



FFI-rapport 2013/02793

Attainment of goals for the Norwegian led provincial reconstruction team in Faryab – an assessment



Svein E. Martinussen, Andreas Barstad
and Jonas Myhre Christiansen



Attainment of goals for the Norwegian led provincial reconstruction team in Faryab – an assessment

Svein E. Martinussen, Andreas Barstad and Jonas Myhre Christiansen

Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

11 February 2014

FFI-rapport 2013/02793

1229

P: ISBN 978-82-464-2344-9

E: ISBN 978-82-464-2345-6

Keywords

Afghanistan

ISAF

Militære doktriner

Operasjonsanalyse

Effektivitetsmål

Approved by

Frode Rutledal

Project Manager

Espen Skjelland

Director

English summary

This work addresses the question: “*Did we achieve what we planned to do in Faryab?*”.

The plans for the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Maimanah in Faryab province in Afghanistan is used as a basis for the analysis. A simple assessment is made to see if the milestones of the plans have been reached. The work is an extension of assessments that were made by operations analysts in the staff of the PRT in the period from 2010 to 2012.

The analysis clearly indicates that the military part of the mission was conducted in accordance with orders from ISAF and the comprehensive Norwegian approach to the challenges in Faryab. Our analysis also suggests that the plans that were made by the Norwegian contingent were consistent over time.

Grouping the milestones according to focus areas as well as activity types, indicate that the success rate has been high in the areas where military resources has been used exclusively, but poor in the areas where civilian and military assets should have been coordinated. More specifically, it is the activities connected to containing and isolating the insurgency, and projecting a positive image of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, that exhibit a level of attainment of goals below 50%.

Norsk sammendrag

Denne rapporten svarer på spørsmålet: “*Oppnådde vi det vi planla å gjøre i Faryab?*”.

Planene til det norsk-ledede *Provincial Reconstruction Team* (PRT) i Maimanah i Faryab-provinsen i Afghanistan er utgangspunktet for analysen. Det gjøres en enkel vurdering av om milepælene i planene er nådd. Arbeidet er en fortsettelse av vurderinger som ble gjort av operasjonsanalytikere som var tilknyttet staben i PRT-et i perioden fra 2010 til 2012.

Analysen indikerer klart at den militære delen av oppdraget er gjort i samsvar med ordre fra ISAF og den norske helhetlige strategien for Faryab. Analysen vår indikerer også at planene som ble laget av den norske kontingenten var konsistent over tid.

Gruppering av milepælene etter fokusområder så vel som aktivitetstype indikerer at suksessraten har vært høy på områder der militære ressurser er brukt alene, men dårlig på områder der sivile og militære virkemidler burde vært koordinert. Mer spesifikt er det aktivitetene knyttet til det å avgrense og isolere opprøret, og det å projisere et positivt bilde av sentrale styresmakter som har en måloppnåelse på under 50%.

Contents

	Preface	6
1	Introduction	7
1.1	Research question	7
2	The Norwegian PRT in Maimanah	8
2.1	Organization	8
2.2	The orders received by the Norwegian PRT	9
2.3	How plans were made	10
3	The method for assessing the level of attainment of goals	12
3.1	Focus areas	12
3.2	Activities	13
3.3	Resources	14
4	Results and analysis	14
4.1	Focus areas	14
4.2	Activities	15
4.3	Resources	16
5	Conclusion	18
	References	20
	Appendix A Assessment of Milestones	21
	Appendix B Acronyms	29

Preface

Operations analysts, with the specific task of making assessment of the effect of the operations were deployed as part of the staff of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Faryab from 2008 to 2012. When analyzing the situation in Faryab, one could not avoid noticing that there were significant discrepancies between the public opinion about our endeavor in Faryab at home and the realities in Afghanistan.

It is the impression of the authors that the soldiers that returned home after having finished their duty in Faryab, experienced the expectations and misconceptions in the public opinion in Norway, and frequently were compelled to feel that they had failed. This report was made to show what the soldiers were working to achieve in Faryab, and to what extent the goals were reached.

We hope that the report, and the information about the military operations that has been made available, will contribute to a better informed public debate. The report has been written to be readable for people that are not familiar with the military decision making process, and does not conform to the terminology of military planners. Some readers may find the report somewhat vague on detailed aspects of the military operations. This is due to the goal of making the report open to the public.

1 Introduction

The problem that will be addressed in this report was first raised by the principal operations officer in the staff of the combined Norwegian - Latvian unit during its last months of deployment to Maimanah:

“What did we achieve in Faryab?”

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) had just been substituted by a contingent dedicated to facilitate an accelerated transfer of full responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). For the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldiers and officers, seeing the dismal security situation, the corruption, the lack of accountability in governance and the lack of coordinated effort amongst the ANSF actors, the accelerated transition to full ANSF responsibility was by many perceived to be premature. After eight years of deployments and after several lives lost, the need to evaluate what had been achieved felt more pressing than ever.

1.1 Research question

As a first cut, to simplify the problem the operations analyst at that time instead addressed the question:

“Did we achieve what we planned to do?”

An answer to the first question would include both wanted and unwanted effects of the comprehensive effort in Faryab. The second question is limited to the effects we wanted to achieve, and would exclude other effects. Also, the second question is more operational as measuring effects is an integral part of most planning processes.

