence of co-operation between German and Palestinian terrorist groups after the early 1980s. There had also been significant co-operation between the various European organisations in the 1980s.\(^{61}\)

The constraints on local groups vary enormously from country to country and from group to group. One limiting characteristic of European groups, however, was their relatively small size. While this was not a problem in terms of operational ability, it did mean that some organisations were vulnerable to the loss of key personnel. In the specific context of the Gulf War, it is important to remember that many European organisations had been inactive for several years at the end of the 1980s.\(^{62}\)

### 3.3 Terrorism spill-over from Operation Desert Storm

Many of the observations below have been made on the basis of statistical data, which must be used with caution. The main problem is that a statistical approach accords equal importance to incidents of very different nature and gravity. Furthermore, the criteria used for classifying an incident as “terrorism” vary between different databases, and even the application of these criteria involves a subjective evaluation process. In the specific case of the Gulf War, this has several important consequences. First, the extensive anti-terrorist measures implemented before, during and after Desert Storm probably prevented a large number of potential attacks from taking place, and hence the positive data belies the actual terrorist response to the UN intervention. Secondly, the complex relationship between the Western coalition, Middle Eastern regimes and their mostly pro-Iraqi masses, meant that a lot of aggression and anti-Western sentiment was channelled through violent demonstrations against the government, such as was the case in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Jordan, for example.\(^{63}\) Such incidents tend not to be included in databases, but need to be taken into consideration if one is to assess the overall level of violent response to a violent intervention. This brings us to the third problem, which is that of the pro-U.S. and pro-European bias in the reporting of terrorism. Western commentators and database compilers tend to focus on international (actual cross-border) incidents at the expense of domestic attacks, as well as on incidents involving Western rather than local targets.

#### 3.3.1 Observations

Research for this report examined the recorded international terrorist attacks between August 1990 and December 1992 using the ITERATE database with a view to identifying those incidents that can be more or less clearly linked to Operation Desert Shield and Operation

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\(^{61}\) For example, in 1984-85 the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells formed an alliance known as the Anti-Imperialist Armed Front (AIAF) with the Red Army Faction and Action Directe. The AIAF carried out an extensive bombing campaign against NATO targets in Europe during this period. See Anderson & Sloan (1995), pp. 70-71.


\(^{63}\) See Azzam (1991), pp. 476-77.
Desert Storm (see introduction for selection criteria). On the basis of this data six major observations can be made.

The first thing to note is that there was a marked increase in international terrorist incidents worldwide during the Gulf crisis. Despite the fact that it took place during a period of decline in the overall level of Middle East-related international terrorism, January and February 1991 witnessed 3.6 times as many incidents as the same period in 1990, and 4.9 times the average level for the rest of 1991. Furthermore, the vast majority of incidents related specifically to the Gulf crisis took place during Desert Storm. Out of 108 incidents, there were only two incidents during Desert Shield, 76 occurred between 17 January and 28 February 1991, 24 took place from March to July 1991, while there were only six incidents after August 1991. This data tells us three important things. First, it confirms the rather obvious assumption that the use of military force produces reactions in the form of terrorism. Secondly, it indicates that mere military presence (such as during Desert Shield) in a potential conflict zone does not necessarily encourage deterrence efforts in the form of terrorism. Thirdly, the Gulf conflict did not produce a prolonged terrorism campaign after the end of Desert Storm. A possible objection may be raised with regards to the rise of Islamist terrorist groups such as Usama bin Ladin’s al-Qaeda in the 1990s, but this will be dealt with below.

The second observation we can make about terrorist incidents during this period is that the majority (57) were carried out by local ideological groups (usually on the extreme left), while Iraqis (5), Palestinians (1?) and Islamists (7) were responsible for a conspicuously low number of attacks.

The third observation concerns the intended recipients of the attacks. Not surprisingly, the United States constituted the preferred target (70), with European allies as second (24) and Middle Eastern allies third (9). Only five attacks affected targets outside these regions.

The fourth observation concerns the geographical location; the vast majority of the incidents took place outside the United States (none) and Western Europe (19). Most attacks (65) took place in the Middle East (39 of which in Turkey), 19 occurred in South America, while Asia and Africa witnessed altogether five acts of terrorism.

Fifth, in terms of target selection, there was a clear tendency to focus on “business targets”, that is to say shops and commercial interests of Western countries. All the 50 attacks on businesses were directed at buildings, not people. This tendency can also be seen with regards to diplomatic targets: the research identified 25 attacks on embassy buildings, while only two diplomats were targeted personally. The opposite is the case with military targets: the research counted 11 attacks on military personnel, and only five on military installations. 14 incidents seemed to be directed at the “general public”.

Finally, most of the attacks were relatively small in scale, i.e. minor bombs, grenades, gun raids,

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64 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991; and Bjørgo (1992), p. 247.
and fires. There were no hijackings and few very serious bomb explosions. Perhaps as a result, the casualty rates of Gulf-related terrorist attacks were relatively low; this research counted eight dead and 33 wounded, while other sources quote slightly higher numbers.\(^{65}\)

### 3.3.2 Spill-over in Europe

The research registered 19 “Gulf-related” terrorist incidents in Europe in the period under consideration. This is a relatively small number, especially considering the threat perceptions and predictions in the run-up to the war. The bulk (11) of these incidents took place in Greece, where the 17 November Group carried out at least nine attacks on business targets and military personnel. Between 25 and 29 January 1991, the group carried out eight attacks with bombs and missiles on various targets, including Barclays Bank, Citibank, American Express Bank (twice), the Inter-American Insurance Company, British Petroleum, and the office of the French military attaché. On 12 March 1991, they used a remotely controlled bomb to kill a U.S. army sergeant stationed at a U.S. Air force base in the country. Four attacks were carried out in Germany; the most famous of these was the machine-gun attack by the Red Army Faction on the U.S. embassy in Bonn on 13 February 1991. Another significant attack (by unknown perpetrators) was the bombing of a military fuel pipeline near Emstek on 18 March, which caused 300 cubic feet of aviation fuel to leak. Three incidents occurred in France, where the leftist Gracchus Babeuf group bombed the European University of America and the U.S. firm New Cosmetics on 3 and 12 December respectively. A curious attack took place on 25 January, when a bomb went off outside the liberal newspaper *Libération*, which had recently changed its editorial view and started expressing support for the intervention. One incident took place in Spain, where the 1 October Group (GRAPO) planted a bomb which slightly damaged an oil pipeline supplying a joint U.S.-Spanish naval base at Rota in Southern Spain.

It is important to note that in all the cases where the perpetrators were identified, the attacks were carried out by local groups which had been active prior to the Gulf War and which continued their activities afterwards. It is therefore possible to conclude that the allied intervention caused a slight change in the activity level of already existing groups, but it did not change the structure of the terrorist landscape in Europe, nor was it “exported” to Europe.

### 3.3.3 Questions and Tentative Explanations

**Why were there relatively few attacks by the Iraqi intelligence services or Iraqi-controlled groups?**

The consensus among scholars seems to be that there is a two-fold explanation for this: first is the widespread belief that Saddam Hussein’s threats prior to the war were part of a deterrence campaign rather than a set of real intentions. Expecting a much milder Western response to the invasion of Kuwait, he did not plan in advance to use terrorism extensively in the West.\(^{66}\) The second reason is that the coalition mounted well-coordinated counter-terrorism operations before, during and after the war. Operational counter-terrorism measures included large-scale

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\(^{65}\) Another figure is 30 dead and 200 wounded, Bjørgo (1992), p. 247.

deportations of Iraqi diplomatic staff throughout the world, close surveillance of other suspected individuals, freezing of Iraqi assets in Western banks, as well as bombing of communication systems in Iraq.

**What explains the low number of attacks by Palestinian organisations?**

As with the Iraqi threat, one might have overestimated the real intentions by Palestinian groups to live up to their rhetoric; most of the organisations had already abandoned the policy of striking at international targets by the early 1980s. One must also be careful not to assume that Palestinian terrorist organisations identified with the Iraqi cause; after all, they had ambiguous feelings about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In this context, the principle of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” was not enough to outweigh the obvious political costs of supporting Iraq. It became clear at an early point in the conflict that Saddam Hussein was a loser, and pragmatic Palestinian organisations were not keen to jeopardise links with sponsor states. Pro-Iraqi operations would not only have damaged relations with states in the Gulf, but also with traditional sponsor states. This was because the diplomatic counter-terrorism measures had been very successful: the United States called on Iraq’s Middle Eastern rivals, such as Syria and Iran, to restrain terrorist groups that might otherwise have mounted operations in support of Saddam Hussein, while Libya was quietly warned that any support of terrorist activities would have the gravest consequences possible.67

**How is it possible to explain the virtual absence of attacks by radical Islamist groups?**

There are three main reasons for this: first is the fact that, contrary to widespread belief, Islamists, up until the early 1990s, had only sporadically engaged in international terrorism; their focus was still primarily domestic. Second is the fact that Saddam Hussein, despite vigorous efforts to portray himself as a man of piety, did not have the religious integrity or credibility to muster support from Islamic organisations.68 Third, and perhaps most important, was the *realpolitik* that influenced the financial considerations of these organisations. Islamists could not afford to upset their main sponsors, namely the conservative Arab states in the Gulf, by engaging in pro-Iraq terrorist activities either abroad or within their respective countries.

**Why were there so many attacks by local ideological groups?**

The main reason for this is that the conflict could very easily be presented as an aggressive, U.S.-instigated, imperialist intervention in the Third World. The structure of the conflict, the asymmetry in the balance of forces, the prominent role of the United States, the financial interests involved, and the level of violence used by the coalition all made the intervention fit more easily into anti-imperialist ideologies than would, say, a low-level intervention in a different type of conflict. Secondly, it may be argued that the media played an important part in bringing the intervention to a wider audience around the world and making it appear more violent, something which in turn could mobilise more local terrorists. The third reason is simply that it is much easier to carry out a terrorist operation within a country than across borders.

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3.3.4 Long Term Effects

So far this report has looked at the immediate terrorism spill-over from the Gulf War. However, there are also serious issues concerning the long-term effects of the Gulf War on terrorism that need to be addressed. Four main aspects will be considered here: first, the possibilities of continued Iraqi sponsorship of international terrorism; secondly, the rise of Islamic terrorism directed against the United States; thirdly, the collapse of Northern Iraq; and fourthly, the occurrence of terrorist attacks carried out by discharged American soldiers who fought in the war.

The protracted confrontation between Iraq and the West in the 1990s over issues such as weapons inspections and oppression of the Kurds has led many in the West to assume that Saddam Hussein’s motivation for carrying out international terrorism had not abated. Even though the level of international terrorism decreased in the years following the Gulf War, there have been a few spectacular incidents, which have been attributed by some to an Iraqi terrorist campaign against the United States. Laurie Mylroie, for example, has argued that the infamous bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York City on 26 February 1993 could be traced back to Iraq, and that this attack was part of a massive campaign of revenge for Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the Gulf War. However, there is no conclusive evidence of Iraqi involvement in the first World Trade Center bombing; indeed the U.S. Department of State said, “the FBI has not found evidence that a foreign government was responsible for the bombing”.

There have also been allegations that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, who bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City in April 1995, killing 168, cooperated with Iraqi intelligence agents. However, the evidence supporting these allegations was not strong enough for U.S. authorities to follow up any leads. On the other hand, there are strong indications that Iraq has ordered several terrorist attacks in nearby countries, particularly Kuwait and Lebanon. Prior to a visit by George Bush to Kuwait in April 1993, Kuwaiti authorities uncovered an Iraqi plot to kill the American ex-President using a huge car bomb. Eleven Iraqis were arrested. All in all it seems difficult to speak of a systematic Iraqi campaign against the United States, although it is clear that Saddam Hussein had not entirely abandoned sponsorship of terrorism as an extension of foreign policy, and Iraq maintained contact with or provided sanctuary to several terrorist groups during the 1990s.

A second possible consequence of the Gulf War may have been the increase in the latent anti-
Western sentiment of radical Islamist organisations.\textsuperscript{73} While it is impossible to draw a direct connection between the Gulf War and Islamic terrorism in general in the 1990s\textsuperscript{74}, it is possible to observe that groups such as Usama bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organisation make specific reference to the Gulf War and the continued U.S. military presence in the region in their statements. For example, a 1998 \textit{fatwa} issued by Usama bin Ladin stated,

\begin{quote}
\textit{First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorising its neighbours, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim peoples.}\textsuperscript{75}
\end{quote}

Bin Ladin may therefore have been influenced by the Gulf War in the development of his anti-Western ideology.\textsuperscript{76} Having said this, it is important to remember that bin Ladin had been active as a \textit{mujahid} before the Gulf War, and it is difficult to conclude that he is a direct product of Operation Desert Storm.

It should be noted that there have been allegations that Usama bin Ladin and Saddam Hussein had an operational relationship from the early 1990s to 2003 that involved training in explosives and weapons of mass destruction, logistical support for terrorist attacks, al-Qaida training camps and safe haven in Iraq, and Iraqi financial support for al-Qaida.\textsuperscript{77}

However, these allegations are disputed and build on reports that are usually uncorroborated and that come from sources of unknown credibility.\textsuperscript{78} It is therefore extremely difficult to establish whether or not there has been a direct link between the Iraqi intelligence services and al-Qaida. One possible explanation is that there were contacts between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida, but that these did not result in a close and long-term strategic partnership.

A third important consequence of international involvement in the Gulf is the post-war collapse of Northern Iraq. Iraq’s treatment of the Kurdish population after their revolt in March and April

\textsuperscript{73} This view is argued by for example Bodansky (1994), Mizell & Grady (1998), Faksh (1994), and Hendrickson (2000).
\textsuperscript{74} However, there have been some specific instances of terrorism that may be linked to the war. Pakistani Mir Aimal Kansi was convicted of a shooting rampage outside CIA headquarters in 1993, which killed two agents. Prosecutors alleged Kansi was trying to avenge the U.S. war on Iraq in 1991. “Execution ‘may spark new terror in Asia’”, CNN.com, 7 November 2002.
\textsuperscript{75} ‘Text of World Islamic Front’s statement urging 
\textsuperscript{76} Such as the December 1992 bombing in Yemen against US servicemen on the way to Somalia; the June 1993 failed assassination of Jordan’s crown prince Abdallah; the January 1995 attempt to assassinate the Pope; the June 1995 failed assassination of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the November 1995 truck bomb in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia which killed five Americans; the November 1995 bombing of Egypt’s embassy in Pakistan which killed 17 people; the 1996 bomb attacks on American service personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; the August 1998 bombings of two US embassies in Africa; and the 2001 attack on USS Cole off the Saudi Arabian coast. See Tanter (1999), p. 266.
\textsuperscript{78} See e.g. “Case Decidedly Not Closed”, Newsweek Web Exclusive, 19 November 2003, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3540586/
1991 led the United Nations to impose so-called “no-fly zones” in the North and to grant semi-autonomy to the Kurdish population in the area. The weakening of the Iraqi authorities’ grip of the north has not been fully supplemented by a strengthening of Kurdish control of the region, but has to a certain extent created a power vacuum and engendered intra-Kurdish conflict. The Islamist organisation Ansar al-Islam, which has been accused by the United States of being linked to al-Qaida, was a protagonist in this conflict, and was able to take control of smaller swathes of Northern Iraqi territory, from which it operated training camps and allegedly experimented with biological and chemical weapons.

A fourth possible consequence of the Gulf War is the occurrence of terrorist attacks carried out by American soldiers who fought in that war. Timothy McVeigh, who was convicted of carrying out the terrorist bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, stated in an interview that he first became disillusioned with the U.S. government during his service in the Gulf War. Moreover, he wrote an essay from his prison cell called “Essay on Hypocrisy”, which was obsessed with the perceived injustice of the U.S. war on Iraq. Nevertheless, his experiences in Iraq seem to have been only one of several factors that induced him toward terrorism, in addition to his relations with his family, his right-wing ideology and also the FBI’s sieges at Waco and Ruby Ridge. It is very difficult to determine which of these factors were more important. However, another instance of violence committed by an American veteran of the Gulf War, which may have been triggered by the war experience, was the sniper attacks that occurred in October 2002 mainly in the Washington DC area, killing 10 people. John Allen Muhammed, who was convicted of the attacks, had served as a marksman in that war.

3.4 Concluding remarks

The terrorist response to Operation Desert Shield/Storm was relatively low compared to the gloomy predictions of Western commentators before the war. The terrorism fears had mainly been linked to the Iraqi regime as well as Palestinian and Islamist groups. The most important finding is therefore that the majority of the terrorist attacks were actually carried out by local leftist groups that had no apparent stake in the conflict. For many of these groups, Operation Desert Storm epitomised the imperialist oppression of defenceless Third World states and

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79 For example, in 1994 a civil war broke out between two rival Kurdish factions, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. See M. Gunter (1996).
justified violent protest against this Imperialism. In contrast, ODS did not result in large direct attacks. This might be explained to some extent by the nature of the allied operation, as the conflict picture was relatively clear-cut, the military intervention quick and overwhelming, and the Arab world so divided that the political cost of supporting Saddam Hussein with terrorist operations far outweighed the potential gain.

The overly pessimistic expectations of terrorism before the war had been influenced by a limited understanding of the *modus operandi* of Palestinian and Islamic groups, of the relationship between terrorists and their sponsor states, and of inter-group dynamics. Moreover, the relative lack of reliable military intelligence from inside Iraq also contributed to a misperception of the real Iraqi intentions and capabilities in the sphere of terrorism. Having said this, there was certainly a divide between the more realistic assessments made by Western security services and the inflated predictions of the media.\(^85\) In view of the disruption caused by fears of terrorism in Western countries, one might ask whether more should have been done to bridge that divide. However, it is clear that the inflated threat perception in the coalition countries served the purpose of reducing political opposition to a military intervention.

The experience from the Gulf War confirmed an important trait in the development of international terrorism, namely that the vast resources that have been devoted to counter-terrorism efforts in recent decades have paid off. It has become difficult for terrorist organisations to carry out cross-border operations in the West, particularly in periods when counter-terrorism efforts are so intense and well co-ordinated as during Operation Desert Storm. This may explain why the majority of terrorist operations against Western targets seemed to be carried out in other regions such as Latin America or the Middle East.

4 THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN LEBANON, 1982 – 84

4.1 Background: The conflict and the MNF intervention

Lebanon was the scene of a bloody civil war from 1975 to 1991.\(^86\) The conflict was caused by a combination of internal sectarian strife and regional political developments related to the situation in and around Israel/Palestine.

France administered Lebanon and Syria under a UN mandate from 1922-1946. Historically, Mount Lebanon had constituted an autonomous area under the Ottoman Empire. However, Lebanon’s coastal areas and the Bekaa’a plain had formed integrated parts of the Ottoman province of “Greater Syria”, which also included Jordan and Palestine. The areas were added to the Christian-dominated Mount Lebanon by the colonial power in an attempt to create an economically strong state that might function as its proxy in the region. Lebanon’s demographic balance was later upset by higher fertility rates among the Muslims, and sectarian conflicts.

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\(^85\) Meeting with chief inspector Tore Risberget from the Norwegian Police, August 2001.

\(^86\) This chapter was authored by Åshild Kjøk and Jørgen Kjetil Knudsen.
between the Christian Maronite, Shi’a, Sunni and Druze communities which were aggrivated as
Muslims demanded a greater say in the country’s affairs.  

The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 resulted in an influx of Palestinian refugees, who were mainly Muslim. The majority of Lebanese Christians were hostile to the refugees, whereas the Muslims tended to sympathise with their cause. The presence of the Palestinians served to draw Lebanon into the conflict across its Southern border, especially following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, as the Palestinian resistance became more organised. PLO guerrillas established bases in South Lebanon, and used them to launch occasional attacks on settlements and military positions in Northern Israel. Moreover, in the wake of the “Black September” - the Jordanian army’s heavy-handed campaign against Palestinian guerrilla bases in Jordan in September 1970 - the PLO transferred its international headquarters to Lebanon. Cross-border attacks then became much more frequent. The Lebanese government had sought to regulate such attacks in 1969 by entering into an agreement with the PLO. It stipulated that the Palestinians were authorised to launch attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory provided that they subjected the attacks to government control. However, the PLO seldom heeded this provision.

The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) invaded South Lebanon in 1978. Its mission was to destroy the PLO infrastructure that had developed in the area between West Beirut and the Southern border. As a result, the United Nations (UN) deployed a peacekeeping force, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), to function as a buffer between the PLO guerrillas and the IDF. Israel then withdrew its forces after pressure from the United States. However, it kept an enclave north of the border, which was controlled by its local ally the South Lebanese Army (SLA). Despite the UN presence, fighting in South Lebanon continued between 1978 and 1982.

In June 1982, Israeli forces occupied South Lebanon and laid siege to Beirut, with the hard-line Likud politician Ariel Sharon as Defense Minister and the rightwing general Rafael Eitan as IDF chief of staff. The operation had three main objectives: to destroy the PLO’s infrastructure in West Beirut and expel the organisation from Lebanon; to deter Syria from interfering in Lebanese affairs; and to have the Christian Maronite Bashir Gemayel elected as the president of Lebanon. Gemayel had already established contacts with the Israelis in the late 1970s, and was a strong opponent of the Palestinian and Syrian presence in the country.

UN mediation did not result in an agreement on how to end the siege, but an American initiative led to the deployment of a Multinational Force (MNF I) consisting of U.S. (800), French (800) and Italian (400) troops in August 1982. Their mission was to monitor the evacuation of PLO combatants and Syrian troops from West Beirut, after which the Israelis would withdraw to South Lebanon. The United States also gave a written, although somewhat ambiguous,

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89 See e.g. Heiberg & Holst (1986), p. 5-6 and 10.
undertaking guaranteeing the security of Palestinian civilians remaining in Beirut. Nevertheless, MNF I pulled out of Lebanon as soon as the evacuation was completed.92

The Israeli invasions and the election of President Bashir Gemayel served to reinforce the sectarian tensions in the country. In September 1982, President Gemayel was assassinated by a Palestinian gunman. This provoked a furious response from the Christian Maronite community, and Lebanon was cast into sectarian violence anew. Israel then decided to deploy troops to West Beirut, in blatant violation of the evacuation agreement, allegedly to protect civilians from the militia fighting. However, the IDF did nothing to prevent Christian militias controlled by Israel from entering the Beirut refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, where they carried out a massacre killing over a thousand Palestinian refugees and Lebanese Shi’ites. Fighting between the various ethnic and religious factions escalated following this atrocity, which made the Christian-dominated government ask the MNF powers to re-deploy their forces to Beirut.93

MNF II was established in September 1982, consisting of French (1500), U.S. (1400), Italian (1400) and British (100) troops.94 Its mission was to provide an interposition force at specified locations and to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area.95 The Lebanese conflict escalated from the autumn of 1982 through 1983, and the MNF became increasingly exposed to armed attacks and shelling at its positions by Muslim militias.96 U.S. and French troops chose to respond to the attacks in a rather disproportionate manner by bombing Shi’ite, Druze and Syrian artillery positions and guerrilla bases. The MNF-forces were thus perceived to assist the LAF, which had partly dissolved along religious lines with the outbreak of the civil war and was now widely perceived as a Christian militia.97

The MNF-powers also became more involved in the political situation in the country. They presented a broad U.S.-led initiative aimed at assisting the Lebanese and Israeli governments in reaching a peace agreement; at preventing the Syrians from enhancing their influence in the country; and at strengthening the position of President Amin Gemayel, Bashir’s brother and successor. These efforts led to a peace accord between Lebanon and Israel in May 1983. The Americans drafted the contents of the agreement, a key element being an Israeli withdrawal to a ‘security zone’ in the South. However, the Shi’ites and the Syrians were not invited to join the peace process, and were neither to respect nor accept the agreement.98

Following the above developments, Shi’ite guerrillas decided to escalate their attacks on French and U.S. interests in Lebanon. One of their most serious strikes was staged on 18 April 1983, when a bomb exploded at the American embassy in Beirut, killing 64 people. The Iran-backed
Shi’ite Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. Moreover, on 23 October 1983, suicide truck bombers struck at the U.S. and French MNF Headquarters in Beirut, killing 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French soldiers. The responsibility has been ascribed to Hizbullah. These attacks resulted in the MNF’s withdrawal from Beirut in February 1984. They also represent the beginning of the trend of suicide terrorism, which was later to be emulated by Palestinian and Sunni organisations such as al-Qaida, as well as by secular terrorist groups such as the PKK and LTTE.

