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Assessing protection of civilians in military operations

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English summary

In today's conflicts, military forces are frequently expected to protect civilians from threats of physical violence. Successful protection is now considered important to ensure local and international legitimacy and in many cases necessary to accomplish the operation's overall objectives. It has therefore become increasingly necessary to assess the degree to which civilians are actually being protected on the ground or not.

Operations assessment is an activity that informs commanders and decision-makers on whether the intended objectives of a military operation are being achieved. In order to be useful, such assessments must measure aspects that are relevant to the particular objective or topic in question. This report deals specifically with the question of how to measure protection of civilians.

When assessing protection of civilians, what is relevant depends on the nature of the threat against civilians in the first place. Successful protection of civilians is defined as having reduced the current level of threat to civilians, without causing more harm than otherwise would occur. In all situations, the greatest threats to civilians are likely to come from perpetrators that deliberately target them as part of their strategy. However, the particular ways in which civilians are targeted will vary greatly.

This report therefore uses seven generic scenarios developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), which seek to capture the range of situations where civilians are faced with fundamentally different types of physical threats (GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING, REGIME CRACKDOWN, POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, COMMUNAL CONFLICT, PREDATORY VIOLENCE, and INSURGENCY). These scenarios also describe the different outcomes that can be expected when perpetrators succeed with their violence against civilians. These expected outcomes provide a starting point against which to assess whether civilians are being protected or not. If the civilian suffering is reduced compared to what could otherwise be expected, a degree of operational success can be claimed. The question is how this can actually be measured.

This report therefore outlines six different approaches to measuring protection of civilians, which can be used to identify relevant metrics depending on the particular scenario one is faced with. These are: (1) civilian casualty figures, (2) civilian behaviour, (3) perception of security, (4) territorial control, (5) delivery of humanitarian assistance, and (6) perpetrator capabilities. Particular attention is given to perpetrator capabilities, because it is the most critical factor to consider from a military perspective in all scenarios. The capabilities are those means the perpetrator actually requires to be able to implement the violence against civilians.

Finally, the report explains how success in protecting civilians can be determined. It outlines a number of generic baselines against which to assess whether the threat to civilians is actually being reduced depending on the particular scenario one is faced with. Importantly, the criteria for success and what constitutes relevant information to measure will change in accordance with developments on the ground.

Sammendrag

I dagens konflikter forventes det at militære styrker skal være i stand til å beskytte sivile mot fysisk vold. Beskyttelse av sivile handler ikke bare om å unngå å påføre unødig skade for sivilbefolkningen i tråd med krigens folkerett, men er stadig oftere en forutsetning for at militære operasjoner skal oppnå legitimitet både internasjonalt og lokalt. Det har derfor blitt stadig viktigere å kunne måle hvorvidt militære operasjoner lykkes med å beskytte sivile eller ikke.

Vurdering av måloppnåelse i militære operasjoner (*operations assessment*) er en aktivitet som skal informere beslutningstagere og militære sjefer om hvor, når og hvordan de tilgjengelige ressursene skal benyttes mest effektivt. Det er derfor viktig at det som måles er relevant for den konkrete operasjonens målsetninger. I denne rapporten diskuteres det hvordan man kan måle beskyttelse av sivile i militære operasjoner.

Beskyttelse av sivile kan sies å være oppnådd når det eksisterende trusselnivået mot sivile reduseres, uten at det volder mer skade enn det som ellers ville vært tilfelle. Den største trusselen mot sivile kommer normalt fra væpnede aktører som bevisst angriper sivile som en del av sin strategi. Hvordan sivile blir angrepet og av hvem vil imidlertid variere i stor grad. Denne rapporten benytter derfor syv generiske scenarioer utviklet ved Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI) for å identifisere ulike situasjoner hvor sivile utsettes for grunnleggende forskjellige typer fysiske trusler (GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING, REGIME CRACKDOWN, POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, COMMUNAL CONFLICT, PREDATORY VIOLENCE og INSURGENCY). Disse scenarioene beskriver også hvilket utfall man kan forvente dersom angriperne lykkes, målt i forskjellige typer sivile lidelser i de ulike scenarioene. Dersom den sivile lidelsen reduseres til mindre enn det man ellers kunne forventet at ville skje, har man oppnådd en grad av suksess.

Spørsmålet er hvordan denne reduksjonen kan måles. Rapporten beskriver derfor seks ulike tilnærminger til å måle beskyttelse av sivile på. Disse tilnærmingene er: (1) sivile tapstall, (2) sivile handlingsmønster, (3) forståelse av sikkerhets-situasjonen, (4) endringer i territoriell kontroll, (5) tilgang på humanitær hjelp og (6) de væpnede aktørenes kapabiliteter. Det legges særlig vekt på angripernes kapabiliteter, som er de midlene de faktisk trenger for å kunne gjennomføre volden mot sivile. Nytteverdien av de ulike tilnærmingene vil variere avhengig av scenarioet man står overfor. Sivile tapstall og de væpnende aktørenes kapabiliteter er som regel relevante å måle på i alle operasjoner, mens de resterende måtene er mest relevant i de minst voldelige scenarioene.

Avslutningsvis beskrives en rekke generelle referansepunkter (*baselines*), som kan brukes til å avgjøre om man faktisk lykkes i å redusere trusselen mot de sivile på bakken i de ulike scenarioene. Suksesskriteriene og hvilke tilnærminger som vil være mest relevante for å måle beskyttelse, vil likevel alltid variere i tråd med endringer i trusselnivået mot de sivile på bakken.

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Preface

This report is the fifth publication on protection of civilians from the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in 2014. Both protection of civilians as an objective and operations assessment as an activity to measure the achievement of objectives have become increasingly important in today's military operations. This report seeks to bridge these two emerging issues in a practical manner, by providing guidance for military staffs involved in operations where operations assessment on protection of civilians is an objective. It is also relevant to subject-matter experts on protection of civilians, academia, and humanitarian actors interested in how protection of civilians can be measured from a military perspective.

This report has been written as part of a Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) project, which has been run by FFI in collaboration with the Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) and the Norwegian Defence International Centre (NODEFIC). The main product has been the development of a guide, which provides practical guidance and advice for military staffs involved in planning and assessment of operations where protection of civilians is an objective:

- Beadle, Alexander William & Kjeksrud, Stian (2014), 'Military planning and assessment guide for the protection of civilians', *FFI-rapport 2014/00965* (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment)

The present report explains the research and methodology behind the guide's particular advice on *operations assessment*. Additionally, there are three other reports that provide underlying research and documentation of the advice presented in the planning and assessment guide listed above:

- Beadle, Alexander William (2014), 'Protection of civilians – military planning scenarios and implications', *FFI-rapport 2014/00519* (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment)
- Våge, Anders Skeibrok (2014), 'Violence against civilians: case-studies of perpetrators', *FFI-rapport 2014/00520* (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment)
- Øen, Ulrik Hallén (2014), 'Protection of civilians in practice – emerging lessons from the Central African Republic', *FFI-rapport 2014/01918* (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment)

1 Introduction

Operations assessment is an essential part of the military operations process, which enables commanders and decision-makers to measure the degree to which a mission's objectives are being achieved. The resulting information is meant to support knowledge development, planning and execution of military operations, such as where, when, and how to allocate resources within the area of operations.

This report deals specifically with the question of how to measure protection of civilians in military operations. Protection of civilians may be the primary objective of an entire operation, one of several objectives, or an important factor or risk that must be considered. The purpose of this report is to provide a better understanding of what type of information will be most relevant to measure protection of civilians and to provide some generic baselines against which to assess an operation's success in protecting civilians in different situations.

The report is divided into three parts. Chapter 2 seeks to bridge the realms of operations assessment and physical protection of civilians. It explains the role of operations assessment in military operations and highlights some challenges for conducting 'good' assessment. A key requirement is to identify metrics that are relevant to the particular topic one seeks to assess. Progress in terms of protecting civilians is defined as reducing the existing level of threat to civilians, without causing more harm in the process. Thus, what constitutes a relevant metric depends on the particular type of threat civilians are under in the first place. A scenario-based approach to assessing protection of civilians is therefore presented, based on the scope of different types of physical threats civilians may be faced with in a military operation.

Chapter 3 then outlines six different approaches to assessing protection of civilians, whose relevance will vary according to the particular scenario one is facing. These are: (1) civilian casualty figures, (2) civilian behaviour, (3) perception of security, (4) territorial control, (5) delivery of humanitarian assistance, and (6) perpetrator capabilities. Examples of metrics that may be relevant in different situations are included for each approach. Particular attention is given to perpetrator capabilities, because it is the most critical factor to consider from a strictly military perspective in all scenarios. The capabilities are those means the perpetrator actually requires to implement the violence against civilians. This information may provide valuable input during threat assessments and military planning of operations.

Finally, Chapter 4 describes how to determine whether a military operation is actually successful in protecting civilians or not. In doing so, it outlines generic baselines against which to measure success or failure, depending on the particular scenario the operation is faced with.

2 Operations assessment in military operations

Operations assessment is an activity used to inform decision-makers and military commanders of whether the intended operational objectives are being achieved. The overarching aim is to provide the commander and his staff with knowledge on two fundamental questions: Is the operation *achieving its goals*? And, is it *doing things right*? This information will typically support the commander's decision-making on where, when and how to allocate scarce resources.

Assessment is used across the entire spectrum of military tasks, including conventional military operations, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief. International and non-governmental organisations typically refer to 'Monitoring and Evaluation' (M&E) in relation to humanitarian relief and development aid, while the United Nations (UN) has developed a guide to 'benchmarking' in peacekeeping operations.[1]

This chapter looks into some of the key challenges when assessing the degree to which objectives are being achieved, the operations assessment process itself, and how it may be applied to the particular objective of protecting civilians. In doing so, seven scenarios, which capture the range of different threats civilians may have to be protected from, are outlined to provide a basis against which to determine what information may be relevant to assess in different situations.

