POLICE FORCES WITH MILITARY STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS. Preliminary Findings.

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Recent peace operations are characterised by a gap between a large number of heavily-armed military forces and the international civilian police – often few in number and if at all equipped with light weapons (the so-called deployment and enforcement gaps). Police forces with military status are often regarded as the perfect filler, despite the fact that very little research has been done on their role, suitability, and effectiveness in peace operations. The present preliminary analysis has a two-fold starting-point: it briefly reviews past experiences with police with military status in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. It then takes a closer look at how the police forces of the major European contributors are structured and function domestically. The report then discusses problematic issues tied to the use of police with military status in peace operations, such as the need to maintain legitimacy and legality in a foreign environment or the forces’ at times dubious human rights record in their home countries. The conclusions point out that police with military status are prepared for and have the skills to carry out a wide range of tasks that can be of great use in peace operations, especially in the unstable early phases of an operation. Their organisation in units can be advantageous to a mission, although there is also a danger of isolation from the rest of the mission and the local population. Most importantly, however, is the fact that their usefulness depends to a large extent on the clarity of their remit and the chain of command. If given clear instructions, police with military status can be a valuable asset. If not, they remain largely underemployed and marginalized.
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POLICE FORCES WITH MILITARY STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS. Preliminary Findings.

1 INTRODUCTION

In the last 10 years or so police personnel with military status have become a more or less permanent element in international peace operations. With the growing complexity and scope of operations such personnel has been hailed as a panacea to all problems, based on no real analysis of their actual qualities and performance but with a mere general reference to the fact that they possess both military and police capabilities. The discussion about the utility of police forces with military status in peace operations is ongoing both in academic circles and among those who work with and within peace operations. The debate has so far been dominated by anecdotal evidence, as the absence of well-researched facts regarding these forces and their deployment is conspicuous.

Very roughly speaking the arguments tend to organize themselves along two main dimensions. One may be called the North-South divide. This dimension reflects the fact that voices based in Northern European countries generally appear to be more negative towards police forces with military status, than those based in Southern Europe or south of Europe. The line corresponds more or less with the line that separates countries that have national police with military status from those that do not. The most widely cited argument against police with military status claims that militarization of executive policing is a threat to civil rights and liberties and removes law enforcement from a community policing ideal. The main argument in support of such forces point to the high degree of professionalism and the flexibility and diverse training and experience they represent. The other dimension indicates a professional divide. Assessments of the contribution by police forces with military status in peace operations given by writers/lecturers with a military background tend to be positive and focus on the efficiency and professionalism displayed by formed units in-theatre. Assessments given by persons with a police or other civilian background tend to be more negative. They often argue that the military organisation of the units is incompatible with a community policing ideal, that the forces have inferior competence in criminal investigation techniques, as well as a tendency to resort to force too willingly. The present study aims to offer a contribution to the debate based on a factual assessment of selected police forces with military status and their actual use in missions.

The study has been conducted over two months and is based on open sources. Existing research literature, United Nations (UN) reports and documents, and official websites are examples of the sources used. In addition interviews were conducted with persons in key positions in relevant institutions to shed further light on specific questions and issues. It proved extremely difficult to find adequate information. That is why the study has to conclude with preliminary findings rather than more solid conclusions, which would have been much
preferred. Nevertheless, these obstacles demonstrate to what extent further research into this field is required, and the present study may provide a useful basis for future work.

The study begins with a short backgrounder on complex peace operations and the deployment of police with military status in them. In the following section, the dilemmas that apply to the gap between military and civilian police capabilities in complex peace operations are more closely described. Then some examples of such operations and how police with military status have been used in them are presented. The next part outlines features of some of the European contributors of police forces with military status to peace operations, with a focus on their roles and functions at home and how they are prepared for duty in peace operations. Finally, the elements identified are used in an attempt to answer the central question: Do police with military status fill a functional gap in peace operations that cannot be filled by either military or civilian police personnel, or that can be filled by other types of units only in an inferior manner compared to police with military status?

1.1 The use of police forces with military status in international peace operations

“Peace operations” is a broad term referring to the spectrum of activities conducted by the United Nations in order to secure peace and stability between or inside member states, in accordance with the UN’s raison d’être which is to “save succeeding generations from the scourges of war”\(^1\). While such operations assumed highly varied scopes and shapes in the first 40 years of the organization’s existence, since 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall the UN has increasingly been called upon to intervene and hopefully solve intrastate conflicts.\(^2\) The following background on the novel types of challenges this has raised is based on the Brahimi Report on United Nations peace operations of August 2000.

In complex peace operations peacekeepers are not deployed into post-conflict situations. They are deployed into an ongoing conflict to try to help ending it, and subsequently make the post-conflict status self-sustaining by altering the situation on the ground enough to produce reconciliation. Essential for such an enormous task is maintaining a secure environment for both the peacekeepers and the local population.\(^3\) When dealing with an intrastate conflict, a “secure environment” refers to the internal situation as well as to borders and other aspects of external security. Indeed, internal security may prove more crucial and more difficult to achieve than external security. In a collapsed state the security infrastructure (police, judicial and penal system etc.) has frequently disintegrated. Former security personnel may have joined belligerents and taken active part in the conflict against a part/s of the population.

During the last 10-15 years the international community has recognised that complex peace operations in collapsed states may call for the assumption of full responsibility for the internal

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\(^1\) UN Charter, 1947.
and external security of the territory. This in turn has raised the question of what kind of peacekeeping force to send. Traditionally, peacekeepers have been military forces, sometimes supported by a few civilian specialists. Military personnel are generally not trained to perform police duties, the basis of internal security in any society. As internal security challenges have become more prominent, it has become the norm to include an element of civilian police in complex peace operations, often referred to as Civpol or UN-CIVPOL.

In international law, any state that is not at war is presumed to be at peace. This conception creates a “missing link” in action plans for international intervention, because in reality the absence of warfare does not mean that peace is restored in a territory. The challenges in internal security in collapsed societies often diverge to a large extent from the duties civilian police normally perform. Consequently, military personnel have been used on numerous occasions to handle internal security problems that civilian police in-theatre were unable to deal with, but that military personnel were generally not trained for either. Violent riots, organized crime, and terrorism are examples of such problems. Soldiers are, ultimately, trained to engage other soldiers in combat, not to face civilians. In countries where there are police forces with military status, there are also categories of criminality that are typically the domain of such forces. Several countries have included units of police with military status in their national contingents to peace support operations. Bosnia-Hercegovina was the first case where such units were deployed with a designated paramilitary role, and the concept has since been employed in both Kosovo and East Timor. As such forces are neither civilian police nor proper military but rather some of both, their usefulness and appropriateness in peace support operations has been a matter of discussion both on the ground, at a political level, and in academic circles.

1.2 The deployment gap

When a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) is passed that calls for the deployment of a peace operation, a Mission as it is often called, that resolution normally authorizes immediate deployment. The resolution usually also states the mandate of that mission. In the case of complex peace operations, which is what the present paper deals with, a clause is often included that calls upon the mission to establish a secure environment and restore law and order. While states commonly have a military force that can be deployed more or less anywhere upon order, this is almost never the case when it comes to civilian police personnel. First of all, many countries maintain only the police force needed to cover national needs and do not have police reserves to spare. Secondly, police officers are generally not trained or equipped for international deployment. Thirdly, most states rely on police officers to volunteer for international missions and cannot order personnel to serve abroad. These factors all make the process of mobilizing civilian police for international duty much slower than the mobilization and deployment of military personnel. The time lag between the arrival of

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4 Dziedzic, 1998, 4-7, 9.
5 Défourneaux, 2000, 16-17.
7 Eisele, 2002, 16.
military forces in-theatre and the arrival of enough civilian police to form an effective CivPol force constitutes **the deployment gap**.

Lawlessness is often a feature of a collapsed state. The establishment of a secure environment and the restoration of law and order in such cases requires a peace support operation to take responsibility for every aspect of public safety, from securing the outer borders to arresting common criminals to disarming soldiers and civilians alike. Due to the deployment gap, military personnel have had to perform every security-related duty in the theatre in the initial phase of a mission, including tasks that under normal conditions belong strictly to the sphere of civilian police.\(^8\)

### 1.3 The enforcement gap

When both the military and the civilian police presence are in place, the distribution of tasks that the mission is obliged to carry out follows the division of labour common to most states: the military component assumes responsibility for area security while police take care of inner security, or public law and order functions. An **enforcement gap** occurs when the operation faces challenges that fall between the two categories. More often than not, the gap has to do with the legitimate use of force. Post-conflict societies can be extremely volatile, and there are two problems that stand out as particularly difficult. One is the maintenance of basic law and order. The other arises if the conflicting parties do not comply with a peace agreement that forms the basis of a mandate, and/or the agreement does not enjoy popular support and is met with active resistance on the ground.