The military and political engagement of the MNF-powers served to convey an impression that they were close allies of the Maronite-controlled government. The MNF I powers were also seen to be co-responsible for the massacre in Sabra and Shatila due to their premature withdrawal from Beirut. Nevertheless, MNF nationals had been victims of abduction, hostage taking and armed attacks even before the military intervention, and hostage taking of Westerners in Beirut actually escalated after the withdrawal of the MNF and continued until the beginning of the 1990s.

4.2 The Lebanon conflict and the potential for international terrorism

4.2.1 Lebanon

The Lebanese political system was founded on a National Pact from 1943, which assigned political power and representation to the various sectarian communities according to a proportional formula based on a census conducted by the French in 1932. It also allotted key positions in the state administration to the different religious groups: the president was to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni, and the speaker of parliament a Shi’a. As a result, the Lebanese government suffered from factionalism and internal disputes. Moreover, the country lacked a central government and a national security apparatus with a sufficiently legitimate basis. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were seen to protect the interests of the Maronite community, and the government’s efforts to ensure national integrity by restructuring and re-deploying the army therefore failed. The belligerent parties to the Lebanese civil war were to a large extent identical to the country’s religious communities, even though the primary dividing line between Christians and Muslims was sometimes complicated by tensions between sub-groups within the religious communities themselves.

Christian groups mainly joined the Lebanese Front, which was dominated by the right-wing Phalange Party. They were generally pro-Israeli, although their co-operation with Israel somewhat decreased during the 1980s. Christian groups normally fought Muslim militias. However, there were exceptions to this rule such as the pro-Palestinian, left-wing and Christian Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Forces (LARF). LARF was founded in 1979 with the aim of

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100 Ibid, p.452.
102 Mickolus et. al. (1989).
103 Sela 1999, p. 480.
establishing a Marxist-Leninist state in Lebanon. The majority of its members were Lebanese Christians who opposed the Lebanese Phalange Party and also the foreign supporters of the Lebanese government, in particular the United States, France and Israel. The group sought to demonstrate its affinity with the Palestinian cause by attacking Israeli targets outside of Lebanon. However, its activities halted in 1984 with the arrest of its leader, Georges Ibrahim Abdallah. The group had initially emerged from the PLO-affiliated Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and was also suspected of having ties to the Shi’ite Hizbullah.¹⁰⁴

**SUNNI MUSLIM MILITIAS** and armed groups mainly joined the *Lebanese National Movement* (LNM), and were situated on the political left. They supported the PLO until the 1980s.¹⁰⁵ Druze militias, although they constituting a separate Muslim sect, usually also adhered to the LNM. However, they would sometimes opt for independent strategies.¹⁰⁶

**LEBANESE SHI’ITES** initially participated in the LNM. However, from the 1970s onwards there was an emerging awareness of Shi’ite identity. This was manifested in the foundation of a Shi’ite movement working for a stronger Shi’ite political representation reflecting demographic changes that had turned the Shi’ites into the largest religious community in Lebanon:

*AMAL* was founded in 1975 by a Shi’a cleric called Musa Sadr.¹⁰⁷ It was the first organised Shi’ite militia, and also evolved into a political organisation. It was initially a Shi’a Islamist movement, but became more secular and inspired by Nasserite Arab nationalism after the mysterious disappearance of its founder in 1978.¹⁰⁸

*Hizbullah* broke away from AMAL in 1982. It had a more Islamist orientation than AMAL, whose position it was to challenge. A point of contention between the groups was the degree to which Shi’ites should make compromises with the Lebanese Christians, Israel and the United States. Hizbullah was even more sceptical about such compromises than AMAL, and distanced itself from the AMAL leadership’s efforts to approach other Lebanese factions. AMAL and Hizbullah both contained armed wings.¹⁰⁹

### 4.2.2 International ramifications

The situation in Lebanon was intimately linked to the conflict in Israel/Palestine. The latter is known to have generated a large number of international terrorist groups, and was probably the most important source of international terrorism in the 1970s.¹¹⁰

**Palestinian groups** had access to weapons as well as experience in carrying out terrorist

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¹⁰⁵ Norton 1991a, p. 82.
¹⁰⁷ AMAL is an acronym for “Afwaj al-Muqawimah al-Lubnaniyah”, i.e. the Lebanese Resistance Battalions. The acronym means “hope” in Arabic.
¹⁰⁸ Esposito (1999), p.150.
operations abroad. Moreover, they used Lebanese territory to arrange terrorist training camps. The eviction of their umbrella organisation (the PLO) in 1982 formed the immediate background for the MNF I intervention, which had failed to protect the Palestinian refugees of Sabra and Shatila. The Palestinians therefore had both the capability and possible motives for attacking the MNF countries.

**Left-wing terrorist organisations in Western Europe** were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and maintained important ties with the PLO, especially its radical Marxist factions. The Palestinians had supplied these groups with training and weapons since the late 1960s, and they had also carried out several joint terrorist attacks. European, Palestinian and Lebanese groups had been training together on Lebanese territory, which had provided the latter with a unique networking opportunity. As we shall see, this resulted in several instances of co-operation, especially between the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions and the French Action Directe.

**Israel** provided some Christian groups in South Lebanon with arms and logistics, and in certain cases conducted attacks on their behalf. However, these operations took place inside Lebanon itself. This research has not been able to identify any external incidents resulting from this relationship.

**Syria** has a strategic interest in Lebanon, and upheld shifting alliances with various groups. It supported the Maronite Christians in the mid-1970s, but established close ties to AMAL, Hizbullah and Druze militias in the early 1980s. Syrian armed forces occupied some areas in eastern Lebanon from 1976, and were thus able to provide their allies with assistance inside Lebanon.

**Iran** has a documented relationship with Hizbullah. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) assisted in the creation of the organisation, and the country continued to provide administrative, financial and operational support, as well as political guidance to the movement. Iran is believed to have provided technical support for car bomb attacks against Western targets in Lebanon, although it has never admitted to such connections. The country is also believed to have supported the Gulf-based Islamist group al-Da’wa, and may have facilitated co-operation between these two groups.

**Lebanese Diaspora communities** may also have played an important role by providing support in the form of money, weapons, recruits, etc. Lebanon was the source of much emigration in the 19th - 20th centuries, especially during the civil wars. The Maronites constituted the largest Lebanese emigrant community until the 1980s. They formed political groups and organisations in many parts of the world, and it is not unlikely that these groups have somehow contributed to

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the war effort. Unfortunately, however, it has not been possible to obtain sufficient information to establish their role in the armed struggle in Lebanon in the course of this research.

4.3 Terrorism spill-over from the Lebanon conflict

The situation in Lebanon seems to have provoked a rather large number of international terrorist attacks (45 recorded incidents). However, many of these incidents were not necessarily directly linked to the multilateral intervention. The reader should be aware that the authors of this chapter have used a somewhat wider definition of “intervention-related attacks” than has been applied in the other case studies in this report. For example, they have included several incidents targeting the Lebanese and other Middle Eastern governments prior to the intervention. These attacks are more likely to be related to the general situation in the region and the civil war in Lebanon than to the intervention as such.

The approach is nevertheless quite useful as it illustrates that the intervention did not necessarily cause an increase in the number of terrorist attacks. There were also many terrorist strikes in the years preceding and following the intervention, i.e. from 1980-1985:

![Figure 4.3.1 Number of Terrorist Attacks](image)

The number of incidents was actually quite stable, given that the period prior to the intervention was the longest, and that the period following it was the shortest. This demonstrates that it may often be quite difficult to establish whether an attack was triggered by the intervention as such, or whether it was caused by the general conflict situation.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the intervention does seem to have turned the terrorists’

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attention away from Middle Eastern governments toward the MNF-powers. Six out of seven attacks before 1982 targeted Middle Eastern regimes, whereas 13 out of 21 attacks after 1982 were directed at the MNF-powers. Moreover, the most active period was immediately before the intervention and during its initial stages, since as many as a quarter of all the incidents occurred from June-September 1982.

In the following, the results for the 45 incidents recorded will be presented. However, if the narrower definition used in the other case studies - i.e. that the attack was either committed by Lebanese militants targeting the MNF-nations shortly before, during or following the deployment and/or accompanied by a specific reference to the intervention - was applied, the number of incidents would decrease to only 23. A short description of the results for those incidents is included towards the end of this chapter.

4.3.1 General Observations

Most of the attacks were carried out either by Islamists (17) or radical leftists (15). Lebanese militants were responsible for 17 strikes, while foreign pan-ideological groups perpetrated 12 attacks. In addition, there were seven joint operations.

The United States and France were the preferred targets (10 incidents each), in addition to Lebanon and Israeli/Jewish targets (9 incidents each). MNF-powers Italy and Great Britain were spared from any terrorist strikes against their interests.

France experienced the most attacks on its territory (15), followed by MNF-participant Italy (6). There were also some strikes in the United States (3), while Great Britain did not witness any incidents on its soil. Furthermore, there were several attacks in various non-participant Western European (8) and Middle Eastern (8) countries.

In terms of target selection, diplomatic missions (15) and the air industry (13) were most often attacked. Other business interests (4) and Jewish institutions (4) were also frequent targets.

There were 18 deaths and at least 248 injuries, excluding a serious attack on a Syrian military base killing 90 and injuring 135.

Attacks that occurred in the period leading up to and during the intervention seem to have been more lethal than incidents that took place much prior to and following the intervention.
4.3.2 Dominant Perpetrators

![Pie chart showing the distribution of perpetrators by ideology.](image)

**Figure 4.3.2.1 Perpetrators by Ideology**

**Islamists (17)** carried out more attacks than any other ideological group. They specialised on aeroplane hijackings. Islamist attacks resulted in at least seven deaths and 65 injuries, and at least one instance of serious material damage.

**Left-wing radicals (15)** were almost as active as the Islamists. Most of their attacks (10) occurred during the first year of the MNF intervention. They mainly focused on diplomatic targets, and their strikes caused at least four deaths, 73 injuries and two instances of serious material damage.

**Palestinian and Jewish organizations** also carried out a few attacks. Palestinian groups conducted three strikes, whereas the Jewish Defense League is suspected of three attacks.

Left-wing radicals carried out most of their strikes in 1982, while Islamist militants only became active with the escalation of violence in 1983. This might indicate that *the Socialists mainly acted based on their own impression of the MNF intervention and its motives, while the Islamists were more responsive to developments on the ground.*
Figure 4.3.2.2 Perpetrators by Nationality

It should be noted that an unusually large number of strikes (23) were carried out by international groups. In addition, there were several joint operations between domestic and foreign terrorists.

4.3.3 Target Countries

MNF-powers the United States (10) and France (10) were targeted slightly more often than the Lebanese government (9) and Jewish and Israeli institutions (9). There were also some strikes against other Middle Eastern regimes (7), whereas British and Italian targets were completely spared from attacks.

Figure 4.3.3.1 Targeted Countries
The United States (10) was mainly attacked by left-wing radicals (6). The most frequent targets were U.S. diplomatic missions (5), and the strikes usually took place in Western Europe (6). America suffered eight deaths and about 65 injuries, which means that attacks on U.S. interests account for a disproportionate share of the MNF-related casualties.

France (10) was struck equally often by Islamists (4) and left-wing radicals (4). No physical target was dominant. The most striking tendency was that most of the incidents took place in France (6), whereas other countries were predominantly attacked abroad. France saw one death and about 30 injuries.

Lebanon (10) was mainly targeted by domestic Shi’ite groups (5), who hijacked planes from their national airline (5). The incidents resulted in three deaths, 63 injuries and two instances of serious material damage. Lebanon experienced a large number of strikes before the MNF intervention (7), but only a few after its deployment.

Israeli and Jewish institutions (9) were predominantly attacked by left-wing radicals (≥5). The most common targets were Israeli diplomatic missions (4) and synagogues (3), and almost half of the incidents took place in France (4). There were three deaths, about 90 injuries and one instance of serious material damage. The majority of the incidents occurred in 1982 (7), mainly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Sabra and Shatila massacre (5).

Other Middle Eastern regimes (6) were usually struck by Lebanese Shi’ites (≥4), mainly through hijackings of their national airlines (4). Excepting the serious attack in Syria, this led to three deaths and one injury.118

The United States and France were targeted even more often than the Lebanese government and Israel, whereas Italy and the United Kingdom were completely spared from attacks against their interests. There might be several explanations to this. The United Kingdom only sent a small number of troops to Lebanon. Moreover, it did not participate in MNF I and could therefore not be blamed for the Sabra and Shatila massacre. The Italian forces were as numerous as the French and American troops. However, they chose to emphasize their role as protectors of civilians and to stress the need of finding a solution to the Palestinian problem.119 In comparison, the United States and France both played a prominent role in the MNF. They became increasingly engaged in the political situation in the country and also in military operations against Muslim militias. In addition, they may have been more vulnerable to terrorism from the outset due to France’s colonial legacy in Lebanon and to the United States’ alliance to Israel.

118 For details on attack in Syria, see p. 38.
119 McDermott and Skjelsbæk (1991), p 175.
4.3.4 Location

There were more incidents in France than in any other country, with as many as one third of all the incidents (15). Most of the other MNF-countries also saw attacks on their own territories, but the United Kingdom was spared from such strikes. However, various non-participant countries in Western Europe (8) and the Middle East (8) became arenas for some attacks, and there was one incident in Latin America.

**France (15)** came under attack by a coalition of the French Communist group Action Directe (AD) and the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Forces (LARF), which carried out at least 11 attacks. Diplomatic missions were struck most often (7). Nevertheless, French targets were most common (6), followed by U.S. (4) and Israeli (4) interests. The attacks resulted in five deaths, about 140 injuries, and three cases of serious material damage. There were roughly equally as many strikes before (5), during (5) and after (4) the intervention.

**Italy (6)** was never a target itself, but saw a large number of strikes on its territory. These mainly targeted embassies and Jewish institutions. The identity of the perpetrators varies, but there seems to have been at least one joint operation between LARF and the Red Brigades. There were five deaths, and 33 injuries. The vast majority of the attacks occurred in 1982 (4).

**The United States (3)** saw relatively few incidents. However, there were two attacks against consulates in New York City, for which the Jewish Defence League was suspected; and an explosion in a U.S. Bank following the Sabra and Shatila massacres, for which a man claiming to represent the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) asserted responsibility.

**Western-European countries (8)** that did not participate in the MNF experienced some strikes, mainly from Islamist groups (7). These were usually aeroplane hijackings (5), in addition to
some attacks on Jewish institutions (2). This resulted in one death and 13 injuries. There was only one incident prior to the intervention, three during its mandate period, and four after the withdrawal.

**Middle Eastern states (8)** without a military presence in Lebanon were the scene of several strikes. Most occurred in the Gulf countries (6), and were carried out by Islamists (7). Hizbullah and the Gulf-based Islamic Da’wa Party conducted two joint operations, and there were also independent attacks by al-Da’wa and Lebanese Shi’ites. The strikes targeted the air industry (4) and embassies (3). Local and MNF targets were roughly equally common. The incidents resulted in six deaths, about 65 injuries, and three hijackings. Half of the strikes occurred prior to the intervention (4), while there were relatively few during the mandate period (2), with a slight increase after the withdrawal (3).

**Lebanon (3)** was the departure point of three international flights, which were hijacked by AMAL-related groups.

*The most important factor determining whether a country would become an arena for terrorism seems to be the presence of pan-ideological groups with experience in terrorism.* The report has already illustrated that this was the case during Operation Desert Storm, and it also seems to apply for the MNF, although the majority of the attacks were perpetrated by Lebanese groups. This is demonstrated by the cooperation between LARF and Action Directe/Red Brigades and also between Hizbullah and the Islamic Da’wa Party. They carried out several joint operations, and Lebanese militants are likely to have received logistical support from locals for their own operations. American left-wing radicals had been much less involved in the situation in the Middle East, while Great Britain had no significant tradition for pan-ideological terrorism. Its dominant terrorist group, the IRA, was founded on nationalist rather than ideological aims, and was therefore less likely to sympathise with causes in far away countries.
Diplomatic missions and their personnel (15) were the most common targets. The attacks were normally directed at the United States (6) or Israel (4), and most of them took place in France (7) or the Gulf (3). Left-wing radicals were the most frequent perpetrators (7). It should be noted that more than 50% of the strikes targeted personnel rather than buildings, which led to eight deaths and about 110 injuries. The majority of incidents occurred in 1982 (10).

The air industry (13) was also a very frequent target. There were 11 hijackings of commercial aeroplanes, and also bombings of an airport and a sales office. Islamists were in charge of all the attacks, and Lebanese (5) and other Middle Eastern airlines (4) were targeted most often. Some passengers were taken as hostages by Shi’ite militias in Lebanon, and two were killed.

Business interests (4) other than the air industry were also attacked. Three of the incidents occurred in France, and two of them targeted banks. No ideological group was dominant. There were two deaths, and about 30 injuries.

Jewish institutions (4) such as synagogues and cultural centres suffered some strikes. All took place in Western Europe following the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Half were perpetrated by Palestinians. There were two deaths, and about 50 injuries.

National authorities (3), the media (3) and the military (2) also witnessed some attacks.

The most common targets for international terrorism in the period 1980-1985 were diplomatic
missions (453) and business interests (418), followed by airlines (192) and the military (141). Airlines were thus much more exposed to attacks than usual, while business interests and – surprisingly – military targets were less exposed. One possible explanation is that that Islamists played a relatively more important role in the case of Lebanon than in international terrorism in general, and that they had specialised in aeroplane hijackings, as it has been argued that terrorists tend to select their targets depending on their ideology.

4.3.6 Casualties

**Figure 4.3.6.1 Deaths by Year**

**Figure 4.3.6.2 Injuries by Year**

Attacks that occurred during the intervention caused a large share of the casualties, excluding the extraordinary attack on a military base in Syria in 1981, killing 90 and injuring 135. Almost half of the remaining deaths and nearly two-thirds of the injuries resulted from incidents that

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120 Search on “Terrorist Incidents by Target” in the RAND-MIPT database.
took place during the 1½ years from August 1982 to February 1984. However, it should be noted that there were also a large number of casualties during the first half of 1982, in the period leading up to the intervention. The casualties might therefore have been the result of a general escalation of violence, rather than the intervention as such.

When compared to the average casualty levels of all the terrorist incidents recorded in the RAND-MIPT database from 1980-1985, the fatality rate of Lebanon-related attacks was lower (0.4 to 1.2 per incident), while the injury rate was higher (5.6 to 28 per incident).

![Figure 4.3.6.3 Deaths by Targeted Country](image)

![Figure 4.3.6.4 Injuries by Targeted Country](image)

Attacks on the MNF-powers seem to have resulted in about as many casualties as attacks on Middle Eastern regimes (nine out of 18 deaths, 93 out of 248 injuries). However, losses were not equally distributed among them. As discussed above, the United States suffered a

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123 In the MIPT-RAND database, there were 1,656 recorded incidents, 2,023 deaths and 4,717 injuries in this period. The Lebanon-related figures exclude the exceptional attack in Syria.
disproportionate share of the casualties. France suffered fewer casualties, and Italy and the United Kingdom none. Possible reasons why Italy and the United Kingdom were spared from attacks were noted in paragraph 4.3.3. However, it is more difficult to account for the difference between the United States and France.

4.3.7 Results for the Narrower Sample

The results for the 23 incidents that can be linked more directly to the intervention are generally very similar to those described above. Not surprisingly, however, a larger share of the attacks happened during the intervention period, and MNF-countries suffered a larger share of the attacks and casualties. The United States became a relatively more important target, while France only suffered a small increase in its share of strikes. General business interests also experienced a relative increase in the number of attacks, while the air industry was considerably less exposed than in the larger sample. Furthermore, international terrorists played a relatively more important role. With regards to the number of casualties that can be linked more directly to the intervention, they increased considerably from 1982 to 1983 with the escalation of violence on the battlefield. Tables describing the results for the narrower sample can be found in the appendix of this report.

4.4 Concluding remarks

The countries that were most often targeted by the terrorists were the United States and France, whereas MNF-countries, Italy and Great Britain, were spared from attacks against their interests. This indicates that the MNF intervention in itself was not a major contributing factor behind the terrorist attacks, but that other factors were also at play. The most immediate explanation that comes to mind is that the United States and France chose to respond to attacks against their military positions in a heavy-handed manner, whereas Italy and Great Britain showed more restraint. It is also tempting to point to the prominent role played by the United States and France in promoting the peace initiative with Israel. However, these explanations are undermined by the fact that a very large number of the terrorist attacks targeting these countries occurred before the military escalation and the peace negotiations in 1983, and that the number of terrorist attacks actually decreased that year.\footnote{Seven out of 20 attacks targeting the two countries occurred before 1983. There were six attacks in 1982, and only four in 1983.}

The United States and France were often targeted for attacks even before the deployment of the MNF. This points to the possibility that the strikes were triggered by the general perception of these two countries’ role and influence in Lebanese and Middle Eastern politics, rather than their actual participation in the MNF. France was most likely seen to be held responsible for the situation in Lebanon, due to the role that it had played in drawing the country’s borders. The United States was probably attacked because of its close relationship with Israel. As a result, they may have been profiled as close allies to the Maronite government, even before they became involved in the internal conflict. Italy and Great Britain did not have similar special relationships to any of the parties to the conflict, which might be the explanation for why they
were not attacked.

The political and military involvement of the United States and France may have served to reinforce the impression that they had a special relationship with the Maronite government, thus aggravating the situation. Although the total number of incidents decreased in 1983, those that did occur tended to be more lethal than previously. Indeed, half of the deaths and almost all of the injuries resulting from strikes against the MNF-powers occurred in 1983 alone. Moreover, Islamist groups became much more active on the international scene after that year. It is also worth noting that the terrorist attacks on the MNF barracks in Beirut marked the beginning of a new trend in terrorism, i.e. suicide attacks, which were later to spread to other countries.

5 INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN KOSOVO FROM 1998 TO MID 2000

This case study begins with the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in mid-October 1998, and follows the developments through the NATO air campaign of March to June 1999 and the deployment of KFOR until mid-2000. 125

5.1 Background

5.1.1 The Events Until Mid-2000

The Balkans moved to the centre stage of international politics during the 1990s. Observers had long warned of the danger of a major conflict in Kosovo, where ethnic tensions, coupled with Serb discrimination and harassment of Albanians, were heating up. However, the province was surprisingly quiet until 1998. The Kosovo-Albanians had formed a shadow government following a popular referendum for independence in September 1991. This shadow dissident society comprised a national assembly, a President, and a local administration, as well as a tax system, schools, judicial and police bodies. It pursued a policy of non-violent resistance, which it hoped would win the support of the international community. 126

When the war that was playing out to the North of Kosovo – in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) – finally came to an end in late 1995, the non-violent dissidents expected that the Dayton Agreement would also produce an arrangement for Kosovo, in which the Kosovo-Albanians would be ‘rewarded’ for their pacifism and their rights would be guaranteed by autonomy or independence. When the negotiations and the subsequent agreement disregarded the issue of Kosovo and recognised the state of Yugoslavia, including the province of Kosovo, the policy of non-violence was increasingly criticised among Kosovo-Albanians. 127 But it was still not until early 1998 that violence erupted. However, in the course of 1998, both the Yugoslav authorities and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) separatist

125 This chapter was authored by Annika Hansen & Åshild Kjøk.
126 See for example, Hagen (1999), pp. 58f; and Hedges (1999), p. 30.
movement stepped up their respective campaigns, triggering Serb counterinsurgency measures and the first wave of expulsions of Albanians throughout Kosovo in the summer of 1998. These developments also sharpened European and NATO attention to the troubles in Kosovo.\(^{128}\)

An agreement was signed in Belgrade on 15-16 October 1998, following months of talks involving President Slobodan Milošević, international mediators and Kosovo-Albanian leaders. It was criticised at the time, as it had been brokered between Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans, and President Milošević “over the heads of the ethnic Albanians and the KLA.”\(^{129}\)

The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was deployed on this fragile basis. It consisted of 2,000 unarmed monitors under an OSCE umbrella and a NATO Air Verification component. It began deploying in November and reached its maximum strength of 1,400 in February 1999.\(^{130}\) The main task of the monitors was to supervise the reduction of Serb forces in Kosovo to 10,000 internal security forces and 12,000 Yugoslav army troops.\(^{131}\) There was widespread scepticism as to its success, given Milošević’s track record in the Balkans, the lack of involvement of the Kosovo-Albanians in reaching the agreement and the fact that the monitors were unarmed. Initially, the situation was relatively quiet and refugees began to return, as both sides appeared to welcome the break in fighting. However, appearances were deceiving. The KLA started preparing a spring offensive and the Yugoslav authorities began redeploying their security forces to the province.\(^{132}\) Fears of an upsurge in violence proved warranted, when 45 ethnic Albanians were murdered in January 1999. The KVM condemned the incident in an unusual public outburst, which shook European capitals but which also indicated that the KVM would have to admit defeat sooner rather than later. In the same way that the absence of Kosovo from the Dayton agenda had indicated to the Kosovo-Albanians that the non-violent path was not effective, the failure of the KVM deprived political leaders in the West of their faith in an amicable political solution and helped build the consensus for a substantial military force.\(^{133}\) The KVM left Kosovo on 20 March 1999.