2.1 Challenges for assessment

Politicians, military planners, decision-makers and assessment staffs sometimes hold certain assumptions and perceptions about what constitutes the 'correct' characteristics necessary to achieve the end state.[2] The issue of predefined assumptions has direct relevance for assessment processes, because they may lead to imprecise or irrelevant metrics. Using seemingly universally valid principles or theories can make the metrics identified unsuitable for the local context.[3]

The problem of predefined assumptions can also occur in military doctrines. This point is made by Schroden, who criticises the vagueness of available assessment doctrines in the US military and lack of methods for assessing counterinsurgency operations more specifically.[4] Given that operations assessment is designed to be applicable to many different forms of conflict, it becomes geared towards a general methodology. This is an unavoidable necessity, as developing a new methodology for every military operation would be unrealistic and probably counter-productive.

What makes for 'good' operations assessment is therefore the ability to appropriately apply and adapt the assessment methodology to the specific operational environment. This primarily involves the ability to select mission-relevant metrics. The value of context-specific metrics is

[1] Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking, *United Nations* (2010).
[2] Stave, Svein Erik (2011), 'Measuring peacebuilding: challenges, tools, actions', *NOREF Policy Brief: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre*, No. 2, p. 3.
[3] Ibid., p. 4.
[4] Schroden, Jonathan (2011), 'Why Operations Assessment Fail: It's Not Just the Metrics', *Naval War College Review*, No. 4, p. 94.

that they 'are generally based on in-depth knowledge of a local conflict and culture, together with a creative understanding of the contextual signals'.[5] An example of useful context-specific metrics from Afghanistan is provided by David Kilcullen. He describes a broad set of metrics, which illustrates a high degree of contextual relevance. He divides his metrics into categories related to the population, host-nation, security forces and enemy. Examples include the price of vegetables, transportation costs, business formation, assassination and kidnapping rates, unit reliance on air and artillery support, the use of small-unit and night operations, insurgent health, mid-level leadership casualties, and kill/capture versus surrender rates.[6]

The need for context-specific metrics raises a dilemma in conducting operations assessment: the need for information versus the availability of information. Assessment staffs need to develop metrics that can be consistently measured over time. They are therefore dependent on the consistent availability of information, but the information required for good metrics might not always be available. This should not, however, lead to measuring only the things that are possible to measure, but raise awareness of what needs to be measured, the gaps in the available information, and possible weaknesses of the current assessment.

Another issue discussed in the literature is the failure to combine qualitative and quantitative information, often relying predominantly of quantitative assessment whose metrics are not always rooted in a qualitative understanding of the area of operations. Schroden points out that, as mathematical weighting of metrics is necessarily a subjective exercise, that subjective assessment requires considerable qualitative understanding.[7] Kilcullen makes the same point by stating that the 'interpretation of indicators is critically important, and requires informed expert judgement. It is not enough merely to count incidents or conduct quantitative analysis – interpretation is a qualitative activity based on familiarity with the environment'.[8] Any quantitative metric must therefore be rooted in a solid qualitative understanding of the operational environment.

In short, good assessment produces mission-specific and context-relevant information, which helps the commander allocate resources more efficiently and informs the mission on whether its goals are being accomplished.

2.2 The operations assessment process

While this report is not about methodology as such, a brief outline of NATO's operations assessment process is included to illustrate how assessment is conducted in the context of a military operation.[9] The findings are applicable to all operations where assessing protection of

[5] Stave, 'Measuring peacebuilding', p. 4.
[6] Kilcullen, David (2010), 'Measuring Progress in Afghanistan' in David Kilcullen (ed.), *Counterinsurgency* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 59–68.
[7] Schroden, 'Why Operations Assessment Fail', p. 93.
[8] Kilcullen, 'Measuring Progress in Afghanistan', p. 56.
[9] NATO Operations Assessment Handbook (NOAH 2.0), *Supreme Allied Command Transformation* (2012). Hereafter cited as NOAH.
Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD Interim V2.0), *Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe* (2013). Hereafter cited as COPD.

civilians is essential. A short description of the operations assessment guides, doctrines and handbooks upon which this reports draws key terms and steps is found in Appendix A.

In NATO terminology, operations assessment is defined as the 'activity that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations in support of decision-making'.[10] The NATO process for operations assessment follows a four-step structure:[11]

1. Designing the operations assessment and support to planning.
2. Developing the data collection plan.
3. Data collection and treatment.
4. Analysis, interpretation and recommendations.

During the first stage, the assessment staffs support the planners by ensuring that the desired system changes are measurable. Secondly, a data collection plan is developed by determining metrics based on a 'systems analysis of key nodes and leverage points'.[12] The data must then be collected, classified and treated so it can be utilised for analysis and interpretation, which forms the basis for recommendations put to the decision-makers.

There are two types of metrics typically used.[13] A Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) is defined as a 'metric used to measure a current system state'.[14] Furthermore, 'monitoring an MOE over time determines whether or not results are being achieved, as defined in the plan', and 'it is the trends that result from these repeated measurements that allow the determination of progress (or lack of) in an operation'.[15] A Measure of Performance (MOP) is defined as 'a metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions'.[16] While the MOEs measure changes caused by military operations, MOPs measure how well military tasks are conducted. NATO's own handbook provides further guidance on how to develop useful metrics.[17]

In order to ensure accurate and consistent measuring it is necessary for decision-makers, planners, data collectors and the assessment staff to have a shared understanding of the metrics. This is necessary to ensure the consistency and relevance of the data collection, and can be done by including a 'criterion', which specifies the metric in more detail. E.g., in conflicts where many civilians are killed by armed actors using indiscriminate military force, a useful metric could be the frequency of explosive weapons use in urban areas. The criterion for this metric could then be specified as the number of attacks per hour against urban populated areas using direct or indirect wide-area effect explosive weapons fired from ground-based systems or delivered by air.

[10] COPD, p. 5-1.
[11] COPD, p. 5-3, NOAH p. 2-4.
[12] COPD, p. 5-7.
[13] A metric is the collective term for the 'means by which progress towards completion of activities and achievement of results can be measured'. NOAH, p. 2-5.
[14] COPD, p. 5-13, NOAH, p. 2-3.
[15] Ibid.
[16] NOAH, p. 2-6.
[17] See NOAH, p. 7-80.

Because metrics are typically expressed in the form of simple statements reducible to a quantity, such as 'percentage of refugees having access to clean drinking water', we need something more to inform us of whether the measurements offered by the metrics are good or not. This can be done by determining desired targets for each metric. E.g. if the mission aims to ensure that 80 per cent of humanitarian aid reaches its destination, but only 50 per cent of it actually arrives, then the performance is clearly not sufficient. This kind of assessment may be expressed using colour-coding, e.g. 0–25 per cent of aid delivered is considered red, 25–50 per cent orange, 50–75 per cent yellow, and 75–100 per cent green.

Such an approach benefits from being visually expressive and communicates information quickly, but have certain limitations. The biggest problem of using traffic-light presentations is perhaps the generalisation of data – and that it does not show trends. As pointed out in an assessment guide from the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory: 'traffic lights are useful for saying where the operation currently stands, as a snapshot of the overall situation. However, what they do not convey is the cause and effect or the trend'.[18] This can in part be remedied by using a colour spectrum with a slide bar, where time references are plotted on the bar to show positive or negative development over time.[19]

Target values are not the same as metrics, but simply a means to evaluate the operation's performance in relation to the metric. The staffs are therefore free to change the target values without changing the metrics.[20] While measuring specific figures may be useful to assess the progress in certain areas, such as the delivery of humanitarian aid, assessing the development over time may be more relevant when measuring complex objectives such as protecting civilians.

2.3 Operations assessment and protection of civilians

Protection of civilians is broadly defined as all efforts to reduce the effects of war on civilian life. This includes protection from threats of physical violence, access to basic needs, enjoyment of human rights (e.g. freedom of speech, freedom from want), and establishing a protective environment in which all of the above are preserved by the host-nation. However, protection of civilians from threats of *physical violence* is the most basic type of protection upon which all other types of protection usually depend. It is also where military forces will have the most decisive role to play in any military mission, which makes it the most critical aspect of protection of civilians for military staffs to assess.

However, despite the unprecedented strategic importance attached to the protection of civilians in today's military operations, civilians have often not become much safer on the ground as a result. Both the UN and NATO have struggled to protect civilians from imminent threats of physical

[18] Howard, Trevor and Picken, Nicola (2008), 'Code of Best Practice for the Use of Measures Effectiveness (MoE) to Support Campaign Assessment', *Defence Science and Technology Laboratory*, p. 22.
[19] Ibid., p. 23.
[20] The NATO Assessment guide (NOAH) uses a set of four 'mechanisms' to set 'explicit targets for each metric to judge the achievement of results'. These mechanisms are Acceptable Condition (AC), Rate of Change (RoC), Threshold for Success (ToS) and Threshold of Failure (ToF). For a guide on the process of using these mechanisms in setting and assessing targets for metrics, see: NOAH, pp. 2-7–2-9, p. 7-80.

violence, despite making it a priority, allocating resources, and taking significant risks to achieve it. This gap has largely been attributed to a lack of guidance on how to operationalize protection of civilians.[21]

This gap also extends to the realm of operations assessment, where the question is how to measure whether civilians are actually being protected or not. The political leadership, international and domestic interest groups and the general public will usually expect to see tangible results from the operation in terms of protecting civilians. The military's ability to provide credible evaluations of progress is also highly important in an age of global information warfare, where the enemy will seek to discredit the operation, where the expectations of the local population must be managed, and where a broad spectrum of media commentators will actively participate in forming public perception.