In environments where people have become accustomed to lawlessness and where weapons are widely available, the potential for serious, organized crime as well as violent public disorder has proved substantial. While soldiers certainly have the firepower to engage in such situations, they are trained to meet other soldiers in armed conflict, not rioting civilians. Civilian police, on the other hand, are generally not equipped to resolve such problems in-theatre, due to an unfortunate combination of usually being too few, not having the appropriate equipment, and not possessing the necessary mandate to intervene.\(^9\) Military units possess both training and firepower of sophisticated and heavy quality. Police units have often worked unarmed and been prohibited from intervening. There is an obvious gap between full-on military capabilities and non-existent means of coercion on the part of civilian police forces. In addition, the mandate of a complex peace operation typically requires the security personnel to act against those that oppose provisions of the peace agreement and to quell any violence. However, engaging local groups can compromise the impartiality ideals of the UN, and may exacerbate the situation by further undermining local support for a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues.\(^10\)

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\(^8\) Dziedzic, 1998, 9.
\(^10\) Ibid, 12.
2 EXPERIENCES WITH POLICE WITH MILITARY STATUS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Growing recognition of the deployment and enforcement gaps has increasingly led peace operation planners to look to police/military forces to cover the ground between the police domain and the military domain. Various missions have shown a growing interest in creating designated units of police with military status, also called formed units, in order to address specific problems that arise with to the deployment gap and especially the enforcement gap. The following cases from the 1990s offer an illustration of the variation with which police with military status have been deployed to missions, with a short recount of the conflict addressed, the essence of the mandate, and the role played by police with military status.

2.1 Haiti

In December 1990, Haiti conducted the first free and fair elections in its independent history (since 1804), voting into office President Aristide with two-thirds majority. But in September 1991 he was already overthrown in a violent military coup, reverting Haiti to its long tradition of autocratic rule and political corruption, in which there was no protection of the individual against the state and there was neither economic growth nor democratic institutions.\(^\text{11}\) In the following years the international community led by the United States repeatedly condemned the coup d’État and called for the restoration of democracy and the re-installation of Aristide as president, to no apparent avail. In 1993 an agreement was brokered under which Aristide would return to Haiti, assisted by a small force of peacekeepers, and economic sanctions against Haiti would then end. The peacekeepers were deployed but were met by an armed mob at the docks of Port-Au-Prince, prompting the USA to call back its ship. The episode created the general perception that only an armed intervention would be able to remove the military regime from office, and the UN Security Council passed resolution 940 in July 1994, calling for the use of “all necessary means” in order to restore to power the legitimate regime in Haiti.\(^\text{12}\) A Multinational Force (MNF) of 21,000 troops, predominantly American, entered Haiti soon after. It was authorized to neutralize opposition to and create a secure environment for the restoration of the elected regime; preserve if possible, restore if necessary, the civil order; and be prepared to transfer responsibility for military operations to the UN peacekeeping force (UNMIH) which was to be deployed as soon as possible. The MNF was accompanied by a group of International Police Monitors (IPM), to be replaced by a corps of civilian police (CivPol) when UNMIH was in place. CivPol would be lightly armed and primarily monitor the work of Haitian security forces, but were nevertheless to act as an executive police authority in their absence, and to train a new Haitian National Police force (HNP).\(^\text{13}\) In a transition phase an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) was to be formed based on local former security personnel, screened and vetted by the United States to exclude any


\(^{12}\) Ibid, 218-219.

\(^{13}\) Ibid, 219-221.
person with a record of abuse or corruption. The IPSF was to fill the public security gap pending the full operational establishment of the HNP.\textsuperscript{14}

The MNF was not supposed to actually perform policing duties, only observe and ensure that local forces conducted policing according to internationally accepted norms. When local forces proved unable to do so, however, US forces interpreted their rules of engagement to allow for intervention by its personnel in criminal activities within and against the population. Another obstacle for the IPSF and the HNP was the fact that Haitian political camps consistently tried to manipulate the lists of cadres to suit their preferences – something that would have created yet another biased public security force.\textsuperscript{15} In order to establish a secure environment suitable for the transfer of responsibility to UNMIH, the MNF started to use American military police and French Gendarmerie for regular patrol activities in the urban centres of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. In addition a Quick Reaction Force was on stand-by at all times in case of public riots or violence. These units of police with military status worked together with both IPMs and IPSF, and the initiative had a calming effect on public life. Then small detachments of police with military status were stationed in each police station throughout the country, primarily training local personnel in a “learning by doing” tutoring process that focused on patrolling, desk operations (including systems for filing complaints) and the use of force. In rural areas Special Forces (SF) consisting of French Gendarmerie performed both stationary and mobile duties in towns and villages, working together with IPSF personnel. Their presence had a significant deterrent effect on ordinary crime, which in turn created much enthusiasm for the SFs in the population. The SFs also carried out many community development projects, engaging in areas such as primary health care and democratisation in addition to crime fighting, which further increased their popularity. While military police on occasion did use force and arrested individuals according to the MNF’s chosen interpretation of UNSCR 940, they did so to a limited degree. The cooperation with the peacekeepers and the standards required in the daily work caused a real boost in morale and discipline in the Haitian IPSF.\textsuperscript{16}

The Haitian experience is an example of how police with military status have been assigned tasks based on needs in-theatre, enforcing the law in an initial phase, providing training and assistance, as well as participating in civilian reconstruction. They were deployed as integrated parts of their national military contingents, not as formed units\textsuperscript{17} with special tasks customized to their paramilitary nature at home.

2.2 Somalia

International intervention in Somalia took place in three successive, partly overlapping, operations from 1992 to 1995. Years of civil war combined with drought had produced a humanitarian catastrophe that finally pushed the UN to intervene. UNOSOM I (UN Operation in Somalia) was launched by Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751 in September 1992 to

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 221.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, 226.
\textsuperscript{17} “Formed units” refers to police with military status deployed as units to perform police/military duties.
monitor a fragile cease-fire and an arms embargo, and to “provide security”. The main aim was to enable humanitarian assistance to be delivered. The security situation for relief personnel was intolerable, however. Attacks on facilities and personnel, as well as looting of supplies, all committed by various armed factions became a real problem. In December 1992, a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was authorized by UNSCR 794 as a peace enforcement operation to be led by the USA. The mandate was to create, with all necessary means, a secure and stable environment so that humanitarian relief operations could be conducted safely. UNITAF was not supposed to perform policing, or to help rebuild a Somali security service, but discovered that it would not succeed in its mission without getting involved in re-establishing the rule of law. The mandate was re-interpreted by commanders on the ground to allow for helping the former Somali Police Force to start functioning again. Unlike the different military security forces, the police force had not engaged in the conflict and generally enjoyed popular confidence and support. Officers were gathered and re-formed under the name Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) in a way that did not compromise guidelines and orders from the UN and home governments, even if police reform strictly speaking was not part of the mandate. This greatly improved the security situation.

It was especially during the UNITAF period that police with military status were involved in Somalia. American military police, Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie provided training as well as armed back-up for the ASF throughout the Area of Responsibility, each in their manner. Precise accounts of their respective activities have proved very difficult to obtain. However, the Carabinieri homepage offers some details of their own contribution. Initially, Carabinieri functioned as military police for the Italian military contingent, as well as an escort and security service for international personnel in general. As the security situation deteriorated, Carabinieri (especially the Tuscan parachutist regiment) took part in several combat situations as a unit within the Italian military contingent. The most infamous episode was the rescue of a unit of Pakistani UN soldiers that had been ambushed by Somali combatants in June 1993, when both surviving soldiers and the bodies of those killed in the attack were successfully evacuated. In addition, the Carabinieri contingent participated in the efforts to re-establish the Somali police, the ASF. The assistance consisted of both training and logistical/economic support.

The use of the Carabinieri in Somalia is a good example of the potential utility of police forces with military status. The range of jobs they performed, from contingent security to police training to combat, demonstrate the versatility such forces may offer. Again deployment took place within the national contingent, not as a formed unit to the mission, and consequently the decision to make such extensive use of the Carabinieri’s paramilitary nature was taken by Italy, not the mission command.