Following the escalation after January 1999, Britain, France and the United States took the lead in the launch of renewed negotiations at Rambouillet in France. No agreement could be reached, as the Serbs were opposed to the complete freedom of movement that NATO demanded for its forces throughout FRY and to the substantial autonomy that Rambouillet would have awarded the province of Kosovo.\(^{134}\) NATO then began an air campaign against FRY on 24 March 1999, without explicit UN Security Council approval (see more below). The campaign consisted of gradually increasing bombardment of targets in Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro and lasted eleven weeks. According to Adam Roberts, the aims of the campaign were to reduce Serb


\(^{129}\) Roberts (1999), p. 113.


\(^{134}\) Posen (2000), p. 44.
military capacity (including capacity for repression) in Kosovo, and to put pressure on FRY to modify or abandon its policies there.\textsuperscript{135} Based on experiences from Bosnia-Herzegovina, many at NATO Headquarters and in the contributing capitals believed that the air campaign would intimidate Milošević, and that these aims would be reached within a few days.\textsuperscript{136}

The reality on the ground during NATO’s air campaign was marked by accelerated displacement and ethnic cleansing. While this fuelled criticism of the campaign, it also contributed to strengthening the NATO coalition, which sought to prevent further atrocities. On 3 June 1999, the basic text of an agreement – accepted by Milošević the day before – was endorsed by the Serb parliament. It involved withdrawing Serb troops from Kosovo, a substantial NATO presence in Kosovo, the demilitarisation of the KLA and a central political role for the United Nations (UN). While the agreement called for “substantial self-government for Kosovo,” it also recognised that the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” would have to be taken into account.\textsuperscript{137} The Military Technical Agreement was then reached on 9 June 1999.

Once President Milošević signed the Rambouillet agreement that brought an end to NATO’s bombing campaign, the international community launched a comprehensive post-conflict operation that consisted of two main parts. First, and foremost for the purposes of this study, a Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed under NATO command and authorised by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999. As of mid-2000, KFOR consisted of approximately 50,000 troops from NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries and its task was to establish a security presence in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{138} The second component part was the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which provided the organisational structure for efforts on the civilian side.\textsuperscript{139}

5.1.2 Legality and Legitimacy of the NATO Interventions

Three different aspects should be considered when discussing the legitimacy of the intervention. First, there is the issue of the actual legality of the intervention, in terms of it being backed by a UN Security Council Resolution. Secondly, the question should be asked whether the use of force can be impartial and whether it was perceived as such by the parties in Kosovo. Thirdly, the strategy chosen by NATO in the bombing campaign, i.e. the reliance on air power, also held implications for the perceived legitimacy of the intervention.

The United Nations never explicitly approved the NATO bombing campaign. While critics used this fact to condemn the operation, it might be argued that UN implicit approval was derived in

\textsuperscript{135} Roberts (1999), p. 111.
\textsuperscript{137} Posen (2000), p. 76.
\textsuperscript{138} Background to the Conflict, www.nato.int/kfor/intro.htm
\textsuperscript{139} UNMIK in turn was composed of four major elements: civil administration under the UN itself; humanitarian assistance under UNHCR leadership; democratisation and institution-building under the OSCE; and economic reconstruction led by the EU.
two ways: (1) Reverse authorisation was supplied when a motion in the UN Security Council to condemn the NATO action was overwhelmingly voted down; (2) NATO acted out of a joint justification in humanitarian concerns and concern for international peace and security, which can be traced back to the UN Charter and other international legal documents. The NATO Kosovo campaign was “the first time a major use of destructive armed force [was] undertaken with the stated purpose of implementing UN Security Council resolutions but without Security Council authorisation.” 140 On the other hand, NATO never put its proposed actions up for a vote, and a veto in the Security Council would have undermined their legitimacy. 141 Reverse authorisation also forms a weak basis of legitimacy and could set a dangerous precedent. Many European countries therefore saw the lack of a UN mandate as a “cloud” over the legitimacy of the intervention, despite their participation in the campaign. 142

There is an inherent difficulty in appearing impartial when engaging in forceful military operations, and the juxtaposition of humanitarian concerns and the use of military means might, to some extent, seem illogical. 143 The demand for clearly defined objectives for the use of force also involves a paradox, in that the more clearly the objectives are defined the more likely they will involve taking sides - such as in Kosovo. 144 The legitimacy of the operation was also challenged by the shifting and ambiguous views from within NATO. The United States initially branded the KLA as a terrorist organisation whose tactics could not be condoned in a statement that was interpreted by Serbia as a green light to clamp down on the organization. 145 However, with the escalation of events in 1998, Western governments, in particular the United States, were increasingly siding with the KLA. Since 1998, authorities in Yugoslavia have consistently accused Western governments of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation, i.e. the KLA that aimed to undermine the Yugoslav state. 146 Moreover, even before the deployment of the KVM, the FRY had accused NATO of seeking an excuse for an intervention in Kosovo. 147 These types of charges were later transferred to KFOR and UNMIK, both being accused of assisting the Kosovo drug mafia, and allowing organised criminals and terrorists to gain a foothold in the province. In that way, it was argued that the peacekeeping mission lost its legitimacy. 148

NATO chose a strategy of air strikes, vocally ruling out ground forces until late in the intervention. This was in part due to exaggerated confidence in the persuasive power of air strikes, but also to the reluctance of NATO member states to provide troops that could potentially return home in body bags. In the course of the confrontation, Serbia made significant

140 Roberts (1999), p. 102, 104f.
143 Mats Berdal, for one, argues that there can be no impartial use of force. Berdal (2000). For the juxtaposition of humanitarian concerns and military means, see Roberts (1999).
146 See for example the accusations in the Serb media of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy contributing arms, medical supplies, and personnel to the KLA’s armed struggle. “Daily Says West, Albania Sponsoring Kosovo ‘Terrorists’,” FBIS/NESA, 5 March 1999.
efforts to use the “squeamishness” of the NATO member states to split the coalition.\textsuperscript{149} The reliance on air power alone might also have diminished the campaign’s legitimacy, as it had to accept more collateral damage as a result of more risky target identification and selection.\textsuperscript{150} Forfeiting a presence on the ground also meant that NATO lost its potential influence on political developments on the ground. While NATO clearly sided with the Kosovo-Albanians against Serbia, the goals of NATO on the one hand and the KLA on the other were far from identical.\textsuperscript{151} Others have claimed that the NATO campaign was controversial due to the selectivity of NATO support, as the organisation was clearly more trigger-happy in the case of Kosovo than it had been, for instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia/Krajina a few years earlier.\textsuperscript{152}

Overall, there were sufficient question marks attached to the legality and legitimacy of the NATO intervention to warrant violent protests.

5.2 The Kosovo conflict and the potential for international terrorism

This section will take a closer look at the two parties most affected by the intervention, namely the Kosovo-Albanians and the Serbian security forces. It will also identify linkages from the conflict area to sympathisers in the immediate vicinity of the conflict, i.e. the Western Balkans, and worldwide, to global Diasporas and to transnational criminal networks. This should provide insight into where terrorist attacks with connections to Kosovo might occur and what motivation would drive them.

5.2.1 Conflict Dynamics and Key Players

Political violence has been common throughout Kosovo since the 1980s. Aside from the KLA and the Serb security forces, violence sprang from more or less organized members of society. Traditions of blood feuds, which reportedly arose under the Ottoman Empire due to the inability of the state to provide security for its citizens, reinforced the continuation of the conflict.\textsuperscript{153} The Yugoslav state did little to protect the security of Kosovo-Albanian citizens, and even initiated and condoned violence against this section of its population. At the same time, the break-up of Yugoslavia led to some confusion as to whose responsibility it was to provide security, and to which areas it applied. Alternative mechanisms for providing security thus emerged among the Albanian population, one element of which was the KLA.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)’s rise in power was precipitated by popular disappointment with the Dayton Agreement and reactions to the anarchic conditions in Albania in 1997. The degree to which it was supported by Kosovo-Albanians varied greatly. Although most sympathised with the KLA’s cause, a far more limited number felt represented by the organisation, sympathised with its violent methods or even knew of its existence before late

\textsuperscript{149} Posen (2000), p. 51f.
\textsuperscript{150} Roberts (1999), p. 114f.
\textsuperscript{152} Roberts (1999), p. 108.
Moreover, once the KLA started to grow, unruly local groups and ad hoc militias also arose. The banditry of some units that called themselves KLA without having any organisational affiliation with the KLA contributed to undermining the support for the group among the general population. Even as late as early 1999, the KLA were allegedly “poorly led, with no central command.” In early 1998, both the Albanian government and the Kosovo authorities thus distanced themselves from the KLA, whose ideology reportedly contains elements of fascism as well as communism. However, despite shadow-President Ibrahim Rugova’s official ignorance, ever-closer ties developed between the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the KLA, so that by 1998 political leaders doubled as commanders. However, given the strong international support for their cause, there were limited motivations for the KLA to engage in international terrorist activities.

The Yugoslav regime’s strategy for Kosovo does not seem to have been to “win” a confrontation with NATO, but rather to prolong the negotiation process until its key aims could be achieved. These aims included a leading role for the United Nations on the political side, Russian participation in any peacekeeping force, no popular referendum on the status of Kosovo, such as was anticipated in the Rambouillet Agreement, and no freedom of movement for NATO personnel throughout Serbian territory. Serbian authorities focused their efforts on splitting what they perceived as a frail military alliance rather than on international terrorism. They thus saw no need for the Serb security forces to affect change by resorting to international terrorist attacks, while the direct confrontation with NATO was taking place in the province of Kosovo. However, the Serb security forces made a fatal misjudgement when they triggered the mass expulsions of Kosovo-Albanians under the cover of the NATO bombing campaign. Rather than weakening the resolve of the alliance, it eventually cleared the path for the possible use of ground forces.

The Yugoslav authorities also seem to have lacked experience in carrying out terrorist attacks abroad. A search in the MIPT-RAND database (1968-1997) on the words “Yugoslav” and “Serb” thus reveals no incidents where Serb authorities were involved outside the area of former Yugoslavia. In comparison, a similar search on Iraq (1968-August 1991) revealed at least seven incidents.

Kosovo-Serbs were increasingly marginalized from mid-1999 onwards, due to harassment by Kosovo-Albanians, but also to the “continued refusal of the Mitrovica leaders to participate in

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159 Milosevic tried to activate Russia as an ally, but ultimately it is assumed that it was Russia who convinced Milošević that he was on his own in late May 1999. See for example Roberts (1999), p. 117; Posen (2000), p. 71.
161 Serb authorities may nevertheless have been involved in the murder of a Yugoslavian oppositionist in France on 28 June 1976.
the UNMIK and OSCE-sponsored political process in the province. As a result, many Kosovo-Serbs left the province for Serbia proper. The failure of UNMIK to take action on behalf of the Kosovo-Serbs to prevent revenge attacks and reversed expulsions could arguably spark dissent. However, opposition to the international military presence has thus far only been expressed locally in direct attacks on KFOR rather than through international terrorism. Albanian nationalists did have some experience in carrying out international terrorist attacks. For instance, such groups seem to have perpetrated a series of strikes against Yugoslav interests in Belgium in 1981. However, Kosovo-Albanians were in a far better situation in mid-2000 than prior to NATO’s interventions. There was, therefore, little motivation to press for the withdrawal of KFOR or other elements of the international presence.

Challenges remain of course. Kosovo has few democratic or liberal traditions and the concept of individual and minority rights is weak. Consequently, one of the tasks of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has been the democratisation of Kosovo. In that context, Kosovo is undergoing three simultaneous transitions – power reversal, democratisation, and a war-to-peace transition – all of which bring with them instability and insecurity in the transitional phase. But most importantly, the major political issue has been the future status of the province, which remains unresolved. Both a decision on the status of the province and the varying prospects for Kosovo-Albanian independence could potentially have security ramifications in the future. In addition, according to one expert writing in 1999,

*The “unemployment rate among ethnic Albanians is 70 percent, and this pressure, coupled with the highest birth-rate in Europe [...], has created a deep recruiting pool for the KLA. Seventy percent of the population is now under 30. [...] In Kosovo, young Albanians have bitterly repudiated not only Serb rule but also Rugova’s older, urbane, and educated leadership. Priština’s elites, they say, have betrayed the Albanian cause.”*

Thus, the loss of the immediate common enemy, i.e. Belgrade, has led to fragmentation within Kosovo-Albanian ranks. Neither the political front, dominated by Rugova’s LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo), nor the security front, in the shape of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), were able to command decisive parts of the population in 2000.

### 5.2.2 International Ramifications of the Kosovo Conflict

The extent to which a conflict is likely to spill over into international terrorist activities depends at least partially on the ties that the conflict itself has to the outside world. In this case, these

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165 RAND-MIPT database.
166 Daalder and O’Hanlon (1999), p. 130.
links could generally take one of two shapes: (1) ties to actors in the immediate region or to other sympathising groups, mainly in the Muslim world; and (2) ties to the ethnic Albanian Diaspora.

As suggested above, the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina affected the Kosovo-Albanians’ choice of strategy. One may argue that the 1991-1995 war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina exacerbated the radicalisation in that Kosovo-Albanians experienced difficulties in making themselves heard over the fray of the battle nearby. The war also had very practical implications in terms of manpower and equipment, as many KLA leaders were drawn “from the 5,000 or so ethnic Albanians who had fought for the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia against the Serbs.” It should be noted that the lack of Western intervention to protect the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina resulted in several international terrorist attacks. For instance, a SAS-flight between the Norwegian towns of Bardufoss and Bodø was hijacked in November 1994 by a Bosnian refugee, who claimed to have placed ten bombs aboard the plane, claiming that these would detonate unless the Norwegian government did more to help the Bosnian people, in particular by contributing to the lifting of the blockades of Bihac and Sarajevo.

Developments in Albania directly affected the conflict. Albania and Kosovo had undeniable ethnic ties, and clear supply lines and other support structures existed between the two countries. There were also KLA training camps over the Albanian border. When Albania collapsed in early 1997, weapons became available in large quantities, and for a long time. The weapons available – estimated to 30,000 automatic weapons – also determined the KLA’s guerrilla strategy. However, as fighting intensified in the course of 1998-99, it became increasingly clear that the KLA’s weapons were insufficient in quality when faced with the heavy military equipment of the Yugoslav army. Mainly due to the violent track chosen by the KLA and Albania’s fear of alienating the international community, official support from Albania was regularly denied throughout 1999. In an interview in early 1998, Albanian Foreign Minister Paskal Milo underlined that his country would be willing to provide political and humanitarian support, but refrain from participating in any fighting in Kosovo. At the same time, he pointed to the danger of the conflict spilling over into Albania, unless it was contained early on.

Prior to the acceleration of the refugee flow from Kosovo, the Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov voiced

\[170\text{ See for example Judah (2000), p. 85.} \]
\[171\text{ Hedges (1999), p. 34.} \]
\[172\text{ “All Well After 7-Hour Drama”, \textit{Aftenposten}, 4 November 1994, via Norwaves: \url{http://www.norwaves.com/norwaves/Volume2_1994/v2nw40} \]
\[173\text{ See Hedges (1999), p. 39f. on the Croatian contribution to the KLA. Also Hagen (1999), p. 59; Hedges (1999), p. 37. Thus, the KLA eschewed direct confrontation and instead launched raids on Serb patrols, which controlled the main roads, while the KLA controlled the countryside.} \]
\[174\text{ See for example “Albania: Majko Denies Tirana Involved in Supplying UCK,” \textit{FBIS/NESA}, 14 January 1999.} \]
\[175\text{ “Albania: Foreign Minister Milo Says US Will Prevent War in Kosovo,” \textit{ibid}, 17 February 1998. The Albanian government was concerned about facilitating the Serb strategy of ethnic cleansing by opening their borders. See also “Albania: Albania To Refuse ‘Flood of Terrorist Elements’ at Border,” \textit{ibid}, 7 March 2000. Initially in mid-1998, the Albanian government also made gestures towards trying to stem the flow of arms, armed groups and military equipment into Kosovo in order to appease Yugoslav authorities. It is unclear whether these were ineffective because of the lack of genuine political willingness in Albania or simply due to a lack of capacity to patrol the border effectively. “Albania: Albania Considers Reinforcing Border to Stem Flow of Arms,” \textit{ibid}, 1 May 1998.} \]
similar fears that a large inflow of Albanians would change the ethnic make-up in Macedonia – at the time consisting of only about 30% Albanians – and would bring with it significant instability.  

In the course of the conflict Albanians in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo discovered that they were not as united as they liked to think. Tensions became increasingly visible under the substantial pressure that arose with the massive flow of refugees during the NATO campaign. In particular the closer encounter with the dismal living and economic conditions in Albania was a revelation to many Kosovo-Albanians. Consequently, their project was revised from striving towards a Greater Albania to the pursuit of an independent Kosovo. In other words, the goals no longer entailed – by definition – the export of the conflict to neighbouring countries.

In the wider region, the Albanians have no immediate allies. Greece is unlikely to support the Kosovo-Albanian cause, due to border disputes in Epirus and also Greece’s interest in an alliance with Serbia to counterbalance Bulgaria and an independent, multiethnic Macedonia. Turkey might be inclined to sympathise with its fellow Muslims in Kosovo, and it is also a NATO ally. However, it faced a dilemma in that it could not condemn the actions of the Yugoslav authorities outright, given its own record of state action against the Kurds.

Aside from its immediate regional friends and foes, Kosovo-Albanians received support from various sympathisers around the world. First, Kosovo-Albanians enjoyed the sympathy of a host of countries in the Muslim world. Until early 1999, Muslim organisations and congresses, such as the Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC), were vocal in their criticism of Western apathy in the face of the atrocities being committed against Muslims in Kosovo. Moreover, these concerns were echoed by Usama bin Ladin and other radical Islamists, who frequently used the fact that the West did not intervene on behalf of Muslims in former Yugoslavia to recruit followers. Moreover, radical Islamists from across the Muslim world had previously participated as warriors during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The KLA thus called for and indeed were provided assistance from radical Islamists in the shape of training, equipment, personnel, and humanitarian aid. In light of the verbal assaults volleyed at ‘the West’ it may seem surprising that there were no Islamist terrorist incidents on behalf of the Kosovo-Albanian cause. The conflict in Kosovo was clearly identified as a strand in the worldwide Jihad.

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178 This had obviously not crystallised in mid-1999, when Hedges pointed to the belief common among KLA leaders of being on course towards the establishment of a Greater Albania. Hedges (1999), pp. 36f.
179 Hagen (1999), p. 60f.
180 Interestingly, the arrest and subsequent trial of Kurdish rebel leader Öcalan coincided with much of the Kosovo crisis. This exemplified Turkey’s uncomfortable position between Western demands and domestic concerns.
181 Hedges (1999), p. 39. Western countries attempted to curb the support by strict export legislation and controls. Britain, for example, introduced legislation to prevent private security companies from providing their services in active conflict areas, including Kosovo. “UK Warns Mercenaries to Stay Away from Kosovo,” FBIS/NESI, 15 February 1999.
182 Indeed, Sebghatullah Qadri, a Pakistani lawyer defending a Pakistani fundamentalist against charges of terrorism in Britain, claimed that NATO’s campaign to defend persecuted Kosovars easily falls under the heading of Jihad.
However, the NATO bombing placed the sympathisers in a bit of a bind, when they found themselves fighting on the same side as the United States and their Western allies. This ambiguity became clear in a statement issued by the Third Fundamentalists Conference in London in May 1999. Amid self-criticism of inaction in Kosovo and an emphasis on the parallels between Kosovo and Palestine, the delegates were reminded not to be deceived by Western organisations’ involvement in Kosovo, which had in no way modified their hostility to the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{183}

Some have argued that the KLA might turn to radical Islamists once it becomes disenchanted with the West, and there have even been claims that there are “signs that contacts have been established.”\textsuperscript{184} The Serbs clearly attempted to play this card against the West, justifying their own heavy-handedness with the need to contain the influence of Islamic fundamentalists and their corresponding terrorist organisations.\textsuperscript{185} However, there were few signs of decisive involvement of foreign – fundamentalist – forces in Kosovo throughout the war, and fewer signs in mid-2000 that Kosovo-Albanians might establish close ties with terrorist organisations in the Muslim world. On the other hand, different sources, in particular the Russian media, have pointed to links to fellow-secessionists in Chechnya. According to a Moscow-based newspaper, Chechen volunteers were “openly training rebels for combat operations on the territory of another state.”\textsuperscript{186} Collaboration between the Chechen secessionists and the KLA does not seem all that unlikely – particularly given the probable transnational criminal ties between the two regions. If true, considering the apparent “jihadization” of the Chechen independence movement, this might to some degree increase the danger of a similar phenomenon occurring in Kosovo.

With regards to the Serbs, left-wing extremist groups around the world were perhaps the most important constellation of sympathisers. They were motivated by an affiliation with socialist Yugoslavia, but even more importantly by an antipathy towards NATO and its policies, which was typical of European leftist terrorism in the 1980s. Yet the Serb regime as such did not have any known established links to these groups.

Finally, Diaspora communities can potentially play three major roles in international terrorism: first and foremost, raising money; secondly, building awareness and political support for the cause; and thirdly, providing manpower.