The most important reason for conducting operations assessment from a military perspective is that it can be an invaluable tool for commanders to adjust operations in light of developments on the ground. This is critical when it comes to protecting civilians from violence, because unlike territory or systems of government, once a human life has been lost, it cannot be recovered. This increases the costs of failing to protect civilians when they are under imminent threat of violence.

2.4 A scenario-based approach to assessing protection of civilians

From a military perspective, physical protection of civilians has traditionally been understood in terms of adhering to the law of armed conflict and avoiding excessive civilian casualties caused by own forces ('collateral damage'). However, the vast majority of civilian casualties today are caused by perpetrators of violence who deliberately target them in a wide variety of ways. A principal recommendation on how to improve protection of civilians has therefore been to acquire a better understanding of the perpetrators and their violence against civilians.

FFI has previously developed seven generic scenarios, which seek to capture the range of situations where civilians are faced with fundamentally different types of physical threats. These scenarios are based on why perpetrators decide to attack civilians in the first place, the types of actors involved, the strategies and tactics they employed, the military capabilities they require in doing so, and finally, the expected outcome in each scenario, measured in terms of civilian suffering if perpetrators actually succeed.[22]

These scenarios are summarised below and their key characteristics listed in Table 2.1 (p. 15).

[21] See e.g. Beadle, Alexander William (2010), 'Protection of civilians in theory – a comparison of UN and NATO approaches', *FFI-report 2010/02453* (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment).
[22] These scenarios are described in more detail in Beadle, Alexander William (2014), 'Protection of civilians – military planning scenarios and implications', *FFI-report 2014/00519* (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment).

GENOCIDE. The gravest threat to civilians occurs when actors seek to *exterminate* a certain national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Only states or militarily superior actors are likely to possess the means required to kill enough people to achieve this objective. Civilians from the targeted group will be under imminent threat of violence wherever they can be found, especially early on and in areas of large concentration. The expected outcome is that the majority of potential victims are killed (50+ %).

ETHNIC CLEANSING. A less deadly, but more frequent situation occurs when actors seek to *expel* a certain group from a specific territory. These perpetrators are also likely to be states or militarily superior actors. Violence is primarily used demonstratively to coerce the targeted group into leaving and to prevent their return. The threat will be greatest in minority enclaves and corridors or pockets that link the perpetrating actor's communal areas together. Violence is most likely immediately following the seizure of new territory. Relatively few people will be killed compared to GENOCIDE (a few per cent), but the proportion of victims displaced will be very high (~90 %).

REGIME CRACKDOWN. This situation occurs when a government or de facto authority responds to threats against its own survival with *violent repression* of the population. Civilians are not primarily targeted on basis if their ethnic or sectarian identity, but according to presumed or real affiliation with any opposition. Most violence will occur in areas where resistance is strongest. Whole population centres may be destroyed to remove a potential support base for the opposition. The principal threat comes from indiscriminate means used (e.g. conventional weapons against civilian areas). The number of people killed or displaced will vary according to the local level of fighting, with many of the dead being combatants rather than civilians.

POST-CONFLICT REVENGE. A far less violent situation occurs in most post-conflict environments as former victims seek to take *revenge* against previous perpetrators. The actors will be individuals or loosely organized mobs seeking to settle scores on a personal basis. The violence will be more criminal than strategic in nature (e.g. murder, arson, kidnapping and looting). Targets are selected on basis of previous culpability and violence will be most likely in areas where most abuses have occurred before. The number of people killed will be comparatively few, but even low levels of violence can prompt many to flee if the former perpetrators are associated with a specific group of people.

COMMUNAL CONFLICT. A potentially very violent situation occurs when whole communities engage in seemingly endless cycles of violence, motivated by a combination of *revenge* and *self-protection*. Because both sides are organized along shared communal identities rather than as organized armed actors, they are unlikely to possess the means to settle conflicts permanently. However, they cannot afford *not* to retaliate, as this will invite further attacks upon themselves. Civilians are primary targets for both sides, as the roles of perpetrator and victim shift with each cycle. The expected outcome is a high number of casualties relative to each group's total population, as well as displacement of whole communities that flee impending attacks.

PREDATORY VIOLENCE. In weak states, armed groups may prey on the local population simply to *ensure their own survival* or *for economic profits*. These actors are typically rogue security forces or rebels who have failed to achieve their political objectives, but refuse to demobilize or disarm. Often physically removed from the geographic areas where they may gain popular support, they have few incentives to limit violence against civilians. Instead, they rely on pillage, forced recruitment, illegal taxation, lootable resources, and labour exploitation. All civilians and humanitarian actors are potential victims. Attacks are launched on basis of opportunity, preferring 'easy', undefended targets. Relatively few people may actually be killed relative to the total population, but the number of displaced may be very high due to the brutality and unpredictability of attacks.

INSURGENCY. This situation occurs when armed groups fighting over political power target civilians *merely as a tactic*. Government forces or rival armed groups are the primary targets, but these perpetrators still employ a combination of indiscriminate attacks against civilians to destabilise the security situation and selective violence to prevent civilians from collaborating with the enemy. The primary concern for most civilians is unlikely to be threats of physical violence, but more development-related grievances, such as unemployment and corruption. The number of people physically harmed will generally be lower compared to other scenarios.

The 'expected outcome' of each scenario (listed in column 5) is particularly relevant for purposes of assessing whether civilians are being protected. The expected outcomes for each scenario are not based on worst-case situations, but the general characteristics of multiple case-studies of conflicts that fall into each scenario.[23] Each expected outcome is expressed in terms of the relative number of civilians killed, displaced or otherwise harmed as a result of the perpetrator's violence. While exact casualty figures are always contentious and hard to establish with certainty, the relative distribution of killed, displaced, abducted or harmed in other ways is usually identifiable.

For instance, ETHNIC CLEANSING will normally lead to a large percentage of displaced relative to those killed, while the order is reversed in cases of GENOCIDE. Another distinction can be made between scenarios where the civilians are killed or displaced by the perpetrators themselves (GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING) and scenarios where civilians are injured or displaced primarily due to the presence of conflict per se (REGIME CRACKDOWN, INSURGENCY).

This scenario-based approach to assessing protection of civilians provides a starting point for measuring protection of civilians in military operations where it is an objective. If the suffering typical of the particular scenario one is faced with is decreasing, it suggests a certain degree of success in terms of protecting civilians. The question is how this may be measured.

[23] For more information about the cases upon which the various expected outcomes are based, see separate sub-chapters on expected outcomes for each scenario in Beadle (2014).

Generic scenario	1. Type of actor	2. Rationale	3. Strategies and tactics	4. Relevant mil. capabilities	5. Expected outcome
GENOCIDE Halabja (’88) Rwanda (’94) Srebrenica (’95)	States, or the militarily superior actor	To exterminate a certain group	Destroy existence of a group through several, simultaneous mass-killings, deportation, camps, systematic rape to prevent reproduction	Command and control, freedom of movement for special/irregular units, sufficient small arms	Majority of targeted civilians killed (50+%), in relatively short time
ETHNIC CLEANSING Bosnia (’92–95) Kosovo (’99) Kyrgyzstan (’10)	States, or the militarily superior actor	To expel a certain group from a specific territory	Force targeted group to leave through threats, demonstrative killings, brutality, mass-rape, destruction of property	Command and control, freedom of movement for irregular units, regular units for military control	Only a few per cent killed, but vast majority of victims expelled (~90%) Destruction of victim homes and cultural buildings
REGIME CRACKDOWN Iraq (’86-89) Darfur (’03–) Libya (’11) Syria (’11–) Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (’13–)	Authoritarian regimes, or de facto authorities in an area	To control restless populations, on basis of real or perceived affiliation with opposition	Violently repress the population at large, through selective and indiscriminate violence, threats, mass-detention, rape as terror, massive destruction, occasional massacres	Command and control from regime, freedom of movement for regular forces, heavy weapons, special/irregular units in support	Mostly combatant deaths, gradual increase in civilian deaths due to heavy weapons and in accordance with intensity of fighting, large-scale displacement, widespread destruction of population centres
POST-CONFLICT REVENGE Kosovo (post 99) Iraq (post 03)	Individuals or mobs	To avenge past crimes on a personal basis	Tit-for-tat score-settling through criminal acts of violence, such as murder, arson, kidnapping, looting	Freedom of movement for individuals and small groups to access victims	Only a few killed (dozens, hundreds), but groups associated with perpetrator may flee following relatively little violence
COMMUNAL CONFLICT Ituri (‘99–03) Iraq (‘06–07) Jonglei (‘09–)	Whole tribal, ethnic or sectarian communities (possibly with outside support)	To avenge a previous attack and to deter further retribution in order to protect themselves	Attempts to coerce other community into submission through massacres, abductions, raids, destruction of homes and means of survival, often seeking to maximise violence	Freedom of movement to reach other communities, access to deadlier weapons and means of communication is associated with higher lethality	Relatively high number of people killed and abducted, especially women and children Livelihoods stolen or killed Temporary displacement in homogenous areas, more gradual withdrawal to ‘their own’ in mixed areas
PREDATORY VIOLENCE Renamo (’75–92) RUF (‘91–’02) LRA (‘94–)	Rebel groups (predatory behaviour)	To survive or make a profit by exploiting civilians	Coerce civilians into compliance through plunder, taxation, forced recruitment, opportunistic rape, brutality, especially against ‘easy targets’	Freedom of movement to pick time and place of attack, operational secrecy, outside support, possibly central command	Temporary, but large-scale displacement in affected areas and disproportionately many relative to the number of people actually attacked; many abductions, especially of young adolescents
INSURGENCY FARC (’64–) Taliban (’06–) al-Shabaab (’06–)	Rebel groups (classic insurgents with political or ideological objectives)	To control populations upon which they depend and undermine trust in their rivals	Selective and indiscriminate violence, through threats, targeted killings, bombings, retribution, depending on their level of control	Freedom of movement to pick time and place of attack, access to indiscriminate and explosive weapons	Fewer killed and injured than in other scenarios, most due to indiscriminate weapons Gradual displacement from areas of heavy fighting

Table 2.1 FFI’s generic military planning scenarios for protection of civilians (Beadle 2014).