18 Ibid, 197.
2.3 Bosnia-Hercegovina

When the province of Bosnia-Hercegovina declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, violent conflict between Muslims, Serbs, and Croats erupted and spread quickly. The international community reacted by authorising a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid, to establish so-called Protected Areas (UNPAs), and to monitor force withdrawals from and demilitarisation of these areas. UNPROFOR included a CivPol element of 900 unarmed personnel whose task was to oversee local police compliance with human rights. UNPROFOR and the CivPol contingent had no authority and no means to enforce their mandates, as the agreement that formed the basis of the mandate was consensual and the parties themselves were meant to enforce the law. As a consequence of forceful NATO intervention and an altered situation on the battlefield, a window of opportunity was opened for a negotiated settlement, leading to the Dayton Peace Accords of December 1995. The UN Security Council adopted the UNSCR 1035, authorizing deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR), led by NATO, to the conflict area.20

IFOR’s mandate did allow for the use of force by NATO troops and assigned to IFOR the task of establishing area security. As during UNPROFOR, the Dayton Accords explicitly charged the signatories themselves with the task of establishing and maintaining internal security for all persons, including a requirement that local police operate according to “internationally accepted standards of policing”. The parties requested international assistance in this matter, resulting in the International Police Task Force (IPTF) that monitored and trained local police and provided analytical support and advice to local authorities in security matters.21 The agreement did not take into consideration that local police forces, to the degree that they existed, were highly biased along ethnic lines and in general enjoyed popular confidence neither before nor after the conflict. Local police often acted in direct opposition to the Dayton Accords whenever its requirements ran counter to their interests. The IPTF had neither the means nor the mandate to prevent this, and the same was true of IFOR.22

The NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR, when the latter’s mandate period ran out after one year. IPTF’s mandate was renewed, with an expectation that it would continue to be renewed for the duration of SFOR’s presence. Both extensions of the international presence were motivated by an obvious need: although several of the external security measures had been implemented within the IFOR’s intended time frame, the goals of societal reconstruction and reconciliation were still far from reached.23 Inter-ethnic tensions were one prominent problem that continued to resurface, especially when displaced persons and refugees attempted to resettle in their former home regions. Riots, violence and organized crime assumed such proportions around 1997/98 that international contributors felt compelled to respond. However, IPTF had neither the authority nor the capacity to intervene. SFOR argued that their forces were soldiers, not trained or intended to handle public order tasks. As a direct response

20 Dziedzic, Bair, 1998, 253-258.
21 Ibid, 269.
22 Ibid, 270.
to these challenges, the Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU) was formed and declared operational in August 1998. It was led by Italy, who provided the bulk of forces from its Carabinieri police-military organization. The Carabinieri’s experience with this particular category of tasks – public order, riot control and organized crime – was the reason Italy was asked to lead the establishment of the MSU. The MSU was therefore organized and trained by the Carabinieri and according to Carabinieri standards. Argentina, Romania and Slovenia also contributed personnel.24

The MSU was to perform public order tasks, preferably on a pre-emptive basis through visible presence throughout the territory. Regular patrolling and community policing would form the core activities that aim to reduce community frictions and cool tempers on a general basis.25 Where needed, they could apply force gradually and as far as possible with non-lethal methods. However, the MSU had sophisticated protection gear and a range of firearms of varying calibres at its disposal, and could reverse to a light infantry role when deemed necessary. Organized crime was to be attacked primarily through information gathering and prevention. Anti-terrorism would be handled in the same way.26 The MSU could intervene if and when local civilian police were unable or unwilling to quell civil unrest, and would refrain from using force as far as possible. The MSU was a battalion-size unit within the SFOR organization, but operated independently of the territorial brigade division of SFOR in Bosnia-Hercegovina. It could be deployed when needed anywhere in the Area of Operation. The commander of the MSU reported directly to the SFOR Commander. SFOR Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and other instructions applied to the MSU as they do to other SFOR units.27

In practise, the MSU was not used very much. This was in part due to a lack of mandate, and to a lack of a clear understanding of their utility. The MSU proved to be only marginally more flexible than SFOR when called upon for assistance or joint actions, claiming to be bound by the same ROEs as SFOR.28

In this case police with military status were deployed as formed units with a designated role based on their paramilitary nature, and in response to perceived needs on the ground. The MSU was modelled entirely on the Italian Carabinieri organisation and mode of operation, and it worked independently and always in units. For these reasons, among others, the level of integration between the MSU and other elements of the international operation was very low.29

27 2nd Lt. Alexis Mersch, SFOR Informer #42, 12 August 1998.
29 Perito, 19 August 2002.
2.4 Kosovo

The events leading up to the widely broadcast NATO air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 were in some ways similar to those that took place prior to the Bosnia crisis. The province of Kosovo was inhabited by Muslim Albanians and Orthodox Serbs, of which the former sought independence or at least autonomy from Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Throughout 1998 reports from Kosovo claimed violent persecution of Albanians by Serb security forces, vigorously denied by Serb authorities. The UN steadily condemned the developments on the ground, and NATO declared that it would not stand idle by and watch UN demands be ignored by Yugoslavia. Intense diplomacy failed to produce an agreement, and on March 24, 1999 NATO launched a bombing campaign against Serb targets throughout Yugoslavia, including in Kosovo. The goals were to stop Yugoslav forces’ aggression against Kosovar Albanian civilians, to damage capabilities of the Serb military, and to demonstrate NATO’s determination. As the bombing progressed, Serb attacks against civilians assumed extreme proportions, triggering an estimated refugee flow of almost 1 million Kosovar Albanians inside and out of Kosovo. In June 1999, Yugoslavia finally announced that it would cooperate with the international community on the question of Kosovo, and on June 10 NATO cancelled its campaign and the UN Security Council passed resolution 1244, establishing the international presence in Kosovo.

UNSCR 1244 maintains that Kosovo remains a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but also calls for the re-establishment of substantial autonomy for the province. The international civil and security presence shall provide an interim administration that paves the way for the development of local, democratic, self-governing institutions. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is a military organization responsible primarily for area security, while UNMIK is a civilian organization responsible for the interim administration and transition to self-government. According to the mandate the two are to cooperate and assist each other as needed to achieve the mission goals stated in the UNSCR 1244.

As the international presence formally assumed full responsibility for every aspect of administering and governing the province, providing security was a central task. Law enforcement had previously been performed by Serb internal security units which all left Kosovo in accordance with UNSCR 1244 provisions. In their absence violence continued unabated in Kosovo, only now directed against non-Albanian population segments. KFOR was assigned, and performed, the task of law enforcement until UNMIK had built sufficient civilian police capacity to take over internal security. UNMIK Police is an international civilian police force with enforcement capabilities that operates in the entire Kosovo province. In addition to performing actual policing, UNMIK Police spends considerable resources on selecting, educating and training candidates for the newly established local police corps, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). This force has begun to take over policing duties from UNMIK Police in line with international standards for human rights and “good policing”, and in

accordance with the mandate goal of establishing self-government. Its composition is to reflect the ethnic make-up of the population of Kosovo.\textsuperscript{31}

Within the Operations Department of UNMIK Police are the so-called Special Police Units (SPU), consisting of mobile, self-sufficient, paramilitary units which were deployed throughout the year 2000. They work in national units, which are stationed in different regions of Kosovo, and consist of police with military status from Spain (Guardia Civil, 112 men), Pakistan (114 men), Jordan (240 men), India (240 men), Poland (115 men), and Ukraine (115 men, plus 35 officers with 25 dogs). Their strength compared to other UNMIK Police is their capacity to deploy rapidly to high risk situations. Principal duties of the SPUs are protection of and security for UN personnel, UNMIK Police and Border Police, in other words tasks that have to do with the security of mission personnel in the field. However, SPUs also provide operational support to UNMIK Police. Public order, civil unrest, crowd control as well as the protection of facilities and assistance to UN agencies when needed, are among the most prominent examples.\textsuperscript{32} The SPU are mandated and arrived in theatre in April 2000.

KFOR still has the overall responsibility for the security situation, although policing has almost entirely been transferred to UNMIK and to a certain degree to the KPS. Due to the especially challenging security situation in the town of Mitrovica, which is split in two along ethnic lines and a river, KFOR is still formally in charge of law enforcement in this town together with UNMIK Police and personnel from KPS.\textsuperscript{33}

KFOR commands a Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), a force of police with military status modelled on the MSU in Bosnia-Hercegovina. It is integrated into the military presence as a direct result of the experiences from Bosnia. The MSU was formed and is led by Italy, more precisely by its Carabinieri institution, due to this corps’ substantial domestic experience in combating organized crime and terrorism.\textsuperscript{34} Italy also provides the bulk of the personnel, one regiment of Carabinieri, enforced by a contingent of French Gendarmerie and a platoon from the Estonian army, a total of 330 soldiers.\textsuperscript{35} The MSU performs regular patrol activity throughout Kosovo in order to acquire knowledge from and the trust of the community, as well as intelligence for a more-informed assessment of the security situation in Kosovo in general. Detachment vary in strength according to the needs of the relevant region. Prevention and persecution of organized crime and terrorism is a central goal and the MSU has the special human and material resources required to meet that goal. Other tasks include law enforcement, the maintenance of a secure environment, and civil disturbance operations.\textsuperscript{36} The MSU is, as it was in Bosnia, dominated by Carabinieri and their mode of operation. They enjoy a reputation for great efficiency, for example in the apprehension of suspects in organized crime and war

\textsuperscript{31} UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 26.
\textsuperscript{34} Wentz, 2002, 327.
\textsuperscript{35} http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/msu, 15 July 2002. The website specifically refers to the personnel as soldiers.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
crimes. However, UNMIK Police, which is responsible for taking the apprehended suspects to court, have complained that arrests are too often made without due observance of the relevant legal procedures that will then allow UNMIK to take a person to court. Instead, the Carabinieri’s job performance follows whatever regulations would pertain to a similar situation in Italy. This has caused problems in judicial processes.  