In this report plans and orders from ISAF and Regional Command North (RCN) is used as a starting point. The PRT received and processed such orders for each new deployment to Faryab. According to established military planning procedures, the part of the order addressing Faryab was interpreted, and plans for the operations in Faryab were established. One of the tools of the Military Decision Making Process is the use of operations designs. The operations design is a tool to visualize the plan. It is also used to assess the progress of own operations while they are ongoing. The operations designs contains milestones that needs to be passed to reach the desired “end state” given by orders from higher command. Milestones may be passed, or they may not, and we have investigated which milestones that were passed to see which goals that were reached during the last three years in Faryab.

The research question may only be answered for the last three years of operations in Faryab. This is due to lack of data during the first deployments to Faryab. Gathering of data and systematic assessments did not start before the Operation Analysts joined the Staff of the PRT.

In the next Chapter, the report outlines the organization, command relations and the planning process of the PRT. Chapter 3 describes a simple method to analyze the attainment of goals in the focus areas of the orders and plans of the Norwegian PRT. Then a simple assessment of attainment of goals for the given focus areas as well as for activities and resources that were needed to reach milestones set by the PRT, is given in Chapter 4. Finally, conclusions are summarized in Chapter 5.

2 The Norwegian PRT in Maimanah

Norwegian forces came to Faryab as part of a British led force in Faryab. In 2005 Norway took over responsibility for the PRT in Maimanah. The deployment period for the Norwegian contingent is 6 months, with changes of command at the beginning of June and the beginning of December. The force composition and size changed from deployment to deployment during this period. In the following chapters we shall have a look at the organization, how the plans were made, and how the activities of the PRTs were managed.

2.1 Organization

The Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Faryab is described by open sources to consist of approximately five hundred soldiers. The structure may be found to be approximately as shown in Figure 2.1, but the organization and size varied slightly from deployment to deployment. From 2007 one of the companies was supplied by the Latvian Armed Forces. During the last contingents the Latvians provided the infantry company. We have chosen to show the organization as it appeared towards the end of the series of deployments.




Figure 2.1 Generic organization chart for the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team towards the end of the series of deployments to Faryab.

The main parts of the PRT were one infantry company, and one force protection company. The infantry company constituted the main operational part of the Norwegian PRT, providing training for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and participating in partnered operations. As a precursor to the infantry company, a task unit equipped with infantry combat vehicles was deployed in 2010. The Task Unit was supported by a platoon size combat support unit, that later grew to become a dedicated combat support company. The PRT also had its own intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) unit. In addition to being an intelligence collector, the ISR unit supported the operation by providing smaller teams that worked together with the ANSF. Other support on the ground was provided by the combat service support (CSS) company and the medical company (MED).

The PRT was supported by an aeromedical detachment and a small civilian component taking care of coordination with the civilian part of the Norwegian effort in Faryab. Norwegian aid was mainly provided through UNAMA and the Afghan government and was, in accordance with the Norwegian comprehensive approach, strictly separated from military operations. Since 2010, the Norwegian PRT also received extensive support from American (US) resources in Faryab. The US support included government aid resources, civil affairs teams, human terrain assessment teams, aerostat surveillance teams, medical teams, evacuation helicopters, fire-fighter units and combat helicopters. The US forces at some stage also took over the responsibility for the most troublesome districts under Norwegian responsibility, Ghowrmach and Qaisar.

2.2 The orders received by the Norwegian PRT

Operational control over Norwegian forces in Afghanistan was delegated to COM ISAF. Hence, COM ISAF had the authority to make plans and give orders to the Norwegian contingent. Regional Command North (RCN) was given tactical control over the Norwegian contingent, which means it could in-cooperate the Norwegian contingent into its own operations. When the last Norwegian contingent to Faryab was withdrawn on September 28th 2012, in addition to finally and irreversibly transferring responsibility for security in the area to the Afghan security forces, this also represented a complete transfer from ISAF command back to national Norwegian command.

In the time up and until the transfer of command, the PRT in Maimanah was subject to orders given on a yearly basis, and handed down through the chain of command from the political level in Afghanistan. Orders for the PRTs in the Northern region, in the period from 2010 to 2012 came in the form of operation plans “Naiad Omid”, “Omid” and “Naweed” (1, 2, 3). These orders were valid for one year, and were supported by plans and fragmentary orders given on a daily basis directly from RCN. In addition, directives from COMISAF bypassed the hierarchy and were valid directly for all subunits. The last one of these was COMISAF Tactical Directive, Revision 4, which is unclassified and available online (4).

In 2009 a comprehensive Norwegian strategy for Faryab was created. The strategy was made in cooperation between the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and the Ministry of Justice (5). The PRT operations were planned in accordance with the comprehensive strategy, and it is used as a reference in PRT plans.

Based on the comprehensive strategy and the orders from ISAF, the PRT in Maimanah planned operations for the six month duration of each contingent (6-12). These plans represented a concretization of the orders from superior units. The plans contain concrete milestones to be passed to reach the desired goals and the end-state. In the next chapter we shall have a quick look at how these plans were made.

2.3 How plans were made

It would be outside the scope of this report to go into detail about the military decision making process. The documents describing the military decision making process are unclassified, and available in various formats online (13, 14). The last contingent to Faryab used a particular approach to planning in order to simplify cooperation with ANSF forces which were using US planning procedures (15).