3 How to measure protection of civilians

This chapter outlines six ways to measure protection of civilians, which can be used as a basis for developing relevant and concrete metrics during the assessment of military operations. These six are: (1) civilian casualty figures, (2) civilian behaviour, (3) perception of security, (4) territorial control, (5) delivery of humanitarian assistance, and (6) perpetrator capabilities. They represent common, but alternative ways to measure a reduction in the threat against civilians.

All of these approaches are relevant to measure protection of civilians in most operations, but some aspects of information will be more important according to the particular scenario one is faced with. The purpose here is to describe the methodological potential and limitations of each approach and identify which metrics will be most relevant to assess in different situations. Examples of such metrics are included for each approach. The possible target values attached to these metrics will always depend on the particular conflict and military operation. Where possible, examples of targets from previous operations are included for illustrative purposes.

While civilian casualty figures and the perpetrator's capabilities are relevant aspects to measure in all scenarios, the four other aspects – civilian behaviour, perception of security, territorial control, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance – will be most relevant in less violent situations.

3.1 Civilian casualty figures

Civilian casualty figures concern the number of civilians killed, displaced and harmed in other ways (e.g. arrested, tortured or abducted). In most operations, it is an explicit or implicit objective to reduce the number of civilian casualties. Within the military sphere, the focus has traditionally been on adhering to the law of armed conflict (which prohibits intentional killing of civilians) and preventing excessive civilian casualties ('collateral damage') resulting from one's own actions. This has been reflected in the measures taken to increase protection of civilians on the ground, through civilian casualty tracking cells, restrictions on the use of close air-support and other tactics that have resulted in significant civilian casualties from own actions. During the intervention in Libya in 2011, the target set was zero civilian casualties.

However, a narrow focus on casualties caused by own actions alone means that the overall number of civilian casualties is ignored. E.g. in Afghanistan, pro-government forces have reduced the proportion of civilian casualties caused by themselves from 39 % in 2008 to 11 % in 2013 (of which the international forces were responsible for even fewer). However, the total figure of civilian deaths has increased in the same period, from 1,523 in 2007 to 2,959 in 2013.[24]

Assessing the total number of civilians killed carries military-strategic importance when gaining the population's support is an objective, because civilians are generally more concerned with the

[24] Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2008, *United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)* (2009), p. ii, Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2013, *United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)*, (2014), p. 1.

fact that they are being killed than who is responsible.[25] The reduction in collateral damage has not led to a significant increase in popular support for the government in Afghanistan. For instance, surveys conducted in Faryab province show that the overall perception of security has not improved, despite the reduction in pro-government collateral damage.[26] Simply counting civilian casualties caused by own forces is therefore not sufficient to measure the degree to which an operation is able to protect civilians in any operation.

The assessment staff must also take into consideration the severe restraints that often exist on credible data collection. Accurate casualty figures are often notoriously difficult to obtain in an area of active conflict. E.g., the oft-cited death toll from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)'s decades of war stands at more than 5 million, but 'this figure isn't a count of bodies piling up at morgues; it's an estimate of the difference between civilian mortality rates and the regional "baseline" historical average, last calculated in 2007'.[27] Accurate data collection is made even more difficult by the fact that – in order to be truly valuable as a basis for analysis – the data should include the location, time and description of how and with what means the violence was perpetrated.[28] The lack of good national data, inconsistent reporting, poor infrastructure, limited means of data collection and geographical inaccessibility are examples of factors making accurate casualty recording difficult in conflict-ridden areas, forcing assessment staff to use extrapolation and other techniques for estimating approximate casualty figures.

Casualty figures also tend to be highly contentious and politicised. E.g., in the Libyan civil war in 2011 the rebels initially estimated 50,000 fatalities, a figure eventually adjusted downwards to 4,700 rebel supporters and a similar figure for government supporters.[29] Western media accentuated this flawed perception by reporting inflated casualties figures. Alan Kuperman argues that during the initial days of the uprising more than 2,000 deaths were reported in Western media, while the Human Rights Watch has documented only 233 deaths in the same period.[30] During the Balkan wars in the 1990s Bosnian leaders presented fatality figures of 250,000, while subsequent investigations by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) has shown the figure to be around 100,000, including about 55,000 civilians.[31] The inflation of

[25] See Beadle, Alexander William (2012), 'Protecting Civilians While Fighting a War in Somalia – Drawing Lessons from Afghanistan', *NUPI Policy Brief*, No. 10.
[26] Marthinussen, Elin, Nordli, David and Eggereide, Bård (2014), 'Faryab Survey wave 8 – a year after the redeployment of Norwegian forces from Faryab', *FFI-rapport 2014/00064* (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment), p. 21.
[27] Foreign Policy, 4 March 2013, 'What Happened in Luvungi?', http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/what_happened_in_luvungi#sthash.wsDfxTrS.dpbs.
[28] Beswick, Jacob and Minor, Elizabeth (2013), 'Casualty Recording as an Evaluative Capability: Libya and the Protection of Civilians' in Michael Aaronson and Adrian Johnson (eds), *Hitting the Target? How New Capabilities are Shaping International Intervention* (RUSI), p. 71.
[29] The Guardian, 8 January 2013, 'Libyan revolution casualties lower than expected, says new government', http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/08/libyan-revolution-casualties-lower-expected-government.
[30] Kuperman, Alan J. (2013), 'Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene', *Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center Policy Brief*, p. 2.
[31] Seybolt, Taylor B., Aronson, Jay D. and Fischhoff, Baruch (2013), 'Introduction', in Taylor B. Seybolt, Jay D. Aronson and Baruch Fischhoff (eds), *Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press), p. 4.

figures on the Balkans reoccurred during the Kosovo crisis, when NATO countries accepted the figure of 10,000 or more dead as the premise on which they based their political campaign for military intervention. The ICTY, however, as part of the investigation and proceedings against Milosevic, has only been able to establish conclusively a figure of 2,788 fatalities.[32]

The issues of data reliability and manipulation raise considerable concern when it comes to using casualty data for assessment. Commanders, data collectors and assessment staff must be highly conscious of the data's limitation both in terms of practical collection and the likelihood of manipulation for political purpose. Yet, casualty figures are an essential part of considering the effects of violence on civilian populations and therefore have to be included in any assessment.

When assessing protection of civilians on basis of civilian casualty figures, the assessment staffs must keep in mind that casualties must be measured against the relevant targeted group – and not the entire national population. The displacement and refugee outflow from Iraq post-2003 offers an example. Prior to the U.S. led invasion Assyrians represented less than 5 per cent of the Iraqi population, but in the subsequent turmoil have come to represent 35 per cent of the Iraqi refugees.[33] This clearly shows a disproportionately targeted group of civilians. During the 1994 Rwandan genocide as many as three-quarters of the minority Tutsi population were killed.[34] Of course, the proportion of a targeted community affected is less relevant if the entire population are potential targets, or the violence does not target any specific communal group. Both relative and absolute numbers should be taken into account; a small percentage of a large population can still represent substantial challenge for a military operation, while a high percentage of a small population can cause irreparable damage to the afflicted community.

When assessing whether protection of civilians is actually being achieved, the expected outcomes of each scenario can serve as a reference point against which to measure success or failure. If the number of casualties is below or declining compared to what is typical of the scenario one is faced with, a degree of success can be claimed. Even without accurate casualty figures, the relative distribution between civilians killed, displaced or harmed in particular ways characteristic of a specific scenario, will provide important indicators.

GENOCIDE is the *only* scenario where the majority of potential victims are likely to be killed (50+ %). During ETHNIC CLEANSING, the percentage of people killed will be much lower, but the proportion of civilians displaced will be very high when perpetrators succeed (~90%). During REGIME CRACKDOWN, the numbers of civilians killed, displaced and injured may gradually reach high figures, because of the conventional weaponry likely to be used against population centres. In this scenario, relatively many will also be arrested or have 'disappeared' as well. In all of these scenarios, sexual violence on a systematic and widespread scale is also common.

[32] Seybolt, Taylor B. (2013), 'Significant Numbers', in Seybolt, Aronson and Fischhoff (eds), *Counting Civilian Casualties*, p. 22.
[33] The Guardian, 24 December 2011, 'The desperate plight of Iraq's Assyrians and other minorities', http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/24/iraq-minorities-assyrians.
[34] Meredith, Martin (2005), *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London and New York: Free Press), p. 523.

The total number of people killed during COMMUNAL CONFLICTS may not be very high, but they may constitute a relatively high proportion of each community's total population. During POST-CONFLICT REVENGE and INSURGENCY, the proportion of people killed or displaced is generally much lower than in other scenarios, due to the selective targeting of individuals or the less destructive means involved. During PREDATORY VIOLENCE, even a relatively low number of civilians killed can cause a large, sudden refugee flows due to the brutality involved. Many may also be subjected to particular acts of brutality, such as amputations.