KFOR Brigade North, which covers the region of Mitrovica, is led by France. France had refused to take part in law enforcement activities in Bosnia because local police existed and were supposed to handle those. In Kosovo then, the mandate to “restore public security” was interpreted in a way that allowed Gendarmerie to take over law enforcement authority temporarily, arguing simply that nobody else was ready or able. From October 1999 onwards, UNMIK took over policing while the Gendarmerie remained in charge of public order. As Tardy points out, the French prefer to work alone, much to the annoyance of other nations operating in Kosovo. On more than one occasion French KFOR troops and Gendarmerie units not only declined to assist units of other nationalities in Mitrovica, but in fact physically resisted it.

The Multinational Specialized Unit of KFOR is to perform executive policing on the ground, providing security services to the local population. The Specialized Police Unit of UNMIK Police is primarily responsible for mission security, not local community security, although they have provided operational support to Civpol on occasion. When the SPU was formed the primary intention was to provide UNMIK Police with a spearhead body of law enforcers capable of rapid deployment and specialized in crowd control and other high risk situations. However, the SPU were so late in arriving that by the time they were in place the security environment had improved so much that their specialised competence was needed much less than in the initial phase of the operation. During that time lag, the tasks intended for the SPU had also largely been assumed by others, predominantly KFOR MSU units. The bulk of SPU officers were provided by states outside of Western Europe, and there was much scepticism among UNMIK staff regarding whether their policing practises would meet human rights standards. For these and other reasons the SPUs have been assigned a range of tasks that have little to nothing to do with the Kosovar civilian population, and they have almost never been deployed to for example public riots. In the functions where they have been employed, there has generally been a high degree of satisfaction with their performance across the UNMIK organization.

Kosovo is the first international operation where formed units with designated duties have been mandated and deployed from the outset. In practise the units under UN command have not functioned entirely according to the intention and have little contact with the community,
while the units under KFOR command to a larger extent engage in law enforcement. Again coincidence and developments on the ground have steered the use of the formed units in-theatre.

2.5 East Timor

The island of Timor used to be a Portuguese colony. Due to political turmoil, Portugal withdrew from the territory in 1974, and Indonesia occupied East Timor and named it its 27th province in 1976. The annexation relied on heavy Indonesian military presence, as the East Timorese felt no allegiance to the new masters. The UN became involved as early as 1982, trying to find a solution together with representatives from Indonesia and Portugal. Following international prodding, Indonesia finally suggested a limited autonomy for East Timor in 1998, and eventually in 1999 agreed – together with Portugal – to assign to the UN Secretary General the task of conducting a popular consultation on East Timor. A Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) was established to oversee the referendum and the following transition period. The population was asked to accept or reject autonomy within Indonesia. As it were, some 78.5% of the voters rejected autonomy in favour of transition to full independence.

Almost immediately the announcement of the result triggered a campaign of violence, arson and looting by pro-Indonesian militias throughout the territory. Indonesian security forces, who were in fact bound by treaty to maintain security and order for all people, to some extent took part in the destruction, and in any case failed in their duty to protect civilians. An unknown number of East Timorese were killed, and around ½ million were displaced from their homes. UNAMET was unable to carry out its mandate under these circumstances, and began to evacuate its personnel. During the period of violence Indonesian security and administrative personnel was withdrawn, and Indonesia accepted an offer of international assistance. The Security Council subsequently decided in September 1999 to authorise a multinational military force (INTERFET), led by Australia, to restore order and facilitate the deliverance of humanitarian aid. UNAMET was then able to resume its work, but in the complete absence of any national authority it was clear that a more comprehensive mission was needed. 43

UNSCR 1272 was adopted in October 1999, authorising the deployment of a transitional administration (UNTAET). The resolution assigned the mission every task of administrating the territory during its transition to independence, starting with providing security and maintaining law and order – that is, executive policing. The security component of the mission authorized up to 1640 civilian police officers and an armed UN force to replace INTERFET that would be of equivalent size. The Civpol component performed regular police duties. Starting in March 2000, they also ran a police academy, in order to build up a national police/security service, and conducted on-the-job training for new, East Timorese police officers. 44

43 http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/
44 Ibid.
Included in the Civpol component were two units of police with military status, called the Rapid Reaction Units (RRU). Each unit counted 120 men, one from the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR) and the other from the Jordanian Special Police. These units were specially trained in crowd control. The Portuguese GNR component was drawn exclusively from the Operational Battalion of the Guard’s Reserve Unit Infantry Regiment, a unit whose personnel undergo physical and psychological aptitude tests every six months. The tasks of the GNR unit in the RRU framework have been, in order of priority: Tactic response and crowd control; area security and anti-insurrection; intensive patrolling; VIP escort services; search and rescue operations; and rendering of State of Honours. Area security and checkpoint staffing was frequently carried out in cooperation with UN police units. The GNR functioned as a self-sufficient unit in-theatre, and did not coordinate operations with the Jordanian unit. Corps loyalties and command relations were in effect the same as in the national environment, despite the fact that the unit was formally under the command of the United Nations Police Commissioner in UNTAET and UNTAET Rules of Engagement applied.

The GNR understands the establishment of the RRU as directly mandated by the UNSCR 1272, as a necessary mission component for successful execution of the mandate. The mandate text, however, makes no specific reference to the RRU component, only to the police, civilian and military components. Due to Portugal’s historical involvement in East Timor, its contribution is considered to be of special importance, and the participation of a GNR unit in the RRU is agreed in the “Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Government of Portugal Contributing Resources to the United Nations Mission in East Timor.”

As an independent unit with a military organisation, integration between the Portuguese RRU and other elements of the international operation was very low. On a few occasions the services of the RRU were called upon to handle civil disturbance situations due to political turmoil, something they generally were very capable of, dissolving crowds with minimum use of force. However, the situation in East Timor was not plagued by severe internal disorder or conflict. After the Indonesian forces and militias fled, the political and civilian environment was one of extraordinary calm and consensus. The potential for public riots was very low, and so also the need for enforced crowd control capabilities. The RRU’s daily patrolling activity, which took place in armoured personnel carriers, and visibly military personal uniforms and equipments, also seemed slightly out of place for the same reasons. All of these factors contributed to cause some resentment against the RRU in the local population, who had endured heavy oppression at the hands of security forces with similar military characteristics. On the other hand, the Portuguese RRU were also engaged in several public relations projects,

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47 GNR Public Relations Office, August 2002.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50 UNSCR 1272, point 3 a-c.  
51 Ibid, point 7.  
52 GNR Public Relations Office, August 2002.
such as building orphanages and infrastructure and participating in sports events with local youths, which were popular and helped to improve their image.\footnote{Melbye, 20 August 2002.}

On May 31\textsuperscript{st} 2002 East Timor was declared an independent nation, and UNTAET was phased out. A UN support mission UNMISET will be present for another two years, but the RRU units are not a part of it.\footnote{http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/} East Timor is only the second mission in which formed units have been mandated and deployed with designated functions from the outset. In this case too they did not perform entirely according to plan due to developments on the ground, mostly because the need for their special services was very limited.

### 2.6 Summary of experiences

The five peace support operations studied in the present paper share some common features. In each case the international mission was launched into a society where law and order had in effect broken down, where local law and order enforcement agencies either did not exist (Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor), or existed but did not perform their duties in an impartial manner in accordance with international human rights standards (Haiti and Bosnia). In each case the general mandate fulfilment depended on a certain degree of stability and general public security. In Somalia the goal was to reverse a humanitarian catastrophe in the making; in Haiti to reinstate the democratically elected exiled regime; in Bosnia and Kosovo, to consolidate the process of reconciliation and reconstruction; and in East Timor to oversee transition to and establishment of full national independence. These goals differ fundamentally in scope and depth, but none was attainable in an environment of violence and lawlessness. This was taken into account when the Kosovo and East Timor missions were mandated and launched, but in the other cases the international community only reluctantly accepted responsibility for internal security – and, in the cases of Bosnia and Somalia, only after the failure to do so proved directly dangerous for the international personnel. In Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia public law and order tasks were taken on following re-interpretation of mandates, in response to developments on the ground. In Kosovo and East Timor the international community assumed full responsibility for every aspect of running the society, including executive policing, unprecedented in UN history and undoubtedly a result of tough lessons learned in previous peace operations.