Military planning involves a rigid regime of reading back to the superior unit's commander how the order has been interpreted, and how it has been reformulated to fit the available organization and resources. The military decision making process is intention based, allows decisions to be made at the appropriate level, and seeks to avoid misunderstandings in the chain of command. The possibility that orders received by the PRT in Maimanah, from RCN, could have been misunderstood is therefore utterly remote. The plans developed by the PRT in Maimanah have been in accordance with orders from RCN.

The focus areas of the plans of the last six PRTs in Faryab can be recognized and traced from contingent to contingent, even though they have been given slightly different names. As will be seen in Chapter 3, the focus areas can easily be paraphrased into four categories. The milestones that were not passed by one contingent were in many cases pursued by the next. The plans developed by the PRTs have been consistent over time.

The first COM ISAF tactical directive was given by General McKiernan towards the end of 2008. Since then several revisions have been made. The tactical directives bypass the chain of command, and provide guidance directly from the commander to all subordinate units in Afghanistan. As such, the directives reflect policy, and political decisions at the highest level of command. Even though the directives may have been introduced to facilitate rapid policy changes, the directives serve to improve coordination between the different forces in the area. The directives are unclassified, and may be found on the internet (4).

The Plans given to RCN are classified GIRoA RESTRICTED releasable to NATO/ISAF. They have been established in cooperation with the ANSF forces in the area, and are valid for all forces that are part of Combined Team North, including several Afghan brigades and smaller Afghan special units. The orders reflect orders given at COM ISAF level, and are valid for all subordinate

units in the RCN area of responsibility. At the time of the deployment of the last contingent to Maimanah, that included PRTs in Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Kunduz, Baghlan and Badakhshan.



Figure 2.2 The RCN area of operations in northern Afghanistan.

On the basis of the orders from RCN, each PRT went through an extensive planning procedure to establish framework orders for own operations. In short, a *framework order* explains how the PRT interprets the orders from RCN, and how it plans to fulfill these orders. The planning process was conducted in parallel with operations under the framework order of the previous PRT contingent, so that continuity was not lost.

The framework order is structured according to focus areas, or operational lines. For each of the focus areas a set of milestones is chosen that need to be passed to arrive at some desired end state. A generic visualization of a plan, an *OPS design*, can be seen in Figure 2.3.




Figure 2.3 A generic and simplified OPS design using simplified terminology.

As can be seen from Figure 2.3, the changes that are desired may be reached by passing milestones to reach the goals. As described in the next chapter, this report will focus on the milestones because they are designed to be measurable, and thus provide a simple yet indirect way to assess to what extent goals have been reached.

3 The method for assessing the level of attainment of goals

Due to the question raised in Chapter 1, “Did we achieve what we planned to do?”, it was decided to make one final assessment of the operations in Faryab. Assessments like these had been made on a regular basis by the operations analyst in the Staff of the PRT. The final assessment was conducted while the staff was in Afghanistan, but after having redeployed from the Area of Operations. At this time, since operations had ceased, it was considered to be irrelevant to make graded assessments. This means that the milestones were either considered to have been reached or not.

The final assessment was conducted by the operations analyst and the chief of the All Source Intelligence Cell (ASIC). Since some of the most important milestones were related to building capabilities in the Office for Cooperation and Coordination in the Province (OCCP), the liaison officer was also conferred. The data from which the assessments were made are extensive. Some of them are unclassified, like the polling data for Faryab Province (16). Other data are classified like the information about actors in the area, enemy actions and ISAF operations.

There are several weaknesses to this approach. Some of the milestones are not quantifiable. This implies that subjective assessments are necessary. Also, there are duplicates of milestones that were kept from deployment to deployment. Counting the same milestone several times may exaggerate the importance of milestones that were hard to achieve. Finally “Afghan good” was accepted for some of the milestones, except where it was considered to make the milestone irrelevant. In an attempt to counter some of these weaknesses, the process of making the assessment was repeated after returning to the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI). The operations analysts of PRT Maimanah’s contingent 17, 18 and 19 took part in the reassessment. This resulted in 5 out of 116 assessments of milestones being changed. The consensus discussion leading up to the assessment of the milestones that were not easily quantifiable was also perceived to be completely unproblematic. This indicates that the subjectivity may be at an acceptable level.

The final assessments of all milestones, with categorizations, can be seen in Appendix A. The details about how the categorizations have been obtained can be seen in Chapter 3.1 through 3.3.

3.1 Focus areas

To enable comparison across different PRTs we shall paraphrase the focus areas illustrated in Figure 2.3 and group the milestones that belong to similar focus areas into the same generic group. This is simple to do since the contents of the plans for the last six PRTs have been fairly similar.

The paraphrased focus areas that were identified are:

- Enable ANSF
- Contain insurgency
- Protect population
- Support governance and development
- Redeploy

The milestones in the redeploy focus area were purely military in nature, and were related to leaving Faryab in a safe and secure manner. The milestones related to enabling the ANSF were also mainly military, and deal with concrete goals for the training and mentoring of the local security forces. The milestones supporting the attempt to contain the insurgency were mainly military in nature but also encompass goals of enhancing the standing of government at all levels. The milestones related to protecting the population to a larger extent focused on encouraging the local security forces to take responsibility for security, and promoting the population's trust in the police. Finally, the milestones that were established to support governance and development mainly deals with how the military forces could coordinate with civilian resources available to improve the standing of government institutions at all levels.