The Albanian Diaspora was larger than that of the Serbs. In the early 1990s, when the Kosovo-Albanian shadow government was established, there were 600,000 ethnic Albanians in European Diaspora communities, the majority of whom were based in Switzerland and Germany. In North America there were 300,000 ethnic Albanians. Existing communities were

\textsuperscript{185} Hedges (1999), p. 39.
\textsuperscript{186} “Khattab Camp Seen as Terrorist Training Ctr,” \textit{ibid}, 14 May 1999.
strengthened by surges of refugees in the course of 1998, such as in Switzerland, where it was reported that a major increase in the number of asylum seekers from Kosovo took place in 1998, surpassing the forty thousand mark.\textsuperscript{187}

In particular, the Albanian Diaspora played a pivotal part in raising money. An established system of funds and contributions (a 3% levy on all earnings abroad) were used to finance the Kosovo shadow society. However, from 1996 onwards funds were increasingly directed towards the KLA and the so-called Homeland Calling Fund and the anticipated ‘war of liberation.’\textsuperscript{188}

The Kosovo-Albanian Diaspora also provided personnel for the KLA. However, it seems that rather than exporting the conflict abroad, the rising level of violence encouraged sympathisers to go into the conflict area to join the struggle. Several European governments were also repatriating Kosovo-Albanian refugees, as new and needier refugees were flowing in from Bosnia-Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{189} Hedges has pointed out that “The Serbs also contend[ed] that the KLA had about 1,000 foreign mercenaries from Albania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Croatia, as well as British and German instructors. However, most of the mercenaries [we]re probably Albanian nationals.”\textsuperscript{190} In mid-1999, newspapers reported campaigns initiated in several countries, including Canada, Holland, Sweden, Britain and Morocco, to recruit and train mercenaries who were to join the KLA.\textsuperscript{191}

The Serb Diaspora was smaller than that of the Albanians, as Serbia had not experienced a flow of refugees similar to that from Kosovo. Moreover, despite calls from Yugoslav Vice Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj for Serbs in all countries to attack countries that participated in the NATO campaign, members of the Yugoslav Diaspora do not seem to have been interested in attacking targets abroad. For instance, Milan Raskovic of the Yugoslav Club in Oslo told journalists that “We fight where we are supposed to fight, which is not in Norway”.\textsuperscript{192}

In the past, there were a few mutual assassinations by Yugoslav secret service and rivalling groups, such as the KLA and any of its predecessors. However, these incidents generally did not take the shape of terrorist attacks that affected innocent civilians. The countries in which the actions took place were more or less coincidental, serving as arenas rather than targets. Still, the presence of a Diaspora community or leading political figures, such as in Switzerland or Germany, has certainly been a factor. Similarly, clashes might occur between sympathisers of the opposing sides, i.e. between Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians, on foreign territory, although no such incidents were witnessed in the 1998-2000 period.

\textsuperscript{188} Hedges (1999), p. 31.
\textsuperscript{189} See for example Hedges (1999), p. 31.
\textsuperscript{190} Hedges (1999), p. 39; see also “Islamists’ Financial Sources Detailed,” \textit{ibid}, 18 April 1999.
\textsuperscript{192} Ingvild Jensesn, “POT frykter ikke terroraksjoner”, \textit{Nettavisen}, 26 March 1999.
5.3 Political violence spill-over from the Kosovo conflict

5.3.1 General Observations

There was very little terrorism spill-over from the military intervention in Kosovo. There were four incidents during the intervention, and one after one year. Local left-radicals carried out three incidents, and Serbs were accountable for one. All the incidents targeted NATO or NATO-countries such as Britain (1) and Canada (1). The attacks took place in Argentina (1), Canada (1), Greece (1), Italy (1) and cyberspace (1). All the incidents targeted the military, either physically (3) or symbolically (2). There was only one serious attack - the assassination of the British Defence Attaché to Greece. The remaining incidents were relatively un-dramatic.

5.3.2 The Incidents

Since the late 1980s, Kosovo has been marked by a high level of tension and corresponding violence. Typical violent incidents included kidnapping, killings, assassinations, and other forms of harassment. In some cases, violence has also been directed towards the international presence. However, in-theatre violence is not the topic of the current study.

Spill-over emanating from the conflict has taken the following shapes: infighting on foreign turf; relatively peaceful demonstrations; bomb attacks and at least one assassination; and information attacks. However, very few of the incidents warrant the designation “international terrorism.” The ‘terrorist’ groups behind the spill-overs are either direct parties to the conflict, i.e. the KLA or Serb authorities, or are sympathisers that in turn can be divided into brothers-in-faith, fellow secessionists, and left-wing extremists.

The extended conflict area included neighbouring Macedonia. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was initially part of the Greater Albania notion and in that sense was considered part of the same struggle. Moreover, a large number of NATO and later KFOR troops were stationed in Macedonia, awaiting deployment to the province of Kosovo, and were therefore considered a legitimate in-theatre target. In early 1998, bombs thus exploded in Macedonia, at sites populated by ethnic Albanians, with the KLA usually taking the credit.

More clearly related to the intervention was an attack on a NATO vehicle in Macedonia in April 1999 and on KFOR headquarters in FYROM, this time traced back to Serbs.

There are also close links with the conflicts in other parts of former Yugoslavia. However, far more instability was feared in Bosnia-Herzegovina than was actually the case. Although an SFOR vehicle was fired upon, the motive behind the attack was unclear and no explicit links to the Kosovo conflict could be identified.

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193 One example of violence against the international presence was the murder of a Bulgarian UN worker in Pristina on 11 October 1999. This was the first major attack since the UN administration was installed in June of the same year. ITERATE, 11 October 1999.
194 ITERATE, 27 April 1999; see also “FYROM Police Arrest 10 Ethnic Serbs Over Bomb at KFOR HQ,” FBIS/NESA, 23 June 1999.
195 ITERATE, 3 April 1999.
Albania, at that time, was quite simply a country in chaos with weak central control. Among the unsupervised comings and goings, terrorists from other areas moved freely under the shelter of the general hubbub. In February 1999, two alleged Islamic extremists, an Iranian and a Syrian, were arrested, suspected of planning an attack on the U.S. embassy in Albania. However, these incidents can to a certain extent be considered “in-theatre” events, as they occurred in the extended conflict area.

Outside the former Yugoslavia and Albania, demonstrations were a frequent tool for gaining international attention and voicing concerns. Until late 1998, Kosovo-Albanians were the most active. However, from late 1998 onwards, the protests on behalf of the Serb side dominated, and were often staged in co-operation with left-wing groups. Demonstrators often targeted embassies and official representations of Western governments, most often the United States, but also Australia, Britain, Germany, France, and Russia. The actions took place with varying degrees of violence, ranging from shouting to throwing firebombs. Whereas the former demonstrations can be regarded as attempts to increase international attention towards the Kosovo-Albanian cause, the latter were a direct reaction to the course of action chosen by the international community and almost functioned as retaliatory hits.

With hindsight, the most ominous of these was perhaps the violent demonstrations by left-wing parties that accompanied President Bill Clinton’s visit to Greece in November 1999. They were part of a trend that started in April 1999 with a bomb attack in Athens directed at international companies regarded as supportive of the NATO campaign, and eventually culminated in the assassination of Brigadier Stephen Saunders, Defence Attaché at the British Embassy in Athens, on 8 June 2000 by the left-wing November 17 group. The group explained its choice of target as being based on Saunders’ diplomatic role in securing Greek support for NATO’s campaign in Kosovo.

A minor incident also took place in Canada, where an “anonymous group […] vandalis[ed] C[anadian] F[orces] property on Vancouver Island to protest against Canada’s involvement in the bombing of Yugoslavia. The attacks began at the beginning of April with the severing of support wires for a military radio tower, and the burning down of a shack at a military rifle range. The group […] issued two communiqués calling the NATO bombings ‘violent imperialist activities’.” It was unclear whether the group was connected to the Serb Diaspora in Canada or whether it simply rejected NATO actions.

Furthermore, a group in Argentina called the Anti-Imperialist Commando exploded a small homemade bomb spreading pamphlets attacking the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia in April 1999. At about the same time, an Italian group called the Fighting Communist Party

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196 Keesings, Vol 45 (February 1999).
(NTA) claimed credit for two night-time attacks against the headquarters of the Italian Democrats in Verona, and warned of upcoming attacks “against NATO and against the imperialist state”.\(^\text{199}\)

Another aspect that is worth mentioning in this context is information warfare. Outside of the immediate conflict area, attacks by Serbs on the information systems of NATO and its member states consisted of blocking email systems and scrambling websites. According to O’Brien, “concerted hacking efforts by individuals supporting the Serbian side resulted in a massive slow-down of NATO and other Western government web-sites” during the NATO air campaign. Similarly, some pro-Serbian hacker groups have disrupted pro-Albanian websites worldwide since October 1998.\(^\text{200}\) However, attempts to hack into military networks, for example in Britain, generally failed.

There have also been some incidents in Scandinavia that might be linked to the situation in Kosovo. A young Kosovo-Albanian man allegedly had plans to bomb a Serbian club and the Police Headquarters in Oslo in the spring of 1999. He was reportedly in possession of a suitcase containing 60 kg of dynamite and detonators. The man was angry that the police were pressing charges against him in a drugs case, but also extremely upset about the situation in his home country.\(^\text{201}\) Finally, the man who stabbed Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh to death in Stockholm on 10 September 2003, Mijailo Mijailovic, had allegedly felt a strong hatred towards Ms. Lindh since 1999, when she gave a speech expressing support for NATO’s campaign in Kosovo.\(^\text{202}\) Mijailovic is a Swedish citizen of Serbian heritage, who spent much of his childhood in Serbia. However, other motives such as psychological problems and anger that the Swedish welfare state did not provide him with satisfactory treatment were also important, and it seems difficult to establish which of these eventually triggered the attack.\(^\text{203}\)

### 5.4 Concluding remarks

The intervention in Kosovo resulted in a surprisingly low level of terrorism spill-over, when compared to the other cases in this study. There may be several explanations for this. The Belgrade regime had little experience in staging terrorist operations abroad, and did not have any well-known links to established terrorist organizations. It seems to have focused its efforts during the intervention on political measures aimed at splitting the NATO alliance and at resuming negotiations, rather than on international terrorism. However, more important is probably the fact that the intervention took place against the backdrop of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which Serbian troops had committed ethnic cleansing and massacres of Bosnian Muslims. As a result, the Serbs were unlikely to receive much sympathy from the international

\(^{199}\) ITERATE, 16 April 1999.


\(^{202}\) “Hennes tal väckte hat”, \textit{Aftonbladet}, 27 September 2003, \url{www.aftonbladet.se/vss/nyheter/story/0,2789,366907,00.html}

\(^{203}\) “Hämnd mot vården möjligt motiv”, \textit{Dagens Nyheter}, 12 January 2004, \url{www.dagensnyheter.se/Dnet/jsp/polypony/jsp?d=147&a=222160}
community, especially as the intervention was aimed at preventing similar massacres from taking place in Kosovo. It should also be noted that the intervening countries did not have any important interests in the region, apart from stopping the flow of refugees, and the fact that the intervention took place on European soil. It must therefore have been difficult for ideological terrorists to interpret the intervention as an “imperialist” enterprise warranting a violent response.

Indeed, there is some reason to speculate as to whether the international terrorist response to the situation in Kosovo would have become larger if the intervention had not taken place. We have already seen that the lack of intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina triggered international terrorist attacks. The Kosovo-Albanians had more international contacts than the Serbs, and Albanian Diaspora communities controlled considerable transnational crime networks. As discussed above, the distinction between terrorism and organized crime can often be quite blurred. The Albanian networks were to a large extent involved in fund-raising for the KLA, and might have been used for international terrorism if the international community had chosen not to react to the situation in Kosovo. It is also known that the KLA received assistance from radical Islamists, and that Usama bin Ladin used the West’s non-intervention as a justification for violence and to recruit more followers. It is important that this be kept in mind when evaluating the consequences of the intervention on terrorism spill-over.

The Kosovo-Albanians have largely achieved their goal, namely a de facto independent state, guaranteed by the presence of international forces, police and administrators. However, there is an inherent tension in this alliance for the Kosovo-Albanians: while they are relatively autonomous under the international tutelage, the international presence also aims to implement fully Security Council Resolution 1244 which stipulates that Kosovo remains a part of Serbia, until a final status has been agreed upon. The Kosovo-Albanian opinion towards the international presence may therefore change, (1) should the force appear to curb that independence, for example by interfering with local power holders, or (2) should the force be regarded as siding with the Serb population in Kosovo. The Kosovo-Albanians are nevertheless not deemed very likely to resort to international terrorism, as “the U.N. remains the sole route for Kosovo-Albanian politicians to gain legitimacy in the West.”

6 RECENT CASES: AFGHANISTAN 2001 AND IRAQ 2003

The outline of this report was drawn in 2000, and the bulk was written by the summer of 2001. This probably means that it provides a more sober look at the historical connections between international interventionism and terrorism than some of the “securitised” debates over terrorism that have emerged after 11 September 2001. The report would nevertheless seem somewhat incomplete without taking into consideration two of the most significant international interventions in recent years, namely “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan and

204 See Lia & Andrésen (2000b).
206 The chapter was authored by Åshild Kjøk and Thomas Hegghammer
“Operation Iraqi Freedom” in Iraq. These interventions represent an important new development within international interventionism, not least because the question of terrorism prevention was presented as a central element in their justification. While it may still be too early to assess their full impact on patterns of international terrorism (they are still ongoing at the current time of writing), this report will devote a few pages to describe the terrorism spill-over that had occurred by 8 January 2004, as well as a brief discussion of the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004.

6.1 Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan (2001-ongoing)

The multilateral military intervention in Afghanistan known as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched on 7 October 2001. It was an attempt to eliminate the al-Qaida terrorist organisation, which carried out the 11 September attacks, and also to remove the Taliban regime, which was seen as providing it with support. The first period of high-intensity fighting was relatively short – most al-Qaida bases were destroyed in weeks; Kabul fell on 13 November, and the Taliban regime’s last stronghold, Kandahar, fell on 7 December 2001. The invasion has been followed by an extended period of low intensity fighting in various parts of Afghanistan against what is often described as remnants of the Taliban regime and the al-Qaida organisation. A new federal Afghan government has been erected, but is still struggling to impose security and stability in the country, with the support of the 28-nation International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed in and around Kabul.

The military coalition that entered Afghanistan was thus relatively wide, and it is fair to say that the intervention enjoyed a high degree of international consent. Moreover, even though OEF was not officially sanctioned by the UN Security Council, it might be justified as an act of self-defence under international law, as it was aimed at rooting out the al-Qaida infrastructure in Afghanistan. However, a number of Muslims have questioned the implication of al-Qaida in the 11 September attacks, and the intervention might be perceived by some as an unprovoked attack on an Islamic country.

6.1.1 The Problem of al-Qaida

The intervention in Afghanistan is a special case in the context of this study, because it was aimed directly at rooting out the infrastructure of an international terrorist organisation. On the one hand, this meant that the terrorism threat was assumed to be higher because al-Qaida was under direct attack. On the other hand, it meant that all security efforts surrounding the intervention focused on this threat, and that the military intervention was coupled with a wide range of other measures aimed at curtailing the ability of al-Qaida or associated groups to carry out attacks.

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207 UN Charter, chapter VII, article 51.
208 For instance, around 70% of British Muslims questioned did not believe al-Qaida was behind the 11 September atrocities, see “Why Muslims mistrust Blair on terror”, *BBC News*, 23 December 2002, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2600919.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2600919.stm)
Assessing the impact of the military intervention in Afghanistan alone on patterns of international terrorism is a relatively complicated task, because the confrontation with al-Qaida has been conducted on many different fronts. If the study was to apply the method used in the earlier case studies to the case of Afghanistan, that is looking at attacks “related to the intervention”, it faces the problem of defining which events are related to the intervention and which are not. If a wide definition is used and all terrorist attacks perpetrated by al-Qaida or suspected sympathisers since October 2001 are counted, the study would have a relatively long list which might include operations whose tactical and strategic motivations may be far removed from the issue of the military intervention in Afghanistan. Some of these operations include:

- A blast at a synagogue on the Tunisian Island of Djerba, which killed 21 people – including 12 Western tourists - on April 11, 2002. Al-Qaida’s ‘third-in-command’ Khaled Sheikh Mohamed reportedly ordered the attack.\(^{209}\)

- The bombing of a French tanker near the Yemeni coast on 6 October 2002. One crewmember was killed, 12 were injured and 90 000 barrels of oil spilled into the sea. The al-Qaida affiliated organisation Aden-Abyan Islamic Army claimed responsibility.\(^{210}\)

- Explosions near a Bali nightclub on 12 October 2002, which killed 202 people, many of them Australians and other foreigners. Members of the al-Qaida affiliated group Jemaah Islamiyyah have been convicted of conducting the attack.\(^{211}\)

- Suicide attacks on compounds housing Americans and other Westerners in Riyadh on 12 May 2003, killing 34, including nine suicide bombers.\(^{212}\)

- Five simultaneous suicide bombings against Western and Jewish targets in Casablanca on 16 May 2003, killing 45 people. Members of the Islamist group Salafiyah Jihadiyah, which is believed to have links to al-Qaida, have been convicted of the attacks.\(^{213}\)

It is uncertain to what extent these operations were motivated by the intervention in Afghanistan and to what extent they were part of an al-Qaida campaign that existed prior to the intervention. To deal with this problem, this study uses a narrower definition of intervention-related attacks than in the other cases, in that it focuses merely on attacks accompanied by a declaration that they were motivated by the multilateral military intervention in Afghanistan. This may be one explanation as to why the terrorist response to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) seems relatively low compared to the other cases.

\(^{209}\) “Al-Qaeda link to bombing”, \textit{BBC News}, 8 March 2003, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2831903.stm}

\(^{210}\) “Yemen ship attack was terrorism”, \textit{BBC News}, 13 October 2002, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/middle_east/2324431.stm}

\(^{211}\) See e.g. “Timeline: Bali bomb trials”, \textit{BBC News}, 9 October 2003, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3126241.stm}

\(^{212}\) See e.g. “Britons killed in Saudi bombing”, \textit{BBC News}, 15 May 2003, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3030255.stm}

\(^{213}\) See e.g. “Death sentences for Morocco bombing”, \textit{BBC News}, 19 August 2003, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3162285.stm}
6.1.2 General Observations

The number of international terrorist attacks resulting from Operation Enduring Freedom was relatively low (7). There were four attacks during major combat operations, while three have occurred during the period of low-intensity fighting. It should also be noted that the incidence of international terrorism during October-November 2001 was relatively normal, with a total of 47 incidents, compared to an average of 40.6 for October –November 1992-2001.\footnote{RAND-MIPT-database. It should be noted that there is a very large variance, as numbers ranged from a high of 55 in 1992, to a low of 21 in 1996.}

Islamist groups were responsible for at least half of the strikes (≥4), but there have also been attacks by left-wing extremists (2). \textit{No incidents have been traced to Afghans}, although unknown perpetrators were responsible for one attack.

Not surprisingly, the United States constituted the preferred target (3). \textit{Western European countries were also attacked} (2), and there have been hostilities against local Christians in Pakistan and Nigeria.\footnote{Christians in Nigeria were targeted in a riot, rather than a terrorist attack. It has therefore not been counted in the statistics.}

There were roughly as many incidents in Asia (4) as in the West (3). Three of these focused on business interests, but there have also been strikes against diplomatic, military, cultural and religious institutions.

\textit{Three of the strikes are deemed serious}: an armed attack on a Christian congregation in Pakistan, killing 17; the bombing of a McDonald’s in Indonesia, killing three; and a failed bombing attempt of a trans-Atlantic flight, which might have killed the 197 people aboard had it succeeded. There has also been one assassination, and hundreds of people have died during anti-war riots.

6.1.3 Terrorism Spill-over

There were at least four cases of terrorism spill-over from Operation Enduring Freedom during October-November 2001: Marxists in India bombed a Coca-Cola plant stating that it was a protest against the U.S. Air Force bombing of Afghanistan; the “Totally Anti-War Group” used burning petrol cans and aerosol spray against a military installation in France; an explosive device that could have caused serious damage was found and defused at an archaeological site in Italy - a piece of white fabric with slogans hailing Afghanistan was found near the scene; and gunmen belonging to a Muslim extremist organisation stormed a church in Pakistan, killing a guard and 16 members of the congregation, shouting that the act was in revenge for U.S. attacks on Afghanistan. Furthermore, the bombing of three hotels in the Philippines on 8 October 2001, which have been attributed to the Islamist Abu Sayyaf group, which has been linked to al-Qaida, might have been planned to coincide with the outbreak of the war.\footnote{\textit{RAND-MIPT database}.}
In addition, there were anti-war riots and demonstrations, which led to a number of violent incidents during the war. For instance, anti-U.S. mobs in Pakistan burned UN and foreign charity offices, police stations, banks and movie theatres on 8 October 2001 protesting the U.S. campaign. The number of casualties is not reported. Moreover, nearly 200 people died in Nigeria on October 13-14, as thousands of Muslims attacked local Christians and set fire to their houses, in protest of the U.S.-led bombing of Afghanistan. Some of the rioters carried pictures of bin Ladin. Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain that the latter riots were triggered by the war in Afghanistan, as conflict over power and land have led to widespread sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria; the war may simply have served as a pretext for carrying out such attacks.

After the fall of Kandahar, the study has only recorded three strikes that can be linked directly to Operation Enduring Freedom: on 22 December 2001, Briton Richard Reid was arrested on a flight from Paris to Miami trying to blow up the aircraft, which carried 197 passengers. He later stated that he committed the act because he was ‘incensed’ by the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan. Moreover, on 28 October 2002, a group calling itself Shurafa al-Urdun (the Honourables of Jordan) killed U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley in Jordan, stating it was a revenge for U.S. support of Israeli aggression and also its “shedding of blood in Iraq and Afghanistan”. Finally, in December 2002, a bomb exploded at the McDonald’s in Makassar, Indonesia. The suspects later mentioned the war in Afghanistan and America’s pending attack on Iraq as important motives during interrogation. Nevertheless, this was only one in a series of attacks against U.S. franchises such as McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut, which have been carried out by various Islamist organisations all over the world since 11 September 2001.

It should also be noted that Islamic groups suspected of links to al-Qaida increased their attacks on Christians and foreigners in Pakistan dramatically in 2002, although such attacks also had occurred before OEF and were not necessarily accompanied by a declaration referring to the invasion of Afghanistan. In this year alone, Islamist militants:

- Launched a suicide bomb attack outside the U.S. consulate in Karachi, killing 11 and injuring 40.
- Detonated a bomb outside the UK embassy.
- Attacked a Protestant church in the diplomatic quarter of Islamabad, killing five.
- Staged a bomb attack outside Karachi’s Sheraton hotel, killing 14.

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217 Ibid.
219 Serrano, Richard A.: “Details on Shoe Bomber Released”, Los Angeles Times, 22 January 2003, via SITE Institute, http://www.siteinstitute.org/exposing.asp?id=40 However, Reid might have carried out a major terrorist operation anyway, as he had attended al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan prior to OIF.
220 RAND-MIPT database.
221 Ibid.
• Kidnapped and murdered American journalist Daniel Pearl.
• Bombed an archaeological site in North West Frontier Province, injuring 12 tourists.
• Tried to fight their way into the Murree Christian School near Islamabad. (Witnesses said the security guards averted a bloodbath by stopping the gunmen from entering a classroom full of children. Six people were killed. Almost all the children studying at Murree are foreigners.)
• There have also been a vast number of other attacks against churches and buses in Pakistan.  

6.1.4 Concluding Remarks

As for the overall assessment of the military intervention in Afghanistan, a similar issue to that mentioned in the conclusion of the preceding chapter is present, namely that of weighing the consequences of action vs. inaction. The al-Qaida network in the autumn of 2001 was a formidable terrorist entity whose strength as displayed on 11 September was largely a result of the existence of training camps in Afghanistan, which enabled the central organisation to generate a high level of expertise, religious indoctrination and internal coherence. It will never be known how al-Qaida would have developed, had it been able to maintain and further develop its infrastructure in Afghanistan, but there are good reasons to believe that it would have continued in its efforts to confront the United States and the West militarily on U.S. and European soil, and there are no reasons to believe that its recruitment and training efforts would have abated. The military intervention in Afghanistan has forced al-Qaida out of Afghanistan, creating a more decentralised and “less tangible” organisation. While these organisational changes pose new challenges, there are reasons to believe that the loss of access to a territory in Afghanistan will weaken the operational capabilities of the al-Qaida movement in the longer run, provided it is prevented from establishing similar bases elsewhere.

6.2 Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003 – ongoing)

The British-American attack on Iraq aimed at toppling Saddam Hussein amid allegations of Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction and links to al-Qaida was known as Operation Iraqi Freedom and started on 20 March 2003. Although the conventional war with the Hussein regime was over relatively quickly and Baghdad fell on 9 April 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom have maintained an important military presence in Iraq. A number of other nations have joined the post-war peacekeeping effort, but the initial fighting was carried out by these two powers, with support from Australia, Denmark and Poland. It was a politically controversial intervention that enjoyed a lower level of international consensus and legitimacy.