### 3 POLICE WITH MILITARY STATUS: NATIONAL SUMMARIES

Many states have special police and/or security forces for internal as well as external security that exist in addition to regular police and military forces. Such personnel has been deployed to peace operations at the initiative of contributing states and have been assigned work according to the needs of the mission on the ground. There does not seem to be any coherent strategy behind their deployment on the part of the home states. Nevertheless, the experiences of operations such as Somalia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo have led scholars and field

\footnote{Melbye, 20 August 2002.}
personnel to articulate conclusions regarding the value of the contributions of “paramilitary” forces in the field. Frequently overlooked is the fact that there is no such thing as a single “police force with military status”. Also there has been no single manner of employment of such personnel in operations, as illustrated above.

This section seeks to illuminate the national characteristics of police with military status in France, Italy, and Portugal, some of the regular contributors of special police to international operations. Their special police have been active in the peace support operations described above. These countries are all members of the European Union, their special police forces are well established in their respective societies and have deep historical roots, common denominators that make them suitable for comparisons. The forces all participate in the fairly new European co-operation project called F.I.E.P (abbreviation for France, Italie, Espagne, Portugal), which is in the process of establishing common standards for training and policing for police forces that have military status in each country. In addition to more technical training, the curriculum includes courses in human rights. The Netherlands and Morocco are also taking part, and Turkey and Romania are looking to join. All three countries are also members of the UN and as such obliged to conduct law enforcement in accordance with the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and UN Basic Principles on the Use of Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.

It is important to note that countries outside of Western Europe make a considerable contribution of police personnel with military status to peace support operations. Unfortunately it has not been possible to include an analysis of these. It would be of great value to conduct further research of the impact of non-Western paramilitary policing in peace operations.

### 3.1 The French Gendarmerie

The Gendarmerie is a separate branch of the military force on par with the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, and is under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. However, around 40% of the Gendarmerie’s work consists of judicial investigations, and all gendarmes bear titles of “police judiciary” (except for special contingents). They are the only police authority that covers the entire territory of France and all her people. Magistrates of the Republic exercise authority over the Gendarmerie in police judiciary affairs.

The Gendarmerie has around 90,000 personnel, men and women, in relation to almost 60 million inhabitants of France. The Gendarmerie is divided into two departments. The Territorial Gendarmerie is primarily in charge of all public contact and affairs, represented in every region and town throughout France and available around the clock. They handle every matter of the judiciary, the military, and the police, from crimes investigations to public

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56 Amnesty International.
58 Total strength: 90,000 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2002.
security to traffic controls.\textsuperscript{59} They number around 60,000 officers and work from approximately 3,600 stations or units.\textsuperscript{60} In addition to the corps rules and regulations, each officer in the Territorial Gendarmerie is subject to individual rights and obligations. The Mobile Gendarmerie has as its primary responsibility the maintenance or restoration of public law and order. They are organized in 129 squadrons of 100 men each (no women) deployed all over France and can also be deployed overseas as well as to duty abroad in the capacity of an operational part of the Army. In the Mobile Gendarmerie the smallest unit of operation is the squadron, which means squadrons are always deployed as singular entities. They are indivisible, and members of a squadron have no individual status. In addition there are 8 special security platoons and 14 motorised brigades.\textsuperscript{61}

The Gendarmerie has military training and can and will act as a regular part of the armed forces in the case of war. It also has the training and obligation to act in case of other types of crises. This means the Gendarmerie has the competence and responsibility to react adequately to more or less every threat to security that may arise in the French society. A Gendarme is obliged to intervene to prevent crimes at any time, whether s/he is on or off duty, and must respond to every call for assistance by members of the public.\textsuperscript{62} All gendarmes are armed on duty with the standard weapon MAS G1 pistol, a Beretta 92 F model produced under license with modifications made to suit Gendarmerie needs. According to Article 174 of the Decree of May 1903, modified in 1943 and still valid, the Gendarmerie enjoys considerable latitude when it comes to the use of firearms on duty. Each Gendarme has significant authority to determine when the use of firearms is appropriate, and this right has been successfully claimed on several occasions in courts of law. For ordinary police forces the use of arms is governed by the concept of “legitimate defence”. The UN Human Rights Committee recommended in 1997 that France consider changing the so-called Decree Law in order to harmonise Gendarmerie weapons guidelines with those of the regular police forces. Amnesty International has also repeatedly expressed concerns over the Decree that grants the Gendarmerie such extensive powers to use firearms.\textsuperscript{63}

The Gendarmerie has been deployed to UN peace support operations for more than 20 years at the request of the French government. They have performed duties such as monitoring and training indigenous and/or interim police forces in the field, fostering policing that is in accordance with international human rights standards, and they are routinely deployed where French armed forces are deployed (for example, the 1991 Gulf War and in Rwanda in the mid

\textsuperscript{59} \url{http://www.defense.gouv.fr/gendarmerie} 2 July 2002.

\textsuperscript{61} \url{http://www.defense.gouv.fr/gendarmerie} 2 July 2002; French Gendarmerie International Department, Aug 2002; and Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2002.

\textsuperscript{62} French Gendarmerie International Department, Aug 2002; and conversation with Joelle Vachter, 24 July 2002.

\textsuperscript{63} International human rights organizations argue that regulations leave too much freedom to the gendarme when it comes to deciding if and when to use a weapon on duty. This view is not shared by Gendarmerie sources, which quote strict guidelines for the use of weapons on duty. Refer note # 72. Amnesty International, “Concerns in Europe January-June 2000: France” and “Annual Report 2001: France”.
1990s). And yet, KFOR, with its MSU, is the first mission in which France has accepted to assume responsibility for executive policing. State sovereignty has always been the principle of highest priority for France.  

The Gendarmerie corps has integrated peacekeeping into its organization, most recently in its 2002 Action Plan. The Plan includes provisions for routinely sending candidates to the Institute for International Human Rights in San Remo. The courses aim to familiarise personnel of all ranks with international law, and to lay the foundations for a concept of deployment that takes aspects of doctrine, human resources, and logistics into consideration. The strength of the Gendarmerie in peace operations, according to its own assessment, is that the Gendarmerie constitutes a comprehensive system of law enforcement which simultaneously uses a prevention-repression-intervention approach, making it especially effective in the international efforts for public security and crime prevention. Traditional police work such as investigation of crime is an integral part of their duties. With regard to riot control, one of the tasks most readily left to police with military status in peace support operations, the Gendarmerie is trained to view and handle violent crowds differently than army elements. The opponent is, to the Gendarme, not an enemy, but a citizen upsetting public order. The Gendarme has been trained to handle the social and psychological factors that come into play in demonstrations. He/she is also used to being under strict legal restraints regarding the use of force and firearms on duty, which include a tradition for never resorting to the use of firearms unless all other options have been exhausted. These factors all constitute a great difference between the preparedness of the Gendarmerie to assume law and order tasks, as compared to the French armed forces. While an army engaged in battle will seek to win by beating the enemy, the goal for the Gendarmes is to disperse a crowd and restore public order. The “enemy” is the situation, not the demonstrators per se.

3.2 The Italian Carabinieri

Until 1999 the Carabinieri was an integrated corps in the Italian Army. The corps has retained its military status, but now answers to the Ministry of the Interior in matters relating to its public order role. The military activities of the Carabinieri, such as military policing, combat support, and the Multinational Specialized Units abroad, are subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. Preventive policing and public order activities are subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior and coordinated at the provincial level. Investigations are part of to the authority of the Public Prosecutor, an office of the Judiciary. The commander of the Carabinieri is still an
army lieutenant-general. He is directly appointed by the President of the republic and answers to the Minister of Defence.\textsuperscript{71}

The Carabinieri are organized according to military standards. The territorial division consists of 5 brigades, 18 regiments, and 94 groups. There is also one mobile defence regiment, one special operations unit, airborne and naval units, and 13 other mobile battalions. The Carabinieri number around 110,000 personnel in relation to almost 58 million inhabitants of Italy.\textsuperscript{72} Until very recently the Carabinieri was male only, but the first female officers took up duty in the autumn of 2001. Carabinieri are armed on duty, with any one of the following standard weapons: Beretta 92 FS pistol, PM 12 S2 machine-gun, Beretta AR 70/90 semi-automatic rifle, or FN Minimi machine gun.\textsuperscript{73}