Monitoring civilian casualty figures is therefore a starting point for assessing protection of civilians in all operations. However, the point is not necessarily to establish exact figures, which are often unobtainable, but to establish trends that help the decision-makers understand the nature and direction of the conflict, that is, whether more people are being killed, displaced, or affected in other particular ways. Below follows a generic list of metrics to measure civilian casualty figures, some of which will be more relevant to certain scenarios than others:

Metrics (examples)
Number of civilians killed in total (e.g. sorted according to tactic used or perpetrators responsible)
Proportion of civilians killed relative to the targeted community's population size
Proportion of civilian casualties caused by own military actions ('collateral damage')
Number of civilians arrested/abducted/sexually abused (e.g. sorted by men, women, children)
Number of young adolescents abducted or forcibly recruited by armed groups in an area
Number of civilians subjected to particular acts of brutality (e.g. mutilation of lips)

Table 3.1 Generic metrics for measuring civilian casualty figures.

3.2 Civilian behaviour

Another way of measuring the degree to which civilians are protected is to study their behaviour. It is possible to infer much knowledge of a person's circumstances from his or her everyday choices. The choices people make in everyday life tend to reflect the opportunities and restraints of their immediate environment. In economic theory, the concept of 'revealed preference' suggest that when a person prefers a commodity over another, then a preference has been expressed, other things being equal.[35] The notion of revealed preference and behaviour can also be used to assess the condition of a civilian population more broadly.

Violence against civilians is expected to alter the pattern of civilian behaviour. Monitoring civilian behaviour can therefore be a way to evaluate the extent to which the mission is successful or not in its protection efforts. For such assessments to be accurate and relevant, detailed knowledge of the 'human terrain' is necessary (e.g. local culture, traditions and economic systems). Given that context-specific knowledge is obtained, observing civilian behavioural

[35] Sen, Amartya (1986), 'Behaviour and the Concept of Preference', in Jon Elster (ed.), *Rational Choice* (Worcester: Basil Blackell), pp. 60–81.

patterns over time can offer an effective and relatively cost-efficient approach to assessment. If civilian activity is showing signs of normalization, that is, people are behaving more as they would absent the threat of armed violence, this would indicate that the threat against civilians has been reduced – or at least the effect it has on everyday life.

An advantage of behavioural metrics is that they are likely to involve relatively simple data collection. In many conflict situations, the costs of basic necessities, their availability, and the selection of various goods may provide useful indicators of civilian security in the area. They may also be used as proxy indicators of possible perpetrator presence. E.g. the presence of predatory rebels in the vicinity of rural villages is likely to hamper the planting and harvesting of agricultural products and thereby restricting local supply and driving prices up. As a result, restricted supply and inflated prices of locally produced agricultural products might be used as a metric to measure the threat from these perpetrators over time. The availability of relevant economic information is likely to vary considerably between cases. Sometimes national statistics might be available, sometimes statistics from international organisations can be used, but to assess local conditions in rural conflict-affected areas information will most likely have to be collected from in-theatre NGOs, aid organisations and the communities themselves.

Another factor to consider is changes in civilian behaviour over time. If the community in question has recently transitioned from peace to conflict then conditions prior to the conflict can be used as a concrete baseline. However, if the conflict has been running for many years, then pre-conflict data might have become out-dated or irrelevant. In such cases, baselines may have to be developed using comparable countries where conflict is absent as an approximate standard.

Civilian behaviour is particularly relevant to monitor in the POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, COMMUNAL CONFLICT, PREDATORY VIOLENCE and INSURGENCY, as these scenarios often involve low-scale violence over an extended time period. A possible metric could be to track the cost of local transportation. In communities where women carry goods for trade over long distances on foot, the presence or absence of such trade will be a strong metric of the perceived or actual presence of perpetrators. The number of roadside attacks on traders, the number of roadblocks where civilians are extorted for money or market place activity in general, might be used to assess local security situations.

Civilian behaviour over time is a less useful metric during GENOCIDE and ETHNIC CLEANSING, as these scenarios often unfold very quickly and with easily observable effects as most people will flee or be killed. During REGIME CRACKDOWNS, civilian behaviour will be a more ambiguous metric with greater local variations, but can offer some indication as to where in the area of operations civilians are under most immediate threat. A key difference between civilian behaviour in these scenarios is that civilians tend to flee the actual or believed presence of perpetrators during GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING, COMMUNAL CONFLICT and PREDATORY VIOLENCE, while they tend to flee the presence of violence (not the perpetrators themselves) during REGIME CRACKDOWN and INSURGENCY.

Below follows a list of examples of metrics that may be used to measure civilian behaviour:

Metrics (examples)
Proportion of civilians who flee, co-exist or fight the perpetrators of violence
Local economic situation (e.g. market prices, planting or harvesting rates, transportation costs)
Estimated number of people participating in trade at the local market
Percentage of rural farmland being cultivated
Refugee return rates

Table 3.2 Generic metrics for measuring civilian behaviour.

3.3 Perception of security

A third way of assessing the civilian security situation is to monitor the civilian population's perception of security and combine survey data with observations of relevant events on the ground, e.g. by combining the objective metric of registered rebel activity or own military presence in an specific area with the subjective metric of local people's perception of security.

Such a combination of subjective and objective metrics offers several benefits. For instance, it can reveal where misperceptions and biases lead to actions which do not reflect the actual conditions on the ground. Furthermore, it can be used to say something about the relevance of the metrics being used. That is, if a change in an objective metric does not lead to the expected change in subjective perception, the mission might not be addressing the right issues. If a reduction in the frequency of registered rebel activity does not impact the population's perception of security, the presence of rebels per se might not be the principal security consideration for civilians. It could also indicate that the mission is unable to measure the metric adequately, for instance the perpetrators could be successfully adapting, concealing his activities and so forth.

A comparison of subjective and objective metrics does not automatically imply causality. Both the UN and NATO assessment guides warn against presuming causality – referring instead to 'possible correlations'. The assessment staff must therefore remain careful in how the interaction of subjective and objective metrics is presented to decision-makers. What military forces do is likely to be just as important as their presence. In 2011, Oxfam conducted an opinion survey in conflict-affected areas of eastern DRC (Province Orientale, North Kivu, and South Kivu).[36] The results indicate some important lessons for assessment. For instance, the UN peacekeeping mission was considered a positive protector by the civilians in the areas where UN forces had a clear presence on the ground and engaged in active patrolling. Conversely, in the areas where the UN did not have a clear on the ground profile or engaged in patrolling, it was considered to be inefficient.[37] The same applies in relation to host-nation forces, who sometimes are perceived as just as threatening as rebel groups, and at other times not.

[36] Oxfam International (2011), 'We are entirely exploitable: The lack of protection for civilians in eastern DRC', *Oxfam Briefing Note*.
[37] Ibid., p. 4.

Perceptions of security, like civilian behaviour, will be less relevant to measure in the most violent scenarios, such as GENOCIDE and ETHNIC CLEANSING. In these scenarios, surveys and opinion polling would be impractical and their results predictable. However, in other scenarios, civilian perception of security could potentially be a valuable metric, whose trends over time may indicate the potential for escalation into more violent scenarios. In fact, the perception of insecurity is a primary driver of the security dilemma underpinning COMMUNAL CONFLICTS. Reducing that perception may be just as important as reducing the actual level of violence. Security itself may also be perceived differently in certain operational environments. One study on how 'protection' was perceived in Jonglei state in South Sudan showed that the population took it to mean physical protection of themselves *and* their animal herds from banditry and local clashes, which is likely to be common across pastoralist communities.[38]

By contrast, security does not necessarily need to be the primary concern of the civilian population, especially during INSURGENCY situations. E.g., in Faryab province of Afghanistan, surveys have shown that unemployment has consistently been the primary concern of the local population, with lack of security mentioned alongside lack of electricity and water, poverty, illiteracy and poor roads.[39]

Below follows a list of metrics that may be relevant to monitor civilian perceptions of security:

Metrics (examples)
Perception of security over time
Percentage of people identifying threats of physical violence as their primary security concern
Perception of security in relation to military presence (perpetrator, host-nation, int. forces)
Perception of security in relation to violent incidents (e.g. suicide attacks, night raids, clashes)
Types of threats identified by civilians (e.g. existential, violence, crime, freedom of movement)
Percentage of population who view host-nation forces as protectors

Table 3.3 Generic metrics for measuring perception of security.

[38] Harragin, Simon (2011), South Sudan: Waiting for Peace to Come – Study from Bor, Twic East & Duk Counties in Jonglei. Local to Global Protection.
[39] Marthinussen et al (2014), p. 28.

3.4 Territorial control

Territorial control may be another indicator of civilian security, as the risks to civilians very often increase significantly when territory changes hands.

The first type of risk involves the violence that a change in territorial control enables. Military superiority on the ground is a prerequisite for conducting GENOCIDE or ETHNIC CLEANSING with smaller, irregular units. Thus, the perpetrators in these scenarios will always be the militarily superior party, as it is impossible to exterminate or expel a population without the freedom of movement to reach their victims and attack them. Temporary territorial control is also relevant to enable larger attacks during COMMUNAL CONFLICT, as one community accumulates the strength to attack the other before victims are able to escape or retaliate. Permanent territorial control by one communal actor may in some cases be acquired over neighbourhoods in mixed urban areas or in enclaves where the members of the targeted community are congregated. In either case, the community that loses territorial control are likely to come under imminent threat in these areas.

The second type of risks associated with shifts in territorial control is the danger of retribution, which is common to most scenarios. The most obvious type of these situations is POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, where it is precisely the opportunities provided by a chaotic post-conflict environment where no one is in control that enables individuals and mobs to settle personal scores with those associated with former perpetrators. The gravest danger of retaliation, however, occurs in situations where civilians are deliberately targeted for purposes of population control, such as in REGIME CRACKDOWN and INSURGENCY where perpetrators rely on violence to eliminate opponents and deter cooperation with their enemies. If government forces capture a village only to withdraw, allowing rebels to retake it (or vice versa), the civilian population is often seen as having collaborated with the enemy and therefore likely to be retaliated against.