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224 See e.g. “Unpopularity begins at home”, The Economist, 18 March 2004.
than the other cases in this study, as illustrated by the controversy it caused between the United States on the one hand, and France and Germany on the other. It is also different from the other cases in the sense that it was not an intervention in an existing conflict, but a preventive attack, which initiated a new conflict. For these and other reasons, there were fears among scholars and policymakers alike that this war could cause an international terrorism backlash, for example in terms of al-Qaida operations or attacks from local Iraqi groups.\textsuperscript{225} Many were worried about possible long-term consequences of the war such as an increase in the recruitment to al-Qaida-related groups worldwide, and deterioration in the co-operation between the United States and key allies in the war on al-Qaida.

It is of course still very early to assess the implications of this war on patterns of international terrorism in general and on the development of the al-Qaida movement in particular, but nevertheless it is possible to make some observations. First, with regards to the immediate terrorist response to the invasion, there seems to have been relatively few successful international terrorist incidents in March and April 2003. Some analysts claimed that al-Qaida entered a “period of dormancy” when the war broke out, only to resume activities in May 2003 with the bombings in Riyadh and Casablanca. However, there have been some tremendous terrorist strikes that seem linked to the intervention after the end of major combat operations, in particular the suicide bombings in Istanbul on 15 and 20 November 2003, and the bombing of commuter trains in Spain on 11 March 2004. The Aznar government’s disastrous handling of the latter attacks contributed to changing the outcome of the Spanish elections, and led to the appointment of a new government, which withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq and induced a re-orientation of Spanish foreign policies toward the European Union and away from the United States. This turnabout may serve as a source of inspiration to future terrorists, providing them with evidence that terrorism is a successful strategy for persuading democratic governments to change their policies.

6.2.1 General Observations

*Operation Iraqi Freedom did not provoke a large number of terrorist attacks* (22). There were five incidents prior to the intervention, six during major combat operations, and ten during the occupation period. It should be noted that there were considerably fewer international terrorist attacks during major combat operations than in the same period the preceding year.

*Many attacks were carried out by local Islamists* (≥7) *or local left-wing radicals* (≥5). Only one incident has been ascribed to Iraqis, and the perpetrators of nine incidents are unknown.

*The United States was not surprisingly the preferred target* (9), *with Great Britain as second* (4). There were also attacks against Turkish (3) and Jewish interests (2), Algeria (1), Israel (1), Japan (1) and the Philippines (1).

*Turkey was the arena for almost half of the attacks.* The study has also registered two minor

attacks in the United States and one in Europe.

There has been a tendency to focus on business interests (8), though diplomatic missions (5) are also common targets. Other attacks were directed at military (3), religious (2) or other (4) targets.

There were at least 80 deaths and about 800 injuries until 8 January 2004. The majority of these occurred in connection with the suicide bombings in Istanbul in November 2003. The number of casualties increased dramatically on 11 March 2004, when terrorist strikes on Spanish trains resulted in 192 deaths and about 1,600 injuries in one single stroke.

6.2.2 Terrorism Spill-over

American government officials expressed surprise at the low level of terrorist attacks during the invasion of Iraq. The incidence of international terrorism was just slightly higher than average during these months, with a total of 287 incidents, as compared to an average of 276 for March – April 1992-2001. Moreover, only a year earlier, from March-April 2002, there were as many as 532 international terrorist attacks. There was a slight increase in the incidence of terrorist attacks after the end of major combat operations, but the total number is nevertheless still relatively low. However, there have been a few very serious incidents claiming a large number of human lives, which seem to be related to the situation in Iraq.

Taking first the terrorist attacks that occurred before the war, these include:

- Explosions near a U.S. and a Japanese military camp in Japan in November 2002, claimed by the Revolutionary Army as an attempt to deter U.S. attacks on Iraq and North Korea.
- The sending of three letters containing a white powder to the U.S. Embassy and the Australian and British High Commissions in New Zealand in February 2003. The latter letter tested positive for cyanide, and all contained notes threatening another September 11th-like attack if the United States were to attack Iraq.
- An armed attack on a police camp outside the U.S. consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, killing two policemen and injuring seven others, in February 2003. The gunman stated that he wanted to punish the policemen for protecting infidels responsible for the killing of Muslims. The attack occurred as anti-American sentiments were on the rise in Pakistan because of the war on terror and the prospects for war on Iraq.
- A foiled hijacking of an Air Algeria flight in Algiers in January 2003, allegedly in protest at the pending Iraq war.

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227 Based on RAND-MIPT-database. Numbers varied with a high of 532 in 2002, and a low of 107 in 2000. However, there seems to have been a sharp increase from 1997 to 1998. The average number of attacks during March-April 1994-1997 was only 49.5, with a high of 67 in 1994 and a low of 34 in 1996.
228 RAND-MIPT database.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
During the war itself, the following attacks took place:

- A firebomb attack on a McDonald’s restaurant in Oslo, Norway, on 21 March 2003. The police found a note referring to the war in Iraq on the scene. There was only minor material damage.\(^{232}\)
- An explosion at the British Consulate in Ecuador on 23 March 2003, claimed by the People’s Revolutionary Militias Group (MRP), causing minor damage. The Consul stated that the perpetrators conducted the attack in response to the war in Iraq.\(^{233}\)
- A suicide attack in Netanya, Israel, on 30 March 2003, which injured 30. Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility, stating the attack was “Palestine’s gift to the heroic people of Iraq”.\(^{234}\)
- The bombing of a wharf in the Philippine city of Davao on 2 April 2003, killing 16 and injuring 55. Local authorities suspected involvement of the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiya, which has connections to al-Qaida.\(^{235}\)
- The damaging of five cars and a truck at the Naval Recruitment Headquarters in Montgomery, Alabama, on 29 March 2003. The Earth Liberation Front claimed responsibility, stating it was a protest against the war in Iraq. They also sprayed 60 SUV-cars in Santa Cruz, California, with anti-war messages on 4 April 2003.\(^{236}\)
- A failed arson attack by Iraqi nationals on the Grand Hyatt Amman hotel in Jordan, where many American journalists and some American military personnel were staying, in late March 2003.\(^{237}\)

As far as it is possible to ascertain, there were about ten international terrorist attacks related to the intervention in Iraq between 9 April 2003 and 8 January 2004. Interestingly, all but one of these occurred in Turkey. Four took place on 17 October 2003, as explosive devices went off at the Chamber of Industry, the Turkish American Association, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association, immediately after the Turkish parliament had decided to send troops to Iraq.\(^{238}\) The remainder happened on 15 and 20 November 2003, as suicide bombers attacked two synagogues, the British consulate and a British bank in Istanbul, killing 62 people. These latter attacks occurred immediately before and during President Bush’ state visit to Great Britain, and a statement claiming responsibility posted on the alleged al-Qaida affiliated website al-Mujahidoun contained clear references to the situation in Iraq and also to the alliance between the United States and Great Britain.\(^{239}\)

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\(^{233}\) RAND-MIPT database.

\(^{234}\) Ibid.

\(^{235}\) “Militant Link to Philippines Bombing Sign of Wider Campaign?,” Stratfor.com 7 April 2003

\(^{236}\) RAND-MIPT database.


\(^{238}\) RAND-MIPT database.

\(^{239}\) “The cars of death will not stop”, The Guardian, November 21 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,12469,1090544,00.html For instance, “the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades targeted the British consul, Roger Short, because […] he is the mastermind of British policy in the region comprising Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran”, “As for the tails of America – especially Britain, Italy, Australia and Japan […] if they do not understand words then the cars of death will make them understand”. See also “Major
was also a bomb blast at McDonald’s in Istanbul on 15 April 2003, which was presumably linked to the situation in Iraq.\textsuperscript{240} Finally, on 10 April 2003 there was a failed gun attack on a U.S. official in Amman.\textsuperscript{241}

The terrorism spill-over from Operation Iraqi Freedom was aggravated when terrorists bombed commuter trains in Madrid on 11 March 2004, killing 192 people and injuring about 1,600. There can be little doubt that these attacks were a direct outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom: Spanish authorities received a video-taped statement in which a masked man, claiming to be al-Qaida’s military commander in Europe, said the bombings were a punishment for Spain’s involvement in the Iraq war. Moreover, subsequent police investigations indicated that members of the al-Qaida affiliated \textit{Groupe Islamique Combattante du Maroc} (GICM) perpetrated the bombings. Finally, Usama bin Ladin chose to offer a “reconciliation initiative” to his “neighbours north of the Mediterranean” following the attacks, on condition that they pull out of Muslim countries and “stop attacking Muslims”. In this connection, it is interesting to note that FFI-researcher Brynjar Lia found a purported al-Qaida document outlining a strategy of exploiting differences between the coalition countries in Iraq with a view to breaking the alliance and undermining the U.S. will to stay on in Iraq, on the internet in December 2003. The author of the document explicitly recommended attacks on Spanish targets before the Spanish elections on 14 March in order to have a Socialist government elected, as the Socialist party had promised to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq.\textsuperscript{242} One might of course object that similar attacks would have occurred in Western Europe independently of the interventions, due to the more general al-Qaida phenomenon, which emerged prior to the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that Spain was picked out as a target due to its close relations with the United States and its military engagement in Iraq. Moreover, it should be noted that al-Qaida’s threats to European allies of the United States did not surface for the first time until after the intervention in Afghanistan began.

It is also necessary to include terrorist plots that were averted, in order to build a complete picture of the terrorist threat in connection with the war. Some of these include:

- Plans by a Tunisian al-Qaida member to attack U.S. and Israeli targets in Germany to coincide with the outbreak of the war. He was arrested by German police.\textsuperscript{243}
- Alleged Iraqi plans to assassinate Iraqi oppositionists in London in October 2002.\textsuperscript{244}
- Alleged plans to bomb embassies, resorts and U.S. targets in Jordan by a cell of Islamist attackers blamed on al-Qaeda”, \textit{BBC News}, 25 November 2003, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3234214.stm}
\textsuperscript{240} Murphy, Dan: “US multinational companies wary of backlash”, \textit{Christian Science Monitor} 21 April 2003, \url{http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0421/p12s01-woap.html}
\textsuperscript{242} Lia & Hegghammer (2004).
\textsuperscript{243} “Germany charges terror suspect”, \textit{BBC World}, 16 January 2004, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3403637.stm}
\textsuperscript{244} “Vil fjerne opposisjonelle: Saddam skal ha beordret drap,” \textit{Nettavisen} 3 Nov 2002; and Coughlin, Con: “Saddam orders to assassinate Iraqi opposition leaders sheltering in Britain”, \textit{The Telegraph}, 3 November 2002.
militants that was broken up by Jordanian police.\textsuperscript{245}

- The alleged sending of two Iraqi agents to the Philippines in February 2003 to conduct terror attacks in response to a U.S. intervention.\textsuperscript{246}
- A suspected plot in Berlin, Germany: six men were arrested for trying to recruit Arab students to carry out suicide missions against Jewish and U.S. targets to coincide with the beginning of the Iraq war.\textsuperscript{247}
- Alleged plans of terror attacks against Israeli and Western targets, which were purportedly stopped by the Romanian intelligence service.\textsuperscript{248}
- A suspected plot in the Philippines by members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in late March 2003, allegedly in sympathy for Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{249}

There have reportedly also been several plots to attack the U.S. embassy, the British Council and other U.S. and British targets in Lebanon between May 2002 and April 2003, and there was allegedly a plan to kill the U.S. ambassador to the country in 2003. Some of these plots occurred before the war in Iraq, but they may nevertheless have been partially motivated by the situation in Iraq.\textsuperscript{250}

Attacks on active duty soldiers may not fall within the definition of terrorism, even if they take place in the territories of third countries. It is nevertheless interesting to note that there have been a number of attempts to attack U.S. soldiers in connection with the war, mainly in countries close to Iraq. For instance, there were suspected plots by “al-Qaida and Iraqi agents” to poison food and water supplies at U.S. bases in Kuwait in January 2003 and a suspected plot by Iraqi agents to poison the water supply of a U.S. military base in Jordan in early April 2003.\textsuperscript{251} Furthermore, on 29 March 2003, an Egyptian truck driver drove into a group of U.S. soldiers at an American military camp in Kuwait, injuring 15 people. (However, it is not clear whether this was an accident or an attack).\textsuperscript{252} Moreover, on 14 December 2003, as it became known that American troops had arrested Saddam Hussein, a Kuwaiti national opened fire on two American truck convoys in Kuwait, injuring four people.\textsuperscript{253}

It is quite likely that there have also been other plots and minor incidents reported in the world

\textsuperscript{245}“Jordan: Plot failed to Bomb Embassies, Resorts”, Reuters 7 July 2003.
\textsuperscript{246}“Xinhua: Philippines TV says Two Arrested Iraqis May Have Had Terror Agenda”, Xinhua in English, 16 February 2003, via FBIS.
\textsuperscript{249}“Philippine police arrest 11 MILF members planning Iraq ‘sympathy attack’, ” Manila (Abante 31 March 2003).
\textsuperscript{252}“Egyptian Rams Truck Into U.S. Soldiers In Kuwait,” Islam Online 30 March 2003.
\textsuperscript{253}“‘Ia’tiqaal kuwaiti nafadha khilaal yaumain hajamaat a’la ‘amrikiin wa-‘asiwayin” (“Arrest of Kuwaiti who conducted attacks on Americans and Asians during two days”) Al-Hayat 16 December 2003, pp. 1 and 6.
media, which this study has not been able to register.

6.2.3 The Use of Force

It is useful to compare the terrorist response to the 2003 invasion to that to the 1998 bombing campaign of Iraq, as this may tell us something about the links between the level of force used and the corresponding terrorist response. The United States and Great Britain conducted a limited bombing campaign targeting alleged Iraqi WMD plants and military targets named “Operation Desert Fox” (ODF) on 16-19 December 1998. The international terrorist response to this operation seems to include six attacks altogether. A pipe bomb went off in Cape Town, South Africa, on 31 December 1998, injuring five. No one claimed responsibility, but the bombing was reportedly one in a spate of attacks following the American and British bombing of Iraq. A Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in the same town was firebombed immediately after an anti-U.S. demonstration protesting the bombings of Iraq and Sudan on 10 January 1999.254 There were also four bomb attacks on U.S. businesses in Greece, which local authorities believed were carried out by Greek left-wing groups acting in solidarity with Iraq, in November –December 1998.255 In addition, there was an alleged plot by Iraqi agents to use a car bomb to blow up Radio Free Europe in Prague, which broadcasts to Iraq and other nations in the Middle East. The attack was foiled when an Iraqi agent defected in December 1998.256 The relatively large number of attacks in response to the limited bombing campaign in 1998, as compared to the all-out war in 2003, demonstrates that there is not necessarily a proportional relation between the levels of force used and the number of terrorist attacks. However, the attacks in response to ODF were relatively un-dramatic and small in scale, whereas some of the attacks related to OIF have been very large-scale and claimed a large number of human lives.

6.2.4 Concluding Remarks

There are to date few indications of the mobilisation of Iraqi groups to violent action outside of Iraq. However, this remains a possible long-term consequence of the 2003 intervention, particularly if the security situation within Iraq continues to deteriorate and the attempts at establishing a new government in Baghdad are further complicated.257 Anti-U.S. paramilitary operations have become frequent within Iraq, and the use of terrorist tactics such as suicide bombings or truck bombs against civilians might continue or even increase and intensify. It should also be noted that the Jordanian Islamist Fadel Nazzal al-Khalayleh aka Abu Mu’sab al-Zarqawi, who has been accused of organizing the Islamist guerrillas within Iraq, is simultaneously suspected of being the king-pin of Islamist terrorist networks in Europe and of involvement in the suicide bombings in Istanbul in November 2003, as well as the terrorist bombings in Spain on 11 March 2004.258 If the disturbances in Iraq continue, he might be

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254 RAND-MIPT database.
255 These incidents have been collected from the ITERATE-database.
successful in recruiting Sunni Iraqis for a global jihad against the West. Another emerging threat to the international presence in Iraq is that of militant Shi’ite factions, primarily the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. Conflicts with such groups may deteriorate as the issue of the secularism of the nascent Iraqi state gains prominence. Finally, Kurdish groups might also turn to violence if the permanent constitution decreases the level of autonomy they have enjoyed during the past decade. With regards to the impact of the Iraq war on recruitment to al-Qaida-related groups, there are numerous indications that recruitment to Islamist groups have increased since the late summer of 2002 when the issue of the Iraq war rose to prominence. Al-Qaida-related groups have been conducting concerted recruitment efforts aimed at exploiting the Muslim dissatisfaction with the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq. A large number of Islamist websites display pictures of dead and wounded Iraqis as well as ideological material aimed at presenting Iraq as a “battlefield of the holy war”.

7 PEACE ENFORCEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

This chapter will present some preliminary conclusions on the validity of the hypotheses introduced at the beginning of this report, based on the findings from the case studies. It will also provide answers as to whether the interventions led to an increase in international terrorism, concerning the terrorists’ target selection and the seriousness of the attacks. Finally, it contains some observations on possible long-term effects of the interventions. However, first of all it is necessary to make explicit certain reservations.

7.1 Reservations

It should be emphasized that each of the interventions had their own set of circumstances that determined the nature and level of the international terrorist response. There were also several years separating the majority of the cases, during which time the international political climate and trends within international terrorism changed significantly. In addition, counting the number of terrorist attacks does not accurately describe the threat in each particular scenario, as it does not account for differences in the anti-terrorism effort during each intervention. Given the large number of variables and the small number of terrorist incidents in each case, it therefore becomes scientifically difficult to isolate variables such as the depth of military involvement of the intervening force, the width of the coalition, or its foundation in international law, and it may be argued that this makes it problematic to draw general conclusions with regards to the

connection between international military interventions and international terrorism.

The greatest value of this compilation of case studies therefore lies in its illustration of the complexities of the phenomenon of international terrorism. Terrorism is an analytically vague concept, which is used as a label for a vast range of acts of political violence. The number of possible motivations behind it is as large as the word “political” is wide-ranging in meaning. The study of terrorism is therefore often most fruitful when it takes into consideration the specificities of the political environment from which the terrorist operations or campaigns are emanating. This is what this study has tried to, by looking in detail at the specific political situations arising during the interventions. Terrorism is not simply a tactic or a weapon that will automatically be taken up by a party to a military conflict under any given circumstances. If this were the case, the occurrence of terrorism would lend itself more easily to analysis along military-strategic dimensions, and one might, for example, have expected more international terrorism during the Kosovo campaign. Nor is terrorism to be viewed simply as a reflection of the level of popular political dissatisfaction or as an unavoidable product of a sense of humiliation within an ethnic group. If this were the case the level of terrorism responses to an intervention could be predicted by opinion polls, and we might have expected more terrorism during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Nevertheless, it would be pushing the relativity argument too far to claim that the cases can only be understood individually and that the sum of the findings does not shed any new light on the connection between international terrorism and international military interventions. In the following, the data from the five cases is compared briefly, highlighting differences and similarities, and drawing some tentative conclusions.

7.2 Comparing the data

All the interventions studied resulted in terrorist attacks. However, the number of incidents varies and was generally relatively low. The use of the term “relatively low” is a subjective statement based on: comparisons with the usually gloomy pre-intervention predictions; the overall level of international terrorism; and also the intensity (Operation Desert Storm) or protractedness (Lebanon) of the international military engagement compared to incident figures from other conflicts (Palestine, Colombia). Operation Desert Shield/Storm was the only intervention to cause a marked increase in the yearly average of terrorist incidents worldwide, while this is much more difficult to prove in the cases of Lebanon, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. On the other hand, the interventions might have served to divert the terrorists’ attention away from national or regional authorities, so that they focused their attacks on the intervening countries instead of local powers, as seen in the case of Lebanon.

There is conflicting evidence about the scale and damage of international terrorist operations motivated by the interventions examined here. The incidents associated with the Lebanon case include several large, high casualty and relatively complex operations (hijackings, hostage situations etc), even if the devastating U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks bombings in 1982 and
1983 are excluded, which are technically in-theatre incidents. There have also been some sophisticated attacks and a very high number of casualties in connection with Operation Iraqi Freedom, i.e. the bombings in Istanbul in November 2003 and Madrid in March 2004. During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, on the other hand, the vast majority of the operations were small, spontaneous and low-casualty, despite the fact that there were a very large number of incidents. The few incidents that occurred in the Kosovo case were also small in scale and damage. Afghanistan seems to lie in between, with a medium level of casualties and one serious bombing attempt that was only averted at the last minute.

Business targets were the most common (77), followed by diplomatic (52) and military targets (22). This is true for all the cases examined, except for Kosovo, where military targets were dominant. There have also been several attacks against religious institutions (12), including four churches and eight synagogues or other Jewish institutions. Moreover, there have been some strikes against newspapers (5). The target selection for intervention-related terrorist attacks thus largely corresponds to the general pattern in international terrorism, in that business interests are most often hit, followed by diplomatic and military targets.260

In chapter 2 a number of hypotheses on possible links between multilateral military interventions and international terrorism were presented. These will now be examined more closely.

7.2.1 Nature and Extent of the Intervention

The case studies indicate that there is no connection between the legal foundation of an intervention in international law and the level of terrorism spill-over. ODS had the strongest legal foundation of all the cases, in that it enjoyed the backing of the UN Security Council. The MNF in Lebanon and the invasion of Afghanistan seem to represent ‘middle cases’, as the MNF had been invited by the official Lebanese government, and OEF can be interpreted as an act of self-defence under the UN Charter. OIF and the intervention in Kosovo both lacked UN-backing and a solid foundation in international law. The intervention enjoying the highest level of international legitimacy (OIF) thus provoked the highest number of terrorist incidents, whereas one of the least legitimate (Kosovo) caused the least. There is also no evident link between the legal foundation of an intervention and the number of terrorism-related casualties. It is true that the terrorist incidents related to ODS caused one of the lowest numbers of casualties among our sample, and that those related to OIF involved the largest number of deaths. However, Kosovo caused the least fatalities among all the cases, and also lacked UN-backing.

It is much more difficult to measure the impact of perceived political legitimacy, as any categorisation of this issue will have to be somewhat subjective. Nevertheless, on the basis of this research OIF can be characterised as the most controversial of the five interventions, and

260 Results from search in RAND-MIPT database for the period 1968-2004: General target selection - Business targets, including airlines (24%) – Diplomatic targets (13%) – Government targets (11%) – Military targets (4%) – Other targets (48%). Target selection in the report’s case studies: Business targets (41%) – Diplomatic targets (28%) – Government targets (-) – Military targets (12%) – Other targets (19%). See also Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31951.pdf, p. 179.
Kosovo may be described as the least controversial with regards to both the Western and the Islamic worlds. This is based on the huge controversy that OIF caused in the United Nations, whereas opposition to attacking Serbia had been weakened after years of Serbian massacres of former-Yugoslavian Muslims. Accordingly, terrorism related to OIF caused the largest number of casualties, and the Kosovo case resulted in the lowest number of both casualties and incidents. It might also be useful to compare the terrorist response to OEF to that of OIF, given that both occurred within a short time span and under similar international conditions. OIF seems to have triggered a larger number of both incidents and casualties, which seems to confirm the hypothesis of a connection between perceived legitimacy and the level of terrorism spill-over. However, al-Qaida attacks in the aftermath of OEF have not been accounted for in the case study, although they might be somehow linked to that intervention. Moreover, the results might have looked dramatically different if “shoe-bomber” Richard Reid, who stated that he was “incensed” by the situation in Afghanistan, had succeeded in his attempt at blowing up a trans-Atlantic aeroplane, killing 197 people. The evidence concerning the impact of political legitimacy is thus unclear, although there are some indications of a direct link between perceived legitimacy and the terrorist response. It should also be kept in mind that what matters to the terrorist response is not necessarily the interventions’ legitimacy among the general population, but how it is perceived among extremist groups with terrorist capabilities.