Carabinieri are first and foremost seen in their capacity of public law and order enforcers, available around the clock all over Italy, with 4,659 stations in every village, town and city.\textsuperscript{74} They deal with everything from regular patrolling and traffic controls to criminal investigations and emergencies. They normally work in pairs, except in public order duty when they are deployed in platoons or squads. A single officer service model is currently, in October 2002, being tried out, but only when backup is immediately available.\textsuperscript{75} A carabiniere is obliged to intervene to prevent crime at any time, and must answer to every call for assistance. This applies regardless of whether he is on or off duty, and regardless of what kind of assistance is required.\textsuperscript{76} Officers are guided by Standard Operating Procedures for most challenges they encounter in the line of duty, but the Carabinieri corps is authorized to react to situations as they deem necessary in order to uphold the law, also when situations arise that are not foreseen by the SOP. The use of force is as a general rule permitted for officers if it is needed to counter use of force by an opponent, or to maintain law and order. The general guideline for such situations is that appliance of force must be “proportionate”. Complaints against officers filed by members of the public are handled by an ordinary criminal court of law (not court martial). If the alleged offence committed does not represent a violation of the law but merely poor or wrongful conduct of duty, the accused officer’s commander may decide to take disciplinary measures against the officer.\textsuperscript{77}

In September 2001, following the reorganization of the Carabinieri, a new brigade was formed specifically for training, equipping and organizing units for foreign deployment. It is stationed in Livorno and consists of the Parachute Regiment, the 7\textsuperscript{th} and 13\textsuperscript{th} Regiments and the special anti-terrorism unit Gruppo d’Intervento Speciale. The brigade was created with the experiences and recognized needs of the Multinational Specialised Units in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo in mind, capitalizing on the dual police/military role of the

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\textsuperscript{71} http://www.carabinieri.it, 3 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{73} http://www.carabinieri.it, 3 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{74} http://www.carabinieri.it, 3 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
Carabinieri for the purpose of establishing the MSU concept as a standard component of NATO missions.\textsuperscript{78}

\subsection*{3.3 The Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republica}

The National Republican Guard (GNR) is one of several paramilitary forces in charge of internal security in Portugal. It is under the authority of the Ministry of Defence and is organized in a military manner, with 4 territorial brigades, and battalions and companies stationed in administrative centres. Reserve and ex-service personnel tend to dominate the ranks.\textsuperscript{79} In daily operations work is performed in patrols consisting of 2 or 3 officers, in some cases by a single officer. Patrols are selected from Squadrons or Teams, two of which form a Section, three of which form a Platoon or an Operational Group. The GNR has around 90\% of the national territory under its exclusive responsibility.\textsuperscript{80} According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2002, their primary duty is policing in rural areas. Other tasks include riot control in urban areas, preventing drug trafficking, and highway patrolling. The Treasury Police is a special unit within the corps responsible for border control, dealing primarily with drugs smuggling, illegal immigration, and contraband. According to the GNR General Mission statement their primary task is to uphold public order to ensure all persons’ rights and liberties as granted in the Portuguese Constitution. Furthermore it is their duty to ensure the security of persons and property and protect them from human transgressions as well as natural disasters, to function as a criminal investigative police force, to uphold financial and customs laws, and to participate in the national defence.\textsuperscript{81} The Guarda Nacional Republica has around 25,000 personnel, men and women, in relation to almost 10 million inhabitants.\textsuperscript{82}

An officer of the National Republican Guard is obliged to act in prevention of crime off duty as well as on duty. His or her actions are always guided by the GNR motto “For the Law and for the People”. The GNR \textit{Principles and Codes of Conduct}, based on the Portuguese Constitution, require the officer to abide by the following standards (among others): To relate to citizens in a correct and polite manner; to perform duty in such a manner as to create a general sense of security and confidence in the corps, preferably preventing crime and combating it if and when necessary; in doing so to employ means of dissuasion/persuasion, resorting to coercion only as a last resort, in a proportional manner, and only to the minimum degree required; to carry out intervention firmly, rapidly, and appropriately. The GNR is armed on duty and may use their firearms in direct self-defence, in the defence of others, or to overcome violent resistance to the mission of the GNR. An officer may only resort to the use of firearms when other means of law enforcement have been exhausted and in a conservative manner, so as to limit damage and as far as possible respect and preserve human life.\textsuperscript{83} A new code of conduct for GNR officers was finalized in the end of 2001. The code requires

\textsuperscript{78} Paolo Valpolini in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 June 2002.
\textsuperscript{79} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2002.
\textsuperscript{80} GNR Public Relations Office, August 2002.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2002.
\textsuperscript{83} GNR Public Relations Office, August 2002.
personnel to pay special attention to the physical and mental integrity of detainees, to prevent ill treatment of persons in custody from taking place. The code also applies to the Public Security Police.\(^{84}\)

The Guarda Nacional Republicana is presently completing the development of a special training program for officers about to serve in a foreign mission, called the International Peacekeeping Operations Corps. While each course will be customized to adjust the curriculum to deployment area specifics, some of the central subjects include: UN structure and peace support operations; geographic and social background on Area of Deployment; human rights and international law; ethics and multicultural issues; negotiation and mediation; mine awareness, practical skills/logistics; language proficiency, first aid, and tests of physical and mental fitness.\(^{85}\)

4 THE USE OF POLICE WITH MILITARY STATUS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Based on the above descriptions of peace operation experiences and characteristics of police with military status, the report now turns to some key issues surrounding the deployment of police with military status in peace operations.

4.1 The unique skills of police with military status

The police forces with military status of France, Italy, and Portugal demonstrate some significant common features that are relevant for their usefulness in peace operations. The crucial question here must be: what do they do that regular police does not do? The answer seems to be anything. Flexibility arguably stands out as their most distinguishing quality. These forces can be ordered to perform any security-related job, including that of professional soldiers should the state be thrown into regular war. Their competence and readiness to act simultaneously as police officers and in a military capacity are clearly a resource for peace operations that has not been exploited to its full potential. That applies first and foremost in those cases where the international community temporarily assumes responsibility for internal security. Among the central tasks for all forces are public order maintenance/crowd control, anti-terror efforts and organized crime. In these areas they have primacy over other law enforcement agencies. These are also some of the most prominent tasks they have been assigned in peace support operations abroad, perhaps in particular in the MSU units of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo.

In his analysis of the French Gendarmerie in Kosovo, Thierry Tardy claims that the domestic experiences of the Gendarmerie make them very well prepared for law enforcement and public order responsibilities in post-conflict societies. He points to their dual police/military status as being the very quality that produces a flexibility combined with robustness that separates

\(^{84}\) Amnesty International: Concerns in Europe July-December 2001; Portugal.

\(^{85}\) GNR Public Relations Office, August 2002.
Gendarmerie from regular civilian police forces. In a volatile, unpredictable environment with ample weapons supplies and low thresholds for violence – characteristics shared by many post-conflict areas – the maintenance of public order poses a difficult and potentially dangerous challenge. Gendarmerie, Carabinieri, and Guarda Nacional Republica are all, in principle, trained to face riots, to assess the developing situation both as individuals and as units, to employ various means of crowd control, and to resort to force in a gradual and restricted manner only when other options have been exhausted. While civilian police normally have training for such challenges in countries that do not have police with military status, they are rarely met with organized and violent, possibly armed, resistance. Therefore they do not tend to have extensive experience in this. Soldiers on the other hand are not prepared to view a situation, rather than the persons who are creating the situation, as the enemy.

While civilian police in many ways work reactively, a military force has a preventive, or, if necessary, deterrent focus. Police with military status represent a crossing point between these approaches and have a universal obligation to act as law enforcement officers. They do work in a reactive manner against crime, but they are also obliged to prevent crime and intervene. The lack of internal security structures in post-conflict societies exacerbates problems with all types of crime and facilitates both organized crime and private security arrangements, both of which contribute to undermining a meaningful national reconstruction process. Gendarmerie, Carabinieri, and Guarda Nacional Republica are experienced in dealing with organized crime and criminal networks. Thus they should be in a good position to understand and target the dynamics at work when such activities threaten civilian society. For example, one look at the Italian Interior Ministry Report on the status of criminality for the second half of 2000 (conducted by the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia) immediately indicates that Italian law enforcement officials have thorough experience with organized crime: The Mafia phenomenon pervades Italian society to such an extent that representatives of Mafia families and clans have taken to ordinary lobbying against stricter laws that target organized crime.