This dynamic has been observed in the DRC, where civilians have been targeted in retaliation by all sides, including government forces.[40] For instance, as the largely Hutu rebel group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) retook areas lost to government and Rwandese forces in 2009, it violently retaliated against civilians it considered government collaborators.[41] In 2012, it was government forces that went on a rampage, looting and raping civilians after an offensive to recapture Goma from the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels ended in failure.[42]

The scale of retribution is also likely to be particularly high during PREDATORY VIOLENCE. This is because predatory rebels, unlike classic insurgents, are unlikely to hold any ambitions of eventually gaining popular support from the population they target. For them, violent retribution is just as much an end in itself. This may be reflected in dramatic peaks in the number of people killed (e.g. during operation 'No Living Thing' launched by the Revolutionary United Front in

[40] Oxfam (2011), p. 5.
[41] The Christian Science Monitor, 23 March 2009, 'Hutu rebels in Congo strike back against joint offensive', http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2009/0323/p04s01-woaf.html.
[42] The Guardian, 26 November 2012, 'Congo's army accused of rape and looting as M23 rebels win image war', http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/26/drc-army-accused-rape-murder-congo.

Sierra Leone, 1999) or in terms of the brutality used to scare the population (e.g. the practise of cutting off ears, lips and nose employed by the Lord's Resistance Army).

Below follows a list of metrics that may be useful to monitor changes in the level of threat to civilians resulting from territorial changes:

Metrics (examples)
Frequency of change in territorial control
Population movements in area of change in territorial control
Number of attacks in areas where territorial control is disputed
Number of civilians killed during retaliatory attacks following armed clashes

Table 3.4 Generic metrics for measuring territorial control.

3.5 Delivery of humanitarian assistance

Assessing the delivery of humanitarian assistance may be relevant in most scenarios given that violence against civilians very often leads to displacement, destruction of livelihoods and the collapse of regular economic activities. However, dealing with the humanitarian consequences of war is typically considered to be the task of international and non-governmental aid organisations. Military forces may nonetheless have to play a role in supporting the delivery of humanitarian aid, which also makes it relevant to measure from a military perspective.

First of all, failure to tackle these indirect consequences of conflict implies mission failure if the operation's mandate is to protect civilians. Secondly, these consequences are often caused by physical violence against civilians, and dealing with them may therefore be considered as part of the military operation's effort to prevent civilian suffering. Thirdly, humanitarian assistance may also be outright denied by perpetrators of violence, making the delivery of aid impossible without military support. This will vary from scenario to scenario.

During GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING and REGIME CRACKDOWN, perpetrators have no incentive to allow aid to reach its intended victims when their objectives are to exterminate, expel or subjugate the populations. Areas affected by COMMUNAL CONFLICT, PREDATORY VIOLENCE and INSURGENCIES may also be too dangerous for civilian organisations to access without military protection. It is therefore reasonable to assume that military forces may be required to create humanitarian corridors into entrapped enclaves, provide protection for civilian aid distributors in areas with high risk of attack, or even be directly involved in the provision of aid if civilian logistics and supply mechanisms prove insufficient or poorly adapted to the prevailing conditions.

The relevant metrics to assess delivery of humanitarian assistance are likely to be the same ones as those used by humanitarian agencies. Many humanitarian organisations have also developed relatively sophisticated tools for assessing the humanitarian situations, which can be a valuable

source of information. Below follows a list of metrics that may be relevant to monitor over time, especially in terms of assessing the need for military involvement in the delivery of aid:

Metrics (examples)
Percentage of civilians with access to basic needs (e.g. water, food, shelter, medical assistance)
Percentage of civilians showing signs of malnutrition
Percentage of trucks carrying humanitarian aid reaching its destination
Percentage of aid stolen by armed actors
Number of attacks on humanitarian actors
Types of attacks on humanitarian actors (threats, theft, destruction of facilities, direct attacks)
Percentage of aid convoys denied entry by government forces

Table 3.5 Generic metrics for measuring delivery of humanitarian assistance.

3.6 Perpetrator capabilities

Perpetrator capabilities refer to the operational requirements perpetrators require to inflict the particular kind of violence that will serve the attainment of their objectives. For instance, genocidaires will require substantial preparation, coordination and sufficient numbers of killers or weapons to achieve high death rates, while insurgents may only require simple explosives to achieve the intended destabilising effect their violence is intended to serve. The purpose of measuring perpetrator capabilities is that it offers a way of assessing factors directly affecting the use of violence against civilians. This approach is qualitatively different from the five previous ones, as it measures not only the ability of a perpetrator to attack civilians today, but also his potential ability to attack civilians in other, perhaps more violent ways in the future. A reduction in perpetrator capabilities will therefore involve a reduction in both the actual and potential threats to civilians. These assessments may in turn provide direct inputs to the risk management and planning of military operations.

FFI has identified five main categories of capabilities that perpetrators may be critically dependent on when attacking civilians.[43] However, not all of these capabilities will be required by perpetrators in all scenarios. Identifying which of these are critical to a perpetrator's ability to attack civilians (as opposed to attacking another armed actor) is necessary to assess whether changes in the perpetrator's capabilities will actually reduce their ability to attack civilians or not.

The first possible perpetrator capability is *advance planning*, which will be relevant for actors who intend to initiate systematic and widespread violence against civilians. This will be critical during GENOCIDE and ETHNIC CLEANSING. In fact, most historical cases of mass killing were not only a result of intentional politics, but required effective preparations. During REGIME

[43] See Beadle (2014) for the identification of these five categories. For concrete examples of perpetrator capabilities, see Våge, Anders Skeibrok (2014), 'Violence against civilians: case-studies of perpetrators', *FFI-report 2014/00520* (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment).

CRACKDOWN, a regime responds to an uprising it has failed to prevent, but more advanced planning for strategic violence against civilians can emerge over time as the conflict progresses. In the remaining scenarios, advance planning is not critical to conduct the type of criminal, opportunistic or indiscriminate violence perpetrated against civilians. Assessing (or reducing) a perpetrator's ability to plan for violence against civilians is, however, very hard to do.

A second, related capability is *top-down coordination*. Political and military leaders often play a leading role in instigating and organizing mass violence. The ability to coordinate attacks against civilians is likely to be critical during GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING, REGIME CRACKDOWN and the most deadly forms of COMMUNAL CONFLICT. For that reason, destruction of command and control (C2) nodes and targeting the responsible leaderships are likely to have a protective effect in cases where the execution of violence relies on coordination from above. In some cases, perpetrators conducting PREDATORY VIOLENCE rely on orders from centralised leaderships, whose orders or characteristics may encourage more violence. By contrast, the political and military leadership of armed groups who only target the population as a tactic will not be critical to the small-scale violence they perpetrate against civilians. In fact, the costs of neutralising key leaders during INSURGENCIES may be higher than the benefits, as it invites retaliation against civilians because new leaders will have to re-impose control over the local population in that area.

Ambiguity concerns the ability of perpetrators to maintain the support required from those units needed to execute the violence (e.g. members of the armed forces, ethnic groups), while concealing their criminal actions from those who may stop them (e.g. moderate politicians, the international community). This is perhaps a unique requirement for perpetrators of violence against civilians, as it constitutes such an obvious breach of legal conventions that all armed actors are bound by. Ambiguity will be most important for perpetrators who plot large-scale violence against civilians, but need to conceal their actions so as not to allow their victims to escape (during GENOCIDE and COMMUNAL CONFLICT) or to prevent outside intervention (in most scenarios). Ambiguity can also be important for regimes trying to legitimise their fight to preserve political control (REGIME CRACKDOWN). For non-state actors who are not able to formally oppose outside intervention, ambiguity is generally less important, but could serve a purpose as part of information warfare in the contest over population control during an INSURGENCY, or to avoid too much unwanted attention during PREDATORY VIOLENCE. Assessing the way in which perpetrators are able to maintain this ambiguity will be important to delegitimise their cause, as well as to monitor their ability to continue or escalate attacks further. This may be done by assessing the degree of support they have.

Freedom of movement is understood as having the means to move forces from one place to another (mobility) and the ability to do so unimpeded (at low risks from enemy attacks). Both of these can be countered, either by destroying the infrastructure needed to travel, or attacking units on the move. Freedom of movement is unique in that it is an operational requirement that all perpetrators require to attack civilians in *all* scenarios. Deprived of the ability to access the civilian population they intend to target, any perpetrator will be unable to inflict violence. The type of freedom of movement required to reach their intended targets, however, will vary. In

general, perpetrators will either need it to concentrate firepower against strategically important population centres, or be able to strike anywhere and at any time of their choosing.

This relates to the fifth and final possible perpetrator capability, which is access to *relevant types of military units and weapons*. Depending on a perpetrator's rationale, which military units and weapons he will require to implement the kind of violence needed to achieve his objectives will vary considerably from scenario to scenario. Access to conventional forces and heavy weaponry, such as air forces, heavy armour and artillery, will only be a critical requirement during REGIME CRACKDOWN, because these perpetrators will literally need to crush all opposition to keep themselves in power. By contrast, perpetrators of GENOCIDE and ETHNIC CLEANSING do not necessarily require heavy weaponry, but still require a preponderance of force relative to the community they are attempting to exterminate or expel. The units used to execute violence against civilians on the ground in these two scenarios are more often than not paramilitaries, militias, or special units. During COMMUNAL CONFLICT, POST-CONFLICT REVENGE and PREDATORY VIOLENCE, violence is usually conducted with simpler means – in many cases not extending beyond hand-held weaponry – and by militias, mobs, criminals or mere individuals. Similarly, INSURGENTS rarely require advanced means to target civilians. Improvised explosive devices are often primary killers of both government forces and civilians in this scenario.