The level of force used can be defined based on the number of civilian casualties caused by the intervention armies. OIF seems to be the most forceful among the cases, resulting in more than 4,300 civilian deaths. OEF and ODS reportedly share second place, with 1,000-3,800 and 1,000-3,000 civilian deaths respectively. The air campaign in Kosovo was apparently much less forceful, causing about 500 civilian deaths. It has not been possible to find corresponding numbers for Lebanon. Based on the figures above, it becomes clear that the number of terrorist incidents does not correspond to the level of force used by the intervention armies. However, there seems to be a link between the use of force and the number of terrorism-related casualties. OIF resulted in most terror-related deaths (80), followed by OEF (18), ODS (8) and Kosovo (1). Moreover, looking at the Lebanon case, the number of casualties that can be directly linked to the intervention increased with the escalation of violence in 1983, although the number of incidents did not increase as such. Furthermore, the terrorist response to OIF has been much more lethal than that of the more limited bombing campaign during ODF. This finding should nevertheless be interpreted with some caution, given that the most forceful interventions were also the most recent and that there has been a general trend toward more lethal types of terrorism during recent years. Further research will therefore be required to confirm the hypothesis.

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261 Extensive counter-terrorism measures following September 11 may be the explanation why OIF only resulted in a medium number of attacks.
Unfortunately, there is no scientific way of measuring the level of casualty averseness of the various interventions, as it is not known at what ‘breaking point’ the various interventions would have withdrawn, with the exception of the Lebanon case. Nonetheless the report has endeavoured to make a subjective assessment. The intervention in Kosovo has been categorised as the most casualty averse, based on the fact that NATO publicly announced that it would not employ ground troops. Lebanon has been classified as the second most casualty averse, as it was a peacekeeping mission rather than regular warfare. ODS has been put in third place, given that it was a limited war. OIF and OEF have been categorised as the least averse to casualties, due to the fact that they were total wars and also occurred after 11 September 2001. The most averse intervention thus caused the least number of both incidents and casualties, whereas the least casualty averse caused a medium level of incidents and the highest casualty rate. Casualty averseness does thus not seem to be a factor when militants decide whether or not it is worthwhile to engage in terrorism.

However, it is interesting to note that the author of the Arabic document *The Jihadi Iraq – Hopes and Dangers*, which seems to be a strategy document for Islamist terrorist groups, states that it is not worthwhile to attack Poland, as “it will not be vulnerable to human casualties, to which it does not attach much value”, suggesting that terrorists should rather focus on Spain. Perceived casualty averseness might thus be a factor in determining what countries will be targeted, when their adversaries have already chosen to use terrorism as a strategy.

Our evidence indicates that the distribution of terrorist attacks against the countries contributing to the interventions tends to be unequal. For instance, the United States and France were the only nations participating in MNF to have their interests targeted, while the United Kingdom and Italy were not targeted as such. In the case of ODS, which featured a wide but U.S.-dominated coalition, the distribution was also unequal. The United States not surprisingly constituted the preferred target, and its European allies were much more frequently targeted than the Middle Eastern coalition partners. The attacks associated with OEF also mainly targeted U.S. interests, in addition to Pakistan and countries in Western Europe. The major share of the attacks resulting from OIF were again directed at the United States, but there have also been several attacks against Great Britain. Denmark and Poland have not experienced any incidents, whereas Australia has only received one threat. There is thus a tendency that great powers that might be suspected of having imperialist ambitions and/or countries that keep a high profile during the intervention are targeted by terrorists, whereas lesser powers participating in the effort are often shielded.

There is no established connection between the composition of the forces and the number of incidents or the level of casualties. The wide UN-coalition in ODS caused the most incidents, followed by the narrower MNF in Lebanon, the U.S.-dominated coalitions in OIF and OEF respectively, and finally the somewhat broader NATO-intervention in Kosovo.

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263 Arabic original available from FFI upon request.
As to the various stages of the intervention, the general trend is not surprisingly that most attacks and casualties occur during major combat operations. Deterrence campaigns do not appear to be a common phenomenon, as there were only very few or no incidents prior to the interventions. However, there do seem to be certain after-effects of military interventions. On average, about one third of the incidents took place after the actual intervention had ended, although the frequency of the attacks decreased as the incidents were spread over a longer time period.\textsuperscript{264} Moreover, in the OIF and Kosovo cases the later attacks tended to be more lethal.

The duration of the intervention does not seem to impact on the level of terrorism spill-over. Kosovo has been the longest of all the interventions (six years), followed by OEF (two years), the Lebanon case (almost two years), OIF (nine months) and ODS (seven months). This categorisation is based on the length of the intervening countries’ military presence. One might also define the duration based on the duration of major combat operations. In that case, OEF was the longest operation (2 months)\textsuperscript{265}, followed by Kosovo (11 weeks), ODS (six weeks) and OIF (three weeks). Either way, there is no connection between the duration of the intervention and the resulting level of terrorism, neither in terms of the number of incidents, nor in terms of casualties. Indeed, the longer operations have usually caused a lower number of incidents than the shorter ones.

The available data is too scarce to draw any definite conclusions as to whether the intervening forces tend to be blamed for their role in the conflict. The importance of France as a location and target for strikes during the civil war in Lebanon might be an indication that the country was blamed for its role in shaping the sectarian power balance of the country. Moreover, the Sabra and Shatila massacre provoked several terrorist attacks, including one against a bank in New York City. A man claiming responsibility for the latter incident stated that it was a protest against “the U.S. support of the Israeli massacres of Palestinian people”. In contrast, the United Kingdom – which had not been part of MNF I and could not be blamed for the massacre - was spared from any intervention-related terrorist attacks. On the other hand, a search in the RAND-MIPT database reveals no terrorism against the Netherlands following the Srebrenica massacre.

7.2.2 Conflict Characteristics and Conditions

The case studies do not provide clear answers concerning the importance of the nature of the conflict. The civil war scenarios in Afghanistan and Kosovo only triggered a small number of incidents, whereas the civil war in Lebanon seems to have caused a medium level of spill-over. The two interstate conflicts with Iraq led to somewhat inconsistent responses, as they represent the first and third largest number of attacks respectively. If there is any tendency, it seems to be that interstate conflicts trigger more incidents. However, the picture is further blurred when looking at the number of casualties. OIF, and to some extent the civil war in Lebanon, represent the highest lethality, whereas ODS and the civil war in Kosovo represent the lowest.

\textsuperscript{264} Percentage of attacks following the intervention: Kosovo 20% - ODS 29% - MNF 29% - OEF 43% - OIF 48%.
\textsuperscript{265} The OEF case is based on the fall of Kandahar.
The intensity of the conflict does also not seem to impact on the number of incidents and casualties. The report has categorised ODS as the most intense conflict, followed in descending order by the civil wars in Kosovo, Lebanon and Afghanistan, with OIF as the least intense. This is a subjective assessment based on the fact that ODS was a reaction to a full-scale invasion of Kuwait, on the massacres of Kosovo-Albanians by Serbian troops, the existence of guerrilla wars in Lebanon and Afghanistan, and the fact that OIF opened a new front. ODS did indeed cause the largest number of incidents. However, this is contravened by the results for the Kosovo case, which caused the least number of incidents. There does also not seem to be any link between the number of casualties and the scale of the conflict. This is illustrated by the fact that OIF caused the largest number of casualties, whereas the conflict in Kosovo caused the least.

On the other hand, the development stage of the conflict prior to the intervention might impact on the terrorism spill-over. Afghanistan and Lebanon had undergone many years of civil war, and the Iraqi population had suffered from many years of international sanctions before OIF. In contrast, ODS opened an entirely “new” conflict between Iraq and the West, and Kosovo had remained relatively peaceful until 1998. Accordingly, the three former interventions led to more casualties than the two latter. However, this finding needs to be substantiated by further research. It is too early to assess the effects of a possible transition to democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The hypothesis about the importance of geographic location is somewhat strengthened by the Kosovo case. A Western intervention in a European country seems less likely to be conceived as imperialism and to provoke aggression, than an intervention in a Middle Eastern country. Accordingly, the intervention in Kosovo caused the lowest number of attacks. It might also be significant that Afghanistan caused the second lowest number of attacks, and that this country is located at some distance from the political hot spots of the Middle East. The findings of this study might therefore have been somewhat different if the majority of the cases had been sampled from Africa or South-America, rather than the Middle East. However, a larger sample of cases would be required to confirm this finding.

Geographical proximity to the conflict theatre seems more important than participation in the intervention to determine whether a country is likely to become an arena for terrorist attacks. For instance, Turkey stands out as the arena for by far the largest number of incidents (39 out of 108) in the case of ODS, while the rest of the Middle East saw 26 incidents, Europe 19 (11 of which in Greece), and South America 19. As a result, the interests of a given country are not necessarily targeted in its own territory. Indeed, the evidence from the five case studies examined in this report shows that it is quite rare for a participant country to have its interests targeted on its own soil. However, France seems to be an exception. There were eight attacks against French interests on French soil, and it became the most important arena for terrorist attacks in the Lebanon case. However, this exception can probably be attributed to France’s
colonial past, rather than its participation in the interventions.\footnote{For a perspective on France’s imperial past and its role as an arena to Middle East related terrorism, see also Lia and Kjøk (2001).}

7.2.3 The Existence of Potential Terrorist Groups

The main terrorism fears before the interventions were associated with actors participating directly in the conflict. However, our data indicate that local ideological groups with no apparent stake in the conflict carried out the majority of the terrorist attacks. Such groups were responsible for at least 96 attacks. Furthermore, circumstances indicate that they also carried out the great majority of the 64 attacks whose perpetrators are unknown. In comparison, activists directly involved in the conflict were in charge of at least 29 attacks, but as many as 23 of these occurred in the Lebanon case, which is an atypical case.\footnote{The numbers do not add up, as there were at least three joint operations between local and affected groups.}

With regards to ideology, leftist radicals are the dominant actors (≥81), although Islamists are also relatively active (≥35). Moreover, it is interesting to note that Islamist groups have carried out a few more attacks than leftist radicals in the two latter cases.\footnote{Attacks by local leftist groups: Lebanon (≥10), Iraq I (≥57), Kosovo (≥3), Afghanistan (≥2), Iraq (≥5). Attacks by Islamists from outside the war zone: Lebanon (≥3), Iraq I (≥6), Kosovo (0), Afghanistan (≥4), Iraq (≥7).} This illustrates a general trend in international terrorism, in that radical Islamists have taken over the dominant role that radical leftists used to play in the 1970s and 1980s.

There can be little doubt that pan-ideologies are an important reason for the export of terrorism in connection with military interventions. Indeed, the most important factor determining whether a country is likely to become an arena to terrorism spill-over seems to be whether it has capable local ideological terrorist groups. For instance, the large number of spill-over attacks in Greece, Turkey and South America during ODS can be related to the historical presence of active leftist extremist groups in these countries. Moreover, the fact that Italy and France had problems with leftist terrorist groups before the MNF-intervention may to some extent explain why these countries saw more spill-over than the United Kingdom and the United States in the Lebanon case. These findings suggest that countries without a presence of pan-ideological terrorist groups have a lower probability of experiencing terrorism spill-over.

Groups that are directly involved in a conflict may nevertheless become an important threat in cases where they have acquired significant international terrorist capabilities. This is demonstrated by the case of Lebanon, in which Lebanese groups carried out more than half of the attacks. Lebanese groups had close contacts with Palestinian and European terrorist groups, links to the Syrian and Iranian regimes, and had perpetrated several terrorist attacks abroad prior to the intervention. This probably explains why there was a significant level of direct spill-over in the Lebanon case, whereas there have been very few such attacks in the other cases. The Afghanistan case may at first glance seem to disprove this explanation, given that al-Qaida controls an extensive transnational terrorist organisation and did not perpetrate any attacks during the war. However, it should be kept in mind that the U.S. intervention was aimed at eliminating the al-Qaida infrastructure in Afghanistan, and that most of the organisation’s
resources were probably spent regrouping, fighting a guerrilla war and seeking refuge in other countries. After the end of major combat operations, al-Qaida thus re-launched its terrorist campaign abroad. The Iraqi regime had a tradition of using its intelligence apparatus to stage attacks on Iraqi oppositionists abroad, and cultivated contacts to Palestinian and European terrorist groups. Nevertheless, its capabilities were hampered by extensive surveillance and counter-terrorism measures, and also international sanctions after the 1991 Gulf War. Consequently, Iraqis only orchestrated five direct terrorist attacks in response to ODS, and none in response to OIF. The intervention in Kosovo only saw one direct terrorist attack from Serbs, probably because the Yugoslav authorities had little experience in staging terrorist operations abroad and also no known links to established international terrorist organisations. If this explanation holds true, one implication is that direct spill-over might become a more serious problem for future interventions in cases where the parties involved have developed significant terrorist capabilities.

There are some indications that Diaspora communities might play a role in the spill-over of terrorism from military interventions. For instance, the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 were conducted by North-African immigrants belonging to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM). We have also seen that several terrorist plots that may have been averted during OIF were related to Arab Diasporas in Europe. It is also not unlikely that the cooperation between the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions (LARF) and Action Directe was facilitated by representatives of the important Lebanese community in France, although it has not been possible to verify this. Finally, the murder of Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh was committed by a Swede of Serbian descent and seems to have been at least partially motivated by her support for the intervention in Kosovo.

The extent of or potential for regional involvement does also seem to affect the level of terrorism spill-over. This is demonstrated by the increased attacks on Christians and foreigners in Pakistan after the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, which might be a result of ethnic bonds between Pashtuns on either side of the border and/or of Islamist allegiances to the Taliban regime. With regards to the two interventions in Iraq, as much as 32 per cent of the terrorist attacks took place in neighbouring Turkey. This might inter alia be related to the fact that both countries have large Kurdish minorities demanding autonomy and that the interventions upset the ethnic power balance in the region. Finally, the capabilities of Lebanese terrorists seem to have been enhanced by their links to experienced Palestinian terrorist groups, and by the direct involvement of these groups in the conflict.

7.2.4 Why have there been relatively few attacks in Western Europe?

It is worth noting that there has been a marked decrease in the number of incidents occurring in Western Europe, from the Lebanon case, where the majority of the incidents took place on

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270 However, such attacks have not been counted in the statistics, as they were not accompanied by any references to the situation in Afghanistan and in most cases the identity of the perpetrators is not known.
European soil (29 out of 45), through ODS, with as many as 19 incidents (11 in Greece and only eight in remaining Western Europe), to OEF with three attacks, and OIF with no attacks on Western European soil (until 8 January 2004). This can probably be explained by increased experience in handling the challenge of terrorism spill-over among European intelligence agencies, and by extensive counter-terrorism measures in connection with the interventions and the war on terror. This is illustrated by the fact that a number of terrorist plots seem to have been averted during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Moreover, even though terrorists managed to carry out a spectacular terrorist attack in Spain in March 2004, European police have been successful in averting at least ten other “spectacular” Islamist plots that had been planned to take place in Europe.\(^{271}\)

Another important explanation for the decrease in the number of incidents is the attrition of leftist terrorist groups such as Action Directe, the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction, etc, after the end of the Cold War. For instance, there were no terrorist incidents in Greece in connection with OIF, which can probably be explained by the fact that Greek police had rounded up the terrorist group 17 November, which alone was responsible for more than 20% of the incidents in Europe in 2002. This might indicate that the danger from such groups will be smaller in the future. On the other hand, there is a strong possibility that the traditional role of leftist groups might sooner or later be taken over by other pan-ideological groups, such Islamist networks or possibly extremist factions within the wider anti-globalisation movement.

### 7.3 Possible long-term effects

The observations presented above relate primarily to the short-term impact of an international intervention on patterns of international terrorism. In the case studies, only incidents occurring just before, during, and right after an international intervention have been examined. This is of course for methodological reasons – it is much easier to identify immediate responses than long-term consequences in the area of international terrorism. However, this is an area in which much more research is needed, as there are indications that international interventions may sometimes have long-term consequences in terms of creating new international terrorist threats.

First, an international intervention may help to transform terrorist groups and movements into symbols of resistance. One reason for the rise to prominence of the Hizbullah in the early 1980s was not only state sponsorship from Iran and Syria, but also its successful paramilitary and terrorist operations against foreign powers that intervened in Lebanon at the time. Hizbullah subsequently became one of the most formidable international terrorist groups in the 1980s and early 1990s, and is still considered a great threat by U.S. and Israeli authorities today. Similarly, the international intervention during the Gulf War in 1990-1991, and particularly the deployment of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, was a catalyst for ideological processes that led to the rise of al-Qaida.

Secondly, individual incidents during international interventions may also acquire long-term

\(^{271}\) See Nesser (2004).
symbolic importance. The bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 was a “pioneering” terrorist operation in terms of its size (241 dead U.S. marines), method (suicide bombing) and political effect (seen as causing US withdrawal from Lebanon), and this operation has continued to inspire Islamist terrorist groups until today. The 11 March 2004 attacks might have similar consequences due to their success in changing the outcome of the Spanish elections and in effecting a Spanish withdrawal from Iraq.

Thirdly, the internationalisation of the conflict may sometimes increase the appeal and credibility of the worldviews offered by radical pan-ideologies, which in turn influences the degree of recruitment to Islamist or radical leftist movements. Such increased recruitment may not have visible consequences in terms of terrorism until long after the intervention is over.

Fourthly, soldiers participating in the intervention might be severely affected by their experiences in the war, which might bring about psychological damage inducing them to turn toward terrorism or other forms of violence. For instance, Timothy McVeigh, who killed 168 people by bombing the Federal building in Oklahoma City, seems to have been at least partially motivated by his experiences as a U.S. soldier during Operation Desert Storm.

It seems therefore that the military involvement of foreign powers in a conflict can have long-term consequences on patterns of international terrorism that are at least as serious as the short-term reactions.

8 CONCLUSION

All the cases studied in this report resulted in terrorist attacks against the intervening countries. There is thus little doubt that participation in military interventions entails risks of international terrorism. However, the scale and number of the strikes vary considerably from case to case. The most important lesson of this study is therefore that there is no automatic relationship between military interventions and international terrorism, but that each intervention has its own set of circumstances that determines the nature and level of the international terrorist response.

The main terrorism fears before multilateral interventions are usually associated with actors that are directly involved in the conflict. However, most intervention-related terrorist attacks are perpetrated by pan-ideological groups with no apparent stake in the conflict. Parties to the conflict usually play a much less important role, though they can become an important threat in cases where they have had time and occasion to acquire terrorist capabilities. The threat of terrorism spill-over does not only come from the side of “the enemy”. However, soldiers participating in an intervention might also turn to terrorism or other forms of violence after

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272 This finding is supported by the Pentagon’s Defence Science Board, which has found a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States. See Eland (1998).
returning home, as a result of psychological damage incurred during the fighting.273

Although all the interventions resulted in terrorist attacks, not all participant nations were targeted. Countries that might be suspected of having “imperialist” intentions and/or of acting upon their own interests, that were seen to have developed special relationships to any of the conflict parties, and/or that kept a high profile during the intervention, tended to be most exposed. Other factors that might influence the motivation of potential terrorists seem to be their perception of the political legitimacy of the intervention and also its geographical location. Support from the UN Security Council, on the other hand, does not seem to impact on the terrorism spill-over. It should also be noted that forceful interventions tend to increase the lethality of the terrorist attacks.

The intervening countries were seldom hit in their own territories. The most important factors determining whether a country is likely to become an arena for terrorism spill-over seem to be geographical proximity to the conflict theatre and the existence local pan-ideological terrorist groups. However, the globalisation process that has taken place in the past decades has served to blur the distinction between international and domestic terrorism. The rise of transnational terrorist networks might increase the threat to countries that have traditionally not been targeted, especially considering the apparent al-Qaida strategy of targeting close U.S. allies.

The security costs of non-action might nevertheless be as great as or even greater than those of action, as indicated by the Kosovo case. It is important to be aware that international terrorism has often been a by-product of protracted armed conflicts, and that increased multilateral military involvement in internal conflict resolution might contribute to reduce or contain such conflicts, thus leading to a reduction in terrorism in the longer run. Interventions can also address the problem of so-called failed states, such as Afghanistan, where terrorist organisations are often able to set up bases from which they can organise their campaigns with impunity.

This study does not measure possible long-term consequences of military interventions, for example their impact on ideology formation and the evolution of terrorism tactics. The intervention itself might transform certain terrorist groups into global symbols of resistance, which inspire new trends and methods in international terrorism, as was the case for Hizbullah and suicide terrorism in Lebanon, or one might see increased recruitment of movements whose ideologies are confirmed by Western interventions. A further risk is that the intervention might stimulate ideological changes within a movement and give it a more global worldview and strategy, as happened to Usama bin Ladin in the years after the Gulf War. It remains to be seen whether the recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq will have similar consequences.

273 A case in point is former U.S. soldier Timothy McVeigh, who bombed the Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1995, killing 168 people. Frustration over his experiences in the 1991 Gulf War seems to have been one of the motives, although other factors such as family problems and right-wing political convictions were also at play.
9.1 Terrorism spillover from the Lebanon case – Narrow definition

Figure 9.1.1 Number of Terrorist Attacks

Figure 9.1.2 Perpetrators by Ideology
Figure 9.1.3 Perpetrators by Nationality

Figure 9.1.4 Targeted Country

Figure 9.1.5 Location of the Attacks
Figure 9.1.6 Physical Target

Figure 9.1.7 Deaths by Year

Figure 9.1.8 Injuries by Year
Figure 9.1.9 Deaths by Targeted Country

Figure 9.1.10 Injuries by Targeted Country
9.2 Incident List

9.2.1 The Gulf War and Operation Desert Shield/Storm

1) 3 December 1990 (France): The leftist Gracchus Babeuf group bombed the European University of America in Paris, saying that they were protesting against the deployment of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. The group was named after the 18th century French revolutionary Francois Noel Babeuf, alias Gracchus.

2) 12 December 1990 (France): A bomb set by the leftist Gracchus Babeuf group damaged the front of the Paris branch of the U.S. firm New Cosmetics during the night. This was the seventh anti-U.S. attack by the group, which left a signed leaflet outside the company offices in western Paris.

3) 18 January 1991 (Venezuela): A Molotov cocktail exploded at dawn at the front door of a Mormon church in Barquisimeto, 400 km west of Caracas, causing structural damage but no casualties. Captain Ali Gomez, a spokesman for the previously unknown Internationalist Brigade called EFE at dawn to say that the attack was “aimed at a US concern in Venezuela in retaliation for U.S. action against Iraq.” He added that the Mormons serve as US spies in the country and that their church would be target of other attacks.

4) 18 January 1991 (Chile): Small bombs exploded at 12.30 am in Santiago’s eastern suburb Providencia at branches of the two U.S. banks Security Pacific and Republic National, destroying windows and damaging furniture, but causing no injuries. The bombings were believed to be a protest against the Gulf war.

5) 19 January 1991 (Philippines): One Iraqi male was killed and another wounded when a powerful 200-pound bomb they were hoping to plant at a building housing the USIS Thomas Jefferson Library and other U.S. offices exploded prematurely.

6) 21 January 1991 (Turkey): Gunmen overpowered guards and set of a bomb in a U.S. Army logistics facility in the Maslak district in Istanbul. The leftist group Dev Sol claimed credit, saying, “Our armed action was a protest against American imperialism’s military power and a warning to the local collaborators.”

7-10) 22 January 1991 (Chile): Two Mormon churches and two U.S. companies were attacked in the cities of Vina del Mar and Valparaiso. Amongelatine and irenite bombs weighing 250-300 grams were thrown at the targets. Police suggested that pro-Iraqi groups might be involved.

23 January 1991 (Turkey): In Istanbul, Dev Sol bombed the charitable American Home Board and the offices of ABS, an American shipping company. The group left leaflets protesting against the involvement of Turkey in the Gulf war.

13-14) 23 January 1991 (Turkey): armed men attacked a U.S. financial consulting firm in Mercan and a maritime firm in Kabatas in the early morning. After overcoming the guards, they threw explosives into the buildings and escaped.
15) 23 January 1991 (Lebanon): A booby trap exploded at the entrance of the Beirut Riyadh Bank opposite the Peugeot Company in Western Beirut. The bank is partially Saudi owned.

16) 23 January 1991 (Peru): Terrorists threw explosives at the Peruvian-U.S. institute in Chiclayo, 750 km north of Lima, in protest of U.S. involvement in the Gulf war. No group claimed credit, although the leftist-Maoist guerrilla group Shining Path had organised pro-Iraqi street rallies in Lima.