3.2 Activities

As will be shown in the next chapter, there are big differences between the levels of attainment in the different focus areas. In an attempt to expand the understanding of these differences, the milestones have also been grouped according to the activities that would have been needed to reach them. The taxonomy is unique and has been derived from the milestones of the operations designs of the last six provincial reconstruction teams in Maimanah.

- Creating *acceptance* of GIRoA plans
- Bolstering the *will* to act according to plans and orders
- Building a *capability* that enable action
- *Projection* of a positive image of GIRoA
- *Isolation* of the insurgents
- *Attack* on insurgents critical vulnerabilities
- *Dislocation* of insurgents from the population
- Providing *security* for the population
- *Containing* the insurgency
- Supporting promotion of good *governance*
- Supporting *development*

Grouping the original milestones according to this taxonomy describes the activities of the PRTs. The activities may also be recognized as similar to those required to maintain a stable state, as described in the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (17). The milestones that have been implemented into the PRT OPS-designs are in accordance with the guidelines given by ISAF (18). They may also be related for instance to the three pillars of counterinsurgency as described

by Kilcullen (19). Based on the list of topics above it would seem as if the emphasis of the PRT has been on the political and security aspects of counterinsurgency, while the economic aspects to a lesser extent have been part of the plans. Several of the categories of milestones, like the ones associated with providing security or those associated with projecting a positive image of GIRA, can be found in several of the focus areas and may require both military and nonmilitary resources to be reached.

3.3 Resources

A direct assessment of whether the milestone requires military, civilian or a mix of both kinds of resources to be reached has also been made. Identifying the level of attainment of goals in the civilian domain and the military domain is in itself not of prime interest. The most important perspective this grouping provides, is the possibility to identify lack of resources or lack of coordination in focus areas and activity areas.

4 Results and analysis

We have concluded that the military part of the comprehensive approach in Faryab has been subject to, and in accordance with, orders and directives from COMISAF, passed on directly or in the chain of command as can be seen in Chapter 2.2. The orders and plans were made in cooperation with Afghan counterparts at the appropriate levels of the military and civilian administration. The practical implementation of the order given by RCN, in the form of plans for utilizing the PRTs resources at the provincial and district level, was developed by the PRT and bounded by the available resources and the boundaries of the Norwegian comprehensive approach.

4.1 Focus areas

Our method for assessing the level of attainment of goals, or passage of milestones, produces a count of milestones that has been passed for each of the focus areas. Counting milestones that have been passed, and milestones that have not been passed, gives an indication of the rate of success in the different areas. The total number of milestones reached for all focus areas is 83 out of 116 corresponding to a total success rate of 72%. The success rate in each of the focus areas can be seen in Figure 4.1.




Figure 4.1 Rate of success in focus areas for Norwegian contingents from 2010 to 2012, measured by the number of passed milestones (green) and not passed milestones (red) in operational plans.

The milestones that were set to enable redeployment from Faryab were all achieved. Several of the milestones connected to handing over the camp to the Afghan Army were grouped with those that support governance and development. All of these milestones were reached, and contribute to the level of attainment of goals supporting governance and development.

The success rate has also been high for the focus area Enable ANSF. A total of 32 out of 35 milestones have been reached according to our assessment. This focus area is mainly military in nature as can be seen from the resource categorization in table 4.1 and Appendix A.

4.2 Activities

Figure 4.2 shows the success rate in different activity areas. The most marked feature of this figure is the high fraction of milestones that were not reached in the category that aspired to promote the projection of a positive image of GIRoA and ANSF. The same goes for the milestones that can be related to the topics isolate and contain. A possible explanation to the low level of attainment of goals in these areas may lie in the fact that Afghanistan does not have tradition for sustaining institutions that are associated with a central government (20), and that provinces like Faryab are still mainly tribal societies. It is therefore a challenge, not only to conduct COIN operations, but also to project a positive image of any central government.




Figure 4.2 Rate of success in activity areas for Norwegian contingents from 2010 to 2012, measured by the number of passed milestones (green) and not passed milestones (red) in operational plans.

To isolate the insurgents, contain the insurgency and to project a positive image of the Afghan security forces and government, a combination of both civilian and military resources was needed. The milestones that were not passed to a large extent were dependent on both military and civilian resources being applied, as can be seen in table 4.2.

4.3 Resources

In Figure 4.3 an attempt was also made to identify directly which milestones required military resources to be reached, and which required nonmilitary resources. This is a difficult categorization because, with the exception of the milestones in the focus areas redeploy and enable ANSF, very few milestones require only one set of resources. Therefore a third category has been added, which include milestones that require both military and civilian resources.




Figure 4.3 Rate of success for milestones that require military, nonmilitary or a mix of military and nonmilitary resources to be reached for Norwegian contingents from 2010 to 2012, measured by the number of passed milestones (green) and not passed milestones (red) in operational plans.

Finally, if we use focus and activity categories respectively in conjunction with the resource categorization, we may provide additional insights into of the lack of success in the Norwegian comprehensive approach. Counting reached milestones separately for the focus areas and grouping them according to resource requirements provides Table 4.1.