4.2 Legitimacy, legality, and the use of force

In Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia the military presence and the presence of civilian police personnel were mandated by the UN. The presence and the role of police with military status was not. The performance of the latter in-theatre is very rarely mentioned in the reports on the status of the missions of the Secretary General presented to the Security Council 2-4 times annually, even in those cases where formed units with designated duties exist. Military and police performance tends to be comprehensively described. Unclear mandates are a recurring nightmare in the world of peacekeeping, but when it comes to the use of police with military status not specifically assigned a role in the mandate, the legal questions multiply. Ultimately, the legality of an intervention rests on a Security Council resolution grounded in the UN

87 Hills, 2001, 95.  
88 Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, 2000, 36.
Treaty (usually chapters VI or VII). Then, a UN operation is always obliged to respect the laws of the land insofar as these are not contradictory to UN treaties and declarations. In addition, the Special Representative of the Secretary General may be authorized to issue regulations valid as law for the duration of the mission, as has been the case in Kosovo and East Timor, if local law is non-existent or to a large degree incompatible with UN standards. The UN has issued guidelines for police work in international operations, and codes of conduct for soldiers in UN service are well established. NATO also has codes of conduct for soldiers in action.

Police with military status who are classified as soldiers but act as executive police fall between the categories, or belong to them all. In the myriad of applicable bodies of law and regulations, the officers easily resort to following the national legal framework of their own country. This is potentially problematic if and when the national guidelines differ from the ones allowed by the relevant mandate. An even more serious problem occurs when officers are left with the impression that they are indeed under no legal restraints when on duty in international operations. There have been incidents of crimes committed by personnel in international operations against local citizens. There is no institutionalised manner of handling such charges, they are matters left to the state of the suspect to handle, all of which contribute to seriously weakening confidence in the UN on the ground.

A controversial issue regarding police forces with military status is the question of the use of force against civilians. Since such use of force is the prerogative of a state, executive policing in peace operations remains a topic of heated debate and its legitimacy can always be questioned – a mission is not a state and is always a temporary arrangement. Policing conducted by foreigners can be hampered by lack of local knowledge and lack of trust in the community. A police force that is from the outset alien to the environment is arguably more vulnerable to accusations of both doing too much and not doing enough. The application of force against civilians in this context is a highly sensitive issue. A foreign police force lacks a natural legitimacy in the population, which is normally a key asset for a national police force in a stable society. Perito emphasizes that in Western European countries that have police forces with military status, these forces have a long tradition which creates an understanding between the population and the force in situations of confrontation; there will be well-founded anticipations in the public as to what the next step of the law enforcer may be, and action will generally be perceived as legitimate. Such tacit understanding is not naturally present outside of a force’s home territory. This bears perhaps an even greater relevance for special police units. Due to the more serious nature of their normal assignments at home, compared to civilian police, they may be more accustomed to employing forceful means on duty.

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89 Perito, 19 August 2002.
90 Tardy, 2000, 47.
91 Hansen, 2002, 46.
93 Perito, 2002, 22.
94 See also Section 4.4 below on “Executive policing and human rights.”
The legitimacy problem is not only about the population’s perception of the police, it also works the other way. The police forces with military status studied here have solid roots in their societies, all dating back more than 150 years. The statements made officially by the forces display a great deal of pride connected to “serving the law and the people” for better or for worse. It cannot be taken for granted that professional commitment of an emotional nature will be automatically transferred to another people and another law (and an unclear one at that) as the station of duty changes for a limited time period. An important difference here is, naturally, that special police units can be expected to perform their duty according to orders whether they are happy to do so or not. Civilian compliance and cooperation is not as easily mobilized.

The dual nature of police forces with military status opens a unique window of opportunity for handling especially serious challenges to public security in post-conflict territories. As police officers they are used to relating to civilians and to consider the importance of evidence material and legal processes, but as soldiers they are simultaneously used to receiving and executing orders, acting in a unified and decisive manner. In peace operations they usually also work in national units. This could potentially eliminate confusion and misunderstandings caused by, for example, individual perceptions, differing national restrictions, and poor communications, while not neglecting the individual rights of the citizen in the face of the law. However, in order to capitalize on this unique quality it is necessary that forces be given a clear legal framework on which basis orders can be issued. This is especially true given the questions of legitimacy that arise with heavy handed use of force. Lack of clarity has been a major reason why forces have displayed very different approaches to their duties, causing confusion and even resentment within the relevant operation as a whole as well as in the local community. The responsibility lies squarely where mandates, standard operating procedures and rules of engagements are formulated, that is, among UN planning staff and in the capitals.

4.3 Patterns of deployment

Where police with military status have been deployed as formed units, notably in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, they have been deployed as whole, national squadrons. They work in units, not as individual officers. As pointed out above (4.2) this can make for efficiency and expedience in “hot” situations and as such may be an asset of squadron deployment. However, this manner of operation tends to remove the personnel from the community they are in the field to serve. It is easy to see how locals can perceive a group of armed, uniformed, foreign police-soldiers as less approachable than a pair of unarmed civilian police officers, possibly working together with a local police trainee. Language is a factor here; formed units have so far not been required to demonstrate proficiency either in the local language or in the mission language (usually English), making communication outside of the unit difficult even if it is sought after. In addition a paramilitary appearance can be disturbing for locals in territories

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95 See for example their respective websites.
96 See examples in Section 2 on “Experiences.”
where civilians have been subject to persecution by paramilitary security forces in the preceding conflict. This in turn can affect the formed units’ ability to perform their duty.

Squadron deployment and language problems also tend to isolate formed units from the rest of the international operation, making cooperation and coordination difficult. This is regrettable, as the different elements of an operation are supposed to work towards the same goal (mandate fulfilment) and their respective activities should be in support of eachother’s efforts. The military nature of the formed units’ organisation also tends to create a stronger loyalty to the unit and to the commander of the unit from each officer than to the mission as a whole – note the fact that individual officers do not ‘exist’ formally other than as a part of a unit. This further enforces the isolation of formed units from the rest of the mission and the community.97

4.4 Executive policing and human rights

In each of the cases the international mission took on the task of training locals, gradually building new local police forces to replace predecessors who all either did not exist or had histories of active participation in the recent conflict, except in Somalia. Recruiting, vetting and training of new candidates are central tasks. While police academies are usually established for this purpose, it takes time for these to become fully operational. Therefore, on-the-job training of new local officers by international police personnel has been widely employed; a “learning by doing” concept.

When the UN participates in reconstruction, it is crucial for credibility that the institutions it helps establish incorporate the ideals and standards set by the UN for member states. The issue of law enforcement in accordance with international human rights is critical. In a collapsed society public trust in and respect for law enforcement officials can be non-existent. The reformed local police must gain trust and respect in order to function as the caretaker of public security. They must protect – and if necessary prosecute – each individual citizen in accordance with an indiscriminate body of law. Nurturing an ideal of impartiality in the local police forces is absolutely necessary for the re-establishment of internal security in a post-conflict territory. In a post-conflict environment the level of animosity between people also tends to run high – making it especially difficult to foster respect for the rights of others throughout the society. At the same time success in this respect is crucial for progress. Police reform therefore aims at creating forces that are ethnically balanced, of sensible and sustainable numbers, responsive to any individual or state agency for the upholding of the law, unbiased, and respectful of human rights standards. Part of police reform is separating military and police forces.98 In Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia international trainers frequently came from police forces with military status, creating a situation of “do what I say, not what I do” which seriously undermined their credibility.

97 Melbye, 20 August 2002.
98 Hansen, 2002, 93-95.
An equally worrying issue is the fact that police forces with military status in France, Italy, and Portugal have all figured on Amnesty International’s annual list of human rights offenders for the last few years. In all three cases police brutality is the most extensively reported allegation. At this point it is important to point out that international human rights do not condemn the use of force by law enforcement officials as such. For police violence to be classified as breaches of human rights it has to be characterized as unnecessary, exaggerated, unmotivated, degrading, as a form of punishment dealt without conviction, as torture, or all of the above. It is also important to remember that in these three countries public awareness of individual rights is generally very high, and police often claim to be falsely accused of unlawful job performance.

In the aftermath of the G8 summit in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001, during which some 200,000 protesters took part in demonstrations that in some cases turned into veritable riots and which were met by heavy-handed measures by law enforcement officers, several inquiries have been conducted regarding the true events. The European Parliament and Amnesty International both expressed deep concerns about what they found to be proven violations of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and international human rights respectively. They found excessive and unlawful use of force by Carabinieri officers to be thoroughly and objectively documented, including inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment in detention facilities. This is particularly relevant, as praise for Carabinieri deployment to peace operations and their function as special units in missions almost always includes references to their experience, professionalism and efficiency in riot control.

The human rights dimension and the issue of police brutality seems even more important considering the multinationality of UN operations. The qualms regarding the European forces studied here turn into a serious dilemma when the total composition of special police units in peace operations is brought into the picture. Many of the regular contributors of police with military status also enjoy a notorious reputation for grave and systematic human rights violations in their home states. Some prominent examples include Pakistan, Ukraine, Jordan, and several African states. Reports in this respect frequently cite systematic use of violence, including torture, outside of due law processes and with practical impunity. If this is indeed part of the professional culture that officers bring with them into the field on foreign duty it is absolutely necessary to analyse in more detail whether and how this may affect their performance when on UN duty.