17) 24 January 1991 (Uganda): A thrown grenade exploded at a U.S. recreation centre six kilometres south of central Kampala 10 minutes after U.S. ambassador John Burroughs ended a tennis game. The embassy had previously received threatening letters about the Gulf war.

18-20) 25 January 1991 (Greece): Three homemade bombs went off at the Athens branches of the British Barclays Bank and the American Citibank, as well as the office of the French military attaché, colonel Bernard Fievet. The 17 November Group claimed credit.

21) 25 January 1991 (France): A bomb went off outside the entrance of Libération, a liberal Parisian newspaper. A leaflet at the scene claimed that the paper had taken a turn against the left and for the Gulf war.

22) 25 January 1991 (Peru): A car filled with dynamite exploded in the parking lot of Lima’s Jorge Chavez airport, killing two people and injuring 20 others. The Shining Path said it acted “in support of the Arab people”.

23) 25 January 1991 (Peru): Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement activists in a pickup truck fired a machinegun and a bazooka at the U.S. embassy building in Lima. In pamphlets and calls to the media, the group condemned American military action in the Gulf and expressed “its militant support for the Arab people that are being massacred by U.S. troops in Iraq.”

24) 25 January 1991 (Uruguay): Gunmen fired four shots from a passing car at the U.S. Embassy; no group claimed credit for the attack.

25) 26 January 1991 (Lebanon): A bomb went off at a Saudi bank in Chhime, 30 kilometres southeast of Beirut. The explosion was attributed to underground pro-Iraqi activists retaliating for the Gulf war.

26) 26 January 1991 (Turkey): A car wired with explosives blew up near the Incirlik Air Base, from which U.S. planes launch strikes against Iraqi military targets.

27-28) 27 January 1991 (Greece): An anti-tank missile was fired at an American Express Bank branch in Athens, while a bomb exploded at a British Bank. The 17 November Group claimed credit, saying it was protesting against the Gulf war.

29-30) 27 January 1991 (Turkey): A bomb exploded at the ticket offices of the Japan and Saudi Airlines. Another bomb went off at the Air France bureau in another building in Ankara, Turkey. The Dev Sol said it was protesting against the U.S.-led military action in the Gulf war and that they would continue their attacks “until imperialism pulls out of the Middle East”.

32) 27 January 1991 (Lebanon): A bomb exploded near the Egyptian embassy in Beirut.

33) 28 January 1991 (Turkey): A bomb went off at a tourist agency with strong U.S. ties.

34-35) 28 January 1991 (Greece): A bomb exploded near the U.S.-French owned Inter-American Insurance Company in Athens. A missile was fired from an improvised bazooka 20 minutes later at the American Express bank in Athens. The 17 November Group claimed credit.

36-41) 29 January 1991 (Turkey): Bombs went off in Izmir at an American immigration aid office, a British insurance office, the Italian consulate, a U.S. TUSLOG logistics depot, the French consulate and the American Cultural Center. The Dev Sol and the Revolutionary Left – Armed Revolutionary Units claimed credit for the bombing of the U.S. Cultural Center, the U.S. depot and the French consulate.

42) 29 January 1991 (Greece): The 17 November Group fired rockets at the British Petroleum office in Athens in protest against “the barbarous Western assault” on Iraq.

43) 30 January 1991 (Turkey): In Ankara, three Dev Sol gunmen shot and killed retired army lieutenant General Hulusi Sayin, senior security advisor to Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut and former security chief of South-Eastern Turkey. A Dev Sol note said that he was a “tool of imperialism”. The group were protesting against Turkish involvement in the Gulf war. However, Police also suggested that a radical Kurdish group might have been responsible.

44) 30 January 1991 (Chile): An incendiary bomb containing sulphuric acid and potassium chloride was thrown at the Chase Manhattan Bank building in Santiago. The attackers were protesting against U.S. participation in the Gulf war.

45-47) 30 January 1991 (Peru): In Lima, a bomb planted by leftist guerrillas toppled a bust of late U.S. President John F. Kennedy. Four terrorists in a moving vehicle lobbed dynamite at the Italian Embassy. Other terrorists in a pickup truck threw a bomb at the private U.S.-Peruvian Cultural Centre. Witnesses said that the attackers shouted criticism against U.S. presence in the Gulf war and support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

48) 30 January 1991 (Jordan): A fire broke out in the library of the French Cultural Centre in Amman. A caller told Agence France Presse that the previously unknown Al-Jihad Brigades (Alwiyat Al-Jihad) were responsible, and their initials were scrawled on the walls of the library. The caller said the group’s name is the new one given to the Islamic Struggle Front (Jabhat Al-Nidal Al-Islami) and the Revolutionary Communist Arab Party.

49) 31 January 1991 (Peru): Three mortar rounds were fired from a passing van against the U.S. Embassy in Lima. Police blamed the pro-Cuban Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, which had claimed responsibility for a similar attack the previous week in which rockets hit the roof of the embassy. The group was protesting against the
Gulf war.

50-52) 31 January 1991 (Yemen): A dynamite stick was thrown at the residence of Japanese ambassador Masaaki Noguchi in Sanaa. Japan had earlier announced that it would provide $2 billion to the multinational forces in the Gulf, and was discussing providing $9 billion more. At the same time a dynamite stick was thrown at the residence of Turkish ambassador Nazim Belger. Meanwhile, gunmen fired three shots through the gates of the residence of the U.S. ambassador to Yemen. Yemen had condemned the Gulf war, and the previous day, Yemeni Muslim scholars called for jihad against the U.S. and its allies, accusing them of unleashing a “brutal Christian-Zionist onslaught in Iraq”.

53) 31 January 1991 (Lebanon): A dynamite stick exploded at the entrance to the Banco de Roma, an Italian-Lebanese bank in West Beirut. No group claimed credit, but the police said it was part of a campaign against the allies in the Gulf war.

54) 1 February 1991 (Puerto Rico): A fire set under a National Guard truck was believed related to the Gulf war.

55) 1 February 1991 (Jordan): A bomb was thrown from a car at a British bank in Amman. The previously unknown group Partisans of Saddam claimed credit.

56) 4 February 1991 (Saudi Arabia): A sniper wounded two American soldiers and a Saudi guard in an attack on a military shuttle bus in Jeddah.

57) 5 February 1991 (Jordan): A car belonging to the U.S. military attaché Colonel Donald Dubay was set on fire by individuals who doused it with petrol.

58) 7 February 1991 (Turkey): A Dev Sol gunman shot and killed Robert Eugene Mozelle, a U.S. civilian accountant and expert in customs matters, outside his home as he was getting ready to go to work at the Incirlik military base. A Dev Sol caller said, “we punished a CIA agent in Adana. The base cannot be used for the bloody games of U.S. imperialism”. Mozelle’s sister said the Detroiter was targeted because he was black and easily identifiable as an American.

59) 7 February 1991 (Turkey): A bomb exploded outside a NATO Air Force Command building in Izmir. Dev Sol claimed credit, saying it was protesting against “imperialism’s occupation of the Middle East”.

60) 8 February 1991 (Lebanon): A bomb exploded near the French Embassy in Beirut.

61) 10 February 1991 (Lebanon): A small dynamite bomb exploded at the Saudi embassy in Beirut.

62) 13 February 1991 (Germany): The Red Army Faction fired 250 machinegun bullets at the U.S. embassy in Bonn. A letter admitting responsibility said the RAF condemned “the imperialist strivings” of the U.S. and the coalition in the Gulf war.

63) 14 February 1991 (Jordan) Andreas Harayd, a German student at the University of Jordan was stabbed in the
chest by an attacker who thought he was an American and who wanted to “avenge the Arab Nation”. The stabbing occurred after Jordanian television showed pictures of the victims of the allied bombardment of an alleged bomb shelter in Baghdad.

64-65) 14 February 1991 (Greece): A bomb destroyed the car of Andrea Roland, a French diplomat in Athens. Another bomb destroyed an American citizen’s car. The 17 November group was suspected.

66) 16 February 1991 (Chile): The Manuel Rodriguez Popular Front claimed credit for firing a LAW rocket and rifles at a vehicle leaving the U.S. marine house in Santiago. A representative of the group said in a phone call to UPI, “we once again reject U.S. imperialist interference in Third World countries, taking advantage of the poverty prevailing in these countries. We will continue to attack objectives as we did in Vina del Mar and at the National Soccer Stadium until we achieve victory or we die.”

67-70) 20 February 1991 (Iran): Grenades exploded on the compound of the embassies of the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey and Italy. The Islamic Jihad Organisation’s Tehran section said “attacks will continue against nationals of aggressor countries if the West’s terrorist attacks on the defenceless people of Iraq do not stop.”

71) 20 February 1991 (Australia): Two Molotov cocktails were thrown through the back window of the Australia-America Association in Sydney at midnight. U.S. Navy personnel and American businessmen frequent the club. A man with a Middle Eastern accent later called a television station to claim that it was linked with the Gulf war.

72-73) 20 February 1991 (Germany): A petrol bomb was thrown at the IBM office building in Freiburg, Germany. A few minutes later, someone set fire to a truck parked outside a Coca Cola office in the same city. No one claimed responsibility, but police suggested that the attacks were related to the Gulf war.

74) 21 February 1991 (Spain): The 1st October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO) told the radio station SER that they had planted a bomb which damaged an oil pipeline supplying a joint U.S.-Spanish naval base at Rota in southern Spain. The pipeline suffered limited damage and was repaired within a few hours.

75) 21 February 1991 (Guatemala): A bomb placed in an electric generator exploded at the British Embassy in Guatemala City. Three days later a woman called the newspaper SIGLO XXI to say that the Islamic Brotherhood [sic] was responsible. The statement said, “we are a pro-Iraqi organisation, and we are brothers in Islam and our faith. Protests against the representatives of the multinational force will continue in Guatemala”. She condemned “the imperialist aggression headed by the United States.” The date coincided with the beginning of Ramadan.

76) 25 February 1991 (Niger): Protesting students attacked the U.S. Cultural Centre and threw petrol bombs at French-owned shops in the capital Niamey. Among other things, the students were calling for the withdrawal of Niger’s 491 troops in the Gulf war coalition. Niger is predominantly Muslim (85%).

77) 26 February 1991 (Germany): A hand grenade exploded on the fourth floor of the Hotel Boulevard in Berlin. A gunman fired machinegun shots at three U.S. government employees inside the building before escaping. On 1 March, Ahmad Sami Zaarour, a Lebanese, was arrested.
78) 27 February 1991 (Tunisia): Dutch Embassy First Secretary Robert Jan Akkerman was assassinated by several gunmen who ambushed him outside his home. Mr. Akkerman was the last Dutch diplomat to serve in Iraq before the Gulf war. The assassination came hours after Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek strongly condemned Yassir Arafat for supporting Iraq in the war. Iraq had threatened to target the Netherlands for its role in the Gulf war. On March 28, the Hilversum International Service reported that a PLO source told a Dutch radio reporter that the Palestinian terrorist group led by Abu Abbas was responsible. The gunmen were reportedly planning to kill about 30 dinner guests who were about to arrive at Akkerman’s home, but were surprised by Akkerman who was waiting at his front gate.

79) 28 February 1991 (Turkey): Dev Sol fired three shots at U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Alvin Macke, hitting him in the head. Macke worked at the NATO Land Southeast Command in Izmir. A caller told the Cumhuriyet daily “we will continue our activities until imperialism gets its hands off the Middle East.”

80) 3 March 1991 (Philippines): Suspected pro-Iraqi terrorists bombed the residence of the rabbi of a synagogue in Manila. Israel’s ambassador called it an act of revenge for Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf war. The time bomb was placed in a concrete flowerpot in the garden. The apartment is also near the offices of the Jewish Association of the Philippines.

81) 12 March 1991 (Greece): U.S. Army sergeant Ronald O. Stewart was killed in Athens when a remotely controlled bomb exploded on the pavement near his house. Stewart had been stationed at Ellinikon U.S. Air Force Base for five years. The 17 November group claimed credit, “to avenge the genocide of 130,000 Iraqis”, and said it would “continue to attack U.S. interests until the last American soldier leaves Greece”.

82-91) 16 March 1991 (Turkey): Ten bombs planted by Dev Sol rocked Ankara, Istanbul, Adana and Izmir. In Adana, two separate bomb blasts broke windows at the Turkish-American Cultural Association and American Life Insurance Company. Dev Sol had bombed the Cultural Association on 26 January. In Istanbul, two bombs exploded in a parking lot near the Bank of Boston building and a business centre housing the American Publications Centre. Bombs also went off at a U.S. cargo firm, a Pepsi Cola office, a U.S.-Turkish insurance company, a Coca-Cola factory, and a company, which sells U.S. cars and trucks. A bomb also went off in Ankara at Interbank. Although this bank is Turkish, the terrorists may have been fooled by its name and thought it was a foreign target. The group said it was protesting against Secretary of State James Baker’s visit to Turkey. A caller to local newspapers said, “we have welcomed Baker who is on a trip to […] the Middle East after public massacres in the region.” One terrorist died in a premature explosion that wounded a colleague as they were planting a bomb outside a U.S. warehouse in Izmir. The police discovered that the dead terrorist was one of two gunmen who shot U.S. Army Lt. Colonel Alvin Macke on 28 February.

92) 18 March 1991 (Germany): A bomb slightly injured a military fuel pipeline near Emstek. The pipeline served two German Air Force units that were stationed in Turkey during the Gulf war. The blast caused 300 cubic feet of aviation fuel to leak. No one claimed responsibility.

93) 22 March 1991 (Turkey): Three Dev Sol gunmen shot to death John Gandy, a former U.S. Air Force chief master sergeant, in his office in Istanbul, Turkey. One killer was dressed as a policeman to gain access to his office in the Yesilyurt district of Istanbul. The killers used a silenced rifle, and they wrote slogans on the walls, such as
“we are sending another Johnny to President Bush along with Ozal”. Gandy was the general manager of the Istanbul Office of Vinnell Brown Root, a company providing cleaning, administrative and support services to U.S. military bases in Turkey. The group had killed another American working for the firm earlier. The killing coincided with the departure of Turkish President Turgut Ozal on a visit to Washington.

94) 26 March 1991 (Turkey): A bomb exploded in the car of the Iraqi trade attaché in Ankara during the morning, injuring attaché Ali Faisal Husayn in the feet. The Islamic Jihad Organisation claimed credit in a phone call to an Istanbul newspaper.

95-96) 26 March 1991 (Turkey): Two bombs exploded in the early morning in front of the Istanbul offices of Shell Oil and the Izmir office of Citibank. The bombs were placed in the main entrances of the offices. Dev Sol and the Turkish People’s Liberation Party Front separately claimed responsibility for the bombings in calls to Turkish newspapers.

97) 28 March 1991 (Jordan): A man threw a bomb from his car at the front door of the Kuwaiti embassy in Amman at 8 p.m., causing no damage or injuries.


99) 23 June 1991 (Honduras): Two individuals on a motorcycle fired a bazooka at the headquarters of the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) at 9 pm. ONUCA was installed in Central America in December 1989 to supervise the demobilisation of the Nicaraguan contras and to verify that the territory of one country was not used for attacks on another. The next day, the Roger Gonzales Commando Unit of the Morazanist Patriotic Front of National Liberation said, “Our action is a strong protest because UN policy in the third world is to yield to the policies of hegemony of gringo imperialism.” A communiqué said the RPG-2 attack was to “express its rejection of the United Nations’ servile and submissive attitude toward U.S. imperialism’s hegemonic foreign policy, which has turned it into a political instrument for the U.S. objectives of domination and expansionism in the world. [The U.S.] uses its [the U.N.’s] extensive structure as a façade for the CIA’s covert operations. In light of this, the United Nations has passed from being an organisation that defends peace and has become an organisation that advocates wars and attacks throughout the world, degenerating the objectives for which it was created and totally losing the reason for its existence. With our action, we are demanding that the United Nations resolve the Israeli-Palestinian problem with the same procedure it used to resolve the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Only in this way can the United Nations show that its actions are fair and impartial. In this way it might regain the trust of Third World peoples.”

100-104) 18 July 1991 (Turkey): Dev Sol set off incendiary bombs at five Turkish banks to protest against U.S. President George Bush’s visit to Turkey. The group attacked the Acibadem, Tahtakale and Sultanhamam banks and two branches of the Erenkoy bank in Istanbul, causing damage but no injuries.

105) 19 August 1991 (Turkey): The Islamic Jihad Organisation claimed responsibility for murdering Andrew Blake, the British vice-president of the Turkish-British Commercial Insurance Company, “to protest the deployment of the multinational force in Turkey. The Islamic Jihad Organisation undertook its first real action in
Turkey.”

106-107) 11 July 1992 (Turkey): Two men and a woman in their mid-twenties belonging to Dev Sol attempted to fire a rocket at the U.S. consulate building at 9.45 p.m. The shell dropped harmlessly in the garden, causing no injuries and minimal damage. The attackers also opened fire on the ground of a nearby primary school in the city’s central Beyoglu district. Security forces found an RPG rocket launcher abandoned in a bag with unused ammunition and a Dev Sol flag. The rocket was fired from the same location as the 16 April rocket attack against the U.S. consulate. A caller to the local press said that the Armed Revolutionary Unit (SDB) of Dev Sol was responsible. He noted “we destroyed the U.S. consulate in memory of our martyrs of July 12, 1991”. On that date, Turkish security personnel raided eight Dev Sol safe houses in Istanbul, killing 12 Dev Sol members and arrested 12 others.

108) 11 July 1992 (Turkey): At 9.30 pm a Dev Sol bomb containing 1.5 kilograms of explosive material exploded near the door to the service entrance of the Opel service station of General Motors in Izmir, destroying 30 cars and causing $2 million damage. One person was slightly injured. Dev Sol’s Armed Revolutionary Unit phoned local newspapers to say that the two attacks were to avenge the deaths of 12 of its members on 12 July 1991 at the hands of the police prior to the visit by U.S. President George Bush.

Important abortive and suspected incidents:
1) 12 October 1990: The murder of Egyptian parliamentary speaker Rifiat Al-Maghub and five of his security guards in Cairo on 12 October 1990.274 Maghub was a close ally of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, who had recently reversed his pro-Iraq policy because of the invasion of Kuwait, and some as a warning and a display of Saddam’s terrorist options saw the event.275 Initially, Abu Nidal was suspected, but further police investigation traced the attack to the radical Islamic group Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya. However, as William Terrill pointed out, the Maghub murder raised the vigilance of the coalition by “raising the spectre of strikes by Abu Nidal”.276

2) 4 February 1991: At Norfolk Naval Base, the world’s largest naval base, bombs were found attached to a 1-million gallon methanol tank and another tank that would have emitted poisonous fumes if breached. The Naval base had recently sent 40,000 soldiers to Operation Desert Storm.

3) April 1993: Bush visits Kuwait. Saddam probably ordered the assassination of President Bush during his visit.277

9.2.2 The Multinational Forces in Lebanon

1) 18 January 1980 (Lebanon): A plane from the Lebanese Middle East Airlines, from Beirut to Larnaca, Cyprus, was hijacked by a young gunman. The hijacker claimed to represent the Sons of the South, and demanded the revealing of the fate of the missing Imam Musa as-Sadr, the founder of the Amal movement in Lebanon, as well as requesting the entry of the Lebanese army into the south. The hijacker demanded the plane to fly to Tehran. However, the plane landed in Beirut, where the hijacker threatened to blow up the plane, but finally surrendered.

No injuries. (Mickolus et al. 1989, pp. 8-9).

2) 6 February 1980 (Italy): Two gunmen shot and killed a policeman guarding the Lebanese embassy in Italy. No information on the origins of the perpetrators. (Ibid. p. 17).

3) 10 March 1980 (Jordan): A Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim hijacked a passenger flight of the Middle East Airlines, from Amman to Beirut. The plane landed in Beirut where the hijacker surrendered after having declared that the objective was to focus attention on the missing Imam Musa as-Sadr. No injuries reported. (Ibid. pp. 26-27).

4) 28 July 1980 (Libya): The Lebanese Amal organisation claimed credit for sending explosives in a suitcase on a Middle East Airlines flight from Beirut to Benghazi, Libya, where this suitcase exploded in the passenger hall, causing no injuries. (Ibid. p. 72).

5) 12 November 1981 (France): A gunman fired at the acting US ambassador, in Paris. However, the gunman missed and escaped. The Lebanese Armed Resistance Front took credit of the incident. (Ibid., pp. 222-223).

6) 29 November 1981 (Syria): A car bomb explosion near a military recruiting centre in Damascus killed 90 and wounded 135 persons. The Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners took credit, but Syrian authorities blamed the Moslem Brotherhood, which was suspected to try to pressure the Syrian government to accept an American peace proposal for the Middle East. (Ibid. p. 228).

7) 7 December 1981 (Switzerland): A Libyan plane from Zurich to Tripoli was hijacked by three Lebanese Shi’ites, who diverted it to Beirut. The hijackers demanded the truth about missing Musa as-Sadr. In Beirut, the hijackers were believed to be supplemented by Amal militiamen (according to Kuwaiti news agency, KUNA). The Plane then went about Beirut-Athens-Rome-Tehran. In Tehran, there was a mediation attempt. The plane finally returned to Beirut, where the hijackers surrendered (to the Amal leader, Nabih Berri). No injuries. (Ibid., p. 231).


9) 31 March 1982 (France): Three gunmen fired at a police hut outside the Israeli consulate in Paris, causing no injuries. The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions claimed responsibility, but the French police found that the weapons used in the incident belonged to the French Action Directe, leading to the arresting of two of its members. (Ibid. p. 269).

10) 3 April 1982 (France): The second secretary in charge of political affairs at the Israeli embassy was shot to death, on the street in Paris by an armed woman. The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Brigades, the Movement of Arab Revolutionary Brigades, the Revolutionary Lebanese Forces, as well as the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions took credit of this incident. The latter claimed that it was committed “in retaliation for the massacre committed by US and Israeli forces against the Lebanese people”. (Ibid. pp. 270-271).

In 1984, the French police arrested a Lebanese man in connection with this last-mentioned case, and in July 1985 a Paris court issued homicide charges against Georges Ibrahim Abdallah. He was considered to be one of the leaders
of the LARF. A weapon found was connected to him and the 1982 killings of both the Israeli and US embassy officials in Paris. Abdallah was sentenced to four years in prison, in July 1986. The Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Prisoners conducted a series of bombings in Paris in September 1986, demanding the release of Abdallah.(Ibid.).

11) 22 April 1982 (France): A car exploded outside the Paris office of the Lebanese newspaper Al-Watan Al-Arabi (pro-Iraqi), killing one person and injuring 62 others. Journalists of the paper had previously received threats for publishing investigations into the killing of the French ambassador in Beirut. French authorities suspected Syria to be responsible and expelled two Syrian diplomats. Syrian authorities responded by expulsing two French diplomats, and recalling its ambassador in Paris. (Ibid., p. 274-275).

12) 17 June 1982 (Italy): A Lebanese PLO sympathiser was shot dead in Rome. The Jewish Armed Resistance of the Jewish Defence League claimed responsibility. (Ibid. p. 291).

13) 5 July 1982 (Qatar): A car set on fire exploded in front of the US Embassy in Qatar, setting fire to the entrance, but no one was injured. According to the clandestine Voice of Palestine, the incident was committed by a Palestinian and the objective was to protest the US support of Israel's policy in Lebanon. (Ibid. p. 295).

14 & 15) 5 July 1982 (USA): Two small pipe bombs exploded at the French and Lebanese consulates in New York City, causing material damage, but no injuries. The Jewish Defence League was suspected to be responsible. (Ibid. p. 295).

16) 11 August 1982 (Guatemala): The Israeli embassy in Guatemala was attacked by unidentified individuals who threw a package of explosives towards the embassy, exploding only at 1000 feet from the embassy itself. Only some cars were damaged. During the same night, dynamite was thrown at a synagogue but did not explode. The police suggested the Guatemalan Labour Party to be responsible, because their leaflets condemning Israel's bombing of Beirut were found near the synagogue. (Ibid. pp. 308-309).