	Retrograde	Enable ANSF	Contain Insurgency	Protect Population	Support G & D
Military	5/5	22/25	11/13	6/11	4/4
Mixed		6/6	7/9	2/12	13/21
Civilian		4/4			3/6

Table 4.1 The number of milestones reached in different focus areas grouped according to resource requirements. The color coding is in accordance with quartiles. Green is from 75% to 100%, yellow from 50% to 75% and red below 50% level of attainment of milestones.

As can be seen from Table 4.1 the level of attainment of milestones is low for the focus area “Protect the population” for the milestones that required a mix of civilian and military resources. These milestones are of the type that requires local police and rule by law to be established in an area that has been cleared of insurgents, see Appendix A. The resources required are mainly civilian, but were supported by military resources. It should be mentioned that the tactical directives (4) explicitly required the PRTs to gradually leave the responsibility for this focus area to the ANSF.

For the “Support governance and development” focus area the main bulk of the milestones that was not reached are related to the activities carried out to project a positive image of GIROA.

A further description of details in the level of attainment of goals specifically for activity areas can be seen in Table 4.2. The activities that require resources both in the civilian and military domain, and that attempted to project a positive image of GIROA and ANSF, to isolate the insurgents and to contain the insurgency, exhibit a low level of attainment of goals.

	Acceptance	Will	Capability	Projection	Isolate	Attack	Dislocate	Secure	Contain	Governance	Development
Military		4/6	17/18	4/4	1/1	12/15		7/10	3/4		
Mixed	1/1	1/1	3/3	5/14	1/6	2/2	8/10	2/2	0/3		5/6
Civilian	4/4			0/2				0/1		2/2	1/1

Table 4.2 The number of milestones reached in different activity areas grouped according to resource requirements. The color coding is in accordance with quartiles. Green is from 75% to 100%, yellow from 50% to 75% and red below 50% level of attainment of milestones.

It would appear that the attainment of goals is low in activity areas that are most vital to counter insurgency. The lack of success for these activities may be due to the limitations of the Norwegian comprehensive approach. It may also be that the challenges of the civilian domain have been more difficult to overcome than the challenges of the military domain. Finally it could be that ISAF plans have been inadequate in addressing challenges in Afghan society. These questions may be answered by studying the attainment of goals for other PRTs in Afghanistan.

5 Conclusion

The analysis answers the question “Did we achieve what we planned in Faryab?”. A simplified method has been introduced, to assess the attainment of goals in the Norwegian led PRT in Maimanah. The assessment has been based on the operations designs of the last six contingents in Faryab. On the military side, we did to a large extent reach the milestones we set. Of the milestones requiring military resources only, 83% of the milestones were reached. The soldiers and officers that took part in the effort have good reasons to be proud of their achievements.

The analysis clearly indicates that the military part of the mission was conducted in accordance with orders from ISAF and the comprehensive Norwegian approach to the challenges in Faryab. Our analysis also suggests that the plans that were made by the Norwegian contingent were consistent over time.

The attainment of goals is low in the focus areas “Protect the population” and “Support Governance and Development”. A majority of the milestones in these focus areas require a mix of both military and civilian resources, and the attainment of goals is even lower when looking only at milestones that require such a mix of resources.

Regrouping milestones according to the type of activities needed shows three activities for which the attainment of milestones is specifically low. Projection of a positive image of GIRoA, isolation of the insurgents and containing the insurgency exhibits a success rate below 50%. A further refinement of the analysis indicates that the attainment of goals is even lower for the milestones that required a mix of resources.

The dismal situation in Faryab (16) most likely does not originate from a military failure. The fact that the activities related to projecting a positive image of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to such an extent has been unsuccessful indicate that more basic challenges in the Afghan society, like the lack of tradition for a strong central government, might be part of the explanation. Another explanation might be poor plans, but as we have described the plans were produced in cooperation between Afghan political institutions, Afghan military forces and ISAF forces. However, the observed lack of success in areas where resources should have been coordinated is disconcerting, since the Norwegian comprehensive approach emphasized a separation between military and civilian resources.

The report analyses an important, but still very limited aspect of the more comprehensive question stated in Chapter 1, "What did we achieve in Faryab?". To address this question requires a broad assessment of the effect of the military operations, as well as the non-military efforts in Faryab. Based on data for own operations in the form of so called *battle logs* from the province, and on corresponding analysis of development projects, it should be possible to measure any significant changes to the populations perception of the state of the insurgency and the general level of governance. FFI is currently well on the way to assess the effect of the military operations, by correlating battle logs and perception studies. The same should be done for civilian development projects in Faryab in order to learn more about how to reach the goals of international operations.