Secondly, according to Amnesty International, persons of foreign origin appear to be victims of police brutality to a disproportionate degree in France, Italy, and Portugal; asylum seekers

100 See the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 2 about the universality of rights, and articles 5-11 about the legal status of the individual before the law and the state. See also Amnesty International Report on the G8 Summit in Genoa, 2001.
and would-be immigrants are especially exposed. Considering the current substantial flow of persons from conflict areas claiming refugee status in Western Europe, it is necessary to raise the question of why foreigners seem to suffer more than citizens at the hands of law enforcement officials in the receiving countries. Human rights activists and spokespersons for such groups tend to cry “racism” when confronted with the statistics, while law enforcement agencies often explain the tendency with reference to these groups simply being over-represented in criminal activities as compared to other groups. While it is fairly easy to find good methodological reasons to question both of these simplified views, the statistics do beg for further inquiries. The Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Somalia and Haiti all figure on the 1999-2001 list of top 40 countries of origin of asylum applicants in 23 European countries. For the same period (aggregated), the Former Republic of Yugoslavia – that includes Kosovo – was a major source of asylum-seekers to France and Italy. No conclusions can be drawn at this time, and more thorough research is needed to address this issue. Suffice it to say that if specific nationalities figure disproportionately highly on police records in those countries that regularly send police with military status to peace operations in the areas of origin of those same nationalities; then the question must be raised regarding the experiences and attitudes that officers bring with them to the theatre of operation.

The Italian crime scene is a case in point: The Italian mafia, which already poses a grave challenge to the rule of law and economic productivity in Italy, has been complemented by “newcomers”, criminal organizations and networks of foreign origin. According to the Interior Ministry, the networks of Albanian and other Balkan origin pose especially serious problems and are not limited to certain parts of the country. It is therefore quite possible, or even likely, that when a Carabiniere arrives in Kosovo or Bosnia for international duty, he will already have encountered the criminal network at play in-theatre in the form of its Italian “franchise”. This could be positive, in that the officer has prior knowledge of the challenge he will face on duty. It could, however, also have a negative side effect: if, in the line of duty, the officer has had contact with people from the Balkans, all of whom were involved in organized crime in Italy, chances are he will have been left with a highly biased impression of the Balkans.

**5 CONCLUSIONS**

Perhaps the most important finding of the present study is the surprising lack of comprehensive research both into the role and function of police forces with military status as such, and into their deployment to peace operations. Considering MSUs have more or less become an institutionalised part of NATO’s operational concept for peace support activities, one would think systematic analyses of the performance of at least the MSUs in Bosnia and

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103 Portugal presently receives only a negligible number of asylum seekers. The total number for 2001 was 190, compared to 47,290 and 9,620 for France and Italy respectively. UNHCR data, February 2002.
104 Aggregated figures. France, Italy, and Portugal all included. Supply countries ranked 1, 7, and 39 respectively. UNHCR 2002.
105 The nationality ranked 5 and 11 respectively. UNHCR 2002.
106 Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, 2000, 36.
Kosovo were behind that decision. On the contrary, much of the research conducted on complex peace operations merely states that police with military status are deployed to fill the enforcement gap, and that they are especially suited to do this because of the training and experience they have from their domestic setting and because their dual status allows flexibility and robustness at the same time. This study has attempted to identify exactly what it is that makes these forces uniquely suited to fill this gap, and how this concept has worked out in practise. It seems clear that in order to answer these questions comprehensively and in a scientifically sound manner it will be necessary to gather information from primary sources through field work. Literature, statistics and official documents simply do not contain sufficient details to piece together the whole picture. Nevertheless the present study does point to some important elements that give grounds for tentative conclusions, on which further analysis may be based.

- **Deployment patterns**
  Police forces with military status have been deployed in an inconsistent manner to peace operations, with highly varying tasks, forms of organization, mandates, duration, and powers. Also the motivations behind their deployment have been driven by national priorities, except in Kosovo and East Timor. They have been deployed both as formed units and within national contingents, which has produced very different uses in the field. Generally speaking deployment within the contingent seems to have resulted in a more flexible but less targeted use of the personnel, which may have allowed missions greater freedom in allocating human resources but more limited abilities with regard to fully exploiting their unique capabilities. Formed units seem to have been more target-oriented and efficient in a problem/solution paradigm, not least because national unity and command significantly enhances their effectiveness. This mode of deployment has, however, made integration of the units into the missions problematic, and it has also isolated the units from the public and society.

- **Capabilities**
  The police forces with military status studied here share many significant common features, and even founded an institutionalised cooperation between such forces in Europe. Flexibility stands out as a quality that they share and that separates them from military forces and regular police forces, placing extensive powers but also great responsibility on their profession in the execution of duty. For all three countries it is true that the forces can be assigned any security-related task, ranging from traffic control, criminal investigation, natural disaster relief, to riot control, anti-terrorism, and regular, armed, territorial defence against foreign enemies. The findings indicate that these European forces in fact are more similar in terms of form and functions than expected at the outset of the study, although their long history and their solid roots in society have naturally led to certain national distinctions. Greater variety must probably be expected if forces outside of Western Europe are included in future analyses.
• **The deployment gap and phases of an operation**

The initial challenges to internal security in a post-conflict territory frequently require tougher and more concerted responses than in a stable society. Law and order have broken down, and the military forces that normally constituting the starting phase of an international mission are not prepared to handle civilian lawlessness. The CivPol element of a mission takes much longer to deploy, and when it is in place it often lacks adequate equipment and authorisation to address serious public disorder. Formed units can be deployed along with military forces, because they are soldiers after all. They have the training and experience to reinstate law and order in a civilian setting that soldiers lack, because they are also police officers. As described above, police with military status possess qualities and specialised skills that should make them very well prepared to fill a significant space of the deployment gap. To a certain extent they have also proved their worth in this respect. Units of police forces with military status in peace operations have, for example, received much praise for their performance in violent riot situations – perhaps more common in the early, less stable days of an operation, often having successfully dispersed hostile crowds in a determined way.

It appears that the value and usefulness of formed units are most prominent in the initial phase of a mission. As the security situation improves in a post-conflict area, the need for formed units may diminish. As law and order is gradually restored and deployment comes close to completion, internal security is more usefully transferred to a more civilian police element.

• **The enforcement gap**

The space between military and police capabilities which constitutes the enforcement gap seems to be filled instantly by police with military status. They have the combination of skills that is missing in both the purely military and the civilian police organizations. Missions have not always capitalized on that, however. Failure to use formed units consciously have barred them from acting against threats to public security, even when no other element of the mission has been able and authorised to intervene. On many occasions missions have been reluctant to employ formed units out of fear that their military traits would be counter-productive when faced with rioting civilians. On this point it is important to keep in mind that just as exaggerated action may undermine a mission’s credibility and popular support among locals, so may impotence. Reluctance to act has usually not improved the popular image of the UN’s conflict resolution abilities. The question, at the end of the day, is whether restraint or determination in law enforcement is more likely to produce the necessary public respect for law and order to reduce the level of tension and crime in the long run. The answer is not given.

• **Rebuilding security**

Territories where peace operations are deployed usually have fresh and traumatic experiences with security forces during the conflict. Peacekeeping units of police with
military status represent a paramilitary alternative that falls between police and military competences and powers. They do not enjoy the natural moral authority in-theatre that they may have at home, because they are, in essence, an alien element (like the rest of the international operation, of course). At home they are used to being allowed to resort to the use of force when they find it necessary. These factors taken together may not be a combination of characteristics most suited to rebuilding a reliable security environment for all, and to cultivating a spirit of tolerance, respect for civil rights, and conflict resolution through non-violent means. It is important to be aware of what signals the nature of the international operation sends to the people of a post-conflict area. These considerations are relevant both for the difficult question regarding the use of force against civilians by an international presence, and regarding the curriculum of the training programs organized for reforming the indigenous police service.

- **Command and mandate**
  What seems clear, however, is that to make comprehensive use of police forces with military status in operations unambiguous remits for their units are needed. In order to capitalize on the combination of case-by-case judgment and military discipline, missions must have a designated place for these units, with clear tasks and rules of engagement. This could increase utility and reduce concerns around human rights issues. The versatility of forces has proved to be a resource, but powers without definite boundaries have also produced unwanted consequences. As the above accounts illustrate, the case for unambiguous remits is regrettably not trivial but on the contrary highly complex.
APPENDIX

A  LITERATURE AND REFERENCES


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