17) 19 August 1982 (France): The French organisation Action Directe claimed responsibility for a bomb explosion at the right-wing newspaper Minute, in Paris. Action Directe claimed that the newspaper was fascist, racist and supported the Israeli policy in Lebanon. No injuries were reported. The police later arrested some members of the organisation in response to this incident and others occurring the same day. (Ibid. p. 310).

18) 21 August 1982 (France): A bomb exploded under the car of the US embassy commercial counsellor, killing a French policeman (but not the targeted person), and injuring two other policemen. First, a member of the Action Directe claimed responsibility, but AD later rejected this. Later, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions took credit of the incident. (Ibid. pp. 311-312).

19) 17 September 1982 (France): A bomb explodes near the car of an Israeli embassy official, in Paris. The official as well as five other persons were seriously wounded. In addition, 40 students nearby were injured by crushed glass. The responsibility was assigned to the Action Directe which had assisted the Lebanese Armed revolutionary Factions in placing the bomb. In the aftermath, the French police arrested several members of the Action Directe, in relation to this and other incident. (Ibid. pp. 318-319).
20) 18 September 1982 (Belgium): A gunman wounded four persons entering a synagogue in central Brussels. The perpetrator quickly and successfully escaped. The organisation Black Lebanon claimed responsibility and declared that they had attacked an "Israeli intelligence center" in retaliation for the massacres of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut. (Ibid. p. 321).

21) 20 September 1982 (USA): An improvised explosive device exploded at Bankers Trust, New York City, causing important material damage, but no injuries. A man claiming to represent the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) said this organisation was responsible. He declared that the intention was to protest the US support of the Israeli massacres of Palestinian people. (Could therefore be related to the Sabra and Shatila massacres). (Ibid. p. 322).

22) 30 September 1982 (Italy): A bomb exploded at the Jewish Community Center in Milan. The center had formerly received several bomb threats intended to revenge the Sabra and Shatila massacres. The Communist Armed Group took credit.

23) 9 October 1982 (Italy): An armed attack by 4 gunmen against a full-packed main synagogue in Rome, killed 2 (1?) children and wounded 33 persons. A PLO spokesman condemned the attack, while an anonymous caller said the PLO-Red Brigades were responsible. Black Lebanon also took credit, declaring that the synagogue "was a den of Israeli intelligence rather than a place of worship". (Ibid. pp. 326-327).

24) 20 October 1982 (Italy): A bomb exploded in front of the Lebanese embassy in Rome. There was heavy material damage, and a passer-by was injured. The Lebanese President, Amin Gemayel, was to arrive in Rome for political talks the next day. No information on the responsible perpetrator(s) (Ibid. p. 328).

25) June 1983 (Greece): A Libyan passenger flight en route from Athens to Tripoli was hijacked by two Lebanese Shi’ites. The hijackers issued no declaration, but it was later discovered that they were affiliated with a Shi’ite militia group that wanted an independent investigation of the fate of the missing Imam Musa as-Sadr. The hijackers diverted the plane to Cyprus, passing by Rome. After negotiations, the hijackers surrendered 22 hours after the beginning of the drama. No injuries. The hijackers left behind a time bomb that was deactivated minutes before its programmed explosion. (Ibid. p. 407).

26) 27 August 1983 (Austria): 4 men speaking Arabic hijacked An Air France passenger flight from Vienna to Paris, but whose identity remained unknown. They claimed to belong to an organisation called the Islamic Liberation Movement, a previously unknown group. They travelled on Tunisian passports, but claimed to be both Lebanese and Iraqi. The hijacking lasted for four days (27. –31.08.83), and the hijackers forced the plane to land in Geneva, on Sicily, in Damascus and finally in Tehran. En route to Tehran, several passengers were released both in Geneva, Sicily and in Damascus. 17 hostages, the crew included remained when landing in Tehran. Iranian authorities engaged in the negotiations with the hijackers. They demanded the freeing of Lebanese captives held in French jails, as well as the ending of French military support to Iraq, Lebanon and Chad. They further threatened to blow up the plane if the demands were not met. However, after 2 ½ days in Tehran, the hijackers surrendered to Iranian authorities, while the demands were still not fulfilled and without any physical injuries among the hostages. (Ibid. pp. 434-435).
27) 30 September 1983 (France): A bomb exploded at an international trade fair in Marseilles. The bomb killed 1 person and injured 26, and destroyed the US, Soviet and Algerian pavilions. The Orly Group claimed responsibility in a phone call, but the police doubted this. Further, the right-wing Charles Martel group also claimed responsibility, as well as the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions (LARF). LARF in addition threatened to commit more incidents if French troops were not withdrawn from Lebanon. (Ibid., p. 443).

28) 12 December 1983 (Kuwait): A suicide bomb attack against the US Embassy in Kuwait resulted in the death of 4 people and injured 59 others. Shi’ite groups with possible Iranian backing were suspected to be the responsible for the incident. On 18 December 1983, Kuwaiti authorities accused 9 Iraqis and 3 Lebanese to be responsible, and they were connected to the Islamic al-Dawa party, a Shi’ite group with close ties to Hizbullah as well as to Iran. (Ibid. pp. 468-469).

29) 12 December 1983 (Kuwait): A car parked near the French Embassy in Kuwait exploded and caused the damage of a wall. The consequence was that 3 people were injured. The incident occurred only 30 minutes after the explosion at the US Embassy, and was seen in connection to this. The above-referred suspected perpetrators were also charged for the incident at the French Embassy. (Ibid.).

30) 25 January 1984 (France): A bomb caused material damage at French Aeronautics and Space Industries Company’s Office, near Paris. An anonymous caller (to the AFP) announced that the action was committed for the sake of “the Martyrs of Baalbek” (Baalbek in Lebanon; area of Shi’ite activities). No other info available on the origins of the group.

31) 15 February 1984 (Italy): The American director-general of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in Sinai, Leamon Hunt, was shot dead by three gunmen near the MFO’s headquarters in Rome. The first to claim responsibility was an Italian left-wing group called The Fighting Communist Party that denounced the presence of “imperialist forces” in Lebanon. Two days after the incident the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions also claimed responsibility. In addition, the Italian Red Brigades too claimed responsibility. In February 1984 15 Red Brigades terrorist suspects were arrested, but no murder charges were levied against them. However, in May 1985, an Italian court charged three members of the LARF with Hunt’s murder, but only one of them was actually arrested in Italy, the other two were believed to be in Lebanon. In June the LARF members were found guilty of the assassination by the Italian court. Eventual ties between the LARF and the Red Brigades were not ruled out.

32) 26 March 1984 (France): The US consul general in Strasbourg was slightly injured by a lone gunman who fired at him at close range. The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions claimed responsibility in a letter to AFP’s Paris office. In the letter the LARF accused the US consul general of being a CIA agent, denied by US authorities. Also police incidents and investigation led to the LARF conclusion.

33) 21 July 1984 (UAE): A Middle East Airlines aircraft was hijacked by a lone, unarmed man (nationality unknown?) – He demanded the liberation of South Lebanon and that the Lebanese government pay more attention to the South. Surrendered in Beirut after meeting with an Amal politburo member. No injuries.

34) 31 July –2 August 1984 (Germany): An Air France plane hijacked just after take-off from Frankfurt, diverted to
Beirut, Larnaca, Tehran (01.08.84). In Tehran the hijackers demanded the release of five terrorists in France, charged with an attempted assassination of Iran’s former Prime Minister (Paris, July 1980). Air France claimed that the nationality of the hijackers was Lebanese. French authorities refused the hijackers’ demand. The hijackers blew up the cockpit of the plane, but the hostages were left unharmed. Guardsmen of Islam and Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

35) 4-9 December 1984 (UAE): four men hijacked A Kuwaiti aircraft, Kuwait – Bangkok, shortly after the departure. The plane was diverted to Tehran. The 17 September Organization took credit, but there were suspicions about affiliations with the Hizbullah – or an ally of that movement; the Al-Dawa. The objective of the hijacking was the liberation of Shi’ite terrorists imprisoned in Kuwait, charged for the bombing at the US and French embassies in K. 1 Am. citizen killed during the hijack. The hijackers had originally arrived in Kuwait from Beirut on forged Lebanese passports. The hijackers’ true identity remains a mystery. Indications on complicity from Iran, in cooperation with Lebanese Hizbullah – the incident planned in Lebanon (Bekaa Valley: area of Shi’ite activists and training facilities).

36) 1-2 April 1985 (Lebanon): A lone Lebanese man hijacked a Middle East Airlines aircraft with 76 passengers, en route from Beirut to Jiddah. The hijacker demanded money for a Shi’ite Muslim militia group. The plane landed in Jiddah as planned where the hijacker surrendered. No passengers injured.

37) 13 April 1985 (France): A bomb explosion caused material damage in the Israeli Leumi Bank’s office in Paris. No injuries. The Islamic Jihad Org. claimed credit for the incident, as well as Action Directe. AD simultaneously denounced “the Zionist actions against the Lebanese and Palestinian people”. The AD communiqué attributed the attack to the Sana Muhaydali Command Unit of the AD.

38) 13 April 1985 (France): 35 min. later a second bomb that day destroyed the windows of the National Immigration Office, also in Paris. AD claimed credit also here – same reference as above.

39) 13 April 1985 (France): A third bomb gutted the office of the right-wing paper Minute, in Paris. AD as above.

40) 25 May 1985 (Kuwait): An attempt of murdering the emir of Kuwait failed, when a suicide bomber rammed the emir’s motorcade in Kuwait City. The emir was only slightly injured, while two people were killed. A self-proclaimed spokesman claimed responsibility on behalf of the Islamic Jihad. The objective was the release of the 17 persons imprisoned in Kuwait charged for the explosions at the American and French embassies in Kuwait City, December 1983. According to local newspapers the nationality of the bomber was Iraqi, and member of the al-Dawa party.

41) 11-12 June 1985 (Lebanon): Six Lebanese gunmen stormed a passenger aircraft from the Royal Jordanian Airlines during the boarding of passengers. The hijackers managed to keep 65 passengers and 9 crewmembers as hostages. The plane was first diverted to Larnaca, Cyprus, then to Sicily – before returning to Beirut, 13 hours after departure. A self-proclaimed spokesman claimed responsibility on behalf of the Iman Musa as-Sadr group. He demanded also that Palestinian guerrillas in the Beirut camps were forced to leave. The hijackers repeated this last claim during the negotiations. Representatives of the Amal led the negotiations. The plane then went to Damascus, but was denied to land and returned to Beirut. The hijackers set the plane on fire before escaping. Conflicting
reports, but no serious injuries.

42) 14 – 30 June 1985 (Greece): Hijacking of American aircraft. Ensuing hostage crisis – lasting almost two weeks, in Beirut. A passenger flight from the US airlines company TWA (Athens-Rome) was hijacked by two Shi’ites with a possible affiliation with the Hizbullah. The hijacking developed into a hostage crisis lasting 14 days. A central demand of the hijackers was the release of Palestinian and Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons. Some prisoners were eventually freed, after pressure from US authorities. The hijacking ended as a hostage crisis in Beirut where the Amal movement was to play a central part.

43) 22 July 1985 (Denmark): Bomb destroying the offices of the US airlines company Northwest Orient, in central Copenhagen, killing a customer and seriously injuring an employee and another customer. Several passersby also injured. One man hit the bomb. In an anonymous call to AP in Beirut, a self-proclaimed spokesman took credit on behalf of the Islamic Jihad – to avenge an Israeli raid the day before on Qabrikiha in South Lebanon.

44) 22 July 1985 (Denmark): Two bombs exploded at the Synagogue and the adjacent Jewish Nursing Home. An employee and seven residents were injured, none seriously. Two men of Middle Eastern appearance were seen leaving the courtyard shortly before the explosion. The same, above-mentioned caller took credit for this incident as well.

On 17 September 1985 the Danish police arrested an undisclosed number of Lebanese refugees for the bombings. The police also found the bag that originally contained the two bombs, as well as an undetonated bomb, which was thrown away by the perpetrator in the harbor of Copenhagen.

45) 19 December 1985 (France): A Moroccan named Khaki took judges and other court personnel as hostages during a takeover in a courtroom in Nantes. The perpetrator then released two of the defendants and armed them. The perpetrator claimed to be member of the Abu Nidal Organisation. The two defendants had met Khaki in jail, the first time. Khaki requested a French TV team to enter the courtroom and communicate their claims. In this communication the perpetrators made random statements about the situation in Lebanon. All the hostages were freed unharmed – but one assistant judge was held hostage until the perpetrators’ planned departure from the airport. However, they surrendered to the French police.

9.2.3 International Interventions in Kosovo

1) 31 March 1999 (Belgium): Hackers in Belgrade conducted a low-level cyber attack against a NATO web site, sending thousands of «pings» («identify yourself» computer instructions) against the site, overloading its ability to respond. Another Belgrade computer sent more than 2500 e-mails to the site, freezing its e-mail capabilities. Some of the e-mails contained viruses. The computers were not entered and no programs were corrupted.

2) April 1999 (Canada): An anonymous group has been vandalizing CF property on Vancouver Island to protest against Canada's involvement in the bombing of Yugoslavia. The attacks began at the beginning of April with the severing of support wires for a military radio tower, and the burning down of a shack at a military rifle range. The group has issued two communiqués calling the NATO bombings "violent imperialist activities". It was unclear whether the group is connected to the Serb Diaspora in Canada or whether group simply rejects NATO actions.
3) 16 April 1999 (Argentina): A small homemade bomb packed with pamphlets exploded outside the Argentine branch of Bank Boston in Buenos Aires, causing minor damage and no injuries. The pamphlets read «Assassin NATO out of Yugoslavia,» and were signed by the Anti-Imperialist Commando.

4) 16 April 1999 (Italy): The Fighting Communist Party (NTA) claimed credit for two nighttime attacks against the Verona headquarters of the Italian Democrats of the Left. The male caller warned of upcoming attacks «against NATO and against the imperialist state.»

5) 8 June 2000 (Greece): Two November 17 gunmen on motorcycles fired into the car of Brigadier Stephen Saunders, 53, the British Defence Attaché, on Kifissias Avenue, a main northern Athens street, killing him. Saunders was driving an embassy car along the busy street at 8 a.m. when he died in a hail of .45 caliber bullets from a gun used in previous November 17 attacks.

9.2.4 Operation Enduring Freedom

1) 10 October 2001 (France): An attack, using aerosol sprays and burning petrol cans, was carried out on a military installation in Pau. A group calling itself, "Totally Anti-War Group" (ATAG) claimed responsibility for the attack, which caused superficial damage.

2) 21 October 2001 (India): The People's War Group (PWG) claimed responsibility for an explosion at the Coca-Cola bottling plant at Atmakuru near the coastal city of Vijayawada in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. The PWG claimed that the attack was in protest to the US-led strikes on Afghanistan.

3) 28 October 2001 (Pakistan) A new group, Lashkar-I-Omar, has claimed responsibility for an attack on Catholic worshippers. Gunmen fired on the congregation killing a clergyman, women and children, and a Muslim policeman. Note: The attack was described as revenge for U.S. attacks on Afghanistan.

4) 5 November 2001 (Italy): An explosive device was discovered and defused at the Temple of Concord at the Valley of Temples archaeological site in Agrigento. The device was connected to a slow match and could have caused serious material damage had it detonated. Police found a piece of white fabric with slogans hailing Afghanistan and Allah near the scene of the explosion, but have ruled out the possibility that the attack was perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists.

5) 22 December 2001 (France): Briton Richard Reid was arrested on a flight from Paris to Miami trying to blow up the aircraft, which carried 197 passengers, with explosives hidden in his shoes. He has stated that he committed the act being ‘incensed’ by the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan.

6) 28 October 2002 (Jordan): Laurence Foley, a US Agency for International Development (USAID) employee in Jordan, was gunned down outside his home in the capital city of Amman. A single gunman shot Foley at least seven times in the head and chest as he was walking to his car. This is the first time a Western diplomat has been assassinated in Jordan. Jordanian officials point to Al-Qaida while the Israelis suggest possible Iraqi involvement. A group called "Shurafa al-Urdun" (the Honorables of Jordan) claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that it was in retaliation for the US government's support of Israeli aggression and "shedding blood in Iraq and Afghanistan."
7) 5 December 2002 (Indonesia): In the first of two bombings in the south Sulawesi capital of Makassar on this day, a bomb explosion ripped through a McDonald's in the Ratu Indah shopping mall. Three people, including the bomber, were killed and two were injured in this explosion. The suspects mentioned the war in Afghanistan and America’s pending attack on Iraq as important motives during interrogation. However, this was only one in a series of attacks against U.S. franchises -- such as McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut -- that have been carried out by Islamist organizations all over the world since 11 September 2001.

9.2.5 Operation Iraqi Freedom

1) 18 November 2002 (Japan): An explosion in a park near the US Army's Camp Zama was claimed by the Revolutionary Army in an attempt to deter US attacks on Iraq and North Korea. Two men were seen running from the scene of the blast.

2) 20 November 2002 (Japan): Explosives were fired at Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces' Asaka base in Saitama Prefecture. The attack was claimed by the Revolutionary Army and was aimed to deter the US from attacking Iraq and to deter Japan, the US and South Korea from attacking North Korea.

3) 25 February 2003 (New Zealand): A letter which was sent to the British High Commission in New Zealand tested positive for cyanide. Three letters were intercepted: one to the US Embassy, another to the Australian High Commission, and this letter to the British High Commission. All three letters contained white powder, but only the third tested positive for cyanide. The letters also contained notes threatening another September 11th-like attack if the US attacks Iraq. The note included this warning: "September 11 waits at the America cup for instruction if Iraq is attacked by the host of Satan, all interests and their supporters will be attacked by September 11." All three letters were mailed from New Zealand and were intercepted at the South Auckland Mail Center. A fourth letter with the same threats was delivered to the New Zealand Herald Newspaper. A similar letter, also containing cyanide, was received in January 2002 at the US Embassy in New Zealand. Note: On 4 March, another threat letter was mailed to the New Zealand Herald that resembled these letters. The parcel, in this instance, did not contain any cyanide.

4) 28 February 2003 (Pakistan): Two policemen were killed and another seven people wounded when a gunman attacked a police camp outside the US consulate in Karachi. The attacker, armed initially with only a pistol, took the sub-machine gun of one of the guards and opened fire. The seven injured included five policemen, one Ranger, and one civilian passer-by. The captured attacker stated, "I wanted to punish the policemen who were protecting the infidels, responsible for the killings of innocent Muslims." There may have been a second assailant, providing cover-fire from a motorcycle. The attack outside, and indirectly on, the US Consulate follows a 14 June 2002 suicide car bomb attack on it that killed 11 Pakistanis (plus the bomber). The mission was relocated two months later and its location kept secret for several months. This latest attack comes as anti-American sentiment in Pakistan is rising sharply due to a combination of the war on terror and possible war on Iraq.

5) A foiled hijacking of an Air Algeria flight in Algiers in January 2003, allegedly in protest to the pending Iraq war.

6) 21 March 2003 (Norway): There was a firebomb attack on a McDonald’s restaurant in Oslo. The police found a note referring to the war in Iraq on the scene. There was only minor material damage.
7) 23 March 2003 (Ecuador): The People's Revolutionary Militias Group (MRP) claimed an attack on the British Consulate on Sunday, 23 March 2003. The explosive device caused minor damage. The Consul stated that the perpetrators conducted the attack in response to the war in Iraq.

8) 29 March 2003 (USA): Five government vehicles were vandalized and one truck was set on fire at a Naval Recruitment Headquarters in Montgomery, Alabama. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) claimed responsibility for the attacks both in a communiqué and by spray-painting their initials at the scene. Messages that read, "Stop the War," "Stop killing" and "Leave Iraq" were also found along with the ELF initials.

9) 30 March 2003 (Israel): A suicide bomber blew himself up outside a café in the coastal town of Netanya, wounding thirty. The bomber was prevented from entering Café London and instead detonated near the entrance. The wounded included nine soldiers. This was the first Palestinian suicide bombing since the war in Iraq began. It also took place on Land Day, an annual day of marches and protests by Israeli-Arabs against land seizures. The last such attack took place in Haifa on 5 March 2003 and killed seventeen. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed the attack, calling it "Palestine's gift to the heroic people of Iraq."

10) March 2003 (Jordan): A failed arson attack by Iraqi nationals on the Grand Hyatt Amman hotel in Jordan, where many American journalists and some American military personnel were staying, in late March 2003.

11) 2 April 2003 (Philippines): Less than a month after a bomb exploded at an international airport in Davao, a bomb planted by a row of food stalls and restaurants near the entrance gate of a passenger terminal at the Sasa Wharf exploded, killing sixteen people and injuring fifty-five others. Initial investigations suggest a combined Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) operation behind this attack, but recent reports blame it primarily on the MILF.

12) 8 April 2003 (USA): The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) claimed responsibility for damaging over sixty SUV's in Santa Cruz, California. The vandalized SUV's included about twenty private vehicles as well forty at the North Bay Ford and Lincoln Mercury car dealership. Messages were spray-painted on the vehicles denouncing the war in Iraq. Messages like "No War," "SUVs Suck" and "No blood for oil" were found on the SUV's. Damage is estimated at about $600 per vehicle.


14) 15 April 2003 (Istanbul): One person was crushed and injured under the rubble of a McDonald's fast food restaurant after it was attacked with an explosive device. The blast took place in the Sirkeci neighbourhood of Istanbul almost simultaneously with another blast at a McDonald's in Istanbul Province. Note: The Revolutionary People's Liberation Front (DHKC) claimed responsibility for this attack and two others (one on a judge's club and one on a second McDonalds). In their claim of responsibility, the group stated, "we carried out these attacks to demand a reckoning from America and the collaborationist government for the massacres in Iraq and in our country."

15) 17 October 2003 (Turkey): An explosive device, presumably a concussion grenade, detonated at the Chamber
of Industry building in the Beyoglu neighbourhood of Istanbul. The device was placed near the rear of the building and caused windows in a nearby market and a car to be shattered. This incident comes as violence has increased in Turkey in the last week since the Turkish parliament voted to send Turkish troops to join US forces in Iraq.

16) 17 October 2003 (Turkey): A concussion grenade detonated in front of the entrance to the Turkish American Association, located in Alsancak, in Izmir Province. There were no reported injuries but several windows in the building were shattered. There has been an increase in violence in Turkey in the last week since the Turkish parliament voted to send Turkish troops to Iraq to join US forces.

17 – 18) 17 October 2003 (Turkey): Two explosive devices detonated within five minutes of each other in Tandogan Square in Ankara. The first device was placed in front of the annex to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building on Anit Street. The second explosion occurred in front of a MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association) building, which is adjacent from the Foreign Ministry. Both devices caused financial damage to the buildings. Explosive attacks have increased in the last week since the Turkish parliament voted to send Turkish troops to join US forces in Iraq.

19- 22) 15 and 20 November 2003 (Turkey): Suicide bombers attacked two synagogues, the British consulate and a British bank in Istanbul. More than sixty deaths and about 700 injuries. The attacks occurred shortly before and during President Bush’ state visit to Great Britain. A statement claiming responsibility at the alleged al-Qaida affiliated website al-Mujahidoun contained clear references to the situation in Iraq and also to the alliance between the United States and Great Britain.
### 9.3 List of Abbreviations

List of Abbreviations for Lebanon:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Action Directe</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LARF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNM</td>
<td>Lebanese National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>The Multinational Force(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>South Lebanese Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of Abbreviations for Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA/UCK</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army/Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPC/TMK</td>
<td>Kosovo Protection Corps/Trupat te Mbrojtjës të Kosovës</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KVM</td>
<td>Kosovo Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo/Lidhje Demokratike e Kosoves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of Abbreviations for Operation Desert Shield/Storm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah – RC</td>
<td>Fatah – Revolutionary Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAPO</td>
<td>1 October Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>Operation Desert Storm/Shield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP-GC</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Red Army Faction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of Abbreviations for Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of Abbreviations for Iraq II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODF</td>
<td>Operation Desert Fox</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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