References

1. COM-RCN, 2010, COMBINED TEAM NORTH OPLAN NAIAD OMID
2. COM-RCN, 2011, COMBINED TEAM NORTH OPLAN OMID 1390
3. COM-RCN, 2012, COMBINED TEAM NORTH OPLAN NAWEED 1391
4. COMISAF Tactical Directive, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/archives.html>
5. A strategy for comprehensive Norwegian civilian and military efforts in Faryab province, Afghanistan, The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Norwegian Ministry of Defence and The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, May 2009
6. PRT MEY FRAMEWORK ORDER QUAT-E MOSHTARAK (July 2009)
7. PRT MEY FRAMEWORK ORDER HAMKAR-E-JADEED (January 2010)
8. PRT XV FRAMEWORK ORDER HAMKAR-E-JADEED (September 2010)
9. PRT MMN OPORD HAMKAR-E-JADEED II (March 2011)
10. PRT MMN/TF F OPO 001 (July 2011)
11. PRT MMN/ TF F HQ OPERATION ORDER 001-2012 (January 2012)
12. TSG-F OPORD 001-2012 (July 2012)
13. Stabshåndbok for Hæren, plan- og beslutningsprosessen, Hærstaben (2011)
14. ADP 5-0 The Operations Process, Headquarters Department of the Army (2012)
15. Battle Staff SMARTbook, 3rd Revision, Ed Guide to Designing, Planning and Conducting Military Operations, Norman Wade, The Lightning Press (2010)
16. Faryab survey wave 8 - a year after the redeployment of Norwegian forces from Faryab, FFI-Report 2014/00064, Elin Marthinussen, David Nordli, Bård Eggereide, Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (2014)
17. AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (2011)
18. ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance, ISAF HQ, General David H. Petraeus (2010)
19. Counterinsurgency, David Kilcullen, Oxford University Press (2010)
20. Afghanistan og Taliban, Fredrik Barth, Pax forlag (2008)

Appendix A Assessment of Milestones

Year/No.	Focus area	Activity area	Resource area	Description	Assessment
2010/14	Enable ANSF	Acceptance	Civilian	Security plan for Faryab implemented	Reached
2010/14	Enable ANSF	Will	Military	ANSF will, understanding and capabilities enabled	Reached
2010/14	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	ABP abilities to conduct operations improved	Reached
2010/14	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	ANSF promoted as credible and capable security provider	Reached
2010/14	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	ANA Kandaks in Faryab reached CM 2	Reached
2010/14	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	ANP operating in focus districts certified FPDD 3	Reached
2010/15	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	ABP has increased their capabilities in terms of manning, equipment, training and operations	Reached
2010/15	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	ANA kandaks in Faryab reached CM 2	Reached
2010/15	Enable ANSF	Capability	Mixed	ANP in focused districts reached FPDD 3	Reached
2011/16	Enable ANSF	Acceptance	Civilian	Security plan for Faryab established and implemented	Reached
2011/16	Enable ANSF	Will	Military	ANSF will, understanding and capabilities eabled	Reached
2011/17	Enable ANSF	Acceptance	Civilian	Security plan for Faryab established and implemented	Reached
2011/17	Enable ANSF	Will	Military	ANA will to enable OCCP improved	Not reached
2011/17	Enable ANSF	Will	Military	ANA will and understanding enabled	Reached
2011/17	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	ANA capacities improved to a level where they are able to conduct independent security operations	Reached

Year/No.	Focus area	Activity area	Resource area	Description	Assessment
2011/17	Enable ANSF	Will	Mixed	AUP will and understanding enabled	Reached
2011/17	Enable ANSF	Capability	Mixed	AUP capacities improved to a level where they are able to conduct independent security operations	Reached
2011/17	Enable ANSF	Projection	Military	ANA perceived as a credible security provider	Reached
2011/17	Enable ANSF	Projection	Mixed	AUP perceived as a credible security provider	Reached
2011/17	Enable ANSF	Will	Military	ABP will and understanding enabled	Reached
2011/17	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	ABP capacities improved to a level where they are able to conduct independent security operations	Reached
2012/18	Enable ANSF	Acceptance	Civilian	Security plan for Faryab established and implemented	Reached
2012/18	Enable ANSF	Will	Military	ANA will to enable OCCP improved	Not reached
2012/18	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	ANA capacities improved to a level where they are able to conduct independent security operations	Reached
2012/18	Enable ANSF	Capability	Mixed	AUP capacities improved to a level where they are able to conduct independent security operations	Reached
2012/18	Enable ANSF	Projection	Military	ANA perceived as a credible security provider	Reached
2012/18	Enable ANSF	Projection	Mixed	AUP perceived as a credible security provider	Reached
2012/18	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	ABP capacities improved to a level where they are able to conduct independent security operations	Reached

Year/No.	Focus area	Activity area	Resource area	Description	Assessment
2012/19	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	Medical training of ANA initiated	Reached
2012/19	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	Training program for use of indirect fires established	Reached
2012/19	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	Ability to use indirect fires exercised	Not reached
2012/19	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	OCC-D and OCC-P basic infrastructure for C2 in place	Reached
2012/19	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	Training of CP's and OCC-D's conducted/ common operational procedure established	Reached
2012/19	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	Reporting from CP's to OCC-D, P & R effective	Reached
2012/19	Enable ANSF	Capability	Military	Handover of camp to ANA facilitated	Reached
2010/14	Contain Insurgency	Isolate	Mixed	AAF leadership isolated and discredited	Reached
2010/14	Contain Insurgency	Attack	Military	AAF FOM and LOCs in key terrain disrupted	Reached
2010/14	Contain Insurgency	Dislocate	Mixed	Positive influencers actively support GIRoA	Reached
2010/14	Contain Insurgency	Attack	Military	Negative influencers identified and disrupted or neutralised	Reached
2010/14	Contain Insurgency	Attack	Military	AAF FOA disrupted	Reached
2010/14	Contain Insurgency	Dislocate	Mixed	Positive influencers, willing to actively pronounce their support to GIRoA identified	Reached
2010/15	Contain Insurgency	Isolate	Mixed	INS denied the information initiative	Not reached
2010/15	Contain Insurgency	Dislocate	Mixed	INS influence on the population degraded	Reached
2010/15	Contain Insurgency	Attack	Military	INS supply routes in key terrain disrupted	Not reached
2011/16	Contain Insurgency	Isolate	Military	INS leadership isolated and discredited	Reached