In general, the pattern is that the more violent a perpetrator plans to be, the more capabilities will he require to implement that violence. Beyond the generic inference of metrics based on which capabilities are normally required, the assessment staff must also identify case-specific metrics on perpetrator capabilities, especially in combination with the resulting civilian behaviour and casualty figures. For instance, a common characteristic of REGIME CRACKDOWN and INSURGENCY is the prevalence of urban and siege warfare. A generic trait of urban and siege warfare is the use of explosive weapons against populated areas, which leads to a much higher proportion of civilian casualties relative to rural areas.[44] An implication is that a reduction in the use of explosive weapons against urban targets implies a relevant metric for assessing protection of civilians.

While a metric can be either qualitative or quantitative, it is suggested that it should be reducible to a quantity.[45] In the case of explosive weaponry being used against urban areas, this could for instance be measured by the frequency and intensity of artillery impacts over a given area. This assessment will give a sense of the destructive force unleashed. For instance, while Sarajevo experienced 3,500 shells per day at its most intensive, the shelling of Grozny in Chechnya in 1995 numbered 4,000 explosive impacts per hour.[46]

[44] Dodd, Henry and Perkins, Robert (2013), 'An Explosive Situation: Monitoring explosive violence in 2012', *Action on Armed Violence*, p. 3.
[45] COPD, p. 5-14, NOAH, p. 2-4.
[46] Bellamy, Alex J. (2012), *Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 324.

Below follows a list of generic metrics sorted according to categories of perpetrator capabilities:

Metrics (examples)	
Advance planning and top-down coordination	Number of simultaneous massacres against civilians in a specific area
	Proportion of civilians killed in coordinated versus uncoordinated attacks
	Geographical patterns of attacks against civilians
Ambiguity	Percentage of the population reached by the perpetrator's media outlets
	Percentage of the population in support of the perpetrator's cause
	Number of defections from perpetrators (e.g. amongst political or military leaders, or military units on the ground)
	Dehumanisation of a specific group (e.g. hate-speech references in the media)
	International public opinion on the perpetrator
Freedom of movement	Frequency of perpetrator sightings in a specific area (e.g. government helicopters)
	Number of security incidents in a specific area (e.g. roadside attacks, extortion at roadblocks, car bombs, air attacks)
	Variation in time and place of attacks (e.g. geographical distance and time intervals)
	Percentage of city entry points or road blocks controlled by perpetrator forces
	Number of relevant forces associated with the perpetrator in a specific area (e.g. sorted according to regular, paramilitary, special units)
Relevant military units and weaponry	Number of civilians killed or injured by certain types of weapons or tactics (e.g. machetes, IEDs, barrel bombs, large-scale massacres, air strikes, assassinations)
	Availability of certain destructive weapons used against civilians (e.g. number of aircraft available to bomb population centres, militia members armed with firearms)
	Deadliness of each attack (e.g. rise associated with access to certain new weapons)
	Military superiority of perpetrators (e.g. relative size of rival militias, number of paramilitaries operating freely in victim areas, perpetrator losses)

Table 3.6 Generic metrics for measuring relevant perpetrator capabilities to attack civilians.

4 Determining success in protecting civilians

In operations assessment, having a 'baseline' is needed as a point of reference against which to compare progression or regression of goal achievement in a military operation. A baseline can be defined as 'the capture of current system state just prior to any attempt by own forces to modify the system'.[47] In protection of civilians, the objective is to reduce the current level of threat, without causing more harm in the process. By using the expected outcomes described for each scenario and the different ways of measuring protection of civilians listed above, it is possible to identify some 'generic baselines' against which to measure progress in protecting civilians in different situations.

Success in protecting civilians must always be determined against the particular threat civilians are faced with in the first place. Assuming that one has identified the kind of scenario(s) one is facing in the area of operations, it is possible to assess whether efforts to protect civilians are succeeding or not based on what is likely to happen if perpetrators succeed. If the suffering typical of the particular scenario one is faced with is being reduced, it suggests a certain degree of success in terms of protecting civilians. Below follows a summary of generic baselines that can be used to assess protection of civilians in each scenario. The indicators of success listed here are primarily related to reducing specific threats of violence rather than the success of a military operation as a whole, as the primary focus of this report is on measuring physical security.

During GENOCIDE, the majority of civilians targeted are likely to die if the perpetrators succeed. Therefore, a reduction in the number of large-scale massacres of civilians belonging to the targeted group will be a primary indicator of success in protecting civilians in this scenario. Protection of civilians by reducing perpetrator capabilities is achieved when the perpetrator's military superiority in victim areas is weakened and the number of killers or highly destructive weapons needed to achieve high death rates is reduced. At the tactical level, preventing or stopping attacks against locations or areas where potential victims are congregated in large numbers is likely to save many lives, because one could reasonably assume that the majority of them would otherwise be killed. Changes in civilian behaviour, threat perceptions, or delivery of humanitarian assistance will have least relevance as indicators of successful protection in situations where civilians are already faced with imminent threats of physical extermination.

During ETHNIC CLEANSING, the majority of civilians targeted are likely to be permanently expelled from specific geographical areas. Therefore, a reduction in the number of civilians displaced and the number of their homes destroyed will be primary indicators of success in protecting civilians in this scenario. The number of civilians killed is a less useful indicator in itself, as this may only constitute very few of the civilians actually under threat of expulsion. A reduction in the particular brutality of violence that makes people flee in advance and their perceptions of threat may provide better indicators of success. Fewer shifts of territorial control will be another critical indicator of success, as this is a prerequisite for conducting cleansing operations and is associated with peaks in violence. Successful protection based on reducing

[47] NOAH, p. 3-25.

perpetrator capabilities include denying freedom of movement for irregular or special forces (e.g. paramilitaries, militias, police units) that usually conduct the violence on the ground, disrupting perpetrator channels of communication through which expulsion is legitimised, and reducing their ability to coordinate attacks in geographical patterns that create contiguous ethnically pure territories. Sustaining the delivery of humanitarian assistance into besieged enclaves will be also an indicator of success in this scenario. The number of civilians returning to areas from which they have previously been expelled is a key indication of a reduced threat of expulsion. The potential for escalation to GENOCIDE, where the objective is extermination rather than expulsion, may be assessed by monitoring the potential support for such a solution (whether amongst the perpetrator leadership or the population in general).

During REGIME CRACKDOWN, a general reduction in the total number of civilians killed, injured, displaced or arrested will be the most basic indicator of success. Here, the overall figure of civilians harmed will be more important than that of a particular group, as civilians are first and foremost targeted on basis of perceived affiliation with the opposition. Reducing the number of territorial shifts and the civilian population's perceived threat of retaliation from either side will be another indicator of success. As will continued delivery of humanitarian aid into opposition-controlled areas, which is likely to be denied by government forces. Protecting civilians is also achieved by denying perpetrators the use of regular forces and heavy weapons (e.g. air forces, tanks, heavy artillery), disrupting their ability to command and control the use of these forces, and access to weapons of mass destruction. The potential of other unfolding scenarios, such as COMMUNAL CONFLICT, ETHNIC CLEANSING, or GENOCIDE, can be assessed by monitoring the degree to which civilians begin to flee the mere presence of certain perpetrators and the number of attacks against civilians based on their communal identity. However, in order to conduct the violence characteristic of these scenarios, perpetrators need control over and freedom of movement for other types of military units (e.g. paramilitaries, militias and special units).

During POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, a reduction in the number of civilians subjected to criminal acts of violence (murder, arson, kidnapping, looting) will be the primary indicator of success in protecting civilians. A reduction in the freedom of movement for individuals or mobs seeking revenge will be the principal (and perhaps only) indicator of success based on perpetrator capabilities. The potential for escalation into other, more violent scenarios can be assessed by monitoring the number of attacks against whole groups of civilians associated with the former perpetrators and their perception of threat. This may indicate how easily these groups may flee in large numbers if more violence breaks out. Greater freedom of movement for civilians associated with former perpetrators (e.g. by travelling outside their 'safe sites') will be a key indication of successful reduction in the threat of POST-CONFLICT REVENGE.

During COMMUNAL CONFLICT, a reduction in the number of retaliatory attacks is perhaps the greatest indicator of protection success. The perception of threat amongst *both* communal groups may be more important than the actual number of civilians killed during each round, as fear of being attacked is the principal motivation for launching attacks by both sides. If the cycles of revenge attacks start to decline and the perception of threat from the other community is reduced,

the primary threats associated with COMMUNAL CONFLICT are being addressed. However, if threat perceptions only decline for one of the communities involved, this may indicate a lack of protection of the other community. It may also indicate that one community is gaining the military superiority required for more decisive violence, such as ETHNIC CLEANSING. Successful protection by reducing perpetrator capabilities depends on restricting the freedom of movement for communal militias from both sides to attack the other community, and denying access to more deadly weapons than are currently available to them.

During PREDATORY VIOLENCE, the greatest indicator of success is a general reduction in the number of civilians killed, injured, displaced, and abducted in particular. If fewer civilians flee as a result of violent incidents nearby and their general perception of threat is being reduced, protection from threats of PREDATORY VIOLENCE is being achieved, because these perpetrators rely on spreading fear to coerce civilians into submission. Protection is also achieved by destroying these perpetrators' ability to operate, especially their ability to launch attacks against undefended civilians in isolated areas and humanitarian actors who deliver assistance in the area.

During INSURGENCY, the greatest indicator of protection success is a reduction in the total figure of civilians killed, injured or displaced – and not merely a reduction in civilian caused by own military actions ('collateral damage'). A certain degree of success is achieved when physical security is no longer the primary concern of the civilian population. Protection is also achieved when the number of shifts in territorial control and the fear of retaliation from both sides are minimised. Reducing perpetrator capabilities to target civilians is possible by degrading or denying them access to particular types of weapons that are responsible for the civilian casualties (such as IEDs or suicide bombers). However, what these weapons or tactics may be, will be very context-specific and change over time as the insurgents adapt to the protector's counter-measures.

These are only *generic baselines*, but they provide a starting point for determining success in protecting civilians in different situations where the threats to civilians vary fundamentally. During actual conflicts or military operations, more concrete baselines will have to be determined and more specific desired targets set. However, regardless of the specific baselines or targets selected, the relevant aspects of information and criteria for determining success in protecting civilians will change in line with the threats on the ground. E.g. if the situation escalates from REGIME CRACKDOWN to GENOCIDE, the civilian casualty figures and perpetrator capabilities that are relevant to measure will alter significantly. Equally, if the situation de-escalates, e.g. from one-sided ETHNIC CLEANSING to more balanced COMMUNAL CONFLICT, civilian behaviour and perceptions of security will become more important. Thus, in order to assess whether civilians are being protected throughout the entire duration of a military operation, information may have to be collected on all of the aspects listed in this report. However, the relevance of each will vary according to the threat one is tasked with protecting civilians from during different phases.

5 Conclusion

Operations assessment is a process that is intended to provide commanders and decision-makers with information on whether an operation's objectives are being achieved and where efforts may have to be adjusted. In order to be useful, such assessments need to measure aspects that are relevant to the particular objectives being assessed, which in this report is protection of civilians.

Progress in terms of protecting civilians is defined as reducing the existing level of threat to civilians. In any situation where civilians are under threat of physical violence, the primary source of that threat is likely to come from perpetrators who deliberately target civilians as part of their strategy. However, there is a great variation in the ways in which they may target civilians. Using the seven scenarios developed by FFI (GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING, REGIME CRACKDOWN, POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, COMMUNAL CONFLICT, PREDATORY VIOLENCE and INSURGENCY), it is possible to identify the scope of threats civilians may be faced with and the types of suffering that must be reduced in order to claim that protection of civilians is achieved.

The question is how this can actually be measured. Assessing civilian casualty figures will be important in all scenarios, but requires a cautious approach and focus on the relevant numbers. In general, the total number of civilian casualties is more important than those caused by own military actions. However, when certain groups of civilians are targeted, the figures must be measured against that group's population rather than civilians in total. The purpose is not to establish exact figures, but identify trends that can help decision-makers understand whether people are being killed, displaced, or harmed in ways that require planning adjustments.

From a strictly military planning perspective, monitoring perpetrator capabilities is perhaps the most useful aspect in all scenarios, because these capabilities represent the means with which perpetrators acquire the ability to attack civilians – and which can be degraded by military action. Assessing perpetrator capabilities will be particularly relevant in the most violent scenarios, where perpetrators are most dependent on numerous capabilities to execute the violence. By assessing a perpetrator's capabilities to conduct other forms of violence, it is also possible to measure the potential for further violence – or at least his ability to do so. Civilian behaviour, perception of security, shifts in territorial control and the delivery of humanitarian aid may provide additional metrics to assess protection of civilians in situations where the violence is not overwhelming. Perceptions of security may in some cases be more important than the number of attacks, while the perception of what is meant by security may vary significantly. Combining these metrics with civilian casualty figures is likely to provide a more comprehensive assessment of whether the threats to civilians in different situations are actually being reduced or not.

These ways of measuring protection of civilians provide the basis for determining the degree to which a military operation is successfully reducing the threat to civilians or not. By using the expected outcomes described for each scenario and the relevant ways to measure, it is possible to develop generic baselines against which to assess protection of civilians. However, the relevance of different aspects of information and the criteria for determining success is likely to change in accordance with developments on the ground where the threats to civilians vary over time.

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Abbreviations

C2	Command and control
COPD	Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
DRC	The Democratic Republic of the Congo
FFI	Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOP	Measure of Performance
NJHQ	Norwegian Joint Headquarters
NOAH	NATO Operations Assessment Handbook
NODEFIC	Norwegian Defence International Centre

Appendix A Operations assessment literature

Source	Title	Short description
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – The Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC)	Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities	The OECD DAC guidance paper is an attempt at standardising some of the Monitoring & Evaluation process in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The underlying rationale for the paper is that the actual outcome of peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts often falls short of the donor states' intentions. Furthermore, it is found that 'conflict prevention and peacebuilding policies, programmes and projects lack coherence with each other, as well as with an overall country strategy'.[48] By developing methods and practices for evaluating processes, insight into best practices can be found. The objective is therefore to improve the 'understanding of what contributes positively to peace' and to 'develop more coherent, co-ordinated and effective interventions at all levels'.[49]
United Nations	Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking	The UN has become increasingly aware of the need for good assessment. In Resolution 1894 the Security Council, in regard to assessment and protection of civilians, stated a need for 'benchmarks, as and when appropriate, to measure and review processes made in the implementation of peacekeeping mandates and stresses the importance of including indicators of progress regarding the protection of civilians'.[50] According to Svein Erik Stave, the author of the UN benchmarking guide, a challenge for the UN is that the goals and objectives of peacekeeping operations are rooted in political desires rather than the actual context on the ground. The conduct of benchmarking (assessment) is not standardised and is largely based on the available resources, priorities and competence within each mission.[51] The UN's Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking is intended to help address this issue, by providing basic principles, guidelines and resources that will enable United Nations field presences to measure progress towards or regress away from peace consolidation. It attempts do so by 'clarifying key terms and providing guidance on establishing a benchmarking system, data handling and reporting'.[52]

[48] Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – The Development Assistance Committee* (2008), p. 12.
[49] Ibid., p. 8.
[50] Security Council Resolution 1894, *United Nations Security Council* (2009).
[51] Stave, 'Measuring peacebuilding', p. 5, p. 7.
[52] Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking, *United Nations* (2010).

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl)	Code of Best Practice for the Use of Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) to Support Campaign Assessment	This guide argues for the importance of assessment in military operations, stating that 'without the ability to measure and assess the success of any given operation we are unable to make best use of the limited resources available and optimise our effort'.[53] The document offers clear military assessment terminology and a fairly straight forward and comprehensible guidance to operations assessment.
Joint Chiefs of Staff	Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations and Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operations Planning	JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 define assessment as 'a process that evaluates changes in the environment and measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment'.[54] Assessment is described as a tool intended to 'help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remains aligned with the mission and military end state'.[55] To be of value to a commander tangible advice must emerge from the assessment process, as 'assessment may diagnose problems, but unless it results in recommended adjustments, its use to the commander is limited'.[56]
Joint Chiefs of Staff	Commander's Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution	A practical guidance on 'how to' conduct operations assessment. Its purpose is to provide a 'reference describing how to conduct assessment execution and planning'.[57] The handbook offers a comprehensive set of guidelines and methodologies on a step-by-step basis to the assessment process and is currently the most extensive U.S. military guide to assessment. It is a valuable source for understanding military assessment in general, and U.S. thinking specifically.
Department of the Army	Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process	Contains a section on assessment with a guide to process and best practice.[58]
Department of the Army	Commander and Staff Officer Guide: Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures	While the ADRP 5-0 does not contain a clear methodology, this is offered in the ATTP, which suggests a six stage model of how to conduct assessment.[59]

[53] Howard and Picken, 'Code of Best Practice', p. 6.
[54] Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, *Joint Chiefs of Staff* (2011), p. II-9, and Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning, *Joint Chiefs of Staff* (2011), p. III-44.
[55] Joint Publication 3-0, p. II-10.
[56] Joint Publication 5-0, p. D-5.
[57] Commander's Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution, *Joint Chiefs of Staff (*2011), p. i.
[58] Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process, *Department of the Army* (2012), pp. 5-1–5-5.
[59] Commander and Staff Officer Guide: Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP), *Department of the Army* (2011), pp. 7-1–7-7.

	(ATTP)	
Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)	Assessment and Measures of Effectiveness in Stability Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures	This assessment guide specifically addresses the issue of stability operations. It suggests integrating the military assessment process with civilian development expertise to develop a comprehensive framework for countering instability. It is a population-centric approach to insurgency by taking as its assumption that there is a direct link between a populations perceptions and the level of (in)stability.
Joint Force Commanders (JFCOM)	Handbook for Joint Force Commanders: Assessing progress in environments involving irregular adversaries	This assessment guide, developed under the auspices of the U.S. Joint Force Commanders (JFCOM) initiated Multinational Experiment 6 (MNE) concept development program, deals specifically with assessment in environments involving irregular warfare.
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)	Progress Assessment in a Multinational Operation – a Norwegian Perspective	FFI has developed a four-stage assessment model, utilised in assessing the Norwegian efforts in Afghanistan.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)	Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD Interim V2.0)	The purpose of COPD is to 'outline the military procedures and responsibilities governing the preparation, approval, implementation and review of operation plans to enable a common approach to operations planning'.[60] Chapter 5 is specifically concerned with operations assessment, which it defines as 'the activity that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations in support of decision-making'.[61] The purpose is to 'inform on progress being made in creating desired effects, establishing decisive conditions (DCs) and towards achieving objectives, which in turn allows for adjustments to be made to the plan, and inform the decision-making process for the military and political leadership'.[62]
Allied Command Transformation (ACT)	NATO Operations Assessment Handbook (NOAH 2.0)	The NOAH is more extensive and detailed than COPD's Chapter 5 and provides extensive guidance on terminology, methodology, and assessment tools. As such, it can be considered a 'how to' guide on operations assessment.

[60] COPD, p. 1-4.
[61] Ibid., p. 5-1.
[62] Ibid.