Year/No.	Focus area	Activity area	Resource area	Description	Assessment
2011/16	Contain Insurgency	Attack	Military	INS FOM and LOC in key terrain disrupted	Reached
2011/17	Contain Insurgency	Attack	Military	INS FOA reduced	Reached
2011/17	Contain Insurgency	Dislocate	Mixed	Positive influencers actively support GIROA	Reached
2011/17	Contain Insurgency	Attack	Military	Negative influencers ID'd and disrupted or neutralized	Reached
2011/17	Contain Insurgency	Attack	Military	INS IED capacities disrupted	Reached
2011/17	Contain Insurgency	Secure	Mixed	Casualties to UXOs and IEDs reduced	Reached
2012/19	Contain Insurgency	Attack	Military	INS leadership in key terrain neutralized	Reached
2012/19	Contain Insurgency	Contain	Military	ANSF/LSF efficiency in ORTHEPA & ALM increased	Reached
2012/19	Contain Insurgency	Secure	Mixed	Population in main part of ORTHEPA and ALM identify GIROA as main security provider	Reached
2012/19	Contain Insurgency	Contain	Military	THARTA BAZAAR CP FOC and GIROA FOM extended to ATA KHAN KHWAJA	Reached
2012/19	Contain Insurgency	Contain	Military	INS contained N&NW of HWY 1 from ALM to AKH	Not reached
2012/19	Contain Insurgency	Contain	Mixed	INS unable to extend their influence in FYB	Not reached
2010/14	Protect Population	Contain	Military	ANSF regular presence in key terrain established	Reached
2010/14	Protect Population	Contain	Mixed	AAF taxation, CPs and intimidation of the population in key terrain disrupted	Not reached
2010/14	Protect Population	Isolate	Mixed	AAF influence on local population reduced	Not reached
2010/14	Protect Population	Dislocate	Mixed	Support to AAF is reduced	Not reached

Year/No.	Focus area	Activity area	Resource area	Description	Assessment
2010/14	Protect Population	Secure	Military	LocPop perception of security and trust towards ANSF improved	Not reached
2010/15	Protect Population	Secure	Military	ANSF regular presence in key terrain established	Reached
2010/15	Protect Population	Acceptance	Mixed	A security plan for Faryab developed	Reached
2010/15	Protect Population	Contain	Mixed	INS taxation, CPs and intimidation of the population in key terrain disrupted	Not reached
2010/15	Protect Population	Projection	Mixed	The population's trust towards ANSF has increased	Not reached
2010/15	Protect Population	Projection	Mixed	ANP has established rule of law in key terrain	Not reached
2011/16	Protect Population	Isolate	Mixed	INS influence on local population is reduced	Not reached
2011/16	Protect Population	Dislocate	Mixed	Support to INS is reduced	Not reached
2011/17	Protect Population	Isolate	Mixed	INS influence on local population reduced	Not reached
2011/17	Protect Population	Dislocate	Mixed	Population feel responsible for the security on HW1	Reached
2011/17	Protect Population	Attack	Military	INS leadership in key terrain neutralized	Reached
2011/17	Protect Population	Attack	Military	INS FOM and LOCs in key terrain disrupted	Reached
2011/17	Protect Population	Secure	Military	Security conditions for completion of HWY1 set	Not reached
2011/17	Protect Population	Attack	Military	INS IED capacities disrupted	Not reached
2012/18	Protect Population	Isolate	Mixed	INS influence on local population reduced	Not reached
2012/18	Protect Population	Attack	Military	INS leadership in key terrain neutralized	Reached
2012/18	Protect Population	Attack	Military	INS FOA in key terrain disrupted	Reached

Year/No.	Focus area	Activity area	Resource area	Description	Assessment
2012/18	Protect Population	Secure	Military	Security conditions for completion of HWY1 set	Not reached
2012/18	Protect Population	Attack	Military	INS IED capacities disrupted	Not reached
2010/14	Support GIRoA	Projection	Mixed	Popular support to GIRoA in key human terrain at sufficient level	Reached
2010/14	Support GIRoA	Projection	Mixed	GIRoA has established rule of law in key terrain	Not reached
2010/14	Support GIRoA	Projection	Mixed	GIRoA credibility and influence on the population has improved	Not reached
2010/14	Support GIRoA	Governance	Civilian	Good governance supported	Reached
2010/14	Support GIRoA	Development	Mixed	Civilian component integrated in PRT ops	Reached
2010/14	Support GIRoA	Development	Mixed	De-confliction with UNAMA established	Reached
2010/15	Support GIRoA	Projection	Military	ANSF and PRT understanding of IO-importance established	Reached
2010/15	Support GIRoA	Secure	Military	Necessary security measures and planning for the successful completion of the election process in place	Reached
2010/15	Support GIRoA	Development	Mixed	GIRoA and IC stakeholders' activities in support of the development process in key terrain are synchronized and processed	Not reached
2010/15	Support GIRoA	Projection	Mixed	GIRoA's credibility in the Uzbek population has been maintained and its influence in the Pashtun population in key terrain has increased	Not reached
2010/15	Support GIRoA	Projection	Mixed	Popular support of GIRoA of 50% or more in key human terrain reached	Reached

Year/No.	Focus area	Activity area	Resource area	Description	Assessment
2011/16	Support GIROA	Projection	Mixed	Popular support to GIROA in key human terrain at sufficient level	Reached
2011/16	Support GIROA	Projection	Mixed	GIROA credibility and influence on the population has improved	Not reached
2011/16	Support GIROA	Governance	Civilian	Good governance supported	Reached
2011/16	Support GIROA	Secure	Civilian	GIROA has established rule of law in key terrain	Not reached
2011/16	Support GIROA	Development	Mixed	Civilian component integrated in PRT operations	Reached
2011/16	Support GIROA	Development	Mixed	De-confliction with UNAMA established	Reached
2011/17	Support GIROA	Projection	Mixed	Populations perception of GIROA competence and efficiency on the provincial level is improved	Not reached
2011/17	Support GIROA	Dislocate	Mixed	Important influencers actively support GIROA	Reached
2011/17	Support GIROA	Projection	Mixed	Populations perception of GIROA competence and efficiency on the district level is improved	Not reached
2011/17	Support GIROA	Attack	Mixed	Negative influencers identified and disrupted or isolated	Reached
2011/17	Support GIROA	Development	Civilian	Support coordination of unifying development projects	Reached
2012/18	Support GIROA	Projection	Mixed	Populations perception of GIROA competence and efficiency on the provincial level is improved	Not reached
2012/18	Support GIROA	Dislocate	Mixed	Important influencers actively support GIROA	Reached

Year/No.	Focus area	Activity area	Resource area	Description	Assessment
2012/18	Support GIROA	Projection	Civilian	Populations perception of GIROA competence and efficiency on the district level is improved	Not reached
2012/18	Support GIROA	Attack	Mixed	Negative influencers identified and disrupted or isolated	Reached
2012/18	Support GIROA	Development	Mixed	Support coordination of unifying development projects	Reached
2012/19	Support GIROA	Projection	Civilian	Populations perception of GIROA competence and efficiency on the provincial level is improved	Not reached
2012/19	Support GIROA	Secure	Military	Handover ceremony of security responsibility is conducted successfully and positively perceived	Reached
2012/19	Support GIROA	Projection	Military	RIP by ANSF effective and positively perceived	Reached
2012/19	Support GIROA	Dislocate	Mixed	Main LPBs in FYB stay loyal with GIROA	Reached
2012/19	Redeploy	Secure	Military	BRANCH Plan 001 activated	Reached
2012/19	Redeploy	Secure	Military	All non mission essential equipment in MES	Reached
2012/19	Redeploy	Secure	Military	TSG-F CP redeployed to MES – FWD CP operational in MMN	Reached
2012/19	Redeploy	Capability	Military	Camp Maimanah handed over to ANA	Reached
2012/19	Redeploy	Secure	Military	All units redeployed to MES–RTOA to TCN	Reached

Appendix B Acronyms

AAF	Anti-Afghan Forces
ABP	Afghan Border Police
AKH	Andkhoy (district in the northern part of Faryab)
ALM	Almar (one of the central districts in Faryab)
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces (umbrella term including all security forces in Afghanistan)
ASIC	All Source Intelligence Cell
AUP	Afghanistan Uniformed Police
C2	Command and Control
CM 2	Unit of Measure referring to the level of training of LSF
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMISAF	Commander International Security Assistance Forces
CP	Check Point (static police check point)
CSS	Combat Service Support
FFI	Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
FOA	Freedom of Action
FOC	Freedom of Communication
FOM	Freedom of Movement
FWD	Forward
FYB	Faryab
FPDD	Focused Police District Development (training program)
G3	Part of the G-structure of command in the staff (chief of operations)
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HW1/HWY1	Highway 1 (paved highway circling Afghanistan)
IC	International community
ID	Identify
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INS	Insurgents
IO	Information Operations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
ISR	Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
KANDAK	Afghan battalion size army unit
LOC	Lines of Communication
LPB	Local Power Brokers
LSF	Local Security Forces
MES	Mazar-e Sharif (largest city in Balkh province, location of camp Marmal, Camp Nidaros and the RCN headquarters)
MMN	Maimanah (district and province capital of Faryab)
MOD	Ministry of Defense
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

No.	Deployment number in the table in Appendix A
OCCD/P/R	Office of Cooperation and Coordination – at the district, provincial or regional level (the OCC system was supported, trained and mentored by ISAF)
OPS	Operations
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RCN	Regional Command North (the superior unit to the PRT in Faryab).
RIP	Relief in Place (one unit taking over the positions and tasks of another)
RTOA	Return and Transfer of Authority
TCN	Transfer of Command
TSG-F	Transition Support Group – Faryab (Originally PRT-19, deployed to Faryab in May 2012 with specific orders to withdraw within October 1 st .)